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Pain Appraisals, Coping, And Adjustment In Daily-Life With Chronic Pain:  
An ecological momentary assessment study  
 
Abstract 
Models of chronic pain guided by Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) Stress and Coping 
Theory have long suggested key psychological variables that may maintain chronic pain 
syndromes and influence psychosocial adjustment. Such research justifies psychological 
interventions for chronic pain management, and provides an evidence-base for targeting 
specific classes of behaviour and cognition for therapeutic change. However, the vast 
majority of this literature is based on between-subjects designs. It cannot be assumed that 
such designs reveal what occurs within people, with some research suggesting that 
findings from the two approaches may yield differences in the strength and direction of 
relationships observed. Micro-level within-subject designs are required to explore the 
relationship between pain, psychological factors and adjustment in daily life.  
The current study sought to test the hypothesis, derived from Stress and Coping Theory, 
that pain appraisals and coping are both important in influencing a chronic pain sufferer’s 
moment-by-moment adaptational states (measured as psychological distress, 
physical/social functioning, and activity-level), and that their effect is not attributable to 
pain-intensity. It employed Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) – a potentially 
fruitful methodology that has been developed to address within-person research 
questions. EMA also minimizes the risk of additional limitations associated with cross-
sectional questionnaire-based methodologies, such as questionable ecological validity 
and potential recall and judgment biases. EMA’s “daily-diary” format allows for 
x 
longitudinal real-time assessment of pain and associated psychosocial variables in 
participant’s every-day environments.  
In the first study the Pain Ambulatory Monitoring Survey (PAMS) – a short (54 item) 
measure of pain, appraisal, coping and adaptation – was developed and validated. PAMS 
was then used to investigate the independent effects of coping and appraisal in a 
conventional between-subjects study (n=124). It was found that coping and appraisal 
played independent roles in predicting distress, whilst only appraisals appeared to be 
related to function. Activity-level, on the other hand, appeared unrelated to either coping 
or appraisals.  
In Study Two, PAMS was applied in an intensive week-long palm-held-computer based 
EMA study of 55 individuals with a variety of chronic pain conditions. Part A of Study 
Two consisted of a set of methodology-related analyses exploring compliance, 
convergent validity between momentary and recall-based measures, and possible 
measurement reactivity. In Part B, a set of repeated-measures multilevel models was used 
to assess whether pain appraisals were associated with the three indices of adjustment 
after controlling for pain-intensity and coping, and whether coping was associated with 
the adjustment indices after controlling for pain intensity and appraisals. Separate 
analyses were conducted to investigate these effects when the predictor variables were in 
the same-lag as (that is, measured at the same time as) and prior-lag to (that is, measured 
some hours before) the outcome measures. Findings supported a stress and coping model. 
Analyses of distress and activity-level revealed that appraisals reported in the same lag 
were associated with both outcomes. Same-lag coping behaviors (performed in the period 
immediately preceding the reported outcome) were associated with activity-level but not 
xi 
distress. Delayed effects were also apparent – appraisals and coping behaviors reported in 
the prior lag demonstrated independent effects on all outcome indices.  
In conclusion, the quality of daily life amongst people with chronic pain appears to be 
influenced by both the strategies they volitionally use to cope with pain and the ways 
they appraise their pain, which are presumably less open to volitional control. These 
effects appeared to be at least somewhat independent, and could not be accounted for by 
the momentary intensity of pain. Therapeutic strategies targeting both appraisal and 
coping would appear to be justified, though on the basis of current findings 
encouragement of active coping may be a less important goal than limiting passive 
coping. The different pattern of results between studies one and two supports the need for 
within-subjects approaches, and the electronic-diary methodology appeared to be a useful 
means of obtaining the kind of macro-level within-person data unavailable to 
conventional questionnaire-based research designs. Applications for PAMS monitoring in 
clinical settings is discussed. 
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1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A large body of research has established that people who suffer from chronic pain are not 
a homogeneous group – they differ in terms of their functional adaptation and quality of 
life and these differences cannot be attributed to differences in the nature or severity of 
their medical condition (Flor and Turk, 1988). Consistent with calls from the stress 
literature (eg. Weber, 1997), adjustment to chronic pain has been investigated as it relates 
to a wide range of functional outcomes, including emotional, physical, and social 
functioning (Jensen, Turner, Romano & Karoly, 1991). The factors associated with 
differences between people in their adjustment to pain have been widely studied in cross 
sectional research, and include a range of psychological factors, including pain 
appraisals, pain beliefs, and coping strategies (Jensen, Turner, Romano & Karoly, 1991). 
Much of this research has been guided by Lazarus & Folkman’s (1984) Stress and 
Coping theory, which provides a heuristic framework for understanding adaptation to 
chronic pain. Namely, pain, the stressor, is presumed to interact with person variables, 
appraisal and coping, to influence adaptation. Stress and Coping theory would suggest 
that we need to understand the intra-psychic processes in order to predict adaptation to 
pain. That is, adaptation to pain is determined not by pain per se, but by the mediating 
influence of cognitive appraisal and coping responses. Stress and Coping theory would 
also suggest that, although appraisal and coping may be interrelated, they would 
nonetheless have independent effects on adaptation. Few studies have investigated these 
processes in the context of chronic pain (c.f. Jensen & Karoly, 1991; Turner, Jensen & 
Romano, 2000). 
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Pain varies not only between people – it fluctuates within people. Within-person research 
has established that the pain experience fluctuates within people over a variety of time-
courses, such as within the course of their condition (Sedlak, 1985; Burton, Tillotson, 
Main & Hollis, 1995), the week (eg. Stone, Broderick, Porter & Kaell, 1997), and the day 
(eg. Jamison & Brown, 1991). As with cross-sectional findings, within-person research 
has established that people change, over similar timeframes, in their adaptation to the 
condition (eg. Affleck, Urrows, Tennen & Higgins, 1992; Feldman, Downey & Schaffer-
Neitz, 1999). However, only a small amount of research has been done to explore the 
processes involved in within-person fluctuations in functional status. This is despite the 
fact that Stress & Coping theory places emphasis on the intra-individual elements of 
adaptation: the stressor, appraisals, and coping behaviors are presumed to interact 
dynamically over time to affect changes in adaptational status within people. Consistently 
with Lazarus and Folkman’s position, a number of major theorists in the field of pain 
research suggest that factors associated with adjustment to pain, namely coping, are best 
studied over time as dynamic processes (eg. Tennen & Affleck, 1996; Jensen & Karoly, 
1991; Lazarus, 2000). Importantly, a number of researchers have made the point that 
within-person and between-person research addresses separate questions, and the 
conclusions of one cannot necessarily be extended to the other (Stone, Schwartz, Neale, 
Shiffman, Marco, Hickox, Paty, Porter & Cruise, 1998). Indeed, Howard Tennen, Glenn 
Affleck (Tennen & Affleck, 1996) and others (eg. Shiffman, Fisher, Paty, Gyns, Hickcox 
& Kassel, 1994) have demonstrated that conclusions can differ when the same variables 
are investigated on those two levels, and that relationships can differ not only in strength 
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but in direction. Thus, within-person research is necessary to address within-person 
questions, such as those posed by Stress and Coping theory. 
Following from this point, the processes underlying clinical change in chronic pain, for 
example from Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, are often cited from cross-sectional 
between-subjects research, and these interventions have been structured and justified on 
the basis of such findings. Clinical change, however, is in essence a within-person 
phenomenon. Psychological interventions are not aimed at transforming one person – 
with all their traits and dispositions – into another, but at inducing change within people 
by modifying the way they appraise and respond to their internal and external 
environments. Thus, within-person research is also needed for the purposes of 
investigating processes of change associated with clinical interventions.  
Stress and coping theory would suggest that it is not pain per se, but appraisal and coping 
mechanisms that account for intra-individual fluctuations in adaptation. Unfortunately, if 
research into the relationship between pain and adjustment within people is sparse, then 
research into factors that may explain the relationship is even more-so. Although some 
clues as to the relevant factors may be gleaned from the between-persons literature, it 
should not be assumed that the same mediating factors responsible for differences 
between people have the same functional significance within-people, or that they have 
any role at all. Again, such issues need to be addressed by within-person designs. Along 
these lines, Catley (1999), Grant (1998), and Keefe, Affleck, Lefebvre, Star & Caldwell 
(1997) have demonstrated that a range of appraisals and coping strategies have important 
influences on adaptation to pain at the intra-individual level of analysis. Unfortunately, 
the functional outcomes assessed in this body of research are narrow, consisting entirely 
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of emotional outcomes such as positive and negative affectivity, and depressed or 
anxious mood. There is a notable absence of research into physical function as an index 
of adaptation. Also, the range of psychological (appraisal and coping) constructs 
investigated in these studies is limited. 
In the following chapter, adaptation to chronic pain is given a more in-depth treatment. 
Firstly, pain and chronic pain are defined, and biomedical and biopsychosocial models of 
the transition from acute to chronic pain are briefly reviewed. Next, findings regarding 
adaptation are reviewed – the extent and nature of the pain problem for individuals and 
society is discussed, drawing attention to the notion that marked differences exist in the 
adaptational status of individuals within the chronic pain population. This is followed by 
a brief review of methods for measuring adaptation to pain. Finally, a distinction is drawn 
between adaptation – which in the current study is understood as a person’s general level 
of functioning and wellness – and momentary adaptational status, which is understood as 
a person’s status on a given measure of adaptation at any specific point in time. 
Chapter three begins with a description of and rationale for Ecological Momentary 
Assessment (EMA; Stone & Shiffman, 1994) – a methodology for exploring momentary 
adaptational status. Momentary adaptational status is then elaborated, and measures that 
have been used to assess changes in adaptational status in every-day life will be 
reviewed. 
In chapter four Stress and Coping theory will be described, including its utility as a model 
of adaptation to chronic pain. This model provides the structure and rationale for the 
following review of psychological factors that may play a role in momentary adaptational 
status in chronic pain. 
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Chapter four then presents a review of research into the role of appraisal and coping in 
adaptation to chronic pain. The research reviewed in that chapter is inter-individual in 
nature, reflecting the majority of research available in the literature. Chapter four ends by 
describing intra-individual chronic pain research into appraisal and coping, leading into 
the aims and hypotheses of the current studies.  
1.1 Overview of the current project 
The aim of the current project is to explore whether pain appraisals and pain coping play 
separate roles in determining the adaptational status of a person with chronic pain in the 
course of their every-day life. Consistent with calls for assessment of multiple indices of 
adaptation, three outcome variables are investigated: psychological distress, involvement 
in functional activities, and physical activity level. Specifically, the study addresses two 
issues posed by Stress and Coping theory and investigated in previous cross-sectional 
research (Jensen & Karoly, 1991; Turner, et al., 2000): Are pain appraisals and coping 
associated with adaptation above and beyond the effect of pain on adaptation?; and, do 
coping and appraisals have independent effects on adaptation, or can one be accounted 
for by the other? To address these questions this study employed EMA, a methodology 
specifically designed for addressing intra-individual questions in an ecologically valid 
way. This methodology requires assessments to be conducted repeatedly over extended 
periods of time, in a momentary fashion (eg. “What is happening right now…”), in the 
participant’s natural environment (Stone & Shiffman, 1994). 
In most within-person research concerned with adaptation to chronic pain, predictors and 
outcomes are measured at the same time and the relationship between them is analysed 
accordingly. These types of analyses will be referred to here as same-lag analyses. 
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However, there is a temporal sequence inherent in EMA data (that is, one entry is 
followed by another entry, which is followed by another, and so on) that allows for 
investigation of effects across time. Predictors from one time-point (such as in the 
morning) can be used to predict the outcome at a subsequent time-point (such as in the 
evening). In this paper, such analyses are referred to as cross-lag analyses. The current 
study is primarily concerned with cross-lag analyses of all three outcomes, and the 
potential causal effects such analyses may suggest (Bateman & Strasser, 1984). See 
Section 4.5.2 for a more full discussion of the definition of same-lag and cross-lag 
analyses and the distinction between the two.  
The first study describes the development and validation of the Pain Ambulatory 
Monitoring Survey (PAMS). This self-monitoring instrument was designed for use in an 
EMA study, using a minimal item-set and momentary question formats. After being 
developed (in Part A of Study One), PAMS is then used in a conventional cross-sectional 
study of adaptation to chronic pain (in Part B of Study One). 
In the second study, PAMS was administered via palm-held computers to 55 people with 
chronic pain, assessing pain, appraisals, coping, and adaptation up to nine times per day 
for up to nine days. Methodological issues are addressed first, in Part A of Study Two, 
relating to compliance rates, convergence between the PAMS data and standardized 
questionnaires, and evidence for any reactivity effects on measurement that might be 
attributable to the methodology. Findings of the EMA study will be presented in Part B of 
Study Two.  
In the current study, EMA data was analysed using multi-level modelling via the 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM; Raudenbush, Bryk, Congdon, 2001) software. This 
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statistical method allows for variance in the outcome variables to be partitioned into that 
accounted for by differences between people, and that which exists within people. The 
focus of analyses in the current study was on explaining variance within persons.
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2 ADAPTATION TO CHRONIC PAIN 
2.1 Nature and Extent of the Problem 
Pain has been defined by the International Association for the Study of Pain (IASP) as 
“An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential 
tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage” (Merskey & Bogduk, 1994). This 
definition underscores that pain is a psychological phenomena involving perception, 
emotion, and the attribution of meaning. The contemporary recognition of the centrality 
of psychology in the experience of pain can be attributed to Melzack and Wall’s (1965) 
influential Gate Control Theory of pain, which conceptualised pain as having sensory 
(physiological), affective (emotional and motivational) and evaluative (cognitive) 
dimensions and allows for the modification of pain sensation by psychological factors 
including memory, meaning, emotion, and attention (Price, 1999). 
Chronic pain has been defined as pain that persists beyond normally expected healing 
time (Bonica, 1985). The term incorporates a wide range of conditions characterised by 
or associated with persistent pain, incorporating pains of nociceptive, inflammatory, and 
neuropathic bases, including migraine headache, low-back pain, rheumatoid arthritis and 
osteoarthritis, fibromyalgia, complex regional pain syndrome, irritable bowel syndrome, 
myofascial pain, post-herpetic neuralgia, and temporomandibular disorder (Merskey & 
Bogduk, 1994).  
Acute pain appears to be very common in the general population, and whilst persistent 
pain appears to be less frequent it nonetheless seems to be a widespread problem. For 
example, 58% to 84% of individuals experience low back pain at some stage of their lives 
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(Dionne, 1999), with prevalence rates of chronic low back pain falling between 10% to 
63% of the general population (von Korff & LeResch, 2005). A brief overview of the 
prevalence (in one year or less) of a range of chronic pain conditions, adapted from a 
recent review by Von Korff and LeResche (2005), is presented in Table 1.1. The breadth 
of these figures demonstrates that the precise extent of pain in the community is difficult 
to determine, partly due to the wide variety of possible conditions, variation in the 
application of duration and severity criteria, and poorly standardised or non-existent 
diagnostic criteria (Von Korff, 1999).  
 
Table 1.1 Reported Prevalence of Chronic Pain Conditions in Community Samples 
(periods of one year or less) 
Condition Range Median 
Number of studies 
reviewed 
Migraine headache 2% and 48% (females) 
0 to 46% (males) 
15% (females)  
6% (males) 
32 
Low back pain 10% and 63% 37% 11 
Knee pain 10% and 29% 18% 11 
Shoulder pain 2% and 61% 7% 5 
Neck pain 10% to 40% (females) 
3% to 29% (males) 
16% (females)  
12% (males) 
4 
Chronic wide-spread pain  
(eg. Fibromyalgia) 
0.66% to 10.7% 8% 8 
Temporomandibular disorder 5% to 14% (females) 
3% to 10% (males) 
9% (females)  
5% (males) 
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A large body of literature has amassed in an attempt to elucidate the processes whereby 
individuals with acute pain conditions go on to suffer chronic pain. Research guided by 
biomedical models suggests that whereas acute pain can be explained via more straight-
forward nociceptive mechanisms (ie. perceived acute pain is usually proportional to 
tissue injury or disease activity), numerous alternate mechanisms may be operational in 
chronic pain conditions that may account for their chronicity (Merskey, Loeser, & 
Dubner, 2005). Briefly, such possible mechanisms include peripheral sensitisation, where 
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inflamed primary afferent nociceptive nerves respond to weak, normally non-painful 
stimuli to produce sensations of pain. This process may be mediated by the activity of 
inflammatory mediator substances, such as Substance P. Central sensitisation involves 
second- and third- order sensory neurons in the central nervous system demonstrating 
abnormal responses to normal input from the primary sensory afferents. This can be 
attributed to numerous mechanisms, including chemically mediated alteration of 
nociceptive processing in the dorsal horn of the spinal cord, or abnormal or persistent 
afferent inputs. Damage to afferent nerves (for example, due to trauma, infection, poor 
nutrition, toxins, or auto-immune attack) can generate firing of spontaneous nociceptive 
signals, cause the nerve to become hypersensitive, and lead to abnormal interactions and 
“cross-talk” between nerve fibres. Finally, changes to modulatory (both inhibitory and 
facilitatory) descending processes may mean that the usual means by which higher-order 
processing modifies incoming nociceptive signals is disrupted. For example, under usual 
circumstances nociceptive signals may be inhibited by factors such as attention and 
emotion by descending control from the periaqueductal gray (PAG), via serotonergic 
neurons in the raphe magnus of the medulla which act to inhibit the firing of spinal 
dorsal-horn nociceptive cells.   
Recognition of the inadequacy of biomedical models of chronic pain to account for the 
full nature and functional impact of these conditions (Turk & Okifuji, 2002) has led to the 
formulation of numerous biopsychosocial models of the transition to pain chronicity. 
Factors including attention (eg. Van Damme, Crombez, & Eccleston, 2004), coping 
strategy usage (eg. Hadjistavropoulos & Craig, 1994), beliefs about pain (Goubert, 
Crombez, & De Bourdeauduij, 2004), and classical and operant conditioning (Fordyce, 
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1976) have been proposed. Behavioural models (eg. Fordyce, 1976; Linton, Melin, & 
Gotestam, 1984), for example, suggest that activities, settings and daily tasks become 
associated with pain, fear and/or tension via classical conditioning. Subsequent avoidance 
of these cues develops due to negative reinforcement via operant conditioning. Finally, 
avoidance contributes to increasing disability and prolongation of the pain condition via 
physical disuse and deconditioning (Bortz, 1984).  
 
Figure 1.1 Fear-Avoidance Model of Chronic Pain (reproduced from Asmundson, Norton, and 
Vlaeyen, 2004) 
 
Early behavioural conceptions of pain and pain behaviours have evolved in more recent 
years into the so-called ‘fear-avoidance’ models of chronic pain. These models attempt to 
explain the disability and physical deconditioning that result from pain, and presumably 
play a role in perpetuating the pain condition, via both behavioural and cognitive 
mechanisms (Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000). Vlaeyen, Kole-Snijders, Rotteveel, Ruesink, and 
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Heuts’ (1995) early version of the fear-avoidance model is demonstrated in Figure 1.1. It 
suggests that an individual’s initial appraisal of the pain resulting from an injury is 
important in determining the subsequent trajectory of the person towards recovery or 
disability. Those who are subject to certain risk factors (including prior exposure to 
threatening pain-related information, and dispositional factors such as ‘anxiety 
sensitivity’) will be more likely to perceive the pain in catastrophic terms. These 
individuals will experience fear as a result of this catastrophic thinking. The 
consequences of fear, including perceptual and information-processing biases (such as 
hypervigilance to threat-cues and misinterpretation of otherwise innocuous bodily 
sensations) and avoidance of threat-related situations and activities, contribute to physical 
deconditioning (reduced cardiovascular fitness and muscular disuse and/or abnormal 
patterns of coordination and activation), depression, and generalised disability. Such 
outcomes purportedly contribute to the pain condition, thus setting up a vicious cycle of 
ongoing pain, catastrophising, fear, avoidance and information-processing abnormalities, 
and depression, disuse, and disability. According to the model, those who do not 
catastrophize do not experience fear, are more liable to approach customary daily tasks 
and confront physical limitations, and progress to eventual recovery of functioning if not 
pain amelioration. A more recent model (Asmundson, Norton, & Vlaeyen, 2004) 
suggests the same central role of catastrophic appraisals in determining the pathway to 
recovery or into the vicious cycle of disability. This model, however, distinguishes 
between fear, experienced in the presence of pain or pain-related activities, and anxiety, 
experienced in anticipation of pain or pain-related situations or activities. Both fear and 
anxiety are related to information-processing biases, physiological arousal, and 
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behavioural responses. In the case of fear, escape behaviours will be enacted to 
immediately reduce pain or fear whereas anxiety will be associated with avoidance 
behaviours to prevent possible pain and avoid the fear associated with pain-related 
activities. A further addition to the model is the role of pain-beliefs, involving beliefs 
about the meaning of pain and the relationship between activities and pain. Each 
successful escape and avoidance attempt reinforces these beliefs, and (consistent with 
general avoidance theory) this supposedly makes avoidance behaviour particularly 
resistant to extinction because the individual is rarely or never exposed to situations that 
provide information to disconfirm the pain beliefs.  
Although the Fear-Avoidance models represent an important step forwards in our 
understanding of the development of chronic pain and disability, they will not feature 
heavily in the current research, which focuses on psychological and physical functioning 
in those who already have chronic conditions. However, the models do make important 
predictions about the role of factors such as catastrophic thinking, expectations about 
pain, and avoidant (passive) coping, and they will be mentioned in these contexts. 
2.2 Inter-Individual Differences in Adaptation 
Pain represents a significant medical, social, and economic challenge to society. The 
significant economic costs of pain are attributable to factors such as medical care and, 
more significantly, occupational disruption including absenteeism and lost workplace 
productivity. Van Tulder, Koes, and Bouter (1995) estimated that in 1991, costs relating 
to back pain in the Netherlands accounted for 1.7% of the gross domestic product, with 
93% of this being associated with disability and absenteeism and only 7% being related 
to medical care. Stewart, Ricci, Chee, Morganstein, and Lipton (2003) estimated that 
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common pain conditions – mainly headache, back pain, and arthritis – were associated 
with lost productivity during a three month period in 13% of their sample of 29,000 US 
workers. Over three-quarters of this was due to reduced performance rather than 
absenteeism. In the UK, the costs of back pain relating to productivity loss and informal 
care were six times greater than the cost of medical care (Maniadakis & Gray, 2000). 
Chronic pain has also been associated with a range of adverse psychosocial outcomes that 
impact negatively on the quality of life of sufferers (Hitchcock, Ferrell & McCaffery, 
1994). Those with chronic pain demonstrate declined participation in social, recreational, 
vocational, and domestic activities (Kerns & Jacob, 1993), and they report lower levels of 
activity and greater interference in their lives (Kerns and Haythornthwaite, 1988). One 
study found that, on average, 30% of the waking time of chronic pain patients was spent 
lying down (Follick, Ahern, Laser-Wolston, Adams & Molloy, 1985). 
Depression and chronic pain appear to be highly related (Feldman, et al., 1999), and 
depression is certainly the psychopathological condition most researched in terms of its 
relationship to chronic pain (Banks and Kerns, 1996). It is more prevalent in chronic pain 
populations than the general population, and more prevalent than in those with acute pain 
(Banks & Kerns, 1996; Erdal & Zautra, 1995). Interestingly, there is some suggestion 
that it is more prevalent in chronic pain populations than amongst those with other 
chronic medical conditions (Banks & Kerns, 1996), including cardiac disease (Schleifer, 
Slater, Macari-Hinson, Coyle, Kahn, Zucker, & Gorlin, 1991), stroke (Morris, Robinson, 
& Raphael, 1990), and Parkinson’s disease (Mayeux, Stern, Cote, & Williams, 1984).  
Chronic pain has demonstrated co-morbidity with a range of psychopathological 
conditions and negative emotional states, including Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (eg. 
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Roy-Byrne, Smith, Goldberg, Afari & Buchwalk, 2004; Sharp & Harvey, 2001), other 
anxiety disorders (Fishbain, et al., 1986), and alcohol and drug abuse (eg. Fishbain, et al., 
1986; France, et al., 1986).  
Chronic pain has also demonstrated strong links with anger and hostility (eg. Taylor, 
Lorentzen & Blank, 1990) and in particular inhibited anger (“anger-in”), passive-
aggression, and “cynical hostility” (see a review by Fernandez & Turk, 1995). Pilowsky 
and Spence (1976) reported that 53% of patients with chronic intractable pain 
demonstrated “bottled-up anger” – a higher incidence than the 33% observed in an 
outpatient sample. Wade, et al. (1990) found that chronic pain patient’s anger-in 
significantly predicted depression scores, and in a path-analysis Tschannen, Duckro, 
Margolis and Tomazic (1992) found that anger-in accounted for 32% of variance in 
depression. Wade, Price, Hamer, Schwartz and Hart (1990) demonstrated that whilst 
depression, anxiety, frustration, anger and fear were all prevalent emotional states 
experienced by chronic pain patients the most prevalent was frustration. 
Whilst adverse emotional states are an understandable response to chronic pain they may 
also feed back to influence the pain experience. Fernandez and Milburn (1994) found 
that, controlling for a range of other emotional states, a subset of emotions consisting of 
anger, fear and sadness accounted for the largest proportion of variance in pain 
affectivity. Chronic pain patients who are also depressed report higher levels of pain than 
non-depressed patients (Magni, 1987; Haythornthwaite, Sieber, & Kerns, 1991). In a 
sample of depressed and non-depressed chronic-pain inpatients, Fisher, Haythornthwaite, 
Heinberg, Clark and Reed (2001) found that depression was associated with greater 
reports of pain and poorer psychosocial function. Longitudinally, depression was 
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associated with an increase in musculoskeletal pain after a 5-year interval (Leino and 
Magni 1993), and over a one-month period amongst women with myofascial pain 
(Zautra, Marbach, Raphael, Dohrenwend, Lennon, and Kenny, 1995). By contrast, 
Summers , Rapoff, Varghese, Porter and Palmer (1992) found anxious and depressive 
symptomatology did not contribute any further unique variance to the 33% of variance in 
pain severity accounted for by anger/hostility ratings.  
 
Other outcomes associated with chronic pain, which have been the focus of empirical 
investigation, include use of health care facilities and prescription medication (eg. Jensen 
& Karoly, 1991), marital discord (eg. Bermas, Tucker, Winkelman, & Katz, 2000), and 
abuse of medication and illicit substances (eg. France, Krishnan, & Trainer, 1986; 
Bermas, et al., 2000). 
Despite the apparent negative psychosocial impact of chronic pain, it is clear that not all 
people with chronic pain could be considered “maladjusted”. Numerous studies have 
demonstrated that people who have chronic pain differ along a range of adaptational 
outcomes, and these differences are not attributable to characteristics of their pain, 
medical status, or pain history (Flor and Turk, 1988; Jensen, Turner, Romano & Karoly, 
1991). Though many people in the general population experience chronic pain, the 
majority continue to work and do not require high levels of medical care such as use of 
multidisciplinary chronic pain centres (Taylor & Curran 1985). That is, chronic pain does 
not equate to maladjustment per se.  
For example, whilst the majority of those in pain continue working – though their job 
performance may be negatively impacted – a minority account for the majority of 
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disability costs. Cathey, Wolfe, Kleinheksel, and Hawley (1986) report that their sample 
of 81 patients with fibromyalgia reported an average of nine days off work in the 
previous year, though this figure was skewed by a minority of patients with over 30 days 
absent – more than half of the sample did not report any lost work days. According to 
research by the Quebec Task Force on Spinal Disorders (Spitzer, LeBlanc, & Dupuis, 
1987), 74% of those with acute back pain resume work within four weeks of pain onset 
and only 8% remain off work after 6 months. Hashemi, Webster, and Clancey (1998) 
found that 5% to 9% of compensation claimants with back-pain accounted for 65% to 
85% of total worker’s compensation costs and 78% to 90% of disability days. 
The prevalence of psychopathology in pain populations also demonstrates that pain is not 
synonymous with maladjustment. Depression is a case in point. Although studies have 
placed the incidence of depression in chronic pain populations between 10% and 100% 
(Banks & Kerns, 1996), in a review of fourteen studies employing standardized criteria 
nine placed the incidence between 30% and 54% (Banks & Kerns, 1996). Amongst those 
who do attend pain clinics, Turner and Romano (1984) found that only approximately 
one-third of chronic pain patients met diagnostic criteria for Major Depression. Love 
(1987) observed a greater incidence of depression in a sample of chronic pain patients 
than amongst a sample without chronic pain, though amongst chronic pain patients those 
with depression represented a minority. Fishbain, Goldberg, Meager, and Rosomoff 
(1986), surveying 283 pain-clinic patients, found that 56.2% had a history of some form 
of depressive condition, though only 4.6% had a current diagnosis.  
Similarly, whilst anxiety conditions appear to be commonly co-morbid with pain, not 
everyone with pain suffers from anxiety. For example, Fishbain, et al. (1986) found that 
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62.5% of their chronic pain sample had a history of Anxiety Disorder, with 15.2% having 
had Generalised Anxiety Disorder. 
In terms of management of chronic pain and prevention of chronic disability it is crucial 
to develop a greater understanding of who will demonstrate poor adjustment as a result of 
chronic pain. A biomedical model would suggest that those with a more severe condition 
will suffer more adverse psychosocial outcomes, but such a model is not well supported 
by current evidence (Turk & Okifuji, 2002). For example, whilst the majority of evidence 
suggests that pain predicts the onset of depression, rather than depression predicting pain 
(Banks and Kerns, 1996; cf. Dworkin, Hartstein, & Rosner, 1992), the evidence for pain 
predicting depression remains ambiguous. Amongst rheumatoid arthritis patients, pain 
severity predicts depression over six (Brown (1990) and 24 month (Nicassio & Wallston, 
1992) periods, though Zautra, et al. (1995) found no effect of pain intensity on distress 
over one-month in a sample of women with myofascial pain. 
The relationship between pain and physical indices of functioning is also ambiguous. 
Strong. et al., (1990) reported that although the assumption would be that those who are 
more physical active and engage in more functional activities would be likely to 
experience more intense pain or more frequent flare-ups, they found no relationship 
between reported pain intensity and self-reported function. Linton (1985) found declining 
relationships between pain and activity level as the method of assessing activity-level 
became more objective, suggesting that although people may perceive that such a 
relationship exists this may not necessarily be the case. In his study, all thirty of the 
chronic pain patients he sampled believed that their pain intensity was influenced by the 
activities they engaged in, and they were able to provide examples of specific activities 
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they believed would increase (eg. bending, walking, vacuuming, sitting) and decrease 
(eg. lying down, taking a bath, massage) their pain. A checklist of ADLs, completed at 
the end of one week, was negatively related to the average of pain ratings taken twice 
daily for one week (r=-.69; controlling for pain at the time of ADL ratings). However, 
this relationship disappeared when the ADL checklist was measured on a daily basis and 
the average of these ratings was correlated with the average of pain ratings. Furthermore, 
no significant relationship was found between distance cycled in a bicycle task and either 
pain rated prior to the task or the average of pain ratings in the prior week. 
The lack of findings of a consistent relationship between activity involvement and 
chronic pain may be partly attributable to the complex casual direction of such a 
relationship – both positive and negative relationships are theoretically plausible. A 
positive relationship found in cross-sectional research may reflect increased pain 
prompted by physical activity (Strong, et al., 1990) whilst a negative relationships may 
also be supported, reflecting poorer functioning amongst those with worse pain 
conditions (Linton, 1985) or greater pain due to physical deconditioning associated with 
activity avoidance (Bortz, 1984). A negative relationship between pain and activity may 
also be supported on the basis of evidence of pain-reduction following acute exercise (eg. 
Koltyn, Garvin, Gardiner, & Nelson, 1996; Pertovaara, Huopaniemi, Virtanen, & 
Johansson, 1984), though this may occur only for exercises performed above 75% 
maximal aerobic capacity (Koltyn, et al., 1996) and such findings appear to be limited to 
experimentally-induced pain in non-clinical samples. 
Ambiguities and inconsistencies in the observed relationship between pain and indices of 
adaptation are largely due to the correlational, cross-sectional design of the majority of 
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studies. Whilst prospective studies predicting long-term adaptation from pain may serve 
to clarify the direction of relationships, a better understanding of how pain is associated 
with adaptation may be gained by analyses on a more micro-level, of the processes that 
unfold within people. Studies observing pain and functioning as they co-vary within 
individuals over time-frames such as days or hours may, for example, help to clarify the 
direction and nature of the relationship between pain and physical functioning. Crucially, 
such studies may contribute to the identification of processes that determine individual 
differences in adaptation to pain. Such studies will be described further in Section 2.4. 
First, methods for assessing the differential adaptational status of individuals with chronic 
pain will be briefly reviewed. 
2.3 Measurement of Adaptation to Chronic Pain 
The selection of appropriate outcome variables is a crucial factor in all stress and coping 
research (Weber, 1997). In the case of pain, a number of outcomes have been studied, 
including indices of psychological well-being, social- and role- functioning, and physical 
health and functioning (Jensen, Turner, Romano & Karoly, 1991).  
Physical outcomes have included mobility, physical strength, activity level, and 
engagement in exercise. In terms of social- and role- functioning, outcome indices have 
included employment status and engagement in activities-of-daily-living (ADLs). Most 
measures of pain-related disability appear to incorporate features of physical, social, and 
role dysfunction. Studies have utilised a variety of standardised measures of functioning 
and disability, including the Activity Scales of the Multidimensional Pain Inventory 
(MPI; Kerns, Turk, & Rudy, 1985), the Health Assessment Questionnaire (HAQ; Fries, 
Spitz & Young, 1982), the Roland and Morris Disability Questionnaire (DQ; Roland & 
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Morris, 1983), the Sickness Impact Profile (SIP; Bergner, Bobbit, Carter, & Gibson, 
1981), the Oswestry Disability Index (Fairbank, Couper & Davies, 1980), the Life Impact 
Scale (LIS; Armentrout, Moore, Parker, Hewett, & Feltz, 1982), the Pain Disability Index 
(PDI; Tait, Pollard, Margolis, Duckro, & Krause, 1987), the Self-Care Assessment 
Schedule (SCAS; Barnes & Benjamin, 1987), or the Medical Outcomes Survey – Short 
Form-36 (SF-36; Ware & Sherbourne, 1992). Many of these questionnaires measure 
function by having participants endorse activities they engage in, or the frequency of 
engagement in functional activities (eg. MPI-Activity Scales, HAQ, SCAS). Others 
include statements indicating specific functional difficulties (eg. DQ, SIP), whilst others 
ask for general ratings of perceived function and impairment due to illness, disability or 
pain (eg. SF-36). In most cases, measures of functioning provide unidimensional scores 
reflecting functional adaptation, though other scales reflect functioning in different 
domains (such as the MPI’s Activity scales) and different aspects of functioning (such as 
physical, social, emotional, and role functioning in the SF-36). Other studies have 
examined performance in a standardised physical task as a behavioural index of physical 
functioning (eg. Lackner, Carosella, & Feuerstein, 1996; Murphy, Lindsay, & Williams, 
1997).  
Psychological outcomes include psychiatric morbidity (especially depressive conditions), 
depressed mood, anxiety, anger, and general distress. Depressive and anxious conditions 
are typically measured using standardised questionnaires such as the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1987), Beck Anxiety Questionnaire (BAI; Beck, Epstein, 
Brown, & Steer, 1988), Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & 
Snaith, 1983), Centre For Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radlof, 
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1977), or the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI, Speilberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 
1970), whereas general psychopathology and psychological symptomatology has been 
measured with the Symptom Checklist-90 - Revised (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1983).  
Some studies are concerned not with psychopathology and symptomatology of emotional 
disorders, but with normal affectivity as experienced in the general population. Such an 
index of psychological functioning was employed in the current study. Negative and 
positive affect (NA and PA), general mood, and distress are commonly measured via 
rating scales of affect adjectives, such as selected items from the Profile Of Mood States 
(POMS; McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971), or the Positive Affect – Negative Affect 
Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  
Other pain-related outcomes have included medication usage, health-service utilisation, 
pain severity, and pain behaviours (such as leaning, guarding, grimacing, and pain 
vocalisations). Scales such as the Pain Behaviour Questionnaire (PBQ; Philips and 
Jahanshaahi, 1986) have been used to provide standardized measures of pain behaviour. 
Scales measuring pain severity have been incorporated into measures of adaptation, such 
as the SF-36, MPI, and SIP. The McGill Pain Questionnaire (MPQ; Melzack 1975) was 
specifically designed to measure pain intensity and includes a rating of pain severity, the 
Present Pain Intensity (PPI) scale, and a set of adjective-based checklists of pain 
descriptors, the Pain Rating Index (PRI), which measures affective, sensory, and 
evaluative aspects of the pain experience, as well as a total PRI score. Many studies use 
single item measures of pain, or averages taken from maximum, minimum, and average 
ratings of daily or weekly pain. Common single item pain rating scales include (Turk & 
Melzack, 1992; Jensen, Karoly & Braver, 1986; Karoly & Jensen, 1987) numerical 
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ratings scales (NRS), including 6-point (eg. Sullivan, Rodgers, Wilson, Bell, Murray, & 
Fraser, 2002), 10-point (eg. Sindrup, Anderson, Madsen, Smith, Kim, & Jensen, 1999), 
and 101-point (eg. Jensen & Karoly, 1991) NRSs, verbal ratings scales (VRS) and, 
perhaps the most frequently used and well-validated single-item measures, the visual-
analogue scale (VAS; eg Lackner, et al., 1996).  
2.4 Levels of Analysis of Adaptation 
Section 2.2 described findings relating to differences between people in their adaptation 
to chronic pain, and highlighted the finding that not all people with pain demonstrate 
poor psychological, social, or physical functioning. The focus was on adaptation at the 
inter-individual level – a perspective that contrasts with studies that are concerned with 
how adaptation varies within people over time. Adaptation can be seen as an ongoing 
process occurring within individuals, changing from moment to moment. The importance 
of intra-individual findings was briefly discussed in terms of identifying the direction of 
the relationship between pain and adaptation and illuminating the processes that may 
account for differences in adaptation. In the current study this intra-individual 
conceptualisation of adaptation will be referred to as momentary adaptational status.  
The distinction between intra-individual adaptation and momentary adaptational status is 
increasingly drawn in the literature (eg. Stone, et al., 1998), and is based on findings that 
indices of adaptational status vary within people over time (eg. Vendrig & Lousberg, 
1997) and that relationships at the two separate levels of analysis, even within the same 
study sample, can be different (eg. Tennen & Affleck, 1996; Shiffman, et al., 1994). This 
research will be reviewed further below.  
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For the purposes of the current study, inter-individual findings are those that establish 
differences between people. For example, Rudy, Kerns & Turk’s (1998) model of 
depression and pain is an intra-individual model because it suggests that people with 
chronic pain differ in the intensity of their pain and the degree to which they manifest 
symptoms of depression (the model elaborates the role of appraisal factors in the 
pain/distress relationship, suggesting that people who report greater tendencies towards 
certain ways of thinking are more vulnerable to depression). Inter-individual models of 
adaptation are usually tested via cross-sectional research, usually questionnaire-based, 
though between-persons experimental research is also inter-individual in nature. This 
kind of research is essentially correlational and cannot make strong claims about the 
causal nature of the relationship between the variables in question. Further, strong claims 
cannot be made about the role of processes in adaptation – the constructs investigated are 
essentially construed as being trait-like.  
In contrast, momentary adaptational status is concerned with variance within people 
along adaptational dimensions. Its measurement involves tracking, from time-point to 
time-point, changes in mood, frequency of health-service utilization, activity-levels, 
social involvement, capacity to perform daily tasks, or other indices of adaptation. When 
an individual is measured on two or more occasions their adaptational status – reflected 
by indices such as mood or psychosocial functioning – is likely to show variation that is 
not entirely attributable to measurement error. Change in adaptational status may take 
place within days, over days, over months, or over the course of some other time-frame, 
and presumably covaries with other factors that may play a causal role in these 
fluctuations. Examples of some of the key questions addressed in intra-individual 
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research are  “Is X index of adaptation stable within people?” and “Does a person’s 
adaptational status improve when they adopt Y appraisal style, or engage in Z behavior”. 
For example, Feldman, et al., (1999) demonstrated that pain intensity varied across days, 
and that it was associated with previous-day depressed mood. 
Intra-individual questions can only be researched using within-person designs. Within-
person designs that adopt a small number of data-points, such as laboratory-based 
experimental designs and pre- post- intervention designs, qualify as intra-individual 
designs. However, questions of momentary adaptational status are increasingly 
investigated using methodologies that sample participant’s daily-life, in their natural 
environments, longitudinally over multiple time-points. This family of research 
methodologies has been referred to as Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA). A 
variant, or sub-class, of possible EMA designs is Experience Sampling Methodology 
(ESM; Csikszentmihalyi, Larson & Prescott, 1977). A central aspect of ESM is that the 
data collected represents a random sample of the participant’s daily life. The timing of 
measures is given a random element (for example, the day may be broken into time-slots 
with one measurement occasion occuring at a random time within each timeslot) so that 
the participant cannot anticipate when they will be asked to make their next data-entry. 
This helps to ensure that entries are not associated with external or internal events and 
consequently biased by the context of data collection – that they are ecologically valid. 
The time-schedule of sampling is operationalized using a signalling device, such as a 
wrist-watch or pager, to signal the participant to make a data-entry. 
EMA methodology, and the rationale for using it, will be described further in Chapter 
Three when its applications to models of adaptation to chronic pain are reviewed. 
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The current chapter described some of the adaptational dimensions on which people 
appear to differ, including emotional states and psychopathology, activity-levels, and 
physical, social and role functioning. Some of the measures that have been used to assess 
these outcomes were reviewed. It concluded by suggesting that individuals also vary over 
time along these dimensions, and that momentary adaptational status needs to be 
investigated as a phenomenon distinct from inter-individual adaptation. 
The following chapter is intended to review the literature regarding momentary 
adaptational status. It begins by introducing EMA – a methodology used to assess 
momentary adaptational status – and concludes with a review of how pain and adaptation 
vary and covary within people over time.
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3 ECOLOGICAL MOMENTARY ASSESSMENT, AND MOMENTARY 
ADAPTATIONAL STATUS 
Lazarus (1993) points out that only within-person designs allow researchers to investigate 
processes of coping and the way processes vary over time and according to a diversity of 
environmental contexts. Such approaches allow researchers to differentiate between 
coping states, characterized by variation in individuals’ coping over time and contexts, 
and coping traits, characterized by stability in individuals’ coping over time and contexts. 
EMA developed out of the need for a technique that was true to the ecological 
perspective, provided within-person data, and minimized risk of recall and judgment 
biases. Such methodologies, also labeled “daily-diary” approaches, have been put 
forward as a solution to some of the shortcomings of questionnaire-based designs 
(Lazarus, 2000; Tennen, Affleck, Armeli, & Carney, 2000). EMA and, specifically, ESM 
methods are able to gather information (a) over relatively long periods of time; (b) in the 
subject’s own milieu; (c) at times not contingent on any environmental event; (d) using a 
technique that minimizes reactivity; and (e) using a technique which minimally disturbs 
the individual’s environment (Hurlburt, 1979).  
EMA (Stone and Shiffman, 1994) involves longitudinal momentary assessment of 
constructs within the natural environment of the participant. That is, participants are 
asked to monitor the constructs of interest at multiple time-points in the course of their 
every-day life. They are (usually) asked to report on what was occurring at the point in 
time they are completing the question or when they were signalled to make an entry. This 
approach minimises the risk of recall bias. Such studies often involve having participants 
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carry a recording device (such as a questionnaire booklet) and a prompting device (such 
as a wrist-watch alarm) that signals participants to complete a data-entry. Depending on 
the nature of the study, prompts can be given at random time points (thus capitalising on 
EMA’s ability to provide a random sample of “moments”, reducing the risk of systematic 
context biases and anticipation effects), or they can be given at pre-set time-points. These 
are referred to as signal-contingent protocols. Other studies employ event-contingent 
protocols whereby participants are asked to make entries in response to events, whether 
they are internal – such as a panic attack – or external – such as a social interaction 
(Stone and Shiffman, 1994).  
3.1 Rationale for EMA 
EMA appears to offer a number of advantages over traditional cross-sectional and 
experimental designs. Namely, the methodology minimizes the risk of biases and 
inaccuracies in recall and judgment, enhances the ecological validity of data, and, most 
importantly for the purposes of the current study, allows the researcher to draw 
conclusions about intra-individual processes. 
Recall and Judgment Problems. Traditional questionnaire-based measures are subject 
to a number of shortcomings that appear to be especially relevant in the case of research 
with pain (Torgangeau, 2000; Stone & Shiffman, 1994; Keefe, 2000; Kihlstrom, Eich, 
Sandbrand, & Tobias, 2000). Part of the inadequacy of questionnaire-based studies lies in 
the fact that standard questionnaires are recall based. They ask participants not only to 
think back over a period of time, but also to make a summary judgment about (usually 
abstract) dimensions of experience that have occurred in that time. This introduces a 
number of sources of potential error related to encoding, storing, recalling, and making 
29 
summary judgments about autobiographical information (Torgangeau, 2000). Memories 
tend to fade over time, and this forgetting appears to be more likely and extensive over 
longer periods of time, and depends on the type of information being stored (Stone & 
Shiffman, 1994).  Memories may also be biased given that recall is not simply a process 
of retrieving information but of reconstructing memories using recall heuristics 
(Torgangeau, 2000). For example, effort after meaning involves biased retrieval of 
information in a way that is more consistent with the retriever’s schematic 
representations. Retrieved information can also be biased by retroactive-reconstruction, 
where recall is influenced by information obtained subsequent to storage of the original 
information. Recall strategies such as availability heuristics may bias memories to be 
more consistent with recent or highly salient memories (Torgangeau, 2000). Tennen and 
Affleck (1996) made the important point that: 
 
More important than inaccuracy per se is the source of the error [in recall]. 
We need to be concerned not only with the random error, but especially with 
systematic error in the recall of pain, coping, and events. Individuals who 
differ on other study variables (or worse, in key ways not measured) may 
report differentially accurate data or use different cognitive heuristics to 
assist their recall… In this vein Larsen (1992) demonstrated that neuroticism 
predicts not only day-to-day reports of illness symptoms, but also the 
subsequent accuracy with which these symptoms are later recalled. (p154) 
 
Issues of recall bias may be especially relevant for research involving recall of mood 
states or pain, where recall of either state may be overly biased by current states (Keefe, 
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2000; Kihlstrom, 2000). For example, Smith and Safer (1993) demonstrated that recall of 
pain and medication-use differed between two samples of chronic pain patients – one 
who had just completed physical therapy (thus rating their current pain as being lower) 
and a control group. The physical therapy group recalled their usual and highest pain for 
the previous day and week as being lower than the control group. They also under-
estimated their prior-week pain compared to diary records kept throughout the previous 
week. Control patients over-estimated their lowest and highest pain for the previous day 
and usual and lowest pain in the previous week, compared to their diary entries. The 
physical therapy group recalled their previous week’s medication usage as being lower 
than both the control group and their own diary entries. 
The heuristics involved in making summary judgments are complex, and people are 
unlikely to accurately recall weekly pain or mood let alone accurately “average” those 
experiences to produce a representative summary score (Menon & Yorkston, 2000). We 
cannot assume that questionnaires that ask participants to recall phenomena over 
(usually) one or two week periods accurately reflect real-world constructs that take place 
in a variety of contexts over time. Differing degrees of convergence between recall and 
momentary reports have been observed in studies that compare one- or two-week 
retrospective questionnaires to the average of a series of momentary measurements 
collected over the same period of time (eg. Catley, 1999; Tennen & Affleck, 1996). 
Indeed, some studies demonstrate a lack of correlation between recalled and momentary 
versions of certain scales.  
Pain recall appears to be related to the average of momentary recordings, however, pain 
generally appears to be remembered as being worse than the momentary ratings would 
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suggest. Lousberg, Schmidt, Groenman, Vendrig and Dijkman-Caes’s (1997) comparison 
between the MPI Pain Severity scale and analogous items measured throughout the 
course of a week demonstrated a significant relationship (r=.75). Similarly, Catley (1999) 
found a significant correlation of r=.65 between the MPI Pain Severity scale and 
momentary reports of pain. Tennen and Affleck (1996) found that although pain-recall 
was correlated with momentary reports, participants consistently recalled their pain as 
being more intense than it was according to momentary reports. Peters, Sorbi, Kruise, 
Kerssens, Verhaak, & Bensing (2000) confirmed this finding – the MPI Pain Severity 
scale consistently over-predicted the average weekly pain ratings, though the two scales 
were correlated r=.4 (this increased to r=.7 for a subset of 12 subjects who completed the 
MPI whilst conducting the monitoring). 
Comparisons between recalled and momentarily reported outcome-measures have also 
been described. Lousberg, et al. (1997) found that the MPI scale measuring involvement 
in Household Chores demonstrated a significant relationship (r=.4) with daily-diary 
ratings, whilst General Activity (r=.16) and Affective Distress (r=.2) scales did not. For a 
range of momentary scales designed to reflect SF-36 scales Peters, et al. (2000) found 
correlations of r=.73 (SF-36 Physical Functioning) and r=.38 (SF-36 Role Functioning). 
They reported a momentary/recall correlation of r=.42 for MPI Affective Distress. Catley 
(1999) reported that the BDI was correlated significantly with momentary measures of 
NA and PA (r=.05 and r=-0.39 respectively). Finally, Gil, Carson, Porter, Ready, Valrie, 
Redding-Lallinger and Daeschner (2003), in a sample of adolescents with sickle-cell 
disease, found correlations of r=.43 and r=-0.36 between the Global Severity Index of the 
SCL-90 and daily ratings of NA and PA, respectively. 
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Finally, psychological scales measuring cognitive and coping constructs have also 
demonstrated varying degrees of convergence between recall and momentary reports. 
Lousberg, et al. (1997) reported a significant relationship for perceived Life Interference 
reported on the MPI (r=.6), but not perceived Life Control (r=.25). Peters, et al. (2000) 
observed a correlation of r=.34 for MPI Life Interference, and for the Coping Strategy 
Questionnaire (CSQ; Rosenstiel & Keefe, 1983) they found significant correlations of r=-
0.66 (Catastrophising) and r=.41 (Diverting Attention and Ignoring/Denying Pain). A 
“Positive Self-Talk” scale of the CSQ did not correlate significantly with the repeated 
daily records. Stone, et al., (1998) found an average correlation of r=.6 between standard 
and momentary versions of the Ways of Coping questionnaire subscales (Folkman & 
Lazarus, 1980), and an average correlation of r=.51 between the individual items when 
measured in the standard manner and during daily recordings. Correlations between 
individual items ranged from r=-.06 (“Found new faith”) to r=.83 (“Ate/drank/smoked etc 
to feel better”). They also inspected over-reporting (ie. when participants recalled they 
used the strategy but momentary reports indicated that they didn’t) and under-reporting 
(ie. recalling non-use of the strategy when the strategy was reportedly used according to 
momentary records) for individual items. Specific Ways of Coping strategies were under-
reporting by as few as 5% of participants (“Concentrated on the next step”), and up to 
100% of participants (“Found new faith”) who reported using that strategy during 
momentary recordings (averaging a 29% under-reporting rate across all items). Strategies 
were over-reported by as few as 7% of participants (“Found new faith”) and as many as 
69% of participants (“Let your feelings out somehow”) who reported not having used a 
strategy during momentary recordings (averaging a 31% over-reporting rate across all 
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items). Tennen and Affleck (1996) reported that recalled and momentary reports of 
coping strategy usage were correlated, however momentary reports of strategy usage 
demonstrated a wider range of strategies used than retrospective reports. Strategies used 
on less than five days per month tended to be overlooked in retrospective reports. 
Ecological Validity. According to Brunswick (1949), ecological validity refers to the 
occurrence and distribution of stimulus variables in the natural or customary habitat of an 
individual. If the stimulus variables of a psychological method are representative of those 
in the individual’s habitat then it is said to be ecologically valid (Hormuth, 1986). 
Promoting ecologically valid assessment requires that data collection occur across all 
contexts in which the phenomena of interest exists (Buse & Pawlik, 1984). 
The push for ecologically valid research is driven by an understanding of the limitations 
of laboratory and questionnaire-based studies. Pawlik (1996) argues that traditional 
research in differential psychology takes a cross-sectional approach, allowing the 
researcher only a narrow “snap-shot” of life. For example, often subjects may be given a 
series of questionnaires, placed in a highly controlled laboratory setting where an 
experimental manipulation may occur, and then given a series of post-experimental 
questionnaires. The external validity of data gathered in this way is constrained by 
internal characteristics of the experimental environment (eg. implicit and explicit reward 
schedules, physical setting, the means by which manipulations are administered) and 
characteristics of data collection. Questionnaires are necessarily limited in their external 
validity. They provide a single sample of the target construct and are usually answered 
either retrospectively or prospectively (Pervin, 1985). 
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At the heart of the push for ecological validity is a recognition that naturalistic research 
(ie. conducted in real-life situations) is most amenable to application (Fahrenberg, 1996). 
An ecological perspective strives to overcome biases produced by intrusive data 
collection methods, including recall biases, social desirability and reactivity (Hormuth, 
1986). By assessing across all life-contexts, ecological assessment allows the researcher 
to look at causal processes at work longitudinally − giving the researcher an opportunity 
to begin untangling the effects of trait and situational variables and to determine the 
extent to which they interact (Pawlik, 1996).  
Karoly and Jensen (1987) stress that the experience of pain is extremely context-
dependent, and attempts to understand it should reflect this. A person’s experience of 
pain will depend, amongst other things, upon their situational context. In other words, an 
accurate, comprehensive, and useful investigation of the pain experience must be 
ecologically valid and minimally intrusive. 
Importantly, Karoly and Jensen (1987) endorse a circular model of pain − such as that 
presented by Elton, Stanley and Burrows (1983). They suggest it is important that data 
captures the ongoing and developing nature of pain, and reflects a process where pain 
acts as both an effect and a cause. This requirement raises the need for research designs 
that provide ongoing monitoring, thereby allowing demonstration of the changing nature 
of the pain condition, the factors that contribute to it, and those that are influenced by it.  
Intra-individual processes. Although many findings of cross-sectional studies of 
adaptation to chronic pain have been assumed to apply within-persons, this assumption 
may not be a safe one to make. As a practical example, a relationship might be 
demonstrated between people (for example, those with greater self-efficacy are likely to 
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be less distressed), and clinical interventions (which are essentially concerned with 
within-person processes) targeting those factors are justified on the basis of those 
findings. Between-person methodologies have been criticized as being inadequate to 
capture the dynamic transactional relationship between stressors, appraisal, coping and 
outcomes. They are cross-sectional and rely on recall and judgment, and this precludes 
the assessment of how psychological constructs relate on a moment-to-moment basis and 
co-vary over time within persons (Stone, et al., 1998; Stone & Shiffman, 1994;Tennen & 
Affleck, 1998).  
Tennen and Affleck (1996) makes the point that within- and between-person methods 
address different questions, and that both the magnitude and direction of associations can 
differ between these approaches. Indeed there is a substantial body of evidence 
suggesting that the assumption that within-person questions can be addressed via 
between-person designs is indeed invalid – what is true of individual differences is not 
necessarily true of within-person processes (Stone, et al., 1998;  Tennen and Affleck, 
1996). Tennen and Affleck (1996) demonstrated the importance of using EMA 
methodologies for addressing pain-related within-person questions by finding that a 
between-subjects analysis of daily events in the lives of rheumatoid arthritis patients 
revealed a positive relationship (r=.5) between the occurrence of positive- and negative- 
events, whereas a within-person analysis revealed a negative (r=-0.25) relationship. That 
is, those who experienced positive events were also likely to experience negative events, 
but individuals who experienced a positive event in a day were less likely to experience a 
negative event in the same day, and visa versa. A similar discrepancy was reported by 
Shiffman, et al. (1994) who found that questionnaire-based reports of the co-occurrence 
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of drinking and smoking found no relationship between the two – people tended not to 
report that they smoked more when drinking. However, self-monitoring data of drinking 
patterns did reveal such a relationship. In between-subjects analyses, Keefe, et al. (1997) 
found that greater use of a variety of coping strategies was related to greater pain. Within-
person analyses, however, revealed that use of certain strategies was associated with 
decreased next-day pain, and improved next-day mood. As a final example, Catley 
(1999) found that whilst pain and affect (both PA and NA) were not significantly related 
in between-subjects analyses, significant relationships in the expected direction were 
found for both PA and NA at the within-subjects level. Whilst Catley’s (1999) sample 
size was negligible (n=45), perhaps accounting for the lack of significance of between 
subject relationships, it does illustrate the point that if she had not conducted a within-
person analysis her conclusions about the pain/affect relationship would have been 
different. 
Other benefits. Because within-person designs investigate the relationship between 
variables as they operate within persons, these designs avoid the potential confounding 
effects of person variables. That is, pre-existing differences between people cannot act to 
confound the within-person effects, though they can be responsible for differences in 
effect between people (Feldman, et al., 1999). Similarly, individual response biases (such 
as exaggerating or down-playing reports of pain) are not necessarily problematic in such 
analyses (Vendrig and Lousberg 1997). 
Palm-held computers in EMA. The palm-held computer (or, personal digital 
assistant; PDA) represents one of the biggest steps in the advancement of ambulatory 
monitoring (Fahrenberg, 1996). PDAs have an in-built clock, LCD display and auditory 
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signalling device, and sufficient memory and battery-life to suit the requirements of most 
EMA studies. More recent models (eg. the Casio E-10 and E-11) operate on Windows CE 
platforms which enable the use of flexible and innovative formats. PDAs have a number 
of advantages over paper-and-pencil methods (Kenardy & Adams, 1993; Newman, 
Consoli & Taylor, 1997; Fahrenberg, 1996): 
a) The PDA’s small size and weight makes it convenient for subjects to carry. It is 
unobtrusive (it looks like a personal organiser) and fits into a pocket or handbag. 
b) The computer prompts compliance with the monitoring schedule through an 
auditory tone. It can be programmed to emit extra reminder signals until the subject 
commences monitoring. These measures ensure that monitoring is completed at the 
intended time − thus protecting the ecological validity of the data. Alternatively, if 
the computer is used for event recording, the subject can easily activate it at any 
time. 
c) The computer automatically dates and times all entries. This ensures that, unlike 
paper-and-pencil methods, entries cannot be made retrospectively. Also, the 
computer is able to keep a record of delays in recording entries and the time taken 
to complete an entry. 
d) All data is coded and can be downloaded frequently. This helps ensure that the 
subject’s confidentiality is maintained.  
e) Large amounts of data can be easily stored, analyzed and presented automatically. 
This cuts down on time and energy expenditure, and reduced paper usage. In 
addition, the probability of scoring or data transposition errors is minimised. 
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f) The structure imposed by the PDA in making a response to questions ensures that 
invalid responses cannot be made. 
g) Information can be obtained in a more user-friendly way. Subjects can be presented 
with multiple-choice formats, scales, graphic representations or any number of 
alternative methods for providing answers. Questions can be ordered in a flexible 
way. 
h) A greater amount of more useful information can be obtained in a more time-
efficient way. Branching questions cut down on otherwise redundant items and 
provide useful information based on subject’s previous answers. The sequence and 
hierarchy of questions can be tailor made.  
i) Computers can be programmed not to proceed until an item is responded to, thus 
providing an incentive for increasing compliance.  
j) As a further means of encouraging compliance, the PDA can be programmed to 
signal the participant if they are taking too long on an entry (or if they have 
abandoned it). 
k) Previously recorded answers are concealed from the subject, helping to eliminate 
reactivity due to feedback. 
l) PDA’s can be used concurrently with ambulatory physiological instruments (see 
Lint, Taylor, Fried-Behar & Kenardy, 1995).  
3.1.1 Methodological Issues in EMA 
3.1.1.1 Signal compliance 
The more signals participants respond to and the shorter their response latency, the more 
confident the researcher can be that the method is truly representative of every-day 
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experience. Overall compliance rates (the percentage of total possible entries that were 
actually completed) have varied from an average of 80% (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 
1987) to 86% (deVries, Delespaul, Dijkman & Theunissen, 1986). Compliance rates for 
Csikszentmihalyi & Larson’s (1987) sample varied from 73% for blue-collar workers to 
85% and 92% for clerical and managerial workers, respectively. They found that in 64% 
of cases subjects responded to the signal immediately, and 87% responded within 10 
minutes. Hormuth (1985; cited in DeVries, 1992) found that half of signals were 
responded to immediately. Response latencies of up to 5 minutes were observed in 80% 
of cases and up to 18 minutes in 90% of cases. However, Stone, Shiffman, Schwartz, 
Broderick & Hufford (2002) provided convincing evidence that reported compliance 
rates of paper-and-pencil diaries cannot be trusted. They paid forty chronic pain patients 
$150 to make three paper-and-pencil EMA records per day over an average of 20.5 days. 
Special diaries were used – they were fitted with photo-sensors that could validate actual 
entry times against reported entry-times. Subjects were considered to have been 
compliant if they responded to an alarm within 15 minutes. The authors found that whilst 
90% of entries were reported to be compliant, photo-sensor recordings demonstrated that 
only 11% were. The actual compliance rate rose to 20% if a more liberal 90-minute 
compliance window was allowed. In contrast a 94% compliance rate was obtained by a 
separate sample of 40 participants using palm-held computers. Fourty-percent of 
participants “hoarded” at least once – that is, they made entries during a subsequent entry 
slot, claiming compliance for the previous entry. On 32% of days no entries were made at 
all, yet participants reported a 92% compliance rate on those days. 
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PDAs can be programmed to ensure that entries are made in close proximity to the time 
of the signal. This assurance, which cannot be made using paper-and-pencil approaches, 
is likely to have important effects on compliance rates. In their EMA study, Pawlik and 
Buse (1982) reported that subjects responded to an average of 86% of PDA signals. 
Similarly, in Kenardy, Fried, Taylor, and Kraemer’s (1992) study, subjects monitoring 
panic symptoms on PDAs had a mean compliance rate of 87.7%. These rates are 
comparable to most EMA studies, in which between 80% and 90% of signals are 
responded to (eg. Csikzentmihalyi & Figurski, 1982; Dellespaul & deVries, 1987). In 
contrast, Hank and Schwenkmezger (1996) found that whilst paper-and-pencil 
monitoring procedures produced a near perfect compliance rate, subjects who monitored 
using PDAs only responded to 75% of signals. Although these findings appear to reflect 
badly on the PDA, the authors interpreted them as resulting from subject’s disregard for 
instructions in the paper-and-pencil condition. That is, subjects using PDA were forced to 
answer immediately, whilst those using paper-and-pencil methods were far more likely to 
have completed entries after the assigned 10 minute cut-off time – a suggestion later 
supported by Stone, et al. (2002). 
In terms of chronic pain populations, comparable compliance rates have been found – 
such as the 94% compliance reported by Stone, Broderick, Schwartz, Shiffman, Litcher-
Kelly and Calvanese’s (2003) PDA users. Peters, et al. (2000) found a total compliance 
rate of approximately 88% in their PDA-based study of 88 general chronic pain patients. 
Of the 116 signal-contingent entries planned for each participant they obtained an 
average of 108.4 responses per person (ranging from 77 to 140, excluding one participant 
with 41 entries). They found that an average of 10.6% of signal-contingent entries were 
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not responded to, 5.1% were missed due to technical problems, and 1.5% were 
voluntarily skipped. All participants received a monetary reward of 100 Dutch guilders. 
Catley (1999), who also offered a monetary incentive, obtained a 91% compliance rate – 
however this was after removing subjects with poor compliance (defined as those making 
fewer than six of the 12 total prompts over two days). Keefe, et al. (1997) found a 97.6% 
compliance rate in a sample of 53 rheumatoid arthritis patients (92% women) making 
daily ratings over 30 consecutive days. Participants were offered a monetary incentive. 
Of Feldman, et al’s (1999) sample of 153 RSD patients who were asked to complete four 
weeks of end-of-day paper-and-pencil recordings, 70% provided at least one week of 
monitoring data. A total compliance rate of 91% was obtained. In terms of timeliness of 
their end-of-day entries, they reported that 98% of entries were made on the correct day, 
with 2% completed one day late, and 0.4% completed 2 to 3 days late. Participants were 
given a small monetary reward for being involved in the project ($5). Gil, et al. (2003) 
found a slightly lower compliance rate of 76% amongst 37 adolescents with sickle-cell 
disease. Participants completed one entry per day over up to 6 months, and were given a 
monetary incentive. 
Stone, et al. (2003) found that varying the demand of the monitoring-schedule did not 
influence compliance. In their PDA-based study of 91 general chronic pain patients they 
found no significant difference in compliance rate between participants completing three, 
six and twelve entries per day (compliance rates were 93.5%, 93.9% and 95.5% 
respectively). The three groups did not differ on average number of monitoring days 
completed, with all three completing an average of slightly over 14 days of monitoring. 
There was also no difference between groups in terms of the number of entries that were 
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postponed per day (0.62, 0.73 and 0.92 respectively). Stone, et al. (2003) offered a 
monetary reward of $100 to participants who completed the project. 
Lousberg, et al. (1997) found that the rate of missing entries differed between 
measurement scales. The lowest compliance was found for the MPI Affective Distress 
and General Activity scales (missing data rates were 24% and 27% respectively) whilst 
the greatest compliance was found for the spousal response scales (missing-data rates of 
6% were found for Solicitous and Distracting Responses, and 5% for Punishing 
Responses). 
3.1.1.2 Stability 
Although one of the intrinsic values of EMA data is its ability to reveal temporal 
fluctuations in the variables it measures, there should nonetheless be a certain amount of 
stability within individuals over time. Csikszentmihalyi & Larson (1987) hoped to assess 
rating stability for activity frequencies and psychological states (including affect, 
activation, motivation and cognitive efficiency) by comparing the first half of the 
sampling week to the second half in a sample of both adolescents and adults. Average 
activity levels only changed for adolescents, and this appeared to be due to the 
occurrence of more weekend ratings in the first half of the week. No change was found in 
mean psychological states. When analyses were conducted on the intra-subject level, 
significant correlations were consistently observed between the two halves of the week 
for both mean scores and standard deviations. Both Wells (1985) and Pawlik and Buse 
(1982) found confirmatory results.  
Two-year test-retest data generated from a sample of 28 adolescents by Freeman, 
Csikszentmihalyi & Larson (1986) displayed significant correlations ranging from r=.45 
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to r=.75 on various psychological variables. Hormuth (1986) observed that rating 
categories that are rarely used are less stable, and those that are frequently used may 
display inflated stability because of a response-set bias. 
3.1.1.3 Reactivity to Monitoring 
Reactivity refers to the possibility that the EMA procedure itself may induce artificial 
changes in the nature of subject’s self-reports (Hank & Schwenkmezger, 1996; 
Csikszentmihalyi and Larson, 1987). Hypothetically, the method may influence the 
amount of time subjects spend in certain situations (situational selectivity), or the way 
they behave (behavioural variability). Although the ecological focus of EMA stresses 
minimising the intrusiveness of the data-collection technique, the risk remains that the 
recording method is at least partially responsible for situational selectivity and 
behavioural variability. That is, subjects may be more or less likely to be involved in 
certain activities or go to certain places knowing that he/she may have to engage in self-
monitoring (Hank & Schwenkmezger, 1996).  
Possible means by which reactivity to monitoring may occur is by providing feedback, 
prompting self-focussed attention, or by being intrusive (Hank & Schwenkmezger, 1996). 
The technique does not appear to be seen as intrusive by a majority of participants. 
Thirty-two percent of Csikszentmihalyi and Larson’s (1987) sample reported that the 
technique was disruptive or annoying after one week of monitoring. In Hormuth’s (1986) 
study 22% of participants felt that the method disrupted their daily routine, however, 75% 
agreed to monitor themselves a second time. 
The EMA approach promotes quite intense self-observation and introspection (Hormuth, 
1986). When induced, self-awareness has been shown to improve the validity of self-
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report questionnaires (Gibbons, 1983). However, self-awareness has also been shown to 
alter subjective perceptions of a situation and to change behavior, for example by 
increasing social conformity (Wicklund, 1975; Hormuth, 1982). The proportion of 
occasions subjects have reported self-focussed thoughts at the time of a monitoring alarm 
varies from 8% (Hormuth, 1984) to 31% (Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski, 1982) and 41% 
(Franzoi & Brewer, 1984). Although these findings are inconclusive, Hormuth (1986) 
concludes “unless specific self-awareness manipulations or instructions at the time of the 
signal are included, the influence of the method does not seem to be strong enough to 
change the situation nor increase the accuracy of perception” (pp. 285-286). 
Csikszentmihalyi and Larson (1987) tested for reactivity effects by looking for systematic 
changes in mean responses over one week. No items (including affect, activation, 
motivation and cognitive efficiency) changed their mean values over the course of the 
week, suggesting that the monitoring procedure did not influence a drift in subject’s 
responses. However, the variance of certain psychological variables decreased in the 
second half of the week. Decreased variability in psychological states was not attributable 
to changes in responsiveness to environmental factors – it was related to greater 
predictability in individual participant’s response-styles. Csikszentmihalyi and Larson 
(1987) interpreted this as meaning that participants developed “more precise self-
anchoring on the rating scales” (p530). Perrez and Reicherts (1992), comparing responses 
from the first half of the monitoring week to the second, found some differences in the 
way certain variables interacted. Although the implications of these findings were 
ambiguous, Hank and Schwenkmezger (1996) warn that once one receives feedback 
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about one’s behavior and its context-relatedness the stage is set for self-initiated behavior 
change. 
It is possible that PDA-based assessment may induce reactivity because participants do 
not want to be seen with the device, or because the beep is intrusive. However, in studies 
by Kenardy, et al. (1992) and Taylor, Fried and Kenardy (1990) less than 5% of 
participants reported that one beep every two hours was intrusive.  
Subjects using PDAs have no access to prior entries and must answer questions in a 
standard order, whilst paper-and-pencil methods provide immediate feedback and allow 
freedom to answer in any order. Such freedom in response order afforded by paper-and-
pencil questionnaires may be disadvantageous in terms of maintaining consistency over 
repeated monitoring episodes. Furthermore, the concealment of previous entries made 
possible by PDA approaches may reduce the risk of biased or “stereotyped” responses 
over repeated measurement occasions. 
In the case of pain, ratings of pain could increase during the course of monitoring 
because, for example, participants may become more aware of and sensitive to their pain 
experience. Alternatively, sensitivity to pain may be reduced by fatigue, which may be 
affected by the monitoring schedule. Over the course of a monitoring study, participants 
responsiveness to monitoring may reduce (for example, if they become frustrated or 
bored with the procedure) and their responses may become more similar. That is, the 
variability of scores may reduce over the course of monitoring. 
A number of studies have sought to determine whether reactivity is indeed an issue in the 
repeated measurement of pain: 
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Von Baeyer (1994) had 54 low-back pain patients keep daily records for eight days. 
Three groups differed in terms of the intensity of their daily monitoring requirements – 
either the McGill scale, a brief pain diary, or a non-pain-related diet list. Before and after 
the eight days of monitoring, participants rated pain-related emotional states and their 
worst, least and usual pain. Von Baeyer found no post-monitoring differences between 
the groups on any dependent measure, suggesting that reactivity did not influence ratings.  
Cruise, Broderick, Porter, Kaell, & Stone (1996) tested for reactivity to diary self-
assessments of pain by using EMA conducted via PDAs. They found no evidence of 
reactivity – participants’ responses did not alter systematically after one-week of 
assessment with seven signals per day. Similarly, Peters, et al. (2000) found no 
systematic change in pain ratings over the course of their 4-week study, though they 
found a slight increase in the incidence of missing and skipped entries over that time. 
Stone, et al. (2003) sought to determine whether reactivity effects may occur as a 
function of the density of monitoring schedules. Participants were asked to complete 
three, six or 12 samples per day. They found that ratings of the presence/absence of pain 
was unrelated to linear effects of time over two weeks of monitoring, either for the whole 
sample or according to the different monitoring densities. When they analyzed pain-
intensity for those entries where pain was reported as being present, the authors found 
that the three-sample group demonstrated a negative trend over the monitoring fortnight, 
the six-sample group demonstrated a positive trend, and the 12-sample group displayed 
no trend.  The authors concluded that reactivity to pain monitoring was possible, although 
they found no systematic effect to suggest that it was likely.  
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Stone, et al. (2003) also hypothesized that the density of the monitoring schedule might 
have reactive effects in terms of influencing recall of weekly pain. They found that the 
groups differing in monitoring density did not differ in their recall of pain from a control 
group who did no daily monitoring. Also, for the groups doing daily monitoring there 
was no difference in pain recall between weeks when EMA monitoring was conducted 
and non-monitored weeks. Thus, by both accounts, EMA self-monitoring appeared to 
have no reactive effect on memory for pain intensity. 
The findings of these studies are encouraging for the validity of computerized EMA for 
the assessment of chronic pain, and contrast with findings that self-assessment influences 
ratings of acute  (eg. labour and post-operative dental pain) and experimentally induced 
pain (eg. Leventhal, Leventhal, Shacham & Easterling, 1989; Levine, Newton, Smith & 
Fields, 1982).  
3.1.1.4 Limited item-sets  
Given that EMA requires participants to complete multiple assessments, usually over a 
number of days and often with a number of entries per day, the item pool for a 
comprehensive cognitive-behavioural assessment must be reduced markedly. Cross-
sectional studies often require participants to complete approximately five questionnaires, 
each with ten to thirty items. For example, the five pain belief and coping measures 
investigated by Jensen, Keefe, Lefebvre, Romano, and Turner (2003) contained a total of 
200 items. Such an item pool would clearly be problematic for studies involving intensive 
repeated measurements. If participants are required to complete too many items per entry 
they are likely to be less compliant with the monitoring schedule. Alternatively, non-
compliance may be more likely in specific contexts where completing a long diary entry 
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is seen as impractical, thus limiting the extent to which diary data is representative of 
ecological contexts.  
3.2 Measurement of Momentary Adaptational Status in Chronic Pain 
Measurement, given the small item-set problem, has been handled in different ways by 
EMA researchers in the field of adaptation to chronic pain. Generally, studies have either 
(a) adopted a subset of items from a questionnaire generally used in cross-sectional 
research, (b) used existing scales outright, (c) devised single-item or small-item scales for 
assessment of specific constructs, or (d) employed questionnaires specifically designed 
for use in EMA research. For example, the first of these approaches was taken by Affleck 
Pfeifer, Tennen, and Fifield (1988), Keefe, et al. (1997), and Peters, et al. (2000), who 
adopted selected scales of the POMS-B. Items from standard questionnaires may need to 
be adapted for use in EMA studies. Peters, et al. (2000) adapted existing scales of the 
MPI, CSQ and SF-36 by changing the wording of items to be relevant for momentary 
assessments. Presumably some amount of effort should be expended to validate the new 
format, though in Peters, et al.’s case this was not explicitly done.  
Sometimes existing questionnaires are simply administered over multiple time-points. 
For example, Keefe, et al.’s (1997) measure of RA pain was via the Rapid Assessment of 
Disease Activity in Rheumatology (RADAR), in which subjects rate 20 joints or joint 
groups on a 4-point numerical scale. In these cases, the scope of a study generally needs 
to be quite specific, allowing measurement of a small number of constructs with a larger 
pool of items. Also, the scale needs to be relevant for EMA application (eg. enquiring 
about state-like constructs in a momentary fashion), or else modified.  
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An example of the third approach is Vendrig and Lousberg's (1997) single-item likert 
scales to measure pain intensity, mood, and activity level. Jensen, et al. (2003) 
constructed one- and two- item measures of a range of constructs via thorough empirical 
means. They selected those items from the Survey of Pain Attitudes (SOPA; Jensen, 
Karoly & Huger, 1987), Chronic Pain Coping Inventory (CPCI; Jensen, Turner, Romano, 
& Strom, 1995), CSQ, Pain Beliefs and Perceptions Inventory (PBAPI; Williams, 
Robinson, & Geisser, 1994), and the Arthritis Self-Efficacy Scale (ASES; Lorig, 
Chastain, Ung, Shoor, & Holman, 1989) that had the highest item-total correlations, 
greatest sensitivity to change from pre- to post-treatment, and greatest relationship with 
pain intensity, depression, and disability. 
Finally, in their investigation into coping amongst people with rheumatoid arthritis, 
Affleck, Urrows, et al. (1992) used the Daily Life Experience Checklist (Stone and 
Neale, 1982), which was developed for repeated use within people. 
The current study employed custom-made scales, largely derived from items in existing 
scales, which were developed and validated (see Study One) for use in Study Two. The 
six scales, measuring a range of constructs, consist of one to three continuously measured 
items, or up to thirteen dichotomously scored items.  
3.3 Intra-Individual Models of Adaptation 
3.3.1 Variation Within- and Between- Days 
Pain conditions have been classified by the IASP according to the temporal properties of 
the pain experienced: Continuous or nearly continuous, non-fluctuating; Continuous or 
nearly continuous, fluctuating; Recurring, irregularly; Recurring, regularly; Paroxysmal; 
and, sustained with superimposed paroxysms (Merskey 1986).  A growing body of 
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research focuses on this notion that the experience of pain varies not only between 
people, but it fluctuates within people, and that part of this fluctuation is associated with 
factors such as mood and activity level (Stone, et al., 2003).  
The majority of studies investigating momentary adaptational status in pain appear to run 
analyses on a daily basis. Fewer studies have conducted multiple within-day analyses. Of 
the former studies, a number have compared the variation of pain and mood within-
people to the variation between people, demonstrating that significant proportions of 
variation exist at the within-person level. Grant (1998), over 30 days of nightly 
monitoring, found that 32% of variance in pain intensity was within-people, as was 47% 
of depressed mood, and 43% of anxious mood. On 11-point NRSs for pain intensity, 
within-person ratings of pain varied by an average standard deviation of 1.46, compared 
with an average between person standard deviation of 2.13. Keefe, Affleck, Lefebvre, 
Underwood, Caldwell, Drew, Egert, Gibson, and Pargament (2001) found that 21.9% of 
variability in the pain reports of rheumatoid arthritis (RA) patients was within-people, 
over 30 days of once-daily monitoring. Focht, Ewing, Gauvin & Rejeski (2002) 
investigated variations in pain and mood both over days and within days in a sample of 
32 overweight individuals with osteoarthritic knee pain. Sampling was conducted via 
booklets six times per day for six days. Like Grant (1998), approximately one-third of the 
variance in both pain and negative affect was within-people. 
Affleck, Tennen, Urrows, & Higgins (1994), over 75 days of daily-monitoring with RA 
patients found that mood (measured on 27-point scale) had an average standard deviation 
of 2.83, compared to between person variation of SD=1.6. Joint pain (on a 60 point-scale) 
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displayed an average standard deviation of 4.16, and varied to a lesser extent between 
people (SD=2.3). 
Affleck, Tennen, Urrows and Higgins (1991) clearly illustrated that the experience of 
pain varies within- as well as between- people. They sought to explore the temporal 
sequencing of rheumatoid arthritis pain in fine-grained analyses via monitoring the daily 
pain of 47 RA sufferers over 75 days. On a 60-point scale (the RADAR) where each of 
twenty joints are rated from 0 (no pain or tenderness) to 3 (severe pain or tenderness) 
they noted a mean score of 13.3 (SD= 9.77), with a mean standard deviation of 4.05 
(SD=2.18). The majority of cases (52.8%) displayed a significant positive skew in pain 
ratings, and negative skew was present in only two cases. The majority of cases also 
showed a significant trend (49.6%), with 61% of these being upward over the monitoring 
days, and 49% being a downward trend. Pain was predictable from one day to the next 
(first-order autocorrelation) in 87.2% of cases (70.2% of cases when the effect of 
trending was statistically removed). Controlling for both first-order autocorrelation and 
trending, 36% of cases displayed autocorrelation effects over two to nine days. Affleck, 
et al. (1991) then sought to identify outlier days, where the pain was either absent 
(painless days), or more severe than usual (painful days). On average, people experienced 
2.2 painful days and 0.37 painless days. Painless and painful outlier days were identified 
in the majority (63.9%) of cases. Of these, 80% demonstrated at least one day of 
unusually high pain and no pain-free days. Half of the participants that demonstrated 
more than one painful day displayed a series of two to three consecutive painful days. 
Affleck, et al. (1991) also investigated correlates of temporal characteristics of pain. 
Higher RA disease activity was associated with worse average pain, more variable pain, 
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steeper trending, fewer outlier days and shorter duration of outlier periods, and greater 
predictability from one day to the next (first-order autocorrelation). Physical disability 
was associated with higher mean pain, more variable pain, and a more normal pain 
distribution. Finally, depression was associated only with higher mean pain. 
3.3.1.1 Diurnal Trends in Pain 
A small number of studies have investigated within-day patterns of pain. It appears clear 
that diurnal trends exist, however it is apparent that there is great variability in within-day 
patterns between individuals. The most common pattern appears to be an increasing 
diurnal trend in pain, though this is not a consistent finding (Focht, et al., 2002). Pain 
associated with rheumatoid arthritis appears to peak in the morning (eg. Stone, et al., 
1997; Labrecque & Vanier, 1995), whereas pain from osteoarthritis, for example, tends to 
increase during the day (eg. Bellamy, Sothern, & Campbell, 1985). There appears to be 
mixed evidence that diurnal trends are associated with other person variables, such as 
depression and neuroticism, though the within-day co-variation of pain and distress 
appears to be reasonably well established.  
Early work by Folkard, Glynn and Lloyd (1976), with 41 chronic pain outpatients, 
demonstrated that daily ratings displayed reliable variation within days, but there were no 
indications of day-of-week effects or an interaction between day-of-week and time-of-
day.  Specifically, pain ratings increased over the course of the day, with an estimated 
peak at 10:27pm. They reported no significant difference in diurnal course between sub-
groups with differing pain diagnoses, though sample sizes were quite small. Interestingly, 
introverts reported more pain between 10:00am and 2:00pm than extroverts – 
demonstrating a “phase shift” such that pain levels appeared to rise earlier than they did 
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for extroverts. Also, participants with high neuroticism scores demonstrated an earlier 
daily rise in pain-levels than those without. Females demonstrated a greater rise in pain 
ratings than males, and reported higher pain levels over-all. Participants who stayed at 
home during the day reported higher pain levels over-all compared to those who went out 
to work, but those two groups also demonstrated different profiles. Participants who 
worked away from home demonstrated a morning drop in pain level, which did not rise 
until approximately 6:00pm. The at-home group demonstrated a morning rise in pain that 
levelled-off at midday and remaining constant for the rest of the day. The at-home group 
also rated their pain as being worse in the evenings. 
Jamison and Brown (1991) identified diurnal profiles in a sample of 195 chronic pain 
patients. They identified groups of participants who demonstrated an increase (35%) or 
decrease (8%) in pain from morning to evening, and U-shaped profiles where pain was 
worse at midday (14%) or in the morning and evenings (7%). Eight percent demonstrated 
complex slopes, and 28% no slope at all. Those who displayed no apparent diurnal trend 
were more emotionally distressed than participants who displayed a trend. Focht, et al. 
(2002) also identified an inverted U-shape in pain monitored six timed per day in a 
sample of 32 individuals with osteoarthritic knee pain. Modelling their daily pain ratings 
against linear, quadratic, and cubic trends, they found that only the quadratic trend was 
significant – accounting for 2.3% of within person variance in pain-intensity. 
In a general sample of chronic pain patients Vendrig and Lousberg (1997) found that 
those who displayed a positive relationship between their mood and pain experienced 
more pain and distress in the mornings and evenings, whilst individuals who displayed no 
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pain/mood relationship demonstrated no such within-day fluctuation. In both cases 
individuals displayed a steady decline in activity level in the course of a day. 
Stone, et al. (1997) had 35 people with rheumatoid arthritis engage in seven days of 
monitoring, with seven entries per day, separated by approximately two-hour intervals. 
They found no variation in pain over days of the week, but substantial within-day 
variation. Almost 40% of their sample displayed diurnal variation, with pain at its worst 
in the morning, and decreasing by midday to a steady rate over the rest of the day. 
Neuroticism, trait-anxiety, and depression did not discriminate between those who 
displayed a diurnal pattern and those who did not.  
Peters, et al. (2000) conducted a PDA-based EMA study with 80 participants with a range 
of chronic pain conditions and differing durations of pain-history (3-6 months; 6-12 
months; over 12 months). They conducted monitoring over four weeks, taking entries 
four times per day between 8:00am and 9:30pm, as well as participant-initiated entries 
prior to bed and upon waking. They found an increasing diurnal trend in pain that did not 
differ between the three pain-history groups. At a subject-level analysis an increasing 
trend was prominent in 47.5% of subjects, however another 47.5% displayed no 
significant trend. A decreasing trend was seen in 2.5% of subjects, and a U-shaped trend 
was seen in another 2.5%. As with Stone, et al. (1997), differences in trend were not 
related to depression, symptomatology, gender, or work status. 
3.3.1.2 Diurnal Trends in Mood 
A range of emotional states have also demonstrated predictable diurnal variation, and this 
has been demonstrated in normal (eg. Fahrenberg, Brugner, Foerster & Kappler, 1999), 
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psychopathological (eg. Kenardy, et al., 1992), and to a lesser degree, chronic pain 
(Focht, et al., 2002) populations. 
Fahrenberg, et al. (1999) found that “angry/irritated” mood-states followed an inverted-U 
shape, with a peak in the middle of the day. Whilst Hartwig (2000) found no diurnal 
pattern for state anxiety in a student sample, such variation has been demonstrated in 
samples with Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD; Hopkins, 1995) and Panic Disorder 
(PD; Kenardy, et al., 1992; Geraci & Uhde, 1992). Hopkins (1995) had 23 GAD patients 
monitor morning, afternoon and evening anxiety for two weeks. A diurnal pattern was 
apparent in 39% of participants, with approximately half of these demonstrating a peak in 
the afternoon. Kenardy, et al. (1992) found that in a sample of PD patients, both panic 
symptomatology and anxiety increased during the morning and reduced in the evening. 
Geraci and Uhde (1992) also observed diurnal variation in anxiety amongst those with 
PD, but found that it interacted with depression – those with a history of depression or a 
current depressive episode demonstrated greater diurnal variation, with more panic 
attacks in the morning and afternoon.  
Diurnal variation also appears to exist in depressive mood-states, though there appears to 
be significant variability between people. In a sample of 18 inpatients with major 
depression, Barbini, Benedetti, Colombo, Guglielmo, Campori and Smeraldi (1998) 
observed daily rhythms in a VAS mood rating in only 44% of the sample.  
A “morning-prominent” pattern appears to be the most common finding (eg. Taub & 
Berger, 1974; Tolle & Goetze, 1987; Stallone, Huba, Lawlor & Fieve, 1973), though 
“evening-prominent” patterns in depressive mood have also been observed (eg. Haug & 
Fahndrich, 1992). There are suggestions that morning-prominent depression may be 
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associated with a more severe depressive syndrome and a wider range of depressive 
symptoms (which may be endogenous) whereas evening-prominent depression may be 
associated with non-clinical depression or chronic but milder forms of depression (eg. 
Robbins & Tanck, 1987). Indeed, morning-prominence has been demonstrated most 
strongly in clinical samples (eg. Taub & Berger, 1974) whereas evening-proneness has 
been observed in student and non-clinical samples (eg. Haug & Fahndrich, 1992). 
Rusting and Larsen (1998) found no prominent diurnal trends in depressive mood in their 
sample of 46 students, though evening-proneness was correlated with dispositional 
factors such as neuroticism, anxiety and private self-consciousness.  
Findings by Wood and Magnello (1992) support a distinction between positive and 
negative affect in diurnal trending. They found that positive mood demonstrated 
variation, peaking in the afternoon, whereas negative affect demonstrated no diurnal 
trend. The authors suggested that PA may be more related to biological processes such as 
cortisol fluctuations whilst NA may be more environmentally determined. Stone, Smyth, 
Pickering & Schwartz (1996) set about untangling the influence of environmental factors 
on a range of mood-states from more natural (possibly biologically-driven) variation. 
They had 94 insurance-company employees monitor a range of mood-states, their 
location, and activities on a 15-minute basis for one day. Ratings were combined into 
hourly scores to investigate daily profiles of annoyed, happy, tired, anxious, angry, bored, 
rushed, sad, tense, and stressed moods. Prior to controlling for activities and location a 
number of mood-states demonstrated variation, including “annoyed”, “anxious”, and 
“happy”. Annoyed and anxious moods demonstrated downward linear trends that 
accounted for only 0.3% of variance in each variable. Happy mood demonstrated a linear 
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trend that accounted for approximately 1.8% variance and a quadratic trend that 
accounted for 0.2%. The variable displayed a relatively even low profile in the morning 
that increased at midday but elevated quickly from mid-afternoon to a peak in the 
evening. After controlling for environmental factors a number of changes in daily mood-
trends were apparent. The trend of some moods became non-significant, such as anxious 
mood. Other mood-states changed their profile, such as annoyed mood, which revealed a 
significant quadratic trend (a dip in the middle of the day) that accounted for 1% 
variance. Happy mood also changed profile, demonstrating only an upward linear trend 
that accounted for 1% variance. Sad mood demonstrated a significant trend that appeared 
to have been suppressed by the influence of environmental events – 0.4% of sadness was 
accounted for by a quadratic trend whereby peaks were observed in the morning and 
evening. In all cases environmental factors accounted for more variance in the mood-
states than did time-of-day, accounting for 12.8% in happy mood to 1.2% in anxious and 
sad moods. 
Daily patterns in the mood-states of pain populations appears to have received very little 
research attention. Focht, et al.’s (2002) study involving 32 older obese patients with 
osteoarthritic knee pain is an exception, reporting that NA decreased throughout the day 
in a linear fashion – accounting for 1.2% variance. 
3.3.2 Covariation of Pain and Mood 
The within-person relationship between mood and pain has also attracted EMA research, 
looking at this relationship on both across- and within- day levels. 
Findings vary in terms of the across-day relations between pain and negative-mood. The 
general picture that emerges is that whilst the average effect is in the positive direction, 
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there is significant variation between people. Affleck, et al. (1994) found that the overall 
beta-weight between same-day negative-mood and pain, ß=0.11, was not significant, 
however the value ranged from -0.23 to 0.52. Affleck, Urrows, et al. (1992), investigating 
the daily reports of 75 RA patients over 75 days, found an average across-day correlation 
between pain and positive mood of r=-.037. 
Affleck, Tennen, Urrows, & Higgins (1992) found that amongst 54 RA patients who 
were monitored over 75 days, the daily pain/positive-mood association was generally 
negative, displaying an average beta-weight of -0.19 (SD=0.2). This effect varied from 
beta-weights of -0.81 to 0.2. On a case-by-case basis, pain was related to same-day lower 
mood in 40.7% of cases. No cases displayed a significant effect in the opposite direction. 
The pain/mood relationship was weaker for those who were more neurotic, with a shorter 
illness duration, less disability, less disease activity, and lower average daily pain 
intensity. 
Gil, et al. (2003) conducted a more complex multi-level analysis in a sample of 37 
adolescents with sickle-cell disease. They found that positive mood and pain shared a 
negative relationship (ß=-0.4), and negative mood and pain were positively related 
(ß=0.36). However the effect of negative mood vanished when entered into an analyses 
simultaneously with stress and positive mood. Also using multi-level analyses, Feldman, 
et al. (1999) investigated the relationship between pain and mood across days. They had 
109 people with reflex sympathetic dystrophy complete end-of-day diary entries over 28 
consecutive days. Previous-day depression predicted increased pain, though previous-day 
anxiety and anger did not. Conversely, previous-day pain predicted greater depression, 
anger, anxiety, and a general distress composite of all three mood-states. They found that 
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the relationship between pain and subsequent-day distress was mediated by the 
perception of social support. That is, for those with greater perceived social support, pain 
had a reduced impact upon negative mood. 
Gil, et al. (2003) also investigated lagged effects, but unlike Feldman, et al. (1999) they 
found no lagged relationship between positive or negative mood and pain either one or 
two days later. On the other hand, both pain from sickle-cell disease and pain from other 
sources were related to lower positive mood on the next day (ß= -0.01 for sickle-cell pain 
and –0.03 for other pain) and the day after (ß= -0.02 for sickle-cell pain and –0.01 for 
other pain). Negative mood was only predicted by previous day non-sickle-cell disease 
pain (beta=0.03).  
Fewer studies have examined the relationship between pain and mood within-days. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, these studies reveal much the same picture as across-day 
findings. Vendrig and Lousberg (1997) had 57 chronic pain patients monitor their pain, 
mood, and activity level eight times per day for six days. They calculated pair-wise 
correlation coefficients for each participant, then calculated mean coefficients across 
individuals. They found a significant overall correlation between pain and positive mood 
in the negative direction (r=-0.22). Approximately 40% of participants demonstrated a 
significant negative relationship between pain and positive mood (averaging r=-.51). 
These participants displayed significantly higher pain reports and worse mood than other 
participants. Eight-percent of participants displayed significant correlations in the 
opposite direction (averaging r=.44). The authors suggested that the latter individuals 
may involve themselves in more rewarding positive activities at the cost of an increase in 
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pain. Catley (1999) reported a negative average relationship between same-moment pain 
and PA (ß=-0.21) and a positive, but somewhat smaller, relationship with NA (ß=.023). 
In summary, although it appears clear that there is a relationship between pain and mood, 
few studies (Feldman, et al., 1999; Gil, et al., 2003) have explored possible causal 
relationships. Further analyses involving cross-lag analyses, such as the current study, are 
needed to further explore these issues. 
In a related area, a number of EMA studies have identified a stress-reactivity pattern 
where occurrence of stressful events impacts negatively upon the experience of pain. 
Stone, et al. (1997) found that the occurrence of stressful events in the interval prior to 
entries was associated with greater pain, and a positive relationship was observed 
between pain and the reported stressfulness of the event.  
In their study of 75 people with rheumatoid arthritis Affleck, Urrows, et al. (1992) 
calculated time-series coefficients for each participant, and then looked for inter-
individual effects via meta-analytic techniques. They found no consistent relationship 
between the occurrence of daily stressors and next-day pain. However, they found that 
individuals with more active arthritic states (measured by examination of joint swelling 
and an immunological marker of inflammation) displayed such a relationship. A positive 
stressor/next-day-pain relationship was also found for individuals who had experienced a 
major stressful event in the prior 6-month period.  
3.3.3 Covariation of Pain and Function 
A small amount of research has investigated the within-person relationship between pain 
and function. There appears to be sparse evidence for a clear relationship between the 
two, with the direction of any relationship appearing equivocal, and apparent variation 
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between people.  Linton (1985) calculated within-person correlations between daily pain 
and daily involvement in ADLs, measured over at-least a two-week period. Of 15 
participants, only six displayed a significant correlation (between r=-.66 and .45). Only 
one participant demonstrated a significant positive correlation. Vendrig and Lousberg 
(1997) investigated the relationship between activity level, pain and mood. They found a 
non-significant relationship between pain and activity level (r=.01ns) and between mood 
and activity level (r=.06ns). Approximately 27% of participants demonstrated a positive 
pain/activity relationship (averaging r=.4), whilst 11% demonstrated an effect in the 
opposite direction (averaging r=-0.41). Whilst Linton demonstrated a predominant 
negative relationship and Vendrig and Lousberg a more prominent positive relationship, 
both effects could be interpreted in plausible ways. Namely, when people experience 
greater pain they may escape from or avoid ADLs, and any activity that is performed may 
be associated with increased pain.  
Focht, et al. (2002) sought to address the effects of acute physical exercise on pain and 
mood in a more fine-grained analysis. They had 32 people with osteoarthritic knee pain 
monitor their pain and mood six times per day over six days. Exercises – consisting of a 
five minute warm-up, two 15 minute walks, a 20 minute strength-training session, and 5 
minutes cool-down – were performed on three of those days, with additional diary entries 
performed immediately before and after exercises. Entries were then classified as being 
on non-exercise days, prior to exercise on an exercise day, immediately prior to exercise, 
immediately after exercise, and post-exercise on an exercise day. Citing prior findings 
that, amongst osteoarthritis sufferers, pain intensity was negatively related to time spent 
in aerobic exercise (Rejeski, Brawley, Ettinger, Morgan,  & Thompson, 1997), the 
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authors suggested that acute exercise may exacerbate pain symptoms and that these flare-
ups may serve as a disincentive for compliance with further exercise. In support of this, 
they found that even after controlling for time-of-day, stress, and medication use, pain 
demonstrated a significant elevation immediately after exercise. Relative to non-exercise 
days, pain remained somewhat elevated during the remainder of the day on exercise days, 
though at a lower intensity compared to the post-exercise pain. Such findings support the 
possibility that positive within-person correlations between pain and activity may be 
attributable to the “flare-up” phenomena whereby activity induces pain. The authors 
noted that alternative exercises, such as non-weight bearing activities, may have differing 
effects. Interestingly, exercise demonstrated no effect on negative affect.  
Further research involving experimental designs and naturalistic studies employing lag-
analyses (as is done in the current study) appears to be needed to illuminate and 
disentangle the two-way relationship between pain and activity. 
This chapter introduced EMA – a methodology designed to capture repeated momentary 
data from within participants’ natural environments. Literature was reviewed suggesting 
that EMA data has significant advantages over traditional cross-sectional research 
designs – it minimizes the risk of recall and judgement biases, maximises the ecological 
validity of the data, and, importantly, allows the researcher to observe dynamic processes 
that unfold within people. The current chapter also reviewed literature that justifies 
within-person approaches to chronic pain – pain and associated adaptational indices, such 
as distress and functioning, vary within people over time. Some of this variation appears 
to relate to diurnal patterns, though the literature suggests that pain also varied with 
factors such as mood and activity-level. The following chapter goes into greater depth 
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regarding factors that may be responsible for within-person changes in pain, mood and 
function. Stress and Coping theory is introduced, as are a number of appraisal and coping 
constructs that have been implicated by research taking a Stress and Coping perspective 
as being important in distinguishing between people in terms of their adaptation to life 
with chronic pain. Research suggesting that these factors may also be operating within 
people is discussed, leading into an overview of the aims of the current study. 
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4 THE STRESS AND COPING MODEL AND ADAPTATION TO CHRONIC PAIN 
4.1 Psychological Factors As Explanatory Mechanisms 
Psychological (cognitive, emotional, and behavioural) factors have been implicated as 
mechanisms that may explain differences in the adaptational status of people with chronic 
pain (Gamsa, 1994) and, to a lesser extent, as mechanisms influencing momentary 
adaptation status (eg. Keefe, et al., 1997). Research efforts have focused on such factors 
as appraisals, attitudes and beliefs (eg. Crombez,Vervaet, Baeyens, Lysens & Eelen, 
1996; Lackner, et al., 1996; Rudy, et al., 1988; Strahl, Kleinknecht, & Dinnel, 2000; 
Sullivan, et al., 2002), avoidance-learning and fear (Lethem, Slade, Troup, & Bentley, 
1983; Murphy, et al., 1997; Asmundson, Norton, & Norton, 1999), interpersonal 
interaction patterns (Subramanian 1986; Mikail, Henderson & Tasca, 1994; Murphy 
1994; Schiaffino and Revenson 1995), and usage of coping strategies (Rosenstiel & 
Keefe, 1983; Spinhoven & Linssen 1991; Rokke & al' Absi, 1992; Grant, 1998). 
Some support for models implicating psychological factors in adaptation to chronic pain 
comes from outcome research involving cognitive-behavioural therapy (CBT) – a set of 
interventions that aim to alter non-adaptive cognitive and behavioural patterns. CBT 
programs have been shown to effectively reduce psychopathology, decrease functional 
disability, decrease usage of health care services, and, in some cases, reduce the 
experience of pain (Turner 1980; Turner 1982; Holroyd and Panzien 1990; Nicholas, 
Wilson, & Goyen, 1991; Nicholas, Wilson, & Goyen, 1992). 
Theoretical accounts of psychopathology and functioning have been applied to 
understanding adaptation to pain, including Social Learning Theory (Bandura, 1986), 
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Seligman’s (1972) Learned Helplessness theory of depression, Lewinsohn’s (1974) 
behavioural model of depression, Locus of Control Theory (eg. Smith, 1970; Calhoun, 
Cheney, & Dawes, 1974), and Beck’s (1967) Cognitive theory of emotional disorders. 
For example, Rudy, et al.’s (1988) cognitive-behavioural model, derived from Lewinsohn 
and Seligman’s models of depression, proposed that depression would be associated with 
perceptions of helplessness and lack-of-control, as suggested by Learned Helplessness 
theory, and limited availability of reinforcement and engagement in positive activities – 
evidenced by perceptions of life interference – as proposed by behavioral models. 
Accordingly, in their cross-sectional path model Rudy, et al. (1988) demonstrated that 
depression was related to participant’s perceptions that pain interfered in their life and 
contributed to lack of life-control, but not to pain intensity per se. 
Another, more general, model that has been widely applied to understanding adaptation 
to chronic pain, and which provides a framework for understanding possible 
psychological factors that may be involved, is Lazarus & Folkman’s (1984) Stress and 
Coping theory (Jensen, Turner, Romano & Karoly, 1991). 
4.2 The Stress And Coping Model 
In Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) Stress and Coping model, stress is defined as “a 
relationship between the person and the environment that is appraised by the person as 
taxing or exceeding his or her resources and endangering well-being” (Lazarus and 
Folkman 1984, p19). Lazarus and Folkman suggest that stressors do not directly 
determine adaptational outcomes, but that adaptation is determined by how individuals 
cognitively appraise the stressors in their environment on an ongoing basis, and how they 
respond to the stressor in terms of coping efforts.  
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Lazarus and Folkman (1984) suggest that though appraisals are generally constrained by 
and reflective of the reality of the environment, they are imperfectly correlated with the 
environmental reality owing to individual differences such as personality factors. Lazarus 
and Folkman make a distinction between primary and secondary appraisals. Primary 
appraisals are judgements about the severity or intensity of the stressor, that is, whether it 
is irrelevant, positive, or associated with harm/loss, threat, or challenge in terms of its 
significance for the individual. Secondary appraisals are judgements about what can be 
done about the stressor, including the availability of coping options, whether coping 
efforts will produce a desired effect upon the stressor, and whether the individual is 
capable of enacting the strategy or set of strategies.  
Lazarus and Folkman (1984) distinguish between appraisals and beliefs. Appraisals, 
which can be viewed as more micro-level cognitive constructs, vary from moment to 
moment, and these fluctuations are said to interact with stressors, coping responses, and 
adaptational outcomes in a dynamic, ongoing manner. Beliefs are “pre-existing notions 
about reality which serve as a perceptual lens” which influence appraisal in that they 
“determine what is fact, that is, ‘how things are’ in the environment, and they shape the 
understanding of its meaning” (Lazarus and Folkman 1984, p63). That is, beliefs can be 
thought of as more stable, macro-level constructs that, though they play a role in 
influencing the nature of appraisal, do not influence coping and adaptation at the 
momentary-level in the same way appraisal does. 
Stress and coping theory suggests that appraisals not only influence adaptational 
outcomes directly, but also indirectly, via their influence on the selection and application 
of coping behaviours. Coping is defined as “constantly changing cognitive and 
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behavioural efforts to manage specific external and/or internal demands that are 
appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the person”. Folkman & Lazarus (1980) 
classify coping into emotion-focussed and problem-focussed strategies. Problem-
focussed coping involves strategies “directed at managing or altering the problem causing 
the distress” and emotion-focussed coping “is directed at regulating emotional response 
to the problem” (Lazarus and Folkman 1984, p150). Coping is considered to be 
behaviour and cognition that is effortful and deliberate, as opposed to adaptive processes 
that are enacted without volition or awareness. According to Stress and Coping theory, 
emotion-focussed coping is considered to be more likely when the stressor is appraised as 
being unamenable to change, whereas stressors appraised as being subject to control are 
more likely to be acted upon with problem-focussed strategies.  
A stress and coping model of pain is in general concordance with how other cognitive 
and behavioural models approach adaptation to pain. For example, cognitive models of 
depression and anxiety (eg. Beck, 1967) suggest that depression does not arise directly 
from negative life experiences, but from mediating cognitive processes such as 
catastrophic thinking patterns and other erroneous cognitive styles. Seligman’s (1972) 
learned helplessness theory, and locus-of-control theory (Smith, 1970; Calhoun, et al., 
1974) propose other control-related cognitive mediational mechanisms by which 
appraisal may directly influence depression and other psychological indices of 
adaptation. These cognitive-emotional theories are consistent with Lazarus' (1993) view 
that cognition is necessary and sufficient in determining the nature and intensity of 
emotional reactions. Also consistent with Stress and Coping theory, social-learning 
theory (Bandura, 1977; 1986; 1997) provides a means of understanding how appraisal 
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constructs such as self-efficacy and expectancy relate to the selection, initiation, and 
maintenance of behaviours such as coping responses. 
Importantly, the various elements within Stress and Coping theory are presumed to 
interact in an ongoing and dynamic way, such that the result of coping efforts and aspects 
of adaptation feed back to influence the stressor and the ongoing process of reappraisal 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Lazarus, 1999).  
4.2.1 Application of Stress and Coping Model to Chronic Pain 
Lazarus and Folkman’s stress and coping model (Lazarus and Folkman 1984) provides a 
heuristic framework for understanding the possible pathways linking pain, the stressor, to 
adaptational outcomes (Jensen & Karoly, 1991; Jensen, Turner, Romano & Karoly, 
1991). Research concerning adaptation to chronic pain that has applied this model 
construes the experience of pain as a stressor that interacts in an ongoing way with 
cognitive appraisals of pain, strategies aimed at coping with pain, and various 
adaptational outcomes. Appraisals may influence adaptation to the stressful experience of 
chronic pain directly via influences on mood and engagement in functional activities, or 
indirectly via selection and initiation of, and persistence in coping strategies (Jensen & 
Karoly, 1991). A large number of psychological factors have been studied in terms of 
their possible impact upon adaptation amongst people with chronic pain. In concordance 
with the distinction made in Stress and Coping theory, these are generally devisable into 
appraisal and coping factors. For example, in terms of cognitive factors, Jensen, Turner, 
Romano and Karoly (1991) identified seven general categories of pain-relevant 
cognitions that have been investigated in the literature: beliefs about general locus of 
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control; beliefs about control over pain; attributional style; cognitive errors; self-efficacy 
beliefs; outcome expectancies; and other pain cognitions.  
Although still of interest, the unique effects of specific appraisal and coping constructs 
was not of primary interest in the current study. Rather, a representative selection of 
important appraisal and coping measures were used to assess the more general 
hypotheses that appraisal and coping are important in understanding momentary 
adaptational status, that these effects are independent of pain intensity, and that appraisal 
and coping have independent effects. 
The following sections review cross-sectional evidence regarding specific appraisal and 
coping factors in adaptation to chronic pain. The first section provides a brief overview of 
literature concerning the four appraisal constructs investigated in the current study – 
catastrophising, perceived interference, pain self-efficacy, and pain expectancy – 
followed by a brief review of the pain-coping literature with a special focus on the coping 
dimensions of interest to the current study – active and passive coping. Finally, 
integrative investigations of coping and appraisal will be discussed. 
4.3 Inter-personal Mechanisms of Adaptation to Pain 
Prior to a review of appraisal constructs, a significant issue in the adaptation to chronic 
pain literature is noted (eg. Jensen, Turner, Romano & Karoly, 1991) – namely, 
confusion over definitions of constructs and conceptual overlap between constructs. For 
example, wide variety can be observed in the operationalization of some of the appraisal 
constructs mentioned below. In the chronic pain literature, self-efficacy has been 
measured as any combination of general self-efficacy, functional self-efficacy, and pain 
self-efficacy, and expectancy has been measured as pain expectancies, injury 
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expectancies, and coping outcome expectancies. Sometimes no clear description is 
provided of exactly what construct is being measured. For conceptual clarity and to 
adequately test specific theoretical predictions, clear distinctions between different 
aspects of appraisal and coping constructs must be made.  
Another issue relates to the conceptual understanding of catastrophising. There has been 
some debate in the literature about whether to understand catastrophising as an appraisal, 
a coping strategy, or as merely an aspect of the syndrome of depression. For example, the 
inclusion of the Catastrophising scale in the CSQ implicates the construct as a form of 
coping strategy. A number of authors (eg. Stewart, Harvey and Evans, 2001; Jensen and 
Karoly, 1991) dispute the inclusion of catastrophising in the CSQ factor structure, noting 
that according to a Stress and Coping interpretation, catastrophising is misrepresented as 
a coping strategy and should be conceptualised as part of the appraisal process. Although 
the details of this debate will not be discussed in this paper, we have taken the latter 
approach – dealing with the construct as being part of the appraisal process. 
4.3.1 Appraisal and Adaptation 
4.3.1.1 Catastrophising and Cognitive Theories of Emotional Disorders 
Catastrophising is characterised by an unrealistic belief that the current situation will lead 
to the worst possible outcome (Katz, Ritvo, Irvine, & Jackson, 1996). Pain 
catastrophising has been defined as an exaggerated negative “mental set” manifested 
during an actual or anticipated painful experience (Sullivan, Thorn, Haythornthwaite, 
Keefe, Martin, Bradley, & Lefebvre, 2001), and as “negative and worrying thoughts 
about pain and the prognosis for the future” (Turner, 1991, cited in Grant, 1998, p2). 
Catastrophising is perhaps an obvious example of the kind of thinking style that would be 
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classified as one of Lazarus & Folkman’s (1984) primary appraisals. Beck’s (1967 ) 
cognitive model of emotional disorders links erroneous thinking, such as catastrophising, 
directly to emotional distress (eg. Winterowd, Beck, & Gruener, 2003). In the domain of 
pain theory, fear-avoidance models accord a central role to catastrophising, suggesting 
that this type of appraisal generates pain-related fear, increasing risk of disability, 
depression, and prolongation/exacerbation of the pain condition (Vlaeyen & Linton, 
2000). It has been linked empirically to a range of adaptation outcomes, including 
psychological and physical functioning, and experienced pain intensity (eg. Sullivan, 
Bishop, & Pivik, 1995; Sullivan, et al., 2002), as will be reviewed below. 
Catastrophising has been operationalized in a number of standardized questionnaires, 
notably the Pain Catastrophising Scale (PCS; Sullivan, et al., 2002), and the 
catastrophising scale of the CSQ. Factor analysis of the PCS demonstrated three factors, 
labelled Rumination, Magnification, and Helplessness – different aspects of cognitive 
distortion that the authors viewed as separate aspects of catastrophising.  
The content of catastrophising scales typically involve such items as “There is nothing I 
can do to reduce the intensity of the pain” (PCS Hopelessness), “Its terrible and I think its 
never going to get any better” (PCS Hopelessness and CSQ), “I keep thinking about how 
much it hurts” (PCS Ruminations), and “I wonder whether something serious may 
happen” (PCS Magnification). One laboratory study operationalised the “magnification” 
aspect of catastrophising with a single item involving participants’ fear of re-injury 
during an exercise task (Crombez, et al., 1996). 
Sullivan, Bishop, and Pivik (1995) demonstrated that students classified as 
catastrophisers, according to PCS cut-off scores, were more likely to report negative 
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pain-related thoughts, greater distress, and higher pain intensity during and after a cold-
pressor task. Pain patients reported more negative pain-related thoughts, greater distress, 
and higher pain intensity during and after an aversive electro-diagnostic medical 
procedure. Sullivan and colleagues (1995) also demonstrated that catastrophising was 
correlated with fear of pain, negative affect, trait anxiety, depression, and pain intensity 
in a sample of students doing a cold-pressor task. Analysed concurrently with these other 
constructs, only the average PCS score significantly predicted pain intensity experienced 
during the cold-pressor tasks (semipartial r=.29, zero-order r=.46).  
In a follow-up study, Sullivan, et al. (2002) demonstrated that catastrophising predicted 
behavioral engagement in physical activity independently of pain intensity and mood. 
After completing the PCS they had 50 students indicate their pain intensity and number 
of pain locations before and after a standardized exercise protocol. Participants repeated 
these ratings and a rating of negative mood before a replicated exercise protocol 48-hours 
later. Catastrophising was related to pain intensity ratings on all three occasions, and to 
negative mood on day two. It was associated with the proportional reduction in weight 
lifted from day one to day two, but not with the reduction in number of exercise 
repetitions. Further, it was not related to exercise performance on day one, which the 
authors interpreted as meaning that pain catastrophising may have an effect only in the 
presence of experienced pain, not in the absence of pain. They found that catastrophising 
predicted 10% of variance in the proportional reduction in weight lifted, once pain and 
mood prior to exercise on day two were controlled. However, when the subscales of the 
PCS were analysed, the helplessness scale demonstrated the greatest predictive power, 
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suggesting a greater role of control-type secondary appraisals than primary-appraisal 
constructs in Sullivan, et al.’s (2002) findings. 
Sullivan’s work (Sullivan, Bishop, & Pivik, 1995; Sullivan, Tripp, Rodgers, & Stanish, 
2000) is supplemented by a number of studies suggesting the importance of 
catastrophising in pain experience, pain-related distress, and functioning. For example, 
Robinson, Riley, Myers, Sadller, Kvaal, Geisser, and Keefe (1997) found significant 
positive correlations between catastrophising (measured on the CSQ) and MPI Pain 
Severity (r=.29), MPI Affective Distress (r=.38), the BDI (r=.5), and McGill PRS 
affective (r=.27), sensory (r=.18), and total (r=.23) scales.  
Geisser, Robinson, and Henson (1994) found that catastrophising was associated with 
distress, even controlling for depression – CSQ Catastrophising was associated with MPI 
Affective Distress, controlling for BDI score, McGill total PRI, age and education. 
Further, catastrophising was entered into the same step of a hierarchical regression 
analysis with other CSQ coping strategies, demonstrating that the effect of 
catastrophising was independent of coping. This finding was confirmed by Turner, et al. 
(2000), who reported that catastrophising was significantly related to depressive 
symptoms even when demograhic variables, coping strategies, and a range of pain beliefs 
were controlled in previous steps of a hierarchical regression analyses. 
Robinson, et al. (1997) provided support for the role of catastrophising in functioning, 
demonstrating a significant negative relationships between catastrophising and MPI 
scales reflecting involvement in activities (r= -0.17 to –0.29). However, Geisser, et al. 
(1994) found that catastrophising was not a significant predictor of perceived life-
interference after controlling for demographic variables, depression, pain-intensity, and 
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coping strategies. Turner, et al. (2000) also found a potential role of coping in accounting 
for the effects of catastrophising on function – catastrophising was not significantly 
related to physical disability once age, sex, pain intensity, pain beliefs, and coping 
strategies were controlled. 
In a more behaviorally based laboratory study, Geisser, Haig & Theisen (2000) also 
found disconfirmatory evidence for a unique role of catastrophising in function. In a 
sample of 133 people with heterogeneous pain conditions (predominantly with low-back 
pain; n=101) they found that the belief that pain represents damage or significant harm to 
the body was related to the amount of weight participants lifted from waist to shoulder, 
but not from floor to waist. However, this effect vanished once demographic, pain-
related, physical-condition, and psychological (depression and belief in the importance of 
activity-avoidance) factors were accounted for. 
Finally, catastrophising has also demonstrated prognostic importance for adjustment six 
months later in a sample of 223 rheumatoid arthritis patients (Keefe, Brown, Wallston & 
Caldwell, 1989). CSQ Catastrophising at lag one accounted for small but significant 
amounts of unique variance in pain (sr2=0.009), AIMS Physical Disability (sr2=0.006), 
and CES-D depression (sr2=0.043) at lag two (six months later), controlling for age, sex, 
SES, pain history, disability support status, and lag one pain, disability, and depression. 
Thus, whilst catastrophising appears to be consistently and independently related to 
distress – even after controlling for depressive symptomatology – the effect of 
catastrophising on function may not be separable from depression per se, and may be 
attributable to the effects of other psychological factors such as pain beliefs or coping 
strategy usage.  
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4.3.1.2 Perceived Interference and the Behavioral Model of Depression 
An aspect of primary appraisal related to catastrophising is perceived interference. The 
degree to which pain is believed to interfere with a person’s functioning and general-life 
has usually been measured via the Life Interference scale of the MPI. Robinson, et al. 
(1997)  reported a correlation of r=.35 between that scale and CSQ Catastrophising. This 
cognitive construct has been linked to depression in Rudy, et al.’s (1988) model, as 
suggested by Lewinsohn’s (1974) model of depression. Put simply, depression is 
presumed to be related to limited availability of reinforcement from one’s environment. 
The perceived interference construct is presumed to be the phenomenological 
manifestation of limited access to reinforcement. It is within this model that the role of 
perceived interference in adaptation to chronic pain has almost exclusively been 
investigated. 
Rudy, et al. (1988) conducted structural-equation modeling of data obtained from a 
sample of 127 mixed chronic pain patients. They found that the relationship between pain 
and depressive symptomatology was mediated by perceived interference and perceived 
lack of life- and pain- control, with lack-of-control proving to be the more powerful 
predictor.  The direct path from pain to depression was found to be non-significant. In a 
subsequent study, Jacob, Kerns, Rosenberg and Haythornthwaite (1993) replicated this 
model, although they found that a direct relationship remained between pain and 
depression in an older population, whereas in a younger population the pain/depression 
relationship was completely accounted for by the appraisals. 
Maxwell, Gatchel and Mayer's (1998) elaboration on this model, which included 
cognitive distortions measured by the Cognitive Error Questionnaire (Lefebvre, 1981), 
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found that pain and pain-related disability did not significantly predict depression once 
the effect of appraisal variables was entered (the effect of age, gender, education, and 
pain duration were controlled). A total of 53.5% of variance in the BDI was accounted 
for by pain and cognitive factors, with cognitive distortion accounting for 11.3% of 
unique variance, perceived interference accounting for 3.5%, and self-control accounting 
for 6%. 
Cately (1999) retested the cognitive-behavioral model, with two noteworthy adaptations. 
Firstly, she tested the model on both positive affect and negative affect. Secondly, her 
measures of pain intensity and affect were averaged over numerous momentary ratings 
made over two days. Thus, some of the issues regarding recall and judgment effects in 
cross-sectional research may have been more adequately addressed. Contrary to 
expectations, she found no relationship between pain and any of the affectivity measures. 
Perceived life control was negatively related to momentary measures of pain and the MPI 
Pain Severity scale, the BDI, PA, and NA. Perceived life interference, on the other hand, 
was not related to PA or NA, but was positively related to the BDI and both measures of 
pain intensity. Thus, although perceived interference demonstrated no relationship with 
summary measures of momentary affectivity, it maintained a relationship with depressive 
symptomatology – as might be suggested by Lewinsohn (1974).  
In summary, perceived interference has demonstrated links to distress and depressive 
symptomatology that are not attributable to pain intensity or other cognitive factors such 
as cognitive errors or perceptions of life control. However, these other appraisals have 
demonstrated effects of equal or greater magnitude than have been shown for perceived 
interference. The potential link between perceived interference and disability-related 
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outcomes has been neglected, however the current study intends to explore such a 
relationship. 
4.3.1.3 Self-Efficacy and Social Learning Theory 
Self-efficacy is a central construct in social-learning theory (Bandura, 1986; 1997). 
Bandura defined it as “people’s judgments of their capabilities to organize and execute 
courses of action required to attain designated types of performances” (Bandura & 
Schunk, 1981, p587).  He stated that “it is concerned not with the skills one has but with 
the judgments of what one can do with whatever skills one possesses” (p587). Self-
efficacy is said to influence individuals’ choice of activities, the amount of effort they 
expend, and persistence in the face of obstacles and aversive experiences (Bandura, 
1977). Self-efficacy can be understood as falling within the framework of secondary 
appraisal (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). 
The construct of self-efficacy has been applied to pain as pain self-efficacy – a person’s 
judgment about the degree to which they have the ability and resources to cope with, 
manage, and/or control the pain (Jensen & Karoly, 1991). Thus, social learning theory 
would suggest that self-efficacy may influence pain via engagement in coping behaviours 
that impact upon adaptation. However, perceptions of control may have a more direct 
relationship with emotional distress as suggested by learned helplessness (Seligman, 
1972) and locus-of-control theory (Smith, 1970). Indeed, pain self-efficacy is associated 
with numerous adaptational outcomes, including psychological and physical functioning, 
use of coping strategies, and exercise/activity involvement (Jensen, Turner, Romano & 
Karoly, 1991). 
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Litt (1988), in a sample of 102 undergraduate students doing the cold-pressor task, found 
that persistence in the task was related to prior ratings of self-efficacy for the task, even 
after the effects of prior performance were accounted for. He suggested that this supports 
the notion that self-efficacy plays a causal role in the production of behaviour, as opposed 
to being just a correlate to change-in-behaviour. In a second experiment, Litt 
demonstrated that self-efficacy interacted with perceived control over the task. 
Specifically, participants were either instructed that they had to remain in the water for a 
non-specified period of time or that the amount of time they spent in the water was 
dependent upon their performance in a biofeedback hand-warming task. He found that 
performance in the cold-pressor was positively related to self-efficacy for the 
biofeedback task, but those who had high self-efficacy and perceived control over the 
task performed better still. Such findings linking control and self-efficacy beliefs to task 
performance may explain how these constructs impact on more general psychosocial 
functioning. For example, Strong, et al. (1990) found a correlation of –0.54 between 
belief in ability to control pain, as measured by the SOPA and functional status measured 
by the Pain Disability Index. Jensen, Turner, Romano, and Lawler (1994) also found that 
this measure of perceived ability to control pain accounted for unique variance in 
physical functioning (measured via the SIP), controlling for pain intensity, age, and 
gender. Buckelew, Murray, Hewett, Johnson, and Huyser’s (1995) study involving 79 
fibromyalgia patients demonstrated that pain self-efficacy was associated with less pain 
and better functioning, controlling for age, education, symptom duration, disease severity 
(tender-point pain threshold), and negative affect. Finally, Strahl, et al., (2000), in a 
sample of 154 rheumatoid arthritis patients, found that self-efficacy for arthritis 
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symptom-control was associated with social and emotional functioning, and pain self-
efficacy was associated with physical functioning and reduced arthritis pain. Health 
status, demographic, and pain history variables were covaried. 
Buckelew, Parker, Keefe, Deuser, Crews, Conway, Kay, and Hewett (1994) found that 
self-efficacy for pain control was also related to lower levels of objectively rated pain-
behaviours in a sample of 73 fibromyalgia patients. Tender-point pain thresholds (on 
examination) were co-varied in these analyses.  
Jensen and Karoly (1991) investigated the association between appraisals of personal 
control over pain, behavioural/social functioning, and psychological distress, controlling 
for pain intensity and coping strategies, in a sample of 118 general chronic pain patients. 
Their findings suggest that pain control self-efficacy may involve more complex 
interactive effects with pain-intensity and coping behaviors. In contrast to the studies 
above, Jensen and Karoly (1991) found a significant interaction between pain control 
appraisals and pain intensity, indicating that pain control appraisals were related to 
function only for those with less intense pain. 
Contrasting with Strahl, et al.’s (2000) finding of a direct relationship between self-
efficacy appraisals and emotional functioning, Jensen and Karoly (1991) found that 
although pain control appraisals were associated with distress, the relationship was 
accounted for by coping strategy usage. They suggested that the action of control 
appraisals may not be directly on psychological well-being, as proposed by learned 
helplessness theory, but via the application of adaptive coping as suggested by social-
learning theory.  
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Investigating a related concept, pain locus of control, Crisson & Keefe (1988) found that 
a chance, but not an internal or powerful other locus of control, was related to activity 
avoidance, depressive, anxious and obsessive-compulsive symptoms, and greater general 
distress.  
Self-efficacy for capacity to function or engage in certain activities has been referred to 
as functional self-efficacy. Functional self-efficacy has been defined as a person’s 
judgment of their ability to execute or achieve tasks of physical performance (Lackner, et 
al.,1996). A person low in functional self-efficacy will, according to theory, be less likely 
to initiate or persist in functional activities such as ADLs (Barry, Zhenchao, Kerns, 
Duong & Reid, 2003).  
Lackner, et al. (1996) measured functional self-efficacy for a range of work-related 
physical tasks prior to having 85 chronic pain patients perform a range of standardised 
physical tasks. Pain intensity, pain expectancies, and injury expectancies were also 
measured prior to task engagement. Functional self-efficacy correlated with performance 
in all five tasks (static pushing, static pulling, bilateral carrying, lifting from waist to eye 
level, and lifting from floor to waist) even once pain and injury expectancies, gender, and 
pain intensity were controlled. 
In a study of 1045 war veterans, Barry, et al. (2003) found that those with moderate or 
low functional self-efficacy were more likely to have experienced days of restricted 
activity due to pain in the prior month, adjusting for depression, pain intensity, chronic 
health conditions, social support, drinking and smoking, and demographic variables. 
However, the retrospective nature of this study would appear to suggest that in this case 
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functional self-efficacy could not have causal primacy in its relationship with prior 
impairment. 
Like pain self-efficacy, Buckelew, et al. (1994) demonstrated that functional self-
efficacy, also, was related to reduced pain behavior amongst fibromyalgia patients 
(controlling for tender-point pain). 
In summary, self-efficacy, both for pain and functioning, and control-related appraisals 
appear to have been strongly linked to functioning, disability, and task-engagement. As 
predicted by Social Learning Theory, this link appears to be a direct one, being 
independent of such factors as mood and pain intensity (though there is some suggestion 
that the self-efficacy/function relationship exists only at low levels of pain intensity). 
Whilst pain self-efficacy and control appraisals have also been linked to emotional 
functioning and distress, as predicted by cognitive theories of distress, the evidence for 
such a direct effect appears to be less conclusive. Indeed, there is some suggestion that 
any link between self-efficacy and distress may be an indirect one, mediated by coping 
strategy usage as suggested by Social Learning Theory. 
Self-efficacy constructs relating to pain and pain-control have been measured via a wide 
range of standardised questionnaires, including: the SOPA’s pain-control scale; the 
ASES; the Multidimensional Locus of Pain Control Questionnaire (MLPC; ter Kuile, 
Linssen & Spinhoven, 1993) which contains scales reflecting beliefs in internal, chance, 
physician, and medication loci of pain control; and, the Pain Self-Efficacy Questionnaire 
(PSEQ; Nicholas, 1988). In addition, two pain control items included in the CSQ 
(perceived ability to control pain and perceived ability to reduce pain) measure what 
might be described as pain coping self-efficacy – one’s perceived ability to reduce or 
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control pain via use of one’s coping repertoire. Measures differ markedly in item content, 
with some scales focusing exclusively on pain control (such as the CSQ scales) and 
others focusing on self-efficacy for functional activities. The content of the PSEQ, for 
example, reflects self-efficacy beliefs relating to coping with pain (eg. “I can cope with 
pain without medication”), though it focuses primarily on self-efficacy relating to 
performing daily activities and functions (eg. “I can still do many of the things I enjoy 
doing, such as hobbies or leisure activities, despite the pain”). Certain studies measuring 
functional self-efficacy have devised single items or a set of single items regarding the 
participant’s belief that they are capable of engaging in a particular activity, such an 
exercise bout or physical task that serves as the criterion variable. For example, Dolce, 
Crocker, Moletteire and Doleys (1986) used a single item “How many repetitions of this 
exercise do you feel you are capable of doing right now?”. Lackner, et al. (1996) devised 
their own Functional Self-Efficacy Scale that consists of a list of 33 physical 
requirements of work (such as lifting, pulling, carrying). Participants rated the tasks they 
considered to be essential to their own work, their belief that they can perform those 
tasks, and their confidence that they could perform the tasks sufficiently to complete a 
job. A similar scale was used by Barry, et al. (2003), measuring participant’s confidence 
that they could perform ten activities required for functional independence (eg. house 
cleaning, preparing a meal). 
4.3.1.4 Pain Expectancies and Expectancy Theory 
Social learning theory suggests that expectations play an important role in the 
determination of an individual’s behaviour (Bandura, 1986). Outcome expectancies, for 
example, involve an individual’s belief that a given action will result in a certain outcome 
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(Bandura, 1977). This construct has been used in pain research to investigate the role of 
beliefs that given behaviours or coping strategies will result in pain reduction (Jensen, 
Turner, Romano & Karoly, 1991). However, once self-efficacy beliefs are controlled, 
outcome expectancies have generally demonstrated little predictive utility (eg. Council, 
Ahern, Follick, & Kline, 1988; Jensen, Turner & Romano, 1991). 
Individuals’ expectations about the intensity of subsequent pain have also been examined. 
Theoretically, a strong pain expectancy is a disincentive for investing effort into goals 
and persisting in goal-related behaviour. Thus, pain expectancies are said to contribute to 
dysfunction via avoidance and behavioural disengagement, which contribute to 
problematic consequences of pain behaviour, such as muscular disuse and atrophy, and/or 
guarding and muscle tension (Dolce, et al., 1986; Turk & Rudy, 1992). Though not 
mentioned formally in fear-avoidance models of pain, pain expectancy tacitly play a 
central role in these models. Predictions of pain increases (presumably associated with 
expectations about pain-related activities) are thought to generate anxiety, which directly 
contributes to behavioural avoidance (Asmundson, Norton, & Vlaeyen, 2004). 
A number of studies have linked pain expectancy to performance and behavioural 
avoidance in standardized exercise tasks. Lackner, et al. (1996) found that pain 
expectancy correlated significantly with performance in three of five behavioural tasks: 
static pushing (r=-0.31), bilateral carrying (r=-0.34), and lifting from waist to eye level 
(r=-0.24). Injury expectancy correlated with only carrying (r=-0.37). However, 
controlling for functional self-efficacy, pain expectancy showed only one significant 
partial correlation, with bilateral carrying (r=-0.29). 
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Murphy, et al. (1997) suggested that chronic pain patients tend to under-predict the pain 
they will experience upon exertion, and that under-prediction is associated with a 
subsequent increase in predicted pain, and subsequent avoidance of exertion. Murphy and 
colleagues compared pain expectancies to actual pain experienced after 20 chronic pain 
patients completed each of three sets of standardized exercises. They found that predicted 
pain increased from the first to the third exercise, but experienced pain did not. At their 
initial rating of pain expectancy, 60% of participants under-predicted pain, 25% over 
predicted, and 15% correctly predicted. For those who under-predicted, greater under-
predictions of pain prior to the first exercise were associated with larger increases in 
prediction over subsequent trials. Absolute pain expectancies, but not actual pain, was 
related to anxiety – those who expected more pain tended do report greater anxiety. 
Conversely, actual pain experienced during the exercise was related to performance on 
the exercise, but pain predicted for that exercise was not. However, the discrepancy 
between predicted and actual pain on the first exercise was related to performance on 
subsequent exercises – those whose experienced pain exceeded their expectations 
engaged less in the subsequent exercise task.  
Crombez, et al. (1996) had 29 low-back pain sufferers perform a series of standardized 
exercise bouts, making between-bout ratings of current pain, maximum pain during the 
previous bout, pain expectancy for the subsequent bout, and fear of injury during the 
previous bout. Contrasting with Murphy, et al.’s (1997) findings, they found that 
participants initially over-predicted pain, and corrected their predictions over subsequent 
trials to more closely match actual pain levels experienced. Pain expectancy had no 
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impact on the amount of subsequent pain experienced, though it was associated with an 
elevated expectation of injury and a reduction in subsequent performance. 
The possibility that the effects of pain expectancy are due to more catastrophising-like 
appraisals, such as expectations of harm or injury, was explored by Cipher & Fernandez 
(1997). They had 39 general chronic pain patients undergo a cold-pressor task to measure 
pain tolerance, and, as a measure of avoidance, asked them to indicate their willingness to 
engage in a further trial. Prior to the cold-pressor task subjects indicated how much pain 
they expected to experience (pain expectancy), how long they predicted they would be 
able to hold their hand in the water (response expectancy), how confident they were of 
maintaining their hand in the water for that amount of time (self-efficacy expectancy), 
and how much harm or danger they believed was associated with the task (danger 
expectancy). They found that only response expectancy predicted pain tolerance, whereas 
only danger expectancy predicted avoidance. They concluded that avoidance of activity 
amongst chronic pain patients may be related more to expectations about possible harm, 
rather than expectations of increased pain per se. 
In summary, laboratory tasks suggest that pain expectancies are not necessarily accurate, 
with initial inaccuracies being corrected over time. Expectancies appear to be linked to 
task performance and persistence, and to anxiety experienced during the task. Part of 
these effects may, however, be due to catastrophic thinking about injury or harm. 
Murphy, et al.’s (1997) work suggested that behavioural avoidance may be more likely 
when pain expectancies are low and “mismatch” with high levels of subsequent pain. 
Research by Van Damme, Crombez & Eccleston (2002) suggested that pain expectancy 
(specifically, predictions of the likelihood of pain following a pain-related cue) plays an 
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attentional role by drawing attention to pain-related cues thereby disrupting processing of 
non-painful stimuli. Further, they suggested that pain expectancies may play a more 
primary role in attentional allocation than catastrophising. They subjected 40 
undergraduate students to an experimental attention-allocation task whereby either pain- 
or neutral cues (presentation of the words “pain” and “tone”) were presented prior to 
either a pain (electric shock) or non-pain (tone) stimuli. There was no contingency 
between the cue and stimulus (the pain- and neutral- cues were randomly followed by 
either of the stimuli), however participants nonetheless reported expectancies that the 
pain cue would be followed by a painful stimulus. Van-Damme and colleagues found that 
those classified as catastrophisers, according to the PCS, took longer to disengage their 
attention from pain cues. That is, their response to neutral stimuli following pain cues 
was more delayed than non-catastrophisers. However, pain-expectancies accounted for 
this effect. The degree to which participants (erroneously) expected a pain cue to be 
followed by a painful stimuli was associated with the amount of attentional allocation to 
pain-related cues.  
In terms of the measurement of pain expectancy, Lackner, et al. (1996) developed a 
Functional Reinjury-Pain Expectancy Scale (incorporated in their Functional Self-
Efficacy Scale) measuring participant’s beliefs that a list of job-related physical tasks 
would result in pain and reinjury. However, all other studies described above adopted 
single item measures of pain expectancy. For example, between exercise bouts, Crombez, 
et al.'s (1996) participants rated the pain they expected to experience on the same verbal-
graphical rating scale they used to measure current pain intensity. Murphy, et al. (1997)  
used the same visual analogue scale to measure expected and actual pain before and after 
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exercise bouts. For Cipher and Fernandez’s (1997) cold-pressor task they had participants 
rate “How much pain do you expect to experience while your hand is in the water?” on a 
ten point scale. 
There appears to be a scarcity of studies that look at the impact of pain expectancies 
outside laboratory environments. This may be because of the challenge presented in using 
cross-sectional designs to look for meaningful relationships between stable outcomes 
(such as depression) and pain expectancy – which is inherently an appraisal that changes 
from moment to moment. Thus, little is known about how pain expectancies fluctuate in 
the natural environment, or about the antecedents or adaptational consequences of free-
flowing pain expectancies. In the current study, natural variations in pain expectancies 
are monitored throughout the course of participants’ daily lives, and the adaptational 
consequences of those expectancies are investigated. 
4.3.2 Coping and Adaptation 
The nature, determinants and consequences of pain-coping strategies have received a 
large amount of research attention (Jensen, Turner, Romano & Karoly, 1991). It is an 
area of research with obvious implications for clinical practice, helping guide clinicians 
to identify and reshape patients’ coping repertoire to suit individual differences in 
pathology and personality.  
Pain coping strategies have been classified along a number of dimensions. Probably the 
most utilized method of assessing coping is via scales Rosenstiel and Keefe (1983) 
developed on an a priori basis for the Coping Strategy Questionnaire – Diverting 
Attention, Reinterpreting Pain Sensations, Coping Self-Statements, Ignoring Pain 
Sensations, Praying or Hoping, Increasing Activity Level, and Catastrophising.  
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Using six of the original CSQ scales (omitting the Catastrophising scale) Jensen and 
Karoly (1991) found that ignoring pain, coping self-statements, and increased activities 
were associated with greater psychological well-being.  
According to Robinson, et al. (1997), the praying scale of the CSQ was related to 
depression measured by the BDI. No other coping strategy was associated with 
depression with the exception of the CSQ Catastrophising scale. Robinson, et al. (1997) 
found that both the ignoring pain-sensations and coping self-statement scales of the CSQ 
were related to better functioning according to the MPI Activity scales (r= 0.19 to 0.26). 
In contrast, Jensen and Karoly (1991) found that ignoring pain, coping self-statements, 
and diverting attention were associated with better functioning, only for people reporting 
lower pain intensity.  
In Robinson, et al.’s (1997) study, the distraction and praying scales were related to 
greater pain severity on the MPI (r= 0.2 and 0.24 respectively). None of the non-
catastrophising CSQ scales correlated with scales of the McGill PRS. Contrasting with 
this, Turner and Clancy (1986) found that an increase in coping via praying and hoping 
from pre- to post- CBT treatment was associated with decreased pain intensity. 
A number of dimensions of coping have been investigated based on empirically-derived 
CSQ factors. Factor analytic studies of the CSQ have adopted two (Nicholas, 1988; 
Keefe, Caldwell, Queen, Gil, Martinez, Crisson, Ogden, & Nunley, 1987), three 
(Rosenstiel and Keefe, 1983; Turner and Clancy, 1986; Hill 1993), five (Tuttle, Shutty & 
DeGood, 1991; Swartzman, Gwadry, Shapiro, & Teasell, 1994) and six (Robinson, et al., 
1997) factor solutions. However, clarity regarding the appropriate structure of the CSQ 
has been obscured by large diversity in approaches taken in factor analysis. Confirmatory 
89 
factor analyses on large samples have suggested both three factor (Lawson, Reesor, 
Keefe, & Turner, 1990)  and six factor (Riley & Robinson, 1997) models. All of the 
factor analytic studies reported above included the CSQ’s catastrophising scale. The 
studies of Rosenstiel and Keefe (1983), Keefe, et al. (1987), Hill (1993) and Lawson, et 
al., (1990) also included the pain control and pain reduction items. These studies, and one 
by Nicholas (1988), analysed the factor structure of the CSQ’s a priori subscales, 
whereas the studies of Tuttle, et al. (1991), Swartzman, et al. (1994), Robinson, et al. 
(1997) and Riley & Robinson (1997) analyzed the CSQ at the item-level. 
Rosenstiel and Keefe's (1983) factor analysis of the eight CSQ scales identified three 
factors, Cognitive Coping And Suppression, Helplessness, and Diverting Attention And 
Praying. The reported frequency of use of these strategies was not related to pain history, 
disability status, or number of surgeries. In total, the three coping factors accounted for 
61% of the variance in trait anxiety (measured on the STAI – Trait scale), 37% of 
average pain level (measured via three 11-point pain ratings), 23% of depression, and 
19% of functional capacity (measured on the Functional Capacity Evaluation Scale and a 
measure of downtime). After controlling for disability status, pain history, previous 
surgeries, and somatization, the three factors accounted for significant variance in 
depression (R2 change=11%), pain intensity (R2 change=22%), state anxiety (R2 
change=14%), and functional capacity (R2 change=12%). Specifically, diverting attention 
and praying was associated with higher average pain and lower functional capacity, 
helplessness was associated with greater depression and anxiety, and cognitive coping 
and suppression with poorer functional capacity.  
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Based on Rosenstiel and Keefe's (1983) three factor model, Keefe, Crisson, Urban & 
Williams (1990) found that the Helplessness factor (consisting of the CSQ’s 
catastrophising and pain control items) accounted for substantial proportions of variance 
in depression (46%) and global symptoms of psychological distress (50%, measured on 
the SCL-90), controlling for demographic and medical status variables. Helplessness was 
associated with greater psychological symptoms and depression. The Diverting Attention 
and Praying factor accounted for only a moderate proportion of variance in pain 
(measured by the McGill pain questionnaire), and was associated with increased pain. 
Cognitive Coping And Suppression factor was a weak but significant predictor of greater 
psychological symptoms.  
In a heterogeneous pain sample of 152 participants, Geisser, et al. (1994) performed a 
principal components analysis only on the cognitive coping subscales of the CSQ. They 
identified two factors, which they labeled “Conscious Cognitive Coping” (CCC; 
consisting of the Coping Self Statements, Ignoring Sensations, and Reinterpreting Pain 
subscales) and “Pain Avoidance” (consisting of the Divert Attention and Praying/Hoping 
subscales). Catastrophising, the two pain-coping self-efficacy scales, and the Increasing 
Activities, CCC, and Pain Avoidance scales were entered in regression analyses 
prediciting MPI Affective Distress and Perceived Interference. In first-order analyses, 
perceived ability to decrease and control pain, catastrophising, and the Pain Avoidance 
scale were related to increased affective distress on the MPI. Within the Pain Avoidance 
Scale, only praying/hoping was associated with distress. Pain Avoidance no longer 
predicted MPI Affective Distress once age, education, McGill total PRI, and BDI scores 
were covaried. The same first-order correlates, except for ability to control pain, were 
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related to the MPI Life Interference scale. Pain Avoidance was the only significant 
predictor in a regression analysis – associated with increased perceived life interference. 
Other standardised measures of pain-specific coping have also been employed. The CPCI 
measures eight a priori dimensions of behavioural coping deemed to be important as 
targets of treatment (guarding, resting, asking for assistance, relaxation, task persistence, 
exercise/stretch, seek support, and coping self-statements). The Cognitive Coping 
Strategy Inventory (CCSI; Butler, Damarin, Beaulieu, Schwebel, & Thorn, 1989; Rokke 
& al’Absi, 1992) was developed to assess coping strategies used in acute pain though it 
has also been used to assess coping with chronic pain. Its seven subscales are labelled 
Imaginative Inattention, Imaginative Transformation – Context, Imaginative 
Transformation – Sensations, Attention Diversion – External, Attention Diversion – 
Internal, Somatization, and Catastrophising. Most of the research on the CCSI has been 
done in the acute-pain arena. For example, Rokke and al’Absi (1992) administered the 
CCSI to undergraduate students to determine the strategies they were most likely to use 
under normal circumstances. Before subjecting the students to a cold-pressor task, the 
researchers either allowed the student to choose which strategy they would use, allocated 
them a strategy that matched their CCSI preferences, or allocated a mismatched strategy. 
Pain threshold and tolerance was lower for those who used a mismatched strategy. 
4.3.2.1 Theoretical Models of Coping: Active and Passive Coping 
Katz, et al. (1996) noted that the distinction between emotion-focused and problem-
focused coping is problematic when distinguishing between strategies for coping with 
pain, largely because pain itself is understood as an inherently emotional experience. In 
terms of theoretically derived models of coping, the pain literature has tended to utilize 
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the presumably more appropriate active versus passive dimensions (Brown & Nicassio, 
1987). According to Brown and Nicassio (1987), passive coping strategies are those 
which are reliant on external sources for pain control, or which allow other life areas to 
be adversely effected by pain. Active strategies are those that are used to actively control 
the pain or to function despite pain. Snow Turek, Norris, and Tan (1996) suggest that the 
active/passive dimensions display greater predictive validity than the problem 
focused/emotion focused dimensions in terms of their relationship to outcomes such as 
positive affect, depression, and distress (eg. Holmes and Stevenson, 1990). Active and 
passive coping have primarily been measured via the Vanderbilt Pain Management 
Inventory (Brown and Nicassio, 1987), and an active/passive factor solution of the CSQ 
(Nicholas, 1988), but the Pain Coping Inventory (PCI; Kraaimaat, Bakker & Evers, 1997) 
has also been used. The PCI measures passive coping strategies including restricting 
functioning, avoiding environmental stimulation, and catastrophising, whilst the active 
scale involves distraction, reinterpreting and transforming pain, and functioning in spite 
of pain. 
To assess the validity of the active and passive coping constructs Brown and Nicassio 
(1987)  conducted Principal Axis Factoring with orthogonal rotation on their 27 item 
Vanderbilt Pain Management Inventory using a sample of 259 rheumatoid arthritis 
patients. They confirmed the factorial solution via LISREL on a further 101 rheumatoid 
arthritis patients. They identified two internally consistent scales reflecting active 
(alpha=0.71) and passive (alpha= 0.82) coping, which were slightly negatively correlated 
(r=-0.29), and stable over 6-months (r=.65 and 0.69 respectively). The passive scale 
incorporated such behaviours as calling health care providers, engaging in wish fulfilling 
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thoughts, and restricting functioning due to pain. It did not incorporate cognitive 
elements, such as catastrophising and low coping self-efficacy, as does the CSQ and PCI.  
Snow Turek, et al. (1996) constructed active and passive coping scales from CSQ items 
based on a factor analysis conducted by Nicholas (1988). The passive coping scale was 
composed of the CSQ Praying/Hoping and Catastrophising scales. The active coping 
scale was composed of the remaining CSQ scales. The CSQ and Vanderbilt scales 
correlated r=.56 for active coping and 0.71 for passive coping. 
There is a large literature on determinants of coping styles, which will not be reviewed 
here except to note that active and passive pain coping has been linked to a number of 
person variables, including personality and demographic factors. For example, Ramirex-
Maestre, Martinez, and Zarazaga (2004) looked at personality factors influencing coping 
in 96 general chronic pain sufferers, using the Eysenck Personality Inventory and the 
Vanderbilt Pain Management Inventory. They found a positive relationship between 
neuroticism, pain intensity, and use of passive coping strategies. Extraversion was related 
to use of active coping strategies and lower reports of pain.  
Coping styles are also likely to be influenced by demographic characteristics. For 
example, Brown and Nicassio (1987) reported that active coping was associated with 
more education, and that females tended to engage in more active and passive coping. 
Mercado, Carrol, Cassidy, and Cote (2000) also found that those with higher education 
were likely to engage in more active coping, but that females were more likely to engage 
in active coping only. They reported that passive coping was more prevalent amongst 
those who were married. Watkins, Shifren, Park, and Morrell (1999) found that older 
participants were more likely than younger participants to report using passive coping 
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when dealing with mild pain. In seeming contrast to the previous studies, Ramirex-
Maestre, et al. (2004) found that men and elderly participants were more likely to use 
active coping. 
Characteristics of the pain experience have also been linked to the use of active and 
passive coping. For example, Watkins, et al. (1999) asked 121 individuals with 
rheumatoid arthritis to complete a modified version of the CSQ according to strategies 
they use for mild versus severe pain. They found that participants reported using more 
active coping for mild pain and passive coping for severe pain. Snow Turek, et al. (1996) 
found that patients with longer pain histories reported greater use of passive coping 
strategies. 
Coping may play a role in the aetiology of chronic pain conditions. Hadjistavropoulos & 
Craig (1994) compared CSQ scores of individuals with acute pain, chronic pain 
congruent with an identifiable pathology, and “incongruent” chronic pain. They found 
that chronic incongruent and acute patients displayed greater passive coping than chronic 
“congruents”. One explanation of these findings was that, although passive coping may 
be a common response to acute pain, those who go on to have more complex medically-
incongruent pain syndromes fail to develop alternative, presumably more functional, 
ways of coping compared to those whose pain is a reflection of ongoing verifiable 
pathology. 
Research using the Vanderbilt scales appears to suggest that active coping is associated 
with positive adaptation and passive coping with negative adaptation. For example, 
Brown and Nicassio (1987) reported that depression and helplessness were associated 
with lower engagement in active coping behaviours and greater use of passive coping. 
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Passive coping was associated with greater pain and functional impairment whilst active 
coping displayed the opposite relationships. Bishop & Warr (2003), also using the 
Vanderbilt scale, investigated pain, disability and mood amongst 68 breast-cancer 
patients with chronic pain. Controlling for pain and catastrophising, active coping was 
associated with less disability and passive coping with greater disability. Active coping 
was also associated with reduced depression. Mercado, et al. (2000), surveyed 655 people 
with neck or low-back pain, and found that passive coping was related to illness, 
depression, and greater pain severity, whereas active coping was negatively associated 
with depression and illness, and positively related to exercise frequency. Strahl, et al. 
(2000) found that, in a sample of RA patients, passive coping was associated with 
physical dysfunction and active coping was associated with greater social interaction, 
controlling for health status, demographic, and pain history variables. 
In contrast, Snow Turek, et al.'s (1996) findings suggest that whereas passive coping is 
associated with adverse outcomes on both the CSQ and Vanderbilt, active coping may 
also be associated with adverse adjustment – but only according to the CSQ. They 
compared the predictive roles of the CSQ and Vanderbilt active and passive scales, 
controlling for age, gender, SES, disability support status, pain history, and pain severity. 
For the CSQ, active coping accounted for significant change in R-squared for activity 
level and depression, and passive coping accounted for significant change in R-squared 
for depression and psychological symptomatology. Both active and passive coping were 
associated with greater depression, though passive coping was the better predictor (R-
square change= 0.05 for active coping and 0.23 for passive coping). CSQ active coping 
was associated with reduced activity according to the MPI, and passive coping was 
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associated with increased psychological symptomatology. Using the Vanderbilt scales, 
only passive coping was associated with significant R-squared change in psychological 
symptomatology and depression (it was related positively to both), whereas only active 
coping was associated with significant R-squared change in MPI Activity – it was related 
to greater functioning. Unlike Jensen and Karoly (1991), Snow Turek, et al. (1996) did 
not find an interaction between pain severity and coping strategy usage in the prediction 
of depression, psychological symptomatology, or activity level – either for the CSQ or 
Vanderbilt scales. 
Madland, Feinmann, and Newman’s (2000) findings in 80 patients with facial 
arthromyalgia did not appear to be promising for either active- or passive- coping 
according to the CSQ. They found that whilst passive coping, but not active coping, was 
associated with both depression and anxiety measured on the HADS, the only subscale 
predictive of anxiety and depression in multivariate analyses was catastrophising. Other 
studies using the CSQ have not found such dire results for the active-coping scale. Fisher, 
et al. (2001) found higher reports of passive coping and lower reports of active coping 
(measured via the CSQ) amongst 26 depressed general chronic pain inpatients compared 
to non-depressed inpatients.  
At least two studies have investigated the potential importance of active and passive 
coping in long-term prognosis. In a sample of 78 rheumatoid arthritis sufferers, Evers, 
Kraaimaat, Geenen, Jacobs, and Bijlsma (2003) demonstrated that passive coping at time 
of diagnosis, but not active coping, (measured by the PCI) predicted functional disability 
at three-years follow-up but not at five-years. In contrast, demographic variables, 
neuroticism and extraversion, disease status, pain intensity and active coping at the time 
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of diagnosis demonstrated no significant relationship with function at either follow-up. 
Neither form of coping was found to be related to pain intensity at three or five years 
follow-up. Brown and Nicassio (1987) found that over a shorter interval (6-months), 
controlling for adaptation at the time coping was measured, active coping predicted lower 
depression and greater physical activity, whilst passive coping predicted more frequent 
rheumatoid pain flare-ups, greater depression, and lower physical activity and 
engagement in ADLs. 
A number of authors have found that reduced passive coping is more associated with 
adaptive functioning than increased active coping (Snow Turek, et al., 1996; Brown and 
Nicassio, 1987; Smith and Wallston 1992), reflecting Keefe, et al.'s (1987) assertion that 
“it’s not what you do, it’s what you don’t do”. Indeed, the importance of passive, and not 
active, coping is highlighted in fear-avoidance models where passive, avoidant ways of 
reacting to pain are said to be associated directly with disability, physical disuse, and 
depression (Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000). Behavioural models of depression, too, suggest 
that reduced involvement in pleasant activities – possibly as a result of passive coping – 
would contribute to the onset of depression (Lewinsohn, 1974). Robinson, et al. (1997) 
noted that many studies employing the CSQ have failed to find associations between 
indices of adaptation and theoretically adaptive coping scales such as coping self-
statements, distraction, and ignoring or reinterpreting pain sensations. For example, 
Jensen, Turner, and Romano (1994) found a predominant change in use of passive coping 
when investigating adaptational outcomes in the context of pre- to post-treatment changes 
in coping strategy usage. Although this contrasts with findings that active coping 
increases after cognitive-behavioural treatment for rheumatoid arthritis (Evers, 
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Kraaimaat, Geenen, Jacobs, & de Jong, 2002) and low-back pain (Nicholas, et al., 1992) 
– such changes may reflect increased use of active coping due to coping training, rather 
than any possible role active coping may play in the process of therapeutic change per se. 
Rosenstiel and Keefe (1983) also noted that catastrophising appeared to have a greater 
impact on adjustment than active use of coping strategies (see also Spanos, Radtke-
Bodorik, Ferguson, & Jones, 1979). According to Robinson, et al. (1997), whilst 
responses to CSQ items reflect respondent’s perceptions of coping strategy usage, their 
actual usage of these strategies may be imperfect, misconceived and inconsistent. That is, 
respondents who endorse the use of a certain strategy would be unlikely to define the 
strategy in the same way it would be taught, for example, in a coping skills intervention. 
Such factors may conceal the predictive validity of coping strategies – especially active 
strategies, which may demonstrate greater effects when they are used consistently and in 
an appropriate manner. This may partly account for the lack of findings that adaptive 
strategies (as opposed to decreased use of maladaptive strategies) are associated with 
greater adaptive functioning and psychological wellbeing. Rosenstiel and Keefe (1983) 
stated that the effectiveness and frequency of coping strategy usage, as reported on the 
CSQ, may differ if participants undergo systematic coping skills training. Alternatively, 
active coping strategies may indeed be less relevant in the chronic setting, being 
predominantly effective for acute pain or only mild and transient flare-ups of chronic 
pain. Rosenstiel and Keefe (1983) noted that prior research into coping with experimental 
pain demonstrates that coping is associated with lower pain ratings (eg. (Kanfer and 
Goldfoot 1966; Spanos, Horton, & Chaves, 1975; Rybstein-Blinchik, 1979). They 
suggested that the relative lack of effect of coping on pain in their findings for the CSQ 
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strategies suggest that different mechanisms may be involved in coping with acute versus 
chronic pain.  
A number of cross-sectional studies have demonstrated that use of active coping 
strategies (eg. Snow Turek, et al., 1996) and strategies traditionally seen as active (eg. 
cognitive coping and suppression in Rosenstiel and Keefe’s (1983) and Keefe, et al.’s 
(1990) studies) are actually related to negative adaptational outcomes. Open-minded 
researchers must entertain the possibility that use of active coping strategies may indeed 
generate distress, and/or impair function. Alternatively, these findings may represent an 
example of the ambiguous direction of causality in cross-sectional research. For example, 
it is also likely that impaired function, increased pain, and/or emotional distress prompt 
the use of active coping strategies as an attempt at self-regulation. The strategies 
themselves may either be ineffective in improving adaptation or may have a beneficial 
effect that, in cross-sectional studies, is masked by the positively correlated causative 
effect of distress, pain  or functional impairment. 
4.3.2.2 Coping With Chronic Pain: Conceptual and Theoretical Issues 
The relationship between coping and adaptation remains ambiguous, and it may not be a 
straight-forward matter of some strategies, or class of strategies, being universally and 
consistently maladaptive, whilst others are adaptive. Stewart, et al. (2001) stated that the 
range of strategies used, use of particular combinations of strategies, flexibility in the use 
of strategies, and the interaction between patterns of strategy use and variables such as 
pain intensity or appraisal may all account for the outcome of coping efforts. For 
example, several studies have demonstrated that the efficacy of coping efforts does 
depend to some extent on pain intensity. The selection of strategies may depend on pain 
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severity (eg. Estlander and Haerkaepaeae, 1989), and the relationship between coping 
usage and distress may reduce as pain intensity increases (eg. Brown, Nicassio, & 
Wallston, 1989; Jensen and Karoly, 1991). 
There are also suggestions that coping strategy usage is influenced by appraisal 
processes, as would also be suggested by Stress and Coping theory. For example, Turner, 
Clancy and Vitaliano (1987) found that certain beliefs were associated with reported use 
of coping strategies on the Ways Of Coping checklist. Those who accepted their pain and 
who did not believe that pain should hold one back in one’s life were more likely to 
report use of problem-solving strategies. A belief that one is able to change one’s pain 
was associated with coping by wishful thinking, and avoidance coping was more likely in 
those who reportedly believed that their pain would not be resolved within four years. 
Robinson, et al. (1997) found that those who demonstrated lower perceived life 
interference were more likely to cope via ignoring sensations (r= -0.22), and less likely to 
cope via distraction and praying (r= 0.19 and 0.16 respectively). Brown and Nicassio 
(1987) reported that active coping was associated with higher internal locus of control 
and self-efficacy, whilst passive coping was associated with lower internal locus of 
control, lower general self-efficacy, and higher powerful-other and chance loci of control. 
Crisson and Keefe (1988), also, found that coping strategies were related to locus-of-
control. They found that a chance-locus-of-control was associated with the Helplessness 
factor of the CSQ and increased reported use of the diverting attention and 
praying/hoping coping styles. 
However, although cognitive-styles may influence coping selection, the relationship 
between appraisal and coping may not be one-way. Brown and Nicassio's (1987) 
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exploration of the predictive role of active and passive coping scales suggests that 
strategy usage may modify appraisal processes over time. Such a notion would not appear 
to conflict with Stress and Coping theory. Over a six-month interval, controlling for 
appraisals at the time coping was measured, they found that active coping predicted lower 
chance locus of control, and greater internal locus of control and general self-efficacy. 
Passive coping predicted greater powerful-other and chance locus of control, and lower 
general self-efficacy. 
As a final comment on the complexity of findings of pain coping, Robinson, et al. (1997) 
suggested that effects of coping may be obscured by differential effects on positive 
versus negative affectivity. That is, some adaptive strategies may increase positive affect 
rather than decreasing distress. They suggest that because coping strategies tend to load 
on separate factors, theoretically “adaptive” and “maladaptive” classes of coping 
strategies represent separate indices that will not necessarily influence the same outcome 
variables in the same way.  
Assessment of pain coping has been criticised on a number of grounds, with a number of 
authors being critical of measurement of coping via coping scales (eg. Jensen, Turner, 
Romano & Karoly, 1991; Jensen, Turner, & Romano, 1992). Stone and Kennedy-Moore 
(1992) suggested that the items within a coping subscale will not necessarily co-vary 
because coping efforts do not necessarily conform to trait-like patterns.  Folkman (1991) 
stated that because coping efforts vary within individuals, process-oriented approaches 
are necessarily to capture temporal dynamics and interactions between environmental 
conditions and coping behaviour. Such portrayals of coping are consistent with 
suggestions (eg. Lazarus, 2000) that coping efforts should be measured and assessed 
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using momentary intra-individual methodologies as a means of accounting for variations 
in individual’s coping efforts and the resultant differential functional and emotional 
outcomes. Such an approach was used in the current study. 
4.3.3 Integration of Appraisal and Coping 
Stress and Coping theory would appear to make a number of predictions regarding the 
relationships between pain, appraisals, coping and adaptation. For example, it would 
predict that pain appraisals and coping would account for adaptational outcomes 
independently of any direct effect pain may have on adaptational status. In operational 
terms, this hypothesis would suggest that appraisal and coping variables would account 
for significant variance in outcomes whilst controlling for pain intensity (eg. Rudy, Kerns 
& Turk, 1998). Stress and coping theory would also suggest that coping efforts are 
influenced by cognitive appraisals  (eg. Crisson & Keefe, 1988) and that coping and 
appraisal also exert independent effects on outcome (eg. Jenson & Karoly, 1991). 
Importantly, it would suggest that these relationships occur on an on-going basis within 
people, rather than being interacting trait-like factors that distinguish between people 
(Lazarus, 1993; 2000).  
Turner, et al. (2000) noted that although a cognitive-behavioural model of adaptation to 
chronic pain has been supported by studies examining the separate impact of appraisals 
and coping on adjustment, few studies have examined the relationships between 
adjustment, coping, and appraisal in the same study. This still appears to be the case. 
Furthermore, they stated that although coping and appraisal may interact reciprocally (for 
example, appraisal may influence the nature and/or impact of coping efforts, and coping 
may reciprocally influence appraisal processes) it is important to first examine the 
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independent relationships between adjustment, appraisal, and coping. Turner, et al. 
suggested that one rationale for this line of enquiry is to establish key goals of targeted 
psychological interventions for chronic pain. If it can be established that certain beliefs, 
coping strategies, or appraisals are unrelated to adaptation, whilst others have effects of 
varying degrees, the efficiency and effectiveness of interventions can be enhanced by 
modifications on the basis of such empirical findings. Few studies have explicitly 
addressed these issues in the chronic pain literature, however Jensen and Karoly (1991) 
and Turner, et al. (2000) are illustrative examples of studies that have done so explicitly. 
Jensen and Karoly (1991) noted the possible role of pain-intensity as a confound in the 
relationship between psychological factors and adjustment. Namely, pain intensity may 
influence both appraisal and adjustment separately, and if it is not co-varied a spurious 
relationship between appraisal, coping, and adaptation may appear. Indeed, Jensen and 
Karoly (1991) suggested that pain intensity may interact with psychological factors to 
influence adaptation, and this was one of the models they tested. They also investigated 
the possible mediating role of coping in the appraisal-adaptation relationship.  
In a sample of 118 former participants in a multidisciplinary pain program with 
heterogenous pain conditions, Jensen and Karoly (1991) set out to address the following 
issues: (1) is appraisal of control over pain related to adjustment, and is this relationship 
moderated by pain intensity?; (2) does coping relate to adjustment, and is this effect 
moderated by pain intensity?;  (3) do control appraisals or the appraisal/pain interaction 
relate to adjustment once the possible influence of coping strategy usage is controlled?  
Jensen and Karoly’s (1991) measure of control appraisal was a factor score derived from 
the SOPA’s Pain Control scale, the two pain-coping self-efficacy items from the CSQ, 
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and an item enquiring about belief that the participant had control over the effects of pain 
on their life. Pain-intensity was also a factor score composed of 101-point NRS ratings of 
current, average, most and least pain, and how many days per week participants 
experienced “intolerable pain”. Coping was measured via the six subscales of the CSQ, 
excluding the catastrophising scale. Factor analysis was also used to derive three indices 
of adaptation: Activity Level (consisting of three of the activity scales of the MPI), 
Medication Use and Professional Service Utilisation (assessed via a series of 
questionnaire items), and Psychological Functioning (consisting of the CES-D and a 
measure of life-satisfaction). 
Jensen and Karoly (1991) found that pain severity accounted for 13% of variance in 
psychological functioning, and 6% of variance in activity-level.  
In hierarchical multiple regression analyses, control appraisals were related to 
psychological functioning, contributing an additional 11% variance to what was 
accounted for by pain intensity. In a subsequent analysis this relationship was no longer 
significant after controlling for coping strategy usage. They suggested that the action of 
control appraisals may not be directly on psychological well-being, as proposed by 
learned helplessness theory, but via the application of adaptive coping. In terms of 
activity-level, Jensen and Karoly (1991) found a significant interaction term with pain 
intensity, indicating that control appraisals related to function for those with less intense 
pain but not those with severe pain. Coping did not account for this effect in subsequent 
analyses. Control appraisals were unrelated to medication usage and medical service 
utilisation after controlling for pain severity. 
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In separate hierarchical regression analyses for each coping strategy, Jensen and Karoly 
(1991) found that ignoring pain, coping self-statements, and increasing activities were 
related to psychological functioning, accounting for 7%, 10% and 12% respectively, 
controlling for pain intensity. No strategy demonstrated a direct relationship with 
activity-level, however ignoring pain, diverting attention, and coping self-statements 
were associated with better functioning only for people reporting lower pain intensity. 
Coping was unrelated to medication usage and medical service utilisation after 
controlling for pain severity. 
In a sample of 169 people with heterogenous pain conditions waiting to commence a 
multidisciplinary pain program Turner, et al. (2000) sought to explore the unique 
relationships between pain beliefs, catastrophising, coping, and two indices of adaptation: 
depression and physical disability. They did so by running three hierarchical multiple 
regression analyses to predict depression and three predicting disability, entering beliefs, 
catastrophising and coping, respectively, in the last step whilst controlling the other two. 
Only the results for catastrophising and coping will be discussed here. Turner, et al. 
(2000) also co-varied age, gender, and pain intensity, in order to reveal the effect of the 
psychological variables independently of the effect of pain intensity and demographics. 
The current study follows this same rationale in as much as pain-intensity is controlled in 
the initial step of all hierarchical analyses. 
Turner, et al. (2000) measured depression via the CES-D, disability via the Roland-
Morris scale, pain on a single 11-point NRS of average pain over the past fortnight, 
catastrophising via the CSQ, coping via the CSQ (using six of the original subscales) and 
the CPCI, and beliefs via the SOPA and PBAPI.  
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In the prediction of depression, age and gender accounted for 9% of variance, with pain 
intensity adding a unique 6%. Catastrophising and coping collectively accounted for 43% 
of variance in depression. When catastrophising was added last it was associated with 
greater depression, accounting for an additional 19% unique variance. The unique 
variance attributable to coping was not significant, though active coping demonstrated a 
significant effect – being associated with reduced distress. This strategy reflected CPCI 
Coping Self-Statements (eg. telling oneself things could be worse, comparison of one-self 
to others, trying to see the pain in a more optimistic light), diverting attention, asking for 
assistance, and increasing behavioural activities. First-order correlations between the 
basic coping strategies and depression revealed that guarding, and lower ignoring, coping 
self-statements, behavioural activities, task persistence, and exercising/stretching were 
associated with greater depression. 
In the prediction of disability, pain, age and gender was associated with 8% of variability, 
all of which was attributable to pain intensity. Catastrophising and coping accounted for 
34% of variance. Catastrophising did not contribute independently to the prediction of 
disability. Interestingly, it did demonstrate a significant first-order relationship, 
suggesting that any affect of catastrophising on disability may have been due to pain-
intensity, demographic, or coping factors. Coping demonstrated the strongest effect, 
contributing 12% unique variance beyond that accounted for by the other predictors. 
Specifically, only the Activity Restriction scale demonstrated a significant effect. The 
first-order correlations of the subscales suggested that disability was related to coping via 
praying/hoping, guarding, resting, asking for assistance, and less use of ignoring and task 
persistence.  
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Collectively, these two studies provide a limited picture of the interactive relationship 
between pain intensity, appraisals, coping, and psychological and physical adaptation. In 
terms of appraisal, Jensen and Karoly (1991) demonstrated that the effect of pain control 
appraisals on distress, whilst independent of pain intensity, appeared to be attributable to 
coping. In contrast, catastrophising, according to Turner, et al. (2000), had a negative 
relationship with distress that was independent of pain intensity and coping strategy 
usage.  
As for coping and distress, whereas Jensen and Karoly’s (1991) study found that ignoring 
pain, coping self-statements, and increasing activities (traditionally seen as active coping 
strategies) were associated with reduced distress, they did not control for the possible 
confounding influence of appraisal. Indeed, Turner, et al. (2000) found that coping had 
no significant effect having controlled for pain intensity and appraisal (ie. 
catastrophising). Interestingly, active coping strategies demonstrated a significant beta-
coefficient, and strategies associated with active-coping had significant first-order 
correlations with distress – suggesting that whilst active coping may ameliorate distress, 
these effects may be due primarily to reduced catastrophic thinking.  
As for function, Jensen and Karoly (1991) found that control appraisal was independently 
related to function, but only for those with low pain intensity. The effect of 
catastrophising on function, according to Turner, et al. (2000) was attributable to other 
factors – possibly pain intensity or coping – that were not statistically disentangled. The 
possible mediating role of pain intensity on catastrophising was not tested, suggesting 
that, like control appraisals, catastrophising may influence function for only those with a 
certain level of pain intensity (c.f. Sullivan, et al.’s (2000) suggestion that catastrophising 
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only had an impact on exercise performance under conditions of pain, but not in the 
absence of pain). In Jensen and Karoly’s (1991) study, three coping strategies 
traditionally seen as active strategies were associated with better functioning for those 
with lower pain intensity. The possible confounding effect of appraisal was not 
investigated in that study. Turner, et al.’s (2000) study, which included a wider range of 
coping strategies associated with passive coping, found that such strategies were related 
to poorer functioning, independently of pain intensity and appraisal. The traditional 
active strategies were not prominent predictors in this study, possibly because the 
potential moderating role of pain intensity was not investigated, leaving open the 
possibility that active coping may have an effect for those with low pain intensity. Also, 
the lack of effect of active coping may have been attributable to the wider inclusion of 
passive strategies, or the co-variation of appraisals – either of which may have accounted 
for the effect of active coping on physical function.  
Unfortunately, Turner, et al. (2000) and Jensen & Karoly (1991)’s studies did not address 
the independent effects of catastrophising and control appraisals in the one study. 
Furthermore, pain appraisals are not limited to these two constructs – there are a number 
of appraisal factors that are theoretically important and have demonstrated a significant 
role in the literature. The unique relationship of a range of pain appraisals to adaptation 
ought to be addressed, controlling for pain and coping factors. That is one purpose of the 
current study. 
The cross-sectional studies of Turner, et al. (2000) and Jensen & Karoly (1991) fail to 
reveal anything about the intra-personal dynamics of the appraisal, coping and adaptation 
variables. Further, these studies are unable to suggest causal relationships – for example, 
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catastrophising and depression may be related either because catastrophising influences 
mood, or because in a depressed mood one is more likely to demonstrate catastrophic 
thinking. In fact, Turner, et al. (2000, p124) acknowledged that “current theories of stress 
and coping posit dynamic and reciprocal relationships among these variables that change 
over time”, and that “longitudinal research is needed to examine more closely the 
sequential relationships among [psychological factors], physical disability, and 
psychological adjustment”.  
To date, few EMA studies have adequately addressed momentary adaptational status in 
chronic pain from a stress and coping perspective. That is, few have investigated the 
within-person processes of appraisal and coping that influence changes in outcomes such 
as function and distress. The current project has taken such an approach. Similar to the 
studies of Turner, et al. (2000) and Jensen and Karoly (1991), the current project aims to 
identify the unique role of appraisal (controlling for pain intensity and coping) and the 
unique role of coping (controlling for pain intensity and appraisal). Unlike those studies, 
the current study is concerned not with general adaptation, but with momentary 
adaptational status. EMA is used to assess these within-person factors, and cross-lag 
analyses are used to facilitate interpretation of directional (and perhaps causal) 
relationships (eg. Bateman & Strasser, 1984). 
4.4 Intra-personal Mechanisms of Adaptation to Pain 
Only a small number of studies, described below, have investigated within-person 
appraisal and coping in EMA studies of chronic pain (Keefe, et al., 1997; Affleck, 
Urrows, et al., 1992; Grant, 1998; Catley, 1999). Prior to reviewing these studies, a brief 
overview of approaches to within-person assessment of appraisal and coping is provided. 
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4.4.1 Measurement of Appraisal and Coping for EMA Studies 
The studies below, with the exception of Catley (1999), involve once-per-day monitoring. 
All used paper-and-pencil questionnaires. So, rather than developing scales, researchers 
have tended to use pre-existing appraisal and coping scales adapted for daily diary use. 
Keefe, et al. (1997) and Grant (1998) measured pain-coping self-efficacy via the two 
CSQ pain items. Grant (1998) also used the CSQ to measure coping and catastrophising, 
and the pain self-efficacy scale of the Arthritis Self-Efficacy Scale. To measure coping, 
Keefe, et al. (1997) and Affleck, Urrows, et al., (1992) used a measure developed by 
Stone and Neale (1982) for use in daily diary research, the Daily Coping Inventory 
(DCI). These researchers adapted the scale for use in a chronic pain population (see 
Affleck, Urrows, et al., 1992). The DCI is a checklist consisting of seven items relating to 
(a) pain reduction efforts, (b) relaxation, (c) distraction, (d) redefinition, (e) venting 
emotions, (f) seeking emotional support, and (g) seeking spiritual comfort. 
4.4.2 Appraisal, Coping and Psychological Distress 
The first study to investigate daily coping and adaptation to chronic pain did not look at 
within-person effects, but the relationship between summary measures of coping and 
within-person trends in mood. Affleck, Urrows, et al. (1992) had 75 RA patients monitor 
their pain (via the RADAR), mood (via POMS scales), and coping (via the Daily Coping 
Inventory) for 75 consecutive days. First-order analyses identified a number of factors 
associated with upward trends in positive mood – the number of reports of engaging in a 
coping strategy, the variety of strategies engaged in, and frequency of coping via seeking 
emotional support or expressing emotions. Coping via direct action was associated with a 
downward trend in positive mood. These significant first-order predictors were then 
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entered into the second step of separate hierarchical regression analyses, controlling for 
average mood and pain, trend in pain, age, gender, disability (via AIMS), and 
neuroticism. The authors found that only the diversity of strategies used and the tendency 
to cope via seeking emotional support were related to upward change in positive mood 
over the monitoring days. 
Keefe, et al. (1997) and Grant (1998) conducted studies investigating the concurrent 
(same-lag) relationship between coping, appraisal, and emotional adjustment. Keefe, et 
al. (1997) monitored 53 RA sufferers over 30 days with one entry per day. All analyses 
were conducted using multi-level modelling with individuals as higher-order (level-2) 
units of analysis and within-person daily observations as lower-level (level-1) units 
couched within the level-2 units. This analytic method allows for partitioning of variance 
into separate within- and between-person components such that within-person predictors 
may have differential effects at the two levels of analysis (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; 
Snijders & Bosker, 1999; see section 6.1.5). Coping strategies and perceived coping 
efficacy were entered together into analyses predicting same-day mood, with pain 
intensity and first-order autocorrelative effects covaried. They reported that pain-coping 
self-efficacy was related to lower negative mood (beta=-.16) and higher positive mood 
(beta=.16), and use of pain-reduction efforts (beta=.08) and venting emotions (beta=.06) 
were related to increased negative mood. Pain reduction efforts were related to reduced 
positive mood (beta=-.08), whilst distraction (beta=.09) and seeking emotional support 
(beta=.05) were related to higher positive mood. Pain-coping self-efficacy was the 
strongest psychological predictor in each within-day analysis. The coping variables and 
pain-coping self-efficacy accounted for 3.8% of NA and 6.1% of PA.  
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Grant (1998) investigated a sample of 88 women with daily low-back pain of over 6 
months duration. The monitoring schedule involved thirty consecutive days of evening 
and morning entries. Separate MLM analyses were conducted to predict night-time 
depressed mood and night-time anxious mood. The morning rating of the night-time 
outcome variables were covaried in the first step of analyses, appraisals were entered 
next, and coping was entered into the last step of each analysis. Morning entries consisted 
of ratings of pain self-efficacy (from the pain-control scale of the Arthritis Self-Efficacy 
Scale), pain (on a ten-point Numerical Rating Scale), anxiety and depression (measured 
by the state-form of the State-Trait Personality Inventory). Evening entries consisted of 
average-daily and current pain (on NRSs), anxiety and depression, catastrophising (the 
CSQ scale), perceived ability to control pain (the CSQ item), and a number of CSQ 
coping strategies:  distraction, ignoring pain, reinterpreting pain sensations, and praying 
and hoping. Grant (1998) did not control for pain-intensity, however Grant and her 
colleagues subsequently reanalysed the data (Grant, Long & Willms, 2002) controlling 
for change in pain-ratings from morning to evening. 
In Grant’s (1998) analysis of night-time depressed mood, reinterpreting pain sensations 
was not included in the analysis because it did not demonstrate a significant first-order 
relationship with the criterion. Morning depression, appraisals, and coping accounted for 
36% of within-person variance in night-time depressed mood, and 53% of total variance. 
Grant found that morning depressed mood was the strongest predictor, being associated 
with elevated night-time depressed mood (accounting for 23% of within-person variance 
in night-time depressed mood). An additional 12% of within-person variance was 
accounted for by appraisals.  The strongest appraisal predictor was catastrophising – 
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associated with greater night-time depression. Night-time depression was also associated 
with low pain-coping self-efficacy on the CSQ. The relationship between general pain 
self-efficacy  (measured in the morning) and night-time depressed mood, though 
significant, was the smallest of all the predictors (standardised co-efficient=0.289). 
However, the effect was in an unpredicted direction – morning self-efficacy was 
associated with greater night-time depression. Grant, et al. (2002) reported that this 
anomalous effect vanished when change in pain intensity from morning to evening was 
controlled. Grant (1998) found that a further 1% of within-person variance in night-time 
depression was accounted for by coping strategies once appraisal and morning mood 
were controlled. Distraction coping and ignoring were associated with lower night-time 
depression. Coping by praying and hoping was not a significant predictor. Two 
interaction effects were identified between pain intensity and the appraisal and coping 
variables. Namely, when the day’s average pain was high, use of Ignoring strategies was 
associated with lower night-time depressed mood, and praying/hoping was associated 
with greater night-time depressed mood.  
Reinterpreting pain sensations was not included in Grant’s (1998) analysis of night-time 
anxious mood because it did not demonstrate a significant first-order relationship with 
night-time anxiety. Morning anxiety, appraisals, and coping accounted for 29% of the 
within-person variance in night-time anxiety, and 38% of total variance. Morning anxiety 
accounted for 18% of within-subject variance in night-time anxiety – it was the strongest 
predictor and was associated with greater night-time anxiety. Appraisals accounted for an 
additional 10% of within-person variance, the strongest predictor being catastrophising. 
High catastrophising and low pain-coping self-efficacy were associated with night-time 
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anxiety. General pain self-efficacy was not significantly related to night-time anxiety but 
its effect demonstrated significant variation between subjects, though Grant did not 
explore this further. Controlling for morning anxiety and appraisals, coping was 
associated with only a further 1% of within-subject variance. Distraction coping was the 
only significant predictor, associated with reduced night-time anxiety. Two interactions 
were found between daily-average pain and the appraisal and coping variables. On days 
with higher average pain, praying/hoping was associated with higher night-time anxiety. 
On days with low average pain, use of distraction coping was associated with lower 
night-time anxiety.  
After controlling for changing pain-intensity from morning to evening, Grant, et al. 
(2002) confirmed many of Grant’s (1998) findings – reporting that pain-coping self-
efficacy, catastrophising, and distraction coping were related to night-time depressed and 
anxious mood, and ignoring strategies were also related to night-time depressed mood. 
Grant and colleagues did not conduct the interaction analyses performed by Grant (1998). 
Only one study to date has looked at the impact of appraisal on momentary adaptational 
status in chronic pain on a within day basis. Catley (1999) conducted an EMA study on 
45 people with chronic pain – 20 with fibromyalgia and 25 with rheumatoid arthritis – to 
test a cognitive mediation model of the pain/distress relationship. Monitoring was 
conducted via questionnaire booklets over a two day period. Entries were made upon 
awakening and prior to bed, and on six occasions between 8am and 9pm signalled by a 
wristwatch alarm. Ambulatory monitoring involved ratings of pain (an average of four 7-
point scales involving pain intensity, stiffness, joint tenderness/swelling, and fatigue), 
positive affectivity, and negative affectivity. Affectivity was measured by averaging 
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ratings on 7-point scales of mood adjectives. Participants also completed one set of 
standard questionnaires – the MPI Life-Control, Life Interference, and Pain Severity 
scales, and the BDI. 
Catley (1999) set out to test a moderation model whereby perceptions of life-control and 
life-interference modify the relationship between within-day pain and mood. She reported 
a positive relationship between pain and negative affectivity, and an interaction whereby 
the pain/affectivity relationship was stronger for those with low perceived life-control. 
She also reported a negative relationship between pain and positive affectivity, and an 
interaction whereby pain was more strongly related to low PA for those with low 
perceived life control and high perceived life interference.  
Keefe, et al.’s, (1997) study is the only one to date to investigate the lagged effects of 
coping and appraisal factors on adaptation to chronic pain. They conducted lagged-
analyses of PA and NA, controlling for previous-day PA and NA respectively (ie. first-
order autocorrelation), and same-day pain. They found that pain-coping self-efficacy was 
associated with neither PA nor NA. This was not inconsistent with Jensen and Karoly’s 
(1991) cross-sectional research demonstrating that pain coping self-efficacy was 
unrelated to distress once coping was covaried.  
Keefe, et al. (1997) found that coping involving pain-reduction efforts, seeking emotional 
support, and relaxation were associated with greater next-day PA. Seeking spiritual 
support was related to greater next-day NA. Pain-coping self-efficacy and the coping 
variables accounted for only 2% of next day PA. The authors did not report proportion of 
next-day NA accounted for. 
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The current state of research into momentary adaptation status in chronic pain using 
models based on Stress and Coping theory appears to be rather sparse and demonstrates a 
number of shortcomings. Firstly, the scope of appraisal and coping constructs 
investigated is very limited. In terms of appraisal, Grant (1998) investigated 
catastrophising, pain-coping self-efficacy and general pain self-efficacy, and Keefe, et al. 
(1997) has also investigated pain-coping self-efficacy. Catley’s (1999) use of perceived 
life-interference and perceived life control were as between-subjects factors. Examination 
of coping has been limited to the DCI scales (Keefe, et al., 1997; Affleck, Urrows, et al., 
1992), and a subset of CSQ scales (Grant, 1998). Appraisals such as pain expectancy and 
perceived interference and the theoretically-driven passive and active coping dimensions 
have been neglected in this research, but will be investigated in the current study.  
Secondly, only three studies (Keefe, et al., 1997; Affleck, Urrows, et al., 1992; Grant, et 
al., 2002) have investigated the independent effects of psychological factors, controlling 
for the effects of pain intensity. The current study covaries pain intensity in all analyses 
to facilitate investigation of the unique effect of appraisal and coping. 
Thirdly, the separate effects of appraisal and coping have only been demonstrated by 
Keefe, et al. (1997), who entered both into analyses simultaneously. Grant (1998) 
removed the effect of appraisals from coping in hierarchical analyses, but did not do the 
same for appraisal. The current study addresses this shortcoming by conducting 
hierarchical analyses where appraisal is investigated after controlling for coping, and 
coping is investigated after controlling for appraisal. 
Fourthly, three of the four studies were conducted across days – only Catley’s (1999) 
investigated within-day variations in pain and mood. That study, however, did not 
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measure the appraisals on a within-person basis. The remaining three studies measured 
appraisal and coping on a daily-recall basis. Although the likelihood of recall and 
judgment biases are reduced under such circumstances, it is nonetheless conceivable that 
such biases are introduced even when the recall period is as short as one day. Whether or 
not biases exist with within-day recall, such approaches forfeit the true advantage of 
EMA studies in that they did not collect data about momentary states (Csikszentmihalyi, 
et al., 1977). The current study was conducted with multiple within-day assessments over 
a number of days, during which ratings of pain, mood, activity, and appraisal were made 
on a momentary basis, and ratings of function and coping were made using recall over 
periods of up to only three hours. 
On a related note, all of the studies reported above were paper-and-pencil based. That is, 
they did not take advantage of the potential methodological advantages of EMA via 
palm-held computers. As discussed, PDAs have a number of potential advantages over 
paper-and-pencil methods, including concealment of previous responses to reduce risks 
of response-set biases and measurement reactivity (cf. Grant (1998) had participants seal 
questionnaire forms in an adhesive label after completion and mail them at weekly 
intervals). Also, Stone, et al. (2002) clearly demonstrated the hazards of assuming paper-
and-pencil diaries schedules are complied with, even when participants report 
compliance. PDAs, as used in the current study, reduce the risk of potential 
methodological problems that may throw doubt on the validity of paper-and-pencil 
studies such as those described above.  
Sixth, only one of the above studies (Keefe, et al., 1997) took advantage of the 
possibilities offered by repeated within-person assessments to investigate lagged effects. 
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Cross-lag analyses not only support presumed “carry-over” effects, but lend weight to 
arguments that the lag1 variable plays a causal role in the lag2 outcome variable 
(Bateman & Strasser, 1984). The current study takes advantage of lagged analyses. 
Finally, the only outcomes investigated in the literature reviewed above relate to 
psychological functioning: depressed mood, anxious mood, PA, NA, and general distress. 
The current study recognizes the importance of assessing multiple indices of adaptation, 
and investigates three criterion measures: distress, psychosocial functioning, and activity-
level. 
4.5 Aims of the Current Study 
The aim of the current project is to explore the possible role of a range of appraisal and 
coping factors in determining momentary adaptational status in a chronic pain sample. Of 
key interest is whether pain-intensity per se is sufficient to account for adjustment, or as 
hypothesized, whether appraisal and coping demonstrate effects on adjustment beyond 
the pain/adjustment relationship (see Jensen & Karoly, 1991). This hypothesis is 
considered significant – it addresses a key issue regarding the importance of 
psychological factors in understanding adjustment to chronic pain. It is relevant not only 
for supporting the use of multidisciplinary and holistic approaches to management of 
chronic pain, but also because it is an example of a more fundamental psychological issue 
– the importance of cognitive mediation, relational meaning, and self-regulatory 
processes in adaptation to an ongoing, unavoidable and often unpredictable stressor 
(Lazarus, 1999; Jensen, Turner, Romano & Karoly, 1991; Burke, Zautra, Davis, Schultz 
& Reich, 2003). 
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Also, it is of interest whether coping and adjustment separately influence adjustment, or 
whether the effects of one account for the other (see Turner, et al., 2000). This too is 
considered important because “identification of specific… cognitive processes and 
coping strategies strongly and independently associated with the primary outcomes of 
interest would suggest the value of targeting those variables for modification in 
treatment” (Turner, et al., 2000, p116-117). The distinction between appraisal and coping 
is crucial here because the two have different implications for personal adaptive 
functioning and therapeutic intervention: coping involves overt and covert behaviours 
that are under volitional control (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984) whereas appraisals, though 
they may be amenable to change (eg. Beck, 1967), are understood to be frequently 
automatic and even beyond awareness until brought to attention (Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984). 
In the current study, adjustment is defined by three criterion variables: psychological 
distress, involvement in functional activities, and physical activity level. Previous EMA 
studies of adjustment to chronic pain have been limited, almost exclusively, to 
investigations of mood. It was considered that a wider range of adjustment outcomes not 
only extends findings across important adaptational domains, but allows for the 
possibility that differential processes operate across indices. 
Selection of the specific appraisal and coping constructs to be investigated in the current 
study (catastrophising, perceived interference, pain expectancy, pain self-efficacy, and 
passive and active pain coping) was guided by psychological theory and on the basis of 
their established role in the literature. The individual effects of the specific predictors, 
though of interest, were not of focal importance in the current study. These appraisal and 
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coping variables have never been investigated concurrently, thus their unique relative 
effects are unknown. Further, within-person research into chronic pain that incorporates 
appraisal and coping variables is sparse, and in the case of predicting physical and social 
functioning, non-existent. Therefore, there are few empirical precedents to guide 
predictions in the current study. Even cross-sectional research into certain appraisal and 
coping variables, such as active coping, appears to remain equivocal as to their role and 
impact (eg. Snow Turek, et al., 1996). Therefore, the current study approached the 
individual appraisal and coping variables on an exploratory basis, guided by theoretical 
predictions and previous findings. In general, it was expected that appraisals and coping 
strategies construed of as being beneficial, such as self-efficacy and active coping, would 
be associated with better adjustment, and “negative” appraisal and coping strategies such 
as catastrophising and passive coping are expected to be detrimental to adjustment. More 
specific predictions are provided in the introduction to Study Two. 
4.5.1 Study 1 - PAMS Development and Validation  
Study One was concerned with developing and validating the PAMS for use in Study 
Two. Study One was composed of two parts, each concerned with different analyses of 
the same data set. Part A involves the development and validation of the PAMS scales. 
Each scale was analysed separately. In the case of composite scales (namely, distress, 
appraisals, coping, and function), data reduction techniques were applied, then the 
internal validity of scales was assessed. Scale properties were calculated, and the scales 
were compared to established measures of the same constructs in order to establish 
convergent validity. In the case of pain intensity and coping, analyses were done to 
evaluate the predictive validity of the PAMS scales.  
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In Part B, the predictive validity of the PAMS instrument, as a whole, was assessed. A 
traditional cross-sectional study was conducted involving a series of hierarchical 
regression analyses, where PAMS predictor variables (pain, appraisal, and coping) were 
employed to predict distress, activity-level, and function. As a means of validating 
PAMS, the results of analyses involving PAMS scales were compared to findings of 
analyses employing predictors and criterion variables from standard questionnaires such 
as the MPI, DQ and CSQ. More specific predictions are provided in the next chapter, in 
the introduction to Study One. 
4.5.2 Study 2 – The Independent Role of Pain Appraisals and Coping in Distress, 
Function and Activity Level 
Study Two set out to address the focal research questions. The study was also structured 
in two parts, involving analyses addressing separate questions. EMA was used to 
investigate momentary adaptation status. Specifically, the daily lives of 55 people with 
chronic pain were sampled using PAMS – assessing pain, appraisals, coping, and 
adaptation up to nine times per day for up to nine days. 
In Part A of Study Two, prior to addressing the focal hypotheses, several methodological 
issues were addressed. Compliance rates were investigated, including exploratory 
analyses of correlates of compliance. For the purposes of establishing convergent validity 
the average of momentary ratings for each PAMS scale was compared to standard cross-
sectional measures of the same constructs. Also, summary scores of the PAMS scales 
were compared to a one-week recall version of the PAMS scales (PAMS-R), both as a 
means of further validating the PAMS scales and to explore the relationship between 
recalled and momentary scales. Finally, possible reactivity effects were investigated both 
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in terms of drift in ratings across entries and over monitoring days, and progressive 
changes in the variability of monitoring ratings between the first and second halves of the 
monitoring period.  
In Part B of Study Two, and in the analyses of reactivity in Part A, EMA data was 
analysed using multi-level modelling via HLM (Raudenbush, Bryk, Congdon, 2001). 
Using multi-level modelling the within-person variance in outcome variables was 
examined separately from between-person variability. Analyses were conducted in a 
hierarchical fashion analogous to hierarchical multiple regression. 
The focal research questions were addressed in Part B of Study Two. The predictive role 
of pain appraisals were explored – firstly without controlling for coping, and then with 
coping covaried. The role of coping, prior to and after controlling for pain appraisals, was 
explored in separate analyses. Analyses were repeated for each of the three outcome 
indices.  
The relationship between variables measured during the same lag were investigated, 
however cross-lag analyses were of primary concern for all three outcomes. Same-lag 
analyses were conducted only for the outcomes of distress and activity-level – the 
function outcome was measured in a retrospective way, making it non-conducive to 
same-lag analyses.  
For the purposes of the current study the term lag will be used to refer to a given 
measurement point, such that same-lag refers to an analysis in which both the predictors 
and the outcome variables were measured during the same assessment point and cross-
lag refers to when the predictors were measured during the assessment point prior to the 
entry from which the outcome measure derives. Furthermore, the terms lag1 and lag2 
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will be used whilst discussing cross-lag analyses. Lag2 refers to the lag, or entry, in 
which the outcome variables are located. Therefore, a lag2 predictor is in the same-lag as 
the outcome measure, and was thus measured concurrently with it. In a cross-lag analysis, 
lag2 variables may also be referred to as being in the next or subsequent lag in relation to 
lag1 variables. A lag1 predictor was measured during the entry prior to the outcome 
measure, up to three hours previously. These variables may be referred to as being in the 
prior or previous lag in relation to lag2 variables. In all cross-lag analyses (predicting a 
criterion at lag2) the predictors of interest are lag1 variables although lag2 covariates are 
also included. Variables measuring the difference between lags (that is, change from lag1 
to lag2) are also included in some analyses. These are referred to as cross-lag change 
variables, and will be further elaborated in Section 6.1.5. 
Whilst cross-lag analyses may reveal delayed effects of the predictors (at lag1) on the 
criterion variables (at lag2), the true value of the cross-lag analyses for the current study 
is the potential to suggest possible causal effects of predictors on next-lag outcomes (eg. 
Bateman & Strasser, 1984). It was anticipated that the effects seen in cross-lag analyses 
would be quite small compared to effects in same-lag analyses (eg. Keefe, et al., 1997).  
Specific hypotheses for each outcome variable, for both same-lag and cross-lag analyses, 
are provided in more detail in the introduction to Study Two. 
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5 STUDY 1 - PAMS DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION 
Study One involved the development and validation of the Pain Ambulatory Monitoring 
Survey (PAMS), and the application of this tool in a set of conventional between-person 
analyses of adjustment to chronic pain.  This measure was designed as a comprehensive 
measure of factors relevant to a stress and coping model of adaptation to chronic pain. 
Items were included to assess pain intensity, a range of outcomes (activity level, distress, 
and function) and key appraisal and coping variables that have been tied, theoretically 
and empirically, to chronic pain adaptation. Importantly, the PAMS represents an attempt 
to measure well delineated and conceptually clear constructs, guided primarily by Stress 
and Coping theory, but also other models of adaptation to pain based on social-learning 
theory, cognitive models of emotional disorders, and behavioural models of depression. 
The instrument was designed to be conducive to intensive within-day repeated 
measurements, for use in EMA research. A minimum set of items was employed, and all 
items were worded to obtain momentary or short-term recall self-reports. The pool of 
items was devised to measure pain intensity, appraisals (catastrophising, pain self-
efficacy, perceived interference, and pain expectancy), coping strategies (including 
strategies of pacing and activity management, solicitation, rest, relaxation, and 
medication and alcohol usage), and adaptational outcomes (activity level, function, and 
psychological distress). Items were either directly adapted from established measures of 
the respective constructs, or devised to reflect the core content of those measures. 
Appraisals were investigated, rather than beliefs, on the basis that appraisals were more 
likely to display fluctuations over timeframes as brief as one to two hours. The appraisal 
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scales were selected on the basis of theoretical importance and demonstrated predictive 
utility in the literature.  
Part A of Study One concerned the development and validation of the PAMS instrument. 
Each of the six content areas of the PAMS – Pain Intensity, Appraisal, Coping, Distress, 
Function, and Activity Level – were investigated separately. Where relevant, each of the 
multi-item dimensions were subjected to data-reduction analyses to establish factor 
structure and eliminate redundant items. The internal reliability and descriptive qualities 
of multi-item scales are also reported.  
PAMS scales were compared to standard measures of similar constructs to establish 
convergent validity. It was hypothesised that the Pain Intensity scale would correlate 
significantly with the McGill PRI-total, MPI Pain Severity, and SF-36 Bodily Pain 
scales. The predictive validity of the scale was also assessed via correlations with a range 
of standard measures of function and emotional distress. It was anticipated that the 
PAMS Pain Intensity scale would be related to higher distress and disability, but that 
these correlations would be no greater than convergent correlations with other pain 
measures. 
The appraisal items were selected on an a priori basis to measure four factors 
representing pain self-efficacy, catastrophising, pain expectancy, and perceived 
interference. Because the single-item scale measuring pain expectancy was selected a 
priori on theoretical grounds it was not subjected to factor analysis with the other 
appraisal items. It was expected that the Pain Self-Efficacy scale would correlate 
significantly with the PSEQ, and the CSQ Ability to Control Pain and Ability to Reduce 
Pain items. The Catastrophising scale was expected to correlate with the PCS scales, and 
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the CSQ Catastrophising scale. It was anticipated that the PAMS Perceived Interference 
scale would be related to the MPI Life-Interference scale. As there is no recall-based 
measure that is analogous to the PAMS pain expectancy measure, there were no specific 
predictions about the inter-relationships of the Pain Expectancy scale. 
PAMS coping items were expected to divide into a two factor, passive and active, coping 
structure. It was anticipated that the Passive scales of the PAMS and CSQ would 
correlate significantly with each other, and vice versa for the Active coping scales. It was 
anticipated that this pattern of inter-relationships would be reflected in the relationship 
between the PAMS coping scales and the traditional CSQ sub-scales. The predictive 
validity of the PAMS coping scales was assessed via a series of multiple regression 
analyses where standard measures of distress and disability were regressed onto the 
PAMS coping scales. Variance-accounted for by the PAMS scales were compared to 
separate analyses where six of the CSQ scales were used as predictors, and another set of 
analyses where the CSQ active- and passive- coping scales were used. It was anticipated 
that the PAMS and CSQ scales would be associated with comparable amounts of 
variance in distress and disability. 
PAMS distress items were selected to cover positive affect and negative affect and the 
dimensions of frustration, depression, and anxiety. Although it was expected that factors 
reflecting these dimensions of affect might emerge, the scale was designed to provide a 
simple unidimensional outcome measure of psychological distress. It was expected that 
PAMS Distress would correlate with the HADS scales, MPI Affective Distress, and SF-
36 Role Functioning – Emotional and Mental Health.  
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As with the distress scale, the PAMS function items were intended to provide a 
unidimensional outcome measure of physical, social and personal functioning. It was 
expected that PAMS Function would be related to the DQ, and SF-36 Physical 
Functioning, Role Functioning – Physical, Social Functioning, and Vitality.  
It was hypothesised that the single PAMS item measuring physical activity level would 
also be related to the above measures of function, especially SF-36 Vitality. 
In Part B of Study One, the PAMS appraisal and coping scales were used to predict 
adjustment in conventional between-subjects hierarchical regression analyses, 
comparable to Turner, et al. (2000). Separate analyses were performed for the outcomes 
of distress, function, and activity-level. Pain intensity was controlled in the first step of 
each analysis. The unique effects of appraisal and coping were investigated in separate 
hierarchical analyses by entering each into the last step of their respective analyses. 
As a further assessment of validity, the analyses involving the PAMS scales were 
contrasted with comparable hierarchical regression analyses performed using standard 
measures, in which functioning (measured by the DQ) and distress (measured by the MPI 
Affective Distress scale) were predicted. It was anticipated that appraisal and coping 
scales would account for comparable amounts of variance in the PAMS analyses 
compared to the standard-measure analyses, and that interpretational differences between 
PAMS and standard-measure predictors would be negligible. Also, it was expected that 
the total variance accounted for in PAMS criterion variables would be similar to that of 
standard measures. 
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5.1 Method 
5.1.1 Participants 
One-hundred-and-twenty-four participants (70 female) were recruited from a student 
sample, community sample, and clinical sample. A pain history criteria used by previous 
epidemiological studies (eg. Bowsher, Rigge & Sopp, 1991; Andersson, Ejlertsson, 
Leden & Rosenberg, 1993; Bergman, Herrstrom, Hogstrom, Petersson, Svensson, & 
Jacobsson, 2001) was adopted as an inclusion criterion: participants were required to 
have experienced bodily pain, not due to cancer, for three months or longer. Ages for the 
total sample ranged from 14 years to 78 years (M=42.17, SD = 15.34). 
The student sample was recruited from a pool of first-year psychology students seeking 
course credit for research participation. It consisted of 27 participants (19 males), aged 
between 18 and 52 years (M=25, SD=10.65). 
The community sample was recruited via three newspaper advertisements in community 
newspapers. In addition, fifteen participants in the community sample had previously 
attended a physiotherapy-based whiplash clinic run as a research project through the 
University of Queensland’s School of Physiotherapy. These people had originally 
responded to advertisements in community newspapers requesting volunteers for the 
whiplash treatment project. As part of that project they indicated they would be willing to 
be involved in other research projects run through the University. The community sample 
consisted of 63 participants (24 males), aged between 14 and 76 years (M= 46.16, SD= 
13.27).  
The clinical sample were recruited from pain-management classes they attended as part 
of the Royal Brisbane Hospital’s Multidisciplinary Pain Management Centre program. 
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The clinical sample was composed of 34 participants (19 males), aged between 26 and 78 
(M= 48.60, SD= 11.84). 
Frequency data relating to marital status, education level, employment status, 
professional background, and source of income can be found in Appendix A, Table A.5, 
both for the total sample, and broken down according to gender and the three sample 
sources. Similar frequency data can be found for pain-related variables in Appendix A, 
Table A.6. Differences between gender and participant-source groups were investigated 
for all demographic and pain-related variables. Chi-square comparisons were conducted 
with nominal and ordinal variables. Descriptive statistics for continuous variables, 
including standardised questionnaires, can be found in Appendix A, Table A.7 (for the 
whole sample) and Table A.8 (broken down according to sample source and gender). For 
these variables independent samples t-tests were used to compare between genders and F-
tests to compare between sample sources, with test-wise Bonferroni adjustments for post-
hoc comparisons.  
There were no significant differences between genders in age (t(121)=0.731, p=n.s.). The 
only gender difference in demographic characteristics was that there appeared to be 
significantly more tradespeople amongst male participants (χ2(9)=21.46,p=0.011). In 
terms of pain characteristics, upper-back (χ2 (1)=4.663, p=0.031) and arm pain (χ2 
(1)=7.653, p=0.006) appeared to be under-represented amongst men, as was the use of 
NSAID medications (χ2 (1)=4.45,p=0.035) and SSRI anti-depressants 
(χ2(1)=6.003,p=0.014). Men also appeared to have attended rheumatologists (χ2 
(1)=6.822, p=0.009) and neurosurgeons (χ2 (1)=4.03, p=.009) significantly less than 
women. Females scored significantly higher on MPI Pain Severity (t(118)=-2.09, p=.039) 
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and HADS Anxiety (t (119)=-2.2, p=.03) than males. The genders did not differ on pain 
duration (t(120)=0.218, p=n.s.) or total number of bodily pain sites (t(121)=-1.2, p=n.s.) 
and radiating pain sites (t(121)=-0.26, p=n.s.). 
Three sets of chi-square tests were conducted on each nominal and ordinal variable to 
compare sample sources in a pair-wise manner. Students were more likely than the 
community sample to have obtained a senior high-school education (χ2 
(5)=18.64,p=.002).  They were more likely than the clinical sample to be studying, and 
less likely to be performing home duties or to be unemployed (χ2 (8)=50.65,p=<.001). 
Students were also more likely to be studying than the community sample (χ2 
(8)=48.4,p=<.001). The clinical sample was less likely than the community (χ2 (1)=7.456, 
p=.006) or student (χ2 (1)=13.45,p=<.001) samples to be earning a wage, and more likely 
than the community (χ2 (1)=7.36, p=.007) or student (χ2 (1)=14.07,p=<.001) samples to 
be receiving an income through disability benefits. The community sample was more 
likely than the student sample to be receiving disability benefits (χ2 (1)=4.13,p=.042).  
In terms of pain-related variables, there were a number of differences between sample 
sources. Students were less likely than both the community (χ2 (5)=22.96, p<.001) and 
clinical (χ2 (6)=22.3, p=.001) samples to report that their pain was constant but varied. 
The community group was more likely than the clinical group to report pain that was 
usually present with short pain-free periods (χ2 (5)=13.32, p=<.021). They were more 
likely than the clinical group to report that their pain was related to a car accident and less 
likely to report it was related to an occupational accident (χ2 (7)=19.62, p<.006). Students 
were also less likely than the community group to report that the pain was related to a car 
accident, and more likely to report that there was no reason for the onset of pain (χ2 
131 
(7)=16.94, p<.018). Compared to the clinical group, students were more likely to report 
no clear reason for pain onset, and less likely to report pain of post-surgical origin (χ2 
(7)=22.19, p<.002). In terms of locations of pain, the community group was more likely 
than both the student (χ2 (1)=6.93, p=.008) and clinical groups (χ2 (1)=5.08, p=.024) to 
report neck pain, and more likely than the clinical group to report head pain (χ2 (1)=4.57, 
p=.032).  
Students were less likely than both clinical (χ2 (1)=7.63, p=.001) and community (χ2 
(1)=6.32, p=.012) groups to use narcotic medications. The clinical group was more likely 
than both groups to use simple analgesics (vs students χ2 (1)=7.21, p=.006; vs community 
χ2 (1)=8.32, p<.004) and anti-convulsant medications (vs students χ2 (1)=11.02, p<.001; 
vs community χ2 (1)=16.92, p<.001). Finally, the community group was more likely than 
the clinical group to use NSAID medications (χ2 (1)=5.38, p=.02). 
There were noteworthy differences in the groups in terms of usage of professional 
services. The student group was less likely than the community and clinical groups to 
have attended a neurologist (vs clinical χ2 (1)=6.46, p==.011; vs community χ2 (1)=6.08, 
p=.014),  neurosurgeon (vs clinical χ2 (1)=13.12, p<.001; vs community χ2 (1)=14.83, 
p<.001), occupational therapist (vs clinical χ2 (1)=28.9, p<.001; vs community χ2 
(1)=6.67, p=.01), orthopedic surgeon (vs clinical χ2 (1)=10.94, p<.001; vs community χ2 
(1)=6.32, p=.012), physiotherapist (vs clinical χ2 (1)=8.3, p=.004; vs community χ2 
(1)=7.23, p=.007), psychologist (vs clinical χ2 (1)=20.8, p<.001; vs community χ2 
(1)=4.78, p=.029), or their GP (vs clinical χ2 (1)=7.67, p=.006; vs community χ2 (1)=7.71, 
p=.005). The clinical group was also more likely to have attended an occupational 
therapist (χ2 (1)=16.45, p<.001) or psychologist (χ2 (1)=11.09, p=.001) than the 
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community group. Finally, the clinical group was more likely than both the student and 
community samples to have attended an anesthetist (vs student χ2 (1)=6.76, p=.009; vs 
community χ2 (1)=5.51, p=.019), psychiatrist (vs student χ2 (1)=18.85, p<.001; vs 
community χ2 (1)=13.44, p=.001), and pain clinic (vs student χ2 (1)=32.84, p<.001; vs 
community χ2 (1)=26.74, p<.001). 
Students were significantly younger than both other samples (F(2,120)=33.753, p<.001), 
and experienced fewer total sites of pain (F (2,120)=6.844, p=.002), and sites of radiating 
pain (F (2,120)=3.788, p=.025). They scored lower than both the clinical and community 
samples on MPI Pain Severity (F(2,118)=12.12, p<.001), MPI Interference 
(F(2,118)=15.39, p<.001),  and the Disability Questionnaire (F(2, 118)=7.894, p=.001). 
They scored lower than the clinical sample only on PCS Helplessness (F(2,118)=3.991, 
p=.021), CSQ Increasing Pain Behaviour (F(2,115)=4.8, p=.01), and HADS Depression 
(F(2,119)=4.876, p=.009). The student sample scored higher than the other two samples 
on the PSEQ (F(2,118)=9.182, p<.001), and the SF-36 scales Physical Functioning 
(F(2,118)=14.4, p<.001), Physical Role Functioning (F(2,117)=6.81, p=.002), Bodily 
Pain (F(2,115)=9.693, p<.001), and Social Functioning (F(2,115)=12.685, p<.001). 
5.1.2 Procedure 
Participants were given an information sheet about the project, given the opportunity to 
ask any questions, and asked to sign a consent form (see Appendix F). They were then 
given a questionnaire package and asked to complete it in their own time. They were 
asked to complete the whole package in one day. The PAMS, demographics and pain 
history questionnaire, and McGill pain rating scale, were presented first in the package 
(in that order), and the order of the remaining questionnaires was varied. 
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To represent responses from across the waking-day, participants were instructed to 
complete the PAMS within a certain 105 minute timeframe. These corresponded with the 
timeframes during which alarms were scheduled to signal during PDA monitoring in 
Study Two (8:00 to 9:45; 9:45 to 11:30; 11:30 to 13:15; 13:15 to 15:00; 15:00 to 16:45; 
16:45 to 18:30; 18:30 to 20:15; 20:15 to 22:00). Each participant’s specific timeframe 
was indicated both on the PAMS and an instruction sheet. To check compliance 
participants were asked to indicate what time they commenced the PAMS. They also 
indicated what time they completed the PAMS, enabling the calculation of completion 
times. 
Participants were asked to return completed questionnaires to the investigator via an 
addressed and stamped envelope provided.  
5.1.3 Measures 
5.1.3.1 Pain Ambulatory Monitoring Survey (PAMS).  
A complete copy of the PAMS can be found in Appendix E. 
The PAMS was designed to provide comprehensive assessment of chronic pain using 
minimal items. It was designed for momentary use: all items ask about what the 
participant was experiencing at the moment they completed the questionnaire or in the 
105 minute period prior to commencing the questionnaire (this time-frame was adopted 
to correspond with the average interval between entry occasions in Study 2). For 
example, “Right now the bodily pain I am experiencing is…”, “How down do I feel right 
now?”. 
The PAMS contains two item formats. The first is what Karoly and Jensen (1987) refer to 
as a Graphic Rating Scale (GRS) - a ten centimetre line labelled “0%” at the left extreme 
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and “100%” at the right extreme, with descriptors anchoring the scale at equal intervals 
along the line. Participants were asked to indicate their response by placing a single 
vertical mark anywhere along the line. The second type of items were check-box items 
where a question is followed by up to five options. Participants were asked to endorse 
relevant items with a tick. The format of these questions was devised to resemble, as 
closely as possible, the format of questions on the PDAs in Study 2. In total, the PAMS 
contains 24 GRS items, and 13 check-box questions containing a total of 63 options. 
The PAMS consists of items relating to five domains: pain intensity, emotional distress, 
pain appraisals, pain coping strategies, and activity/functioning.  
Pain Intensity. The pain intensity domain contained one item (see Table 5.1) – a GRS 
indicating the degree of physical pain experienced at that moment. Verbal anchors were 
based upon the fifteen-point verbal-rating scale used by Gracely, McGrath and Dubner 
(1978). 
Emotional Distress. Eight GRS items were included to measure emotional distress 
(see Table 5.1). A number of these items were sourced from items used in other 
questionnaires (see Appendix A, Table A.1). An additional item (“I am feeling frustrated 
at this moment”) was included to gain a more comprehensive assessment of the 
frustration/irritability spectrum of emotional responses to pain. An emotional components 
analysis of pain conducted by Wade, et al. (1990) suggested that frustration was the most 
commonly reported emotion associated with chronic pain, and it was the most consistent 
predictor of participant’s ratings of pain unpleasantness. 
Table 5.1 PAMS Items Measured by GRS  
Pain Intensity 
"Right now the bodily pain I am experiencing is..." 
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Emotional Distress 
"Right now I feel calm and peaceful" 
"How down do I feel right now? " 
"I am depressed at this moment " 
"How anxious do I feel right now? " 
"I am feeling frustrated at this moment" 
"How irritable do I feel right now? " 
"I feel tense or 'wound up' right now " 
"I feel cheerful right now " 
 
Pain Appraisals 
"At the moment I can tolerate pain without medication  " 
"At the moment I am able to cope with the pain without medication " 
"I'm capable of controlling the amount of pain I experience (without medication)" 
“Right now I feel I’m capable of decreasing the pain without using medication” 
"Right now the suffering I experience because of the pain is... " 
"Right now I think that having the pain is terrible and I can't stand it anymore " 
"Right now I wonder whether something serious may happen because of the pain" 
"I expect that in the next 1 hour 45 minutes the pain will be..."  
“At this moment I believe I am able to do the things I need to do today” 
“I believe I’m capable of engaging in physical activity (eg. work chores, shopping) 
At the moment I am accomplishing less than I would like because of the pain  " 
"Right now I am finding it difficult to perform day-to-day activities because of the pain " 
"Right now I feel I'm limited in the kinds of activities I can perform, because of the pain " 
 
Activity-Level 
"Prior to beginning the questionnaire/s how physically active was I? "  
"What was my highest activity level over the last 1 hour 45 minutes?"  
 
 
Pain Appraisals. Thirteen GRS items (see Table 5.1) were used to measure pain 
appraisals from the domains of pain self-efficacy (six items), catastrophising (three 
items), pain expectancy (one item), and perceived interference (three items). Once again, 
many of these items were influenced by items from other questionnaires. A comparison 
between these items can be found in Appendix A, Table A.2. 
Items not specifically sourced from other questionnaires were also included in the pain 
self-efficacy (“At the moment I can tolerate pain without medication”), catastrophising 
(“Right now the suffering I experience because of the pain is...”), and pain expectancy (“I 
expect that in the next 1 hour 45 minutes the pain will be...”) scales. Verbal anchors for 
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the pain expectancy item were identical to those used to rate current pain severity. Verbal 
anchors for the catastrophising item “Right now the suffering I experience because of the 
pain is…” were adapted from verbal rating scales used to measure pain unpleasantness 
(eg. Tursky, Jammer, & Friedman, 1982; Gracely, et al., 1978). 
Function. The Function domain of the PAMS consisted of check-box items concerned 
with activities engaged in and activities avoided in the 105 minutes prior to completion of 
the questionnaire (see Table 5.2). Items that were derived from pre-existing scales are 
displayed in Appendix A, Table A.3. 
The first set of check-box questions assessed function via five questions comprising a 
total of 21 check-box options. These enquired about which activities the participant had 
engaged in during the prior 105 minute period. Sets of options were preceded by one of 
two questions: “Which of these activities have I done for over 10 MINUTES in total?” or 
“Which of these activities have I done over the last 1 hour 45 minutes?”. 
The second set of check-boxes involved two questions comprising ten check-box options 
enquiring about which activities have been avoided during the past 105 minute period 
because of pain or fear of the pain getting worse. These options were preceded by the 
question “Which of these things have I avoided because of the pain, or fear of it getting 
worse?”. 
Some activity engagement items that were sourced from other questionnaires were 
reversed and used as activity avoidance items (eg. “Shopping” and “Avoided Shopping”), 
and visa versa. This was done because it was considered that because a participant 
indicated that they did not engage in an activity does not necessarily mean they actively 
avoided that activity. 
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Items not sourced from other scales were also included as activity engagement and 
avoidance items (eg. “A hobby”, “A sport”, “Watching TV”, “Leant on something”). 
Activity-Level. The Activity-Level domain of the PAMS (see Table 5.1) consisted of 
one GRS item assessing physical activity prior to commencing the questionnaire (“Prior 
to beginning the questionnaire/s how physically active was I?”).  
Pain Coping. Pain coping was assessed via six questions comprising a total of 24 
check-box items (see Table 5.3). Four questions related to use of specific coping 
Table 5.2 PAMS Function Items  
 
Which of these activities have I done for over 10 MINUTES in total (tick as many boxes as you need to)? 
 Housework/chores 
 Yardwork/gardening 
 Work - paid or unpaid 
 A sport 
 
Which of these activities have I done over the last 1 hour 45 minutes (tick as many boxes as you need to)?  
 Bend, kneel or stoop  
 Carry or push an object 
 Lift an object 
 Walked 500 meters 
 Walked a kilometer 
 Climbed 1 flight of steps 
 Climbed several flights 
 
Which of these things have I avoided because of the pain, or fear of it getting worse (tick as many boxes as 
you need to)?  
 Housework/chores 
 Yardwork/gardening 
 Work (paid or unpaid) 
 Shopping 
 A sport 
 Cooking 
 Visiting 
 Dress or bath myself 
 A hobby 
 Driving 
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behaviours, one question related to activity management strategies, and one question 
related to solicitation of help from others.  
Four questions asked the participant to indicate what things they have done to cope with 
the pain during the prior 105 minute period (“Which of these things have I tried to help 
myself cope with the pain?”). Pain coping items were selected to cover the domains of 
coping assessed by the CSQ, and also to assess substance use (four items), and 
communication (one item). In addition to items sourced from other questionnaires, 
additional items were included relating to coping behaviours and relaxation (“Lay 
down/rested/slept”, “Relaxed/breathed deeply”), positive self-statements (“Talk sense to 
myself”, “Use positive thinking”), substance use (“Taken sleeping tablets”), and 
praying/hoping (“Hope/wish it'd go away”). 
The fifth question, relating to activity management, asked participants to indicate how 
they managed their activities during the previous 105 minute period (“In relation to my 
tasks/activities over the last 1 hour 45 minutes, at times I have:”). Possible response 
options were: “Avoided doing a task/s”; “Given up during a task/s”; “Persisted despite 
pain”; “Taken breaks to rest”; “Switched between tasks”. 
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Table 5.3 PAMS Coping Items  
 
Which of these things have I tried to help myself cope with the pain (tick as many boxes as you need to)? 
 Drank alcohol 
 Did an activity/stretched 
 Did something I enjoy 
 Hope/wish it'd go away 
 Ignore the pain 
 Talk sense to myself  
 Think of pleasant things  
 Distract myself from pain  
 Taken pain medication as part of a regular schedule 
 Taken pain medications that were not part of a regular schedule 
 Taken sleeping tablets 
 Lay down/rested/slept 
 Pretend it isn't there 
 Use positive thinking 
 Tell myself it doesn't hurt  
 Relaxed/breathed deeply 
 
In relation to my tasks/activities over the last 1 hour 45 minutes, at times I have: (tick as many boxes as 
you need to) 
 Avoided doing a task/s 
 Given up during a task/s 
 Persisted despite pain 
 Taken breaks to rest 
 Switched between tasks 
 Refused help from others 
 Sought help from others 
 Accepted their help 
 
A sixth question asked about help-seeking behaviour during the previous 105 minute 
period (“In relation to my tasks/activities over the last 1 hour 45 minutes, at times I 
have:”). Possible response options were: “Refused help from others”; “Sought help from 
others”; “Accepted their help”.  
See Appendix A, Table A.4 for a comparison between PAMS items and items sourced 
from standard coping scales. 
All items sourced from other questionnaires were adapted so that they were (a) worded in 
the first person which, according to Peters, et al. (2000), mimics participant’s internal 
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dialogue, (b) momentary (eg. “Right now I feel…”) or short-latency recall (In the past 1 
hour 45 minutes I have….”), (c) were suited to either the GRS or check-box format, and 
(d) were of minimum word length to fit on the screen of the PDA in Study Two.  
5.1.3.2 Demographics and Pain History Questionnaire 
Participants were asked to complete a demographics questionnaire with items regarding 
age, gender, marital status, education, occupation, and source of income. Pain-related 
variables were also assessed, including time since onset, bodily locations of pain (eg. 
Toomey, Gover, & Jones, 1983; Margolis, Tait, & Krause, 1986), onset circumstances, 
temporal fluctuations in pain, treatments sought, current medication usage, and 
involvement in litigation. A copy of this questionnaire can be found in Appendix B. 
5.1.3.3 McGill Pain Rating Index – Total (PRI-T) 
The McGill Pain Rating Index (Melzack, 1975) is composed of twenty lists of adjectives 
that can be used to describe the experience of pain. The lists reflect three dimensions of 
pain sensation, based on Melzack and Wall’s (1965) Gate Control Theory of pain. Ten 
lists reflect the sensory dimension, five reflect the affective dimension, and one reflects 
the evaluative dimension. The scale also contains four additional miscellaneous lists. 
Participants are instructed to underline words that reflect their pain, but to underline no 
more than one word per list. Originally, Melzack (1975) described three scales, Sensory, 
Affective, and Evaluative, which are calculated by designating each underlined word a 
rank value according to its order in its list, and then summing the rank values for each list 
in the respective scales. Melzack also proposed a total score calculated by summing the 
rank-value of underlined words across all twenty lists. 
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After conducting a confirmatory factor analytic study across two separate samples Turk, 
Rudy, and Salovey (1985) recommended that only the Total scale of the MPI was valid as 
a measure of pain experience. They found a high degree of internal consistency for the 
total scale (alpha=0.84), more so than the other scales (alpha= 0.78, 0.71 and 0.46 for 
sensory, affective and evaluative scales respectively). Only the MPI PRI-Total scale was 
employed in this study. The current study employed a scoring system devised by Kremer, 
Atkinson, and Ignelzi (1982) whereby the rank-ordered values summed over all lists are 
divided by the sum of the maximum possible rank-ordered scores, providing a score 
between zero and one. 
5.1.3.4 Multidimensional Pain Inventory – Part One (MPI-I) 
The MPI, originally developed as the West Haven-Yale Multidimensional Pain Inventory 
(Kerns, et al., 1985), was divided into three parts consisting of 12 a priori scales. Part 
One included scales assessing (1) pain severity and suffering (Pain Severity), (2) pain-
related life-interference and degree of satisfaction with that level of functioning (Life-
Interference), (3) appraisal of social support (Support), (4) perceived life control (Life 
Control), and (5) Affective Distress. Part Two assessed perceptions of the reactions of 
significant others to the pain condition, and Part Three assessed involvement in various 
activities of daily living.  
Kerns, et al. (1985) developed the scale on a sample of 120 chronic pain patients. Using 
confirmatory factor analysis with oblique rotation they found support for four scales in 
Part One. They collapsed a fifth and sixth scale (pain-related life interference versus 
dissatisfaction with current functioning) into a single scale. Internal reliability for these 
five scales ranged from alpha=0.7 to 0.9. Two-week test-retest reliabilities ranged from 
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0.62 to 0.91. All inter-correlations amongst the scales (from 0.0 to 0.58) were lower than 
the reliability of the individual scales, supporting the discriminant validity of the scales. 
To assess convergent and divergent validity, Kerns, at al. (1985) entered the MPI scale 
scores into an exploratory factor analysis with other standard measures. They found that 
the MPI Affective Distress and Self-Control scales fell into an affective distress 
dimension. The MPI Support scale and a range of scales from Parts Two and Three of the 
MPI fell into a support dimension. MPI Pain Severity and Interference fell into a third 
dimension. 
5.1.3.5 Pain Self-Efficacy Questionnaire (PSEQ) 
The PSEQ (Nicholas, 1988) is a ten-item self-report scale in which participants are asked 
to rate (on a seven-point scale) how confident they are that they can perform a number of 
activities (zero being “not at all confident” and six being “completely confident”). The 
content of the scale reflects self-efficacy beliefs relating to coping with pain (eg. “I can 
cope with pain without medication”), though it focuses primarily on self-efficacy relating 
to performing daily activities and functions (eg. “I can still do many of the things I enjoy 
doing, such as hobbies or leisure activities, despite the pain”). 
Evidence of the reliability and validity of the PSEQ was presented by Nicholas (1989). 
5.1.3.6 Pain Catastrophising Scale (PCS)  
The PCS (Sullivan, Bishop, & Pivik, 1995) is a 13-item scale in which participants are 
asked to indicate on a five point scale (0=not at all, 4= all the time) the frequency with 
which they experienced a range of pain-related catastrophic thoughts in the prior week. 
Sullivan and colleagues identified three scales from their original principal components 
analysis, rumination, magnification, and helplessness. The scales were moderately to 
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highly correlated (r=-0.3 to –0.5), and ranged in internal validity (alpha=0.87, 0.6 and 
0.79 for rumination, magnification and helplessness respectively).  Support for this factor 
structure has been reported in confirmatory factor analytic studies with student (Osman, 
Barrios, Gutierrez, Kopper, Merrifield, & Grittmann, 1997), community (Osman, Barrios, 
Kopper, Hauptmann, Jones, & O’Neill, 2000), and sport-participant (Sullivan, et al., 
2000) samples. In a confirmatory factor analysis involving one-, two-, and three- factor 
models of the PCS in separate pain-free, low-back pain and fibromyalgia samples, Van 
Damme, Crombez, Bijttebier, Goubert, and Van Houdenhove (2002) found that the three 
factor model was the best fit for all three samples, and was invariant across the three 
samples and across gender.  
Sullivan, Bishop, & Pivik (1995) validated the scale by demonstrating that students 
classified as catastrophisers according to cut-off scores were more likely to report 
negative pain-related thoughts, greater distress, and higher pain intensity during and after 
a cold-pressor task. They reported a six-week test-retest reliability of r=.75 for this 
student sample. Further, pain patients reported more negative pain-related thoughts, 
greater distress, and higher pain intensity during and after an aversive electro-diagnostic 
medical procedure. In a final study, Sullivan and colleagues demonstrated that the 
average score for the three PCS scales (PCS Total) was correlated with fear of pain, 
negative affect, trait anxiety, depression, and pain intensity in a sample of students doing 
a cold-pressor task. Controlling for these other constructs, only the PCS average score 
significantly predicted pain intensity experienced during the cold-pressor tasks 
(semipartial r=.29, zero-order r=.46). A ten-week test-retest reliability of 0.7 was found in 
this student sample. 
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Studies employ both the PCS subscales and PCS Total (eg. Sullivan, Bishop, & Pivik, 
1995), and all four scales will be used in the current study. 
5.1.3.7 Coping Strategy Questionnaire (CSQ) 
The Coping Strategy Questionnaire (CSQ; Rosenstiel and Keefe 1983) is perhaps the 
most frequently used measure of strategies used to cope with chronic pain (Stewart, et al., 
2001). The original scale is composed of 48 items measured on a seven-point (1= never, 
3= sometimes, 7= always) scale indicating frequency-of-use. 
Rosenstiel and Keefe (1983) devised seven scales reflected coping strategies  (Diverting 
Attention, Reinterpreting Pain Sensations, Coping Self-Statements, Ignoring Pain 
Sensations, Praying or Hoping, Increasing Activity Level, and Increasing Pain 
Behaviours), and an eighth scale, labelled “Catastrophising”, was composed of items 
relating to catastrophic pain cognitions (eg. “It is awful and I feel that it overwhelms 
me”). The CSQ included two pain coping self-efficacy items, rated along seven-point 
scales, assessing participants beliefs that they are able to control and decrease pain given 
their repertoire of coping strategies. 
Rosenstiel and Keefe (1983) found adequate internal consistency for seven of their scales 
(0.85 to 0.71), however “Increasing Pain Behaviour” produced an alpha-reliability of 
only 0.28 and was rejected from the final scale. With a sample of 30 chronic pain 
outpatients Stewart, et al. (2001) found alpha-coefficients between .82 and .75 for four 
scales, and alpha coefficients of 0.49, 0.66, 0.5, and 0.1 for Coping Self-Statements, 
Praying and Hoping, Increasing Behavioural Activity, and Increasing Pain Behaviour 
respectively. Test-retest reliabilities between 0.68 and 0.91 were reported for the CSQ 
sub-scales over a one-day interval (Main and Waddell, 1991). Stewart, et al. (2001) found 
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one-week test-retest reliabilities between .69 and .40 for seven of the eight scales – the 
lowest of these being Increasing Pain Behaviour and the next lowest being Diverting 
Attention (at 0.47). Only the Catastrophising scale fell above 0.7. Neither of the pain 
control self-efficacy items displayed adequate test-retest properties in this study, both 
being below 0.4. 
The validity of Rosentiel and Keefe’s (1983) eight scales has not been well replicated 
(eg. Main and Waddell, 1991; Lawson, et al., 1990). The current study used seven of the 
original scales (not including “Increasing Pain Behavior”), and a two factor version of the 
CSQ reflecting active- and passive- coping dimensions. Based on factor analytic work by 
(Nicholas, 1988), the passive coping scale is composed of the CSQ Praying/Hoping and 
Catastrophising scales, whilst the active coping scale was composed of the remaining 
CSQ scales. Snow Turek, et al. (1996) found alpha reliability coefficients of 0.88 and 
0.81, respectively, for the CSQ active and passive coping scales.  
5.1.3.8 Medical Outcomes Survey Short-Form 36 (SF-36) 
The SF-36 is a 36 item scale designed as part of the Medical Outcomes Study as a brief 
measure of general health-related outcomes that could be administered to both clinical 
and general populations (Ware and Sherbourne, 1992). The scale consists of eight scales 
reflecting (1) limitations in physical activities due to health problems (Physical 
Functioning), (2) limitations in social activities (Social Functioning), (3) limitations in 
usual roles due to physical health (Role Functioning – Physical), (4) limitations in usual 
roles because of emotional problems (Role Functioning – Emotional), (5) General Mental 
Health, (6) Bodily Pain, (7) Vitality, and (8) general perceptions of health (General 
Health Perceptions). A ninth scale, composed of a single item, measures participant’s 
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perception that their health has changed over the previous year (Health Transition). 
These scales and the items they are composed of were adapted from the full MOS scale 
(Ware and Sherbourne, 1992). 
In initial attempts to validate the SF-36 scales on a sample of 1014 health-system 
consumers, McHorney, Ware, and Raczek (1993) conducted a Principal Components 
Analysis on the eight scales, revealing a Physical Health factor and a Mental Health 
factor. The Physical Functioning, Role Functioning – Physical, and Bodily Pain scales 
were (in that order) most related to the Physical Health Factor (all loadings above 0.77). 
The Mental Health, Role Functioning – Emotional, and Social Functioning scales were 
most related (in that order) to the Mental Health factor (all loadings above 0.71). The 
Social Functioning scale loaded to some degree on the Physical Health factor 
(loading=0.44), whilst the Vitality and General Health Perceptions scale loaded on both 
the Physical Health (loadings= 0.59 and 0.68 respectively) and Mental Health (loadings= 
0.57 and 0.32 respectively) factors. They then compared the profile of the eight scales 
across four clinical samples: minor chronic medical conditions, serious chronic medical 
conditions, psychiatric conditions, and both psychiatric and serious chronic medical 
conditions. The various scales distinguished between the four groups in anticipated ways, 
including distinguishing between the severity of medical conditions, the extent of 
psychiatric symptomatology, and between patients with and without psychiatric illness. 
Garratt, Ruta, Abdalla, Buckingham, and Russell (1993) assessed the psychometric 
properties of the SF-36 on 1787 people with low back pain, excessive uterine bleeding, a 
possible peptic ulcer, or varicose veins. Item-total correlations between 0.55 and 0.78 
were found within each scale, and all items correlated more with their own scale than 
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with divergent scales. Cronbach’s alpha exceeded 0.8 for all scales. They found that the 
profile of the clinical samples differed from that of the general population sample in 
predictable ways. In a Swedish sample (n=8930), Sullivan, Karlsson, and Ware (1995) 
found internal reliabilities between alpha=0.79 and 0.93. 
5.1.3.9 Roland and Morris Disability Questionnaire (DQ) 
The Roland and Morris Disability Questionnaire (Roland and Morris, 1983) was 
constructed as an outcome assessment of functional status amongst low-back pain 
populations. The scale consists of 24 check-box items in which participants are asked to 
endorse relevant statements about the functional impact of pain. Items were originally 
selected from the Sickness Impact Profile (Bergner, Bobbitt, Carter, & Gibson, 1981). 
Roland & Morris (1983) found a same-day test-retest reliability of 0.91 for 20 
participants. They found that for 124 participants, average DQ scores increased with 
higher ratings on a six-point pain rating system. Other studies with longer retest intervals 
found test-retest reliabilities of 0.88 (one week; Johansson and Lindberg, 1998)  and 0.83 
(three weeks; Deyo and Centor, 1986), though the authors of the test argue that the 
measure was designed to be sensitive to changes over time, questioning the use of longer 
retest intervals (Roland and Fairbank, 2000).  
Internal reliabilities between alpha= 0.84 (Jarvikoski, Mellin, and Estlander, 1995) and 
0.93 (Hsieh, Phillips, and Adams, 1992) have been reported for the DQ. The DQ has also 
been shown to correlate with other measures of functional disability, including the 
Oswestry disability questionnaire (Leclaire, Blier, & Fortin, 1997) and the Sickness 
Impact Profile (Deyo and Centor, 1986). Reneman, Jorritsma, Schellekens, & Goeken 
(2002) found that the DQ correlated r= 0.5 with the Oswestry Disability Index (Fairbank, 
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et al., 1980), and 0.6 with the Quebec Back Pain Disability Scale (Kopec, Esdaile, 
Abrahamowicz, Abenhaim, Wood-Dauphinee, Lamping and Williams, 1995). They 
found that the DQ correlated higher than those two questionnaires with a behavioural 
measure of functional performance (r=-0.52). 
Recent adaptations of the DQ have altered the wording for applicability to non-low-back 
pain conditions, including a version for pain conditions in general (Roland and Fairbank, 
2000). 
5.1.3.10 Hospital Anxiety and Depression Questionnaire (HADS) 
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) consists 
of separate Anxiety and Depression scales consisting of seven items each. For each item 
respondents are asked to underline one of four statements to indicate how they have been 
feeling over the past week. Items were selected to avoid measurement of anxious and 
depressive symptoms that would overlap with medical symptoms of participants in 
medical settings. The HADS was chosen for the current study because of its greater 
interest in affective symptoms, and to avoid complications arising from medical 
symptoms relating to chronic pain conditions. 
In Zigmond & Snaith’s (1983) original article, the Depression scale of the HADS 
correlated r=.70 with clinician ratings of depressive symptoms and was unrelated to 
clinician ratings of anxiety (r=.08).  Depression scale scores appeared to be unrelated to 
physical illness severity. The HADS’s Anxiety scale correlated r=.54 with clinician 
ratings of anxiety, and was somewhat less related to clinician ratings of depression 
(r=.19). Internal consistency of the scales was assessed by correlating each item with a 
composite composed of the other items in its scale. All correlations were significant 
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(p<.01) and ranged between 0.76 and 0.41 for the Anxiety scale, and 0.6 to 0.3 for the 
Depression scale. 
5.2 Results – Part A: PAMS Validation 
Part A of Study One reports analyses aimed at developing, validating, and describing the 
PAMS scales. The Pain-Intensity scale is investigated first, followed by the appraisal 
scales, the coping scales, the Distress scale, the Function scale, and the Activity-Level 
scale. 
5.2.1 Pain Intensity 
Descriptive statistics for the PAMS Pain Intensity scale is displayed in Table 5.1 
 
 
The convergent validity of the PAMS Pain Intensity scale was evaluated against the 
McGill PRI–Total, and the MPI and SF-36 pain scales (see Table 5.5). Note that higher 
SF-36 Bodily Pain scores reflect less pain.  
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics for 
PAMS Pain Intensity scale  
Minimum 2 
Maximum 97 
Mean 56.09 
SD 20.91 
Skew -0.49 
Std. Skew -2.24 
Kurtosis -0.34 
Std. Kurtosis -0.79 
Std. Skew= Standardized Skew 
Std. Kurt.= Standardized Kurtosis 
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Table 5.5 Correlation between PAMS Pain Intensity 
and standard pain measures 
 
PAMS Pain Intensity 
SF-36 Bodily Pain -0.612*** 
MPI – Pain Severity 0.687*** 
McGill – Total 0.299** 
*** p= <.001    ** p= <.01 
 
The PAMS scale correlated significantly with the SF-36 and MPI scale, comparing to a 
correlation between the MPI and SF-36 scales of r=-0.734. 
The PAMS scale correlated with the McGill PRI-T, though to a much lesser extent. 
However, it is noted that the SF-36 and MPI pain scales also displayed lower correlations 
with the McGill PRI-T (r=-0.42 and r=.33, respectively). According to the test described 
by Williams (1959), PAMS Pain Intensity correlated significantly better with the MPI 
(t(114)=4.68, p<.001) and SF-36 (t(114)=3.64, p<.001) scales than it did with the McGill 
PRI. 
Table 5.6 Correlation between PAMS Pain Intensity 
and standard measures 
Scale PAMS Pain Intensity 
SF-36 Phys. Functioning -0.456*** 
 Phys. Role Funct. -0.462*** 
 General Health -0.235* 
 Vitality -0.26** 
 Social Functioning -0.411*** 
DQ 0.349*** 
SF-36 Emotional Role Funct. -0.141 
 Mental Health -0.164 
MPI Affective Distress 0.23* 
HADS Anxiety 0.258** 
 Depression 0.352*** 
*** p= <.001    ** p= <.01     * p= <.05 
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The predictive validity of the PAMS Pain Severity scale is demonstrated in Table 5.6. In 
support of its validity, the scale was significantly related to all measures of functional 
status and a number of measures of distress – the MPI and both HADS scales. It is noted 
that these correlations assessing concurrent validity were lower than the convergent 
correlations with the MPI and SF-36 pain scales. 
5.2.2 Appraisal 
The factor structure of the PAMS Appraisal items was explored via Principal Axis 
Factoring with oblique (SPSS Oblimin) rotation (see Table 5.7). Oblique rotation was 
employed because appraisal dimensions were not expected to be orthogonal. Pain 
Expectancy was intended to remain as a single-item measure of that construct and as such 
it was not entered into the analysis. 
Table 5.7 Principal Axis Factoring of PAMS Appraisal items, using orthogonal (Oblimin) 
rotation. 
  Pattern Matrix 
  1 2 3 
Pain Self-Efficacy: Pain tolerance -0.06 0.74 -0.38 
Pain Self-Efficacy: Pain coping -0.11 0.79 -0.44 
Pain Self-Efficacy: Pain control 0.04 0.79 0.03 
Pain Self-Efficacy: Ability to decrease pain 0.06 0.63 0.26 
Pain Self-Efficacy: Ability to perform daily tasks 0.28 0.18 -0.44 
Pain Self-Efficacy: Capacity to engage in physical activity 0.40 0.26 -0.37 
Catastrophising: Perceived suffering from pain -0.18 -0.08 0.53 
Catastrophising: Pain is terrible -0.08 0.15 0.71 
Catastrophising: Injury expectancy -0.02 -0.02 0.52 
Pain Interference: Doing less -0.85 0.13 0.02 
Pain Interference: Difficulty performing tasks -0.79 -0.14 0.08 
Pain Interference: Limited in tasks -0.84 0.02 -0.01 
VARIANCE ACCOUNTED FOR: 41.92 17.33 10.21 
Loadings in bold typeface were considered to load uniquely on a factor 
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Three factors were identified with eigenvalues over one, and were also suggested by 
inspection of the scree plot. These factors accounted for a total of 69.5% of total variance. 
Factor one was correlated r=.23 with factor two, and r=-0.48 with factor three. Factors 
two and three correlated r=-0.24. An orthogonal rotation revealed an identical pattern of 
loadings to those seen in Table 5.7. Items with a loading outside the range -0.3 to 0.3, and 
that diverged from loadings on other factors by at least 0.2 were considered to load 
uniquely on a factor. 
The first factor, labelled Pain Self-Efficacy, was composed of the four pain-coping self-
efficacy items. The second factor, Catastrophising, contained items reflecting perceived 
suffering due to pain, perceptions that the pain is terrible, and expectation about the 
likelihood that an injury would occur as a result of pain. The final factor, Perceived 
Interference, contained the three items designed to measure that construct. The two self-
efficacy items measuring perceived capacity to engage in daily activities and physical 
activity did not form a separate factor or load in a simple manner on any of the three 
factors identified. Further, these items did not form a separate “functional self-efficacy” 
factor when additional oblique and orthogonal factor analyses were conducted with four 
factors selected. Thus, these two items were not included in the selected scales.  
Except for one item, inspection of corrected item-total-correlations revealed no items 
that, if removed, increased scale reliability significantly. The corrected item-total-
correlation of the Ability to Decrease Pain item was alpha =0.46, as opposed to the other 
three items in the Pain Self-Efficacy scale, which fell between alpha =0.71 and 0.81. 
Removing the item did not increase the reliability of the scale, but decreased it only 
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mildly from alpha=0.89 to 0.85. For the sake of maintaining minimal item sizes the item 
was deleted from the Pain Self-Efficacy scale. 
Scales were constructed from each of the three factors by unweighted averaging. 
Descriptive statistics and internal reliability estimates can be found in Table 5.8  
Table 5.8 Descriptive statistics for PAMS Appraisal scales  
 PAMS Factor  Alpha Min Max Mean SD Skew 
Std. 
Skew Kurt. 
Std. 
Kurt 
 Pain Self-Efficacy  0.89 1.00 94.00 45.95 26.45 0.02 0.10 -1.20 -2.78 
 Catastrophising  0.66 3.67 83.00 39.88 18.46 0.36 1.65 -0.60 -1.39 
 Perceived Interference  0.88 12.67 99.67 65.36 20.20 -0.77 -3.53 0.20 0.45 
 Pain Expectancy   2 96 54.44 21.25 -0.44 -2.02 -0.447 -1.03 
Std. Skew= Standardized Skew; Kurt.= Kurtosis; Std. Kurt.= Standardized Kurtosis 
 
 
All scales demonstrated high levels of internal reliability, except Catastrophising, which 
demonstrated a moderate but acceptable level. 
Correlations between the PAMS appraisal scales and existing scales measuring pain 
appraisals were calculated (see Table 5.9).  
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Table 5.9 Correlation of PAMS Appraisal scales and standard cognitive measures 
 PAMS    
Comparison Scale Pain SE Catas. Perc. Int. Pain Exp. 
PAMS Pain Self-Efficacy -    
 Catastrophising -0.37*** -     
 Perceived Interference -0.29** 0.45*** -   
 Pain Expectancy -0.4*** 0.5*** 0.38*** - 
MPI Life-Control 0.09 -0.26** -0.17 -0.16 
PSEQ  0.48*** -0.42*** -0.44*** -0.4*** 
CSQ Control over Pain 0.25** -0.10 -0.12 -0.26** 
 Ability to Decrease Pain 0.22* 0.03 -0.11 -0.28** 
 Catastrophising  -0.29** 0.45*** 0.16 0.2* 
PCS Total -0.3** 0.54*** 0.25** 0.23* 
 Helplessness -0.27** 0.52*** 0.27** 0.23* 
 Rumination -0.27** 0.42*** 0.15 0.21* 
 Magnification -0.16 0.5*** 0.2* 0.17 
MPI Life Interference -0.32*** 0.44*** 0.6*** 0.51*** 
*** p= <.001  ** p=<.01  * p=<.05 
Pain SE= Pain Self-Efficacy; Catas.= Catastrophising; Perc. Int.= Perceived 
Interference; Pain Exp.= Pain Expectancy 
 
Moderate but adequate relationships were found between the PAMS scales and alternate 
measures of similar constructs. Comparisons between correlations were made using the 
method described by Williams (1959). PAMS Pain Self-Efficacy correlated r=.48 with 
the PSEQ, significantly higher than with any other scale (vs. MPI Life Interference 
t(113)=2.36, p=.02). PAMS Catastrophising correlated r=.54 with the PCS Total scale. 
Although this appeared higher than correlations with all other cognitive scales testing 
revealed that it was significantly higher than relationships with all other scales (vs. MPI 
Life Control, t(113)=2.99, p=.003) except MPI Life Interference (t(113)=1.07, p=ns) and 
the PSEQ (t(113)=1.35, p=ns). PAMS Perceived Interference correlated r=.6 with MPI 
Life Interference, which was higher than correlations with all other standardised 
cognitive scales (vs. PSEQ, t(113)=2.39, p=.018). Although no alternate scales were 
included to measure pain expectancy, the PAMS Pain Expectancy scale demonstrated 
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some moderate correlations, including r=.51 with MPI Life Interference and r=–0.4 with 
the PSEQ. PAMS scales displayed significant inter-relationships, between r=–0.29 and 
r=.5.  
Of all the PAMS scales, Pain Self-Efficacy displayed the lowest convergent relationship. 
Although its relationship to the PSEQ, a known measure of pain self-efficacy, was in the 
moderate range, the PAMS Catastrophising scale demonstrated a relationship of similar 
magnitude with that measure. It was considered that the differing item content of the two 
pain self-efficacy scales may have been responsible for this poor divergent/convergent 
validity. Namely, the PSEQ appears to focus heavily on self-efficacy as it relates to 
function and capacity to engage in activities, as opposed to self-efficacy for coping with 
pain per se. To test whether this was the case the PAMS Pain Self-Efficacy scale was 
correlated with the PSEQ item “I can cope with my pain without medication” (Item 7), 
which was considered to most reflect the construct of self-efficacy for coping with pain. 
It was noted that this item had the lowest item-total correlation with the total PSEQ scale 
for the current sample (r=.39) and correlated below 0.41 with all items except one (“I can 
still accomplish most of my goals in life, despite the pain”; r=.56). PAMS correlated 
r=.72 with PSEQ item seven. The other PAMS Appraisal scales correlated between only 
r=-0.19 and r=-0.3 with PSEQ item seven, which appears to support the convergent 
validity of the PAMS Pain Self-Efficacy scale as a measure of self-efficacy for coping 
with pain. 
5.2.3 Coping 
The factor structure of PAMS coping items was investigated via principal-axis factoring 
(see Table 5.10). Coping scales were not hypothesised to be orthogonal therefore oblique 
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rotation (SPSS Oblimin) was used. Seven factors were identified with eigenvalues over 
one, accounting for 58.19% of shared variance. Inspection of the scree plot suggested a 
two factor model. A two-factor solution accounted for 26.61% of total shared variance. 
Variance accounted for by each factor can be found at the bottom of the table. Factors 
one and two were correlated r= 0.154. 
Table 5.10 Principal Axis Factoring of PAMS Coping items 
  Pattern Matrix 
  1 2 
Drink alcohol -0.07 0.37 
Do an activity, or stretch 0.30 -0.20 
Think about something I enjoy 0.49 0.13 
Hope or wish the pain would go away 0.07 0.52 
Ignore the pain 0.00 0.22 
Talk sense to myself 0.51 0.22 
Think pleasant thoughts 0.66 0.04 
Distract myself 0.35 0.19 
Take PRN pain medication -0.01 0.51 
Take a sedative 0.10 0.44 
Lay down, rest or sleep 0.21 0.41 
Pretend the pain isn't there -0.03 0.22 
Use positive thinking 0.59 0.06 
Tell myself the pain doesn't hurt 0.07 0.42 
Relax or breathe deeply 0.50 0.09 
Avoid activity 0.02 0.49 
Give up doing activities 0.04 0.30 
Persist with activities despite pain 0.24 -0.10 
Take regular breaks between activities 0.47 -0.05 
Switch between activities 0.46 -0.03 
Refuse help with doing activities -0.09 0.20 
Seek help with doing activities 0.21 0.28 
Accept help with doing activities 0.43 0.02 
VARIANCE ACCOUNTED FOR: 16.9% 9.71% 
Items with bold loadings were considered to load uniquely on the 
respective factor 
 
An item was considered to load uniquely on a factor if it obtained a loading outside the 
range –0.3 to 0.3, and the loadings across factors differed by a range of at least 0.2. Items 
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fulfilling these criteria appear in bold in Table 5.10. Scales were constructed by summing 
items loading uniquely for each of the two-factors. Internal reliabilities measured 
according to coefficient alpha were 0.75 for the eight items in the first factor, and 0.64 for 
the seven items in the second factor. Inspection of item-total correlations and adjustments 
to alpha revealed no items that could be beneficially deleted from the scales. Descriptive 
statistics can be found in Table 5.11  
 
Table 5.11 Descriptive statistics 
for PAMS coping scales 
 Factor  
1 
 
 2 
Minimum 0 0 
Maximum 8 7 
Mean 3.5 2.04 
SD 2.35 1.69 
Skew 0.19 0.67 
Std. Skew 0.87 3.09 
Kurtosis -0.99 -0.01 
Std. Kurtosis -2.29 -0.03 
Std. Skew= Standardized Skew 
Std. Kurt.= Standardized Kurtosis 
 
Square-root and squared transformations were performed on factor two, with a 
standardised skew above 3.0, however kurtosis became unacceptably elevated. Thus, the 
untransformed scale was used in subsequent analyses. 
Inspection of item content suggested that factor one represented active-coping strategies 
and factor two represented passive-coping strategies and scales were labelled Active- and 
Passive- Coping, respectively. 
Convergent and divergent validity was assessed by comparing the PAMS scales with the 
CSQ two-factor (active and passive) model and six of the original CSQ coping scales (not 
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including the catastrophising scale and the pain-control items). Correlations can be found 
in Table 5.12. 
Table 5.12 Correlation between PAMS and CSQ coping scales  
  PAMS Scale 
 CSQ Scale Active Passive 
 Active 0.398*** 0.073 
 Passive 0.071 0.329*** 
 Divert Attention 0.129 0.015 
 Reinterpret Pain Sensations 0.14 0.22* 
 Ignore 0.149 -0.036 
 Pray/Hope 0.444*** 0.008 
 Coping Self-Statements 0.071 -0.076 
 Increase Behavioural Activity 0.095 0.002 
*** p= <.001     ** p= <.01    * p= <.05 
 
The PAMS coping scales were significantly and positively correlated (r=.28, p<.01). 
Active Coping appeared to be related to CSQ Active Coping, but not CSQ Passive 
Coping. Amongst the CSQ subscales, PAMS Active coping was related to only CSQ 
Praying-and-Hoping. PAMS Passive coping was related to CSQ Passive Coping, but not 
CSQ Active Coping. Passive Coping appeared to be unrelated to the original CSQ coping 
subscales, except for a small correlation with CSQ Reinterpret-Pain-Sensations. 
A series of multiple regression analyses were conducted to investigate the predictive 
validity of the PAMS coping scales. Analyses were also conducted for the CSQ passive 
and active scales, and six of the standard CSQ scales (not including the self-efficacy 
items and catastrophising scale) to assess comparative predictive validity. Thus, three 
analyses were conducted for each of the two criterion measures – the HADS depression 
scale, and the Disability Questionnaire. Results can be found in Table 5.13. 
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For the HADS Depression scale the CSQ six-scale version provided superior prediction. 
Both the PAMS and two-factor version of the CSQ provided significant prediction, 
accounting for comparable proportions of variance. 
Table 5.13 Regression analyses assessing the predictive validity of PAMS scales 
compared to CSQ scales 
Predictor R-square Scale Beta 
HADS - Depression 
CSQ – 2 factors 0.083* Active -0.191** 
  Passive 0.25* 
CSQ – 6 scales 0.163* Divert Attention 0.159 n.s. 
  Reinterpret Pain Sensations 0.064 n.s. 
  Ignore -0.383* 
  Pray/Hope 0.059 n.s. 
  Coping Self-Statements -0.225** 
  Increase Behavioural Activity -0.086 n.s. 
PAMS   0.078* Active 0.02 n.s. 
  Passive 0.273* 
Disability Questionnaire 
CSQ – 2 factors 0.067** Active 0.119 n.s. 
  Passive 0.21** 
CSQ – 6 scales 0.083 n.s.   
PAMS  0.197*** Active 0.257* 
  Passive 0.295* 
*** p= <.001   ** p= <.01   * p= <.05 
 
The PAMS proved to be the better predictor of the Disability Questionnaire, predicting 
19.7% of variability. The CSQ passive/active coping scales accounted for a notably 
smaller but still significant amount of variance, whilst the six CSQ subscales were not 
significant. 
5.2.4 Distress 
The two PAMS items measuring Calmness and Cheerfulness were inverted to ease 
interpretation. Descriptive data can be found in Table 5.14. 
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Table 5.14 Descriptive statistics for PAMS Distress items 
 PAMS Items Mean SD Min. Max. Skew 
Std. 
Skew Kurtosis 
Std. 
Kurt. 
 Cheerful (Inverted) 51.02 22.74 6 97 0.21 0.96 -0.56 -1.30 
 Calm (Inverted) 46.11 20.06 3 93 0.07 0.31 -0.42 -0.98 
 Down 35.01 21.47 1 90 0.35 1.60 -0.92 -2.11 
 Depressed 36.02 24.17 0 82 0.11 0.51 -1.43 -3.31 
 Anxious 31.73 22.00 1 97 0.63 2.90 -0.46 -1.07 
 Frustrated 47.72 25.62 0 93 -0.25 -1.13 -0.94 -2.18 
 Irritable 35.71 22.59 1 95 0.44 2.02 -0.54 -1.24 
 Tense 44.57 23.22 1 99 -0.22 -1.01 -0.85 -1.96 
 Std. Skew= Standardized Skew; Kurt.= Kurtosis; Std. Kurt.= Standardized Kurtosis 
 
Factor analysis was conducted on PAMS distress items using principal axis factoring. 
One factor with an eigenvalue above one was identified, accounting for 63.56% of 
variance. Factor loadings can be found in Table 5.15.  Factor two accounted for only 
9.18% of additional variance. Only factor one was retained. 
Table 5.15 Factor loadings of PAMS 
distress items 
 Factor Loading 
Cheerful (Inverted) 0.72 
Calm (Inverted) 0.66 
Down 0.67 
Depressed 0.80 
Anxious 0.80 
Frustrated 0.76 
Irritable 0.83 
Tense 0.86 
 
 
Descriptive statistics for the PAMS Distress scale can be found in Table 5.16. The scale 
displayed a high degree of internal consistency (alpha=0.92). There were no items that 
increased alpha reliability when deleted. 
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Table 5.16 Descriptive statistics 
for PAMS Distress scale  
Minimum 6.75 
Maximum 88 
Mean 40.96 
SD 18.12 
Skew 0.11 
Std. Skew 0.51 
Kurtosis -0.65 
Std. Kurtosis -1.50 
Std. Skew= Standardized Skew 
Std. Kurt.= Standardized Kurtosis 
 
Convergent validity of the PAMS Distress scale was assessed via correlation with a range 
of standard measures of psychological distress (see Table 5.17).  
For the purpose of comparison, the inter-correlations amongst the standard measures are 
included. 
Table 5.17 Correlation of PAMS Distress scale with standard measures of distress 
 PAMS MPI HADS  SF-36  
 Distress  
Affective 
Distress Anxiety Depress. 
Role Funct 
– Emotion. 
Mental 
Health 
MPI – Affective Distress 0.67 -        
HADS – Anxiety 0.62 0.67 -      
HADS - Depression 0.57 0.55 0.59 -    
SF-36 Role Function - Emotional  -0.52 -0.51 -0.55 -0.52 -  
SF-36 Mental Health -0.63 -0.61 -0.71 -0.64 0.61 - 
All correlations p= <.001 
Depress.= Depression; Role Funct.= Role Functioning 
 
The PAMS scale correlated significantly with all standard measures of distress. These 
correlations were in a comparable range to the intercorrelations amongst the comparison 
measures. 
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Table 5.18 Communalities of PAMS Function items 
 Communality 
Avoid Housework/Chores 0.40 
Avoid Yardwork/Gardening 0.49 
Avoid Work (paid or unpaid) 0.42 
Avoid Shopping 0.50 
Avoid Sport 0.56 
Avoid Cooking 0.36 
Avoid Visiting 0.31 
Avoid Dressing Self/Bathing 0.26 
Avoid Hobby 0.36 
Avoid Driving 0.29 
Work (paid or unpaid) 0.31 
Housework/Chores 0.22 
Yardwork/Gardening 0.29 
A Sport 0.19 
Bend/Kneel/Stoop 0.44 
Carry An Object 0.38 
Lift An Object 0.47 
Walk 500 Meters 0.28 
Walk A Kilometre 0.21 
Climb A Flight Of Steps 0.31 
Climb Several Flights Of Steps 0.22 
Items in bold-face loaded over 0.3 and were adopted in the 
PAMS Function scale. 
 
5.2.5 Function 
Factor analysis was conducted on the PAMS activity and avoidance checklists using 
principal axis factoring. To assess which items were most convergent for constructing a 
single scale measuring function, items with communalities over 0.3 were included in 
subsequent analyses (see Table 5.18). This method was selected because the function 
scale was intended as a gross measure of function and there was no reason to assume an 
underlying factor structure. It was considered that factor analysis per se would not reveal 
theoretically important latent dimensions, but would merely reveal which activities 
people tended to do at the same time regardless of whether they were functional or 
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dysfunctional. This conclusion was confirmed when PAMS items were submitted to 
factor analysis with Varimax rotation. No inherent meaning appeared to be conveyed by 
the factor solutions other than the practicalities of which activities tend to co-occur in 
daily life (for example, doing yardwork tends to co-occur with lifting and carrying 
objects, thus revealing a yardwork/lifting factor). 
Descriptive statistics for a scale constructed from the 13 selected items can be found in 
Table 5.19. This scale displayed an adequate degree of internal consistency (alpha=0.71). 
Inspection of item-total correlations revealed that one item (“Work (paid or unpaid)”) 
correlated only r=.081 with the total scale. Removal of this item did not appear to 
increase internal validity significantly, thus the item was retained. It was considered that 
because the function scale was intended as a gross measure of function, and items were 
not selected on the basis of factor structure, it was not surprising that certain items had 
low item-total correlations. Further, it was considered important to retain that item for the 
sake of content validity. 
Table 5.19 Descriptive statistics 
for PAMS Function scale  
Minimum 0 
Maximum 100 
Mean 57.88 
SD 21.63 
Skew -0.42 
Std. Skew -1.95 
Kurtosis -0.17 
Std. Kurtosis -0.39 
Std. Skew= Standardized Skew 
Std. Kurt.= Standardized Kurtosis 
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To assess convergent validity the PAMS Function scale was correlated with a range of 
outcome measures related to function, including the PAMS GRS rating of physical 
activity (see Table 5.50). 
Table 5.50 Correlation of PAMS Function scale 
with function outcome measures 
 
PAMS 
Function 
SF36 - Physical Function 0.638*** 
SF36 - Physical Role Function 0.574*** 
SF36 - General Health 0.322*** 
SF36 - Vitality 0.457*** 
SF36 - Social Function 0.575*** 
Disability Questionnaire -0.593*** 
PAMS - Activity-level 0.235* 
*** p= <.001          ** p= <.01        * p= <.05 
 
All correlations with outcome measures were significant and in the range of r=.32 and 
0.638. The correlation with PAMS activity-level was significant but small, indicating that 
the two PAMS measures represent related but distinct measures of physical functioning. 
5.2.6 Activity Level 
Descriptive Statistics for the single-item PAMS Activity Level measure can be found in 
Table 5.51. 
Table 5.51 Descriptive statistics 
for PAMS Activity Level scale  
Minimum 2 
Maximum 89 
Mean 37.53 
SD 18.87 
Skew 0.059 
Std. Skew 0.27 
Kurtosis -0.613 
Std. Kurtosis -1.42 
Std. Skew= Standardized Skew 
Std. Kurt.= Standardized Kurtosis 
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The concurrent validity of the PAMS Activity-Level scale was assessed via correlation 
with outcome measures of function (see Table 5.52). The SF-36 Vitality scale 
demonstrated the highest correlation with PAMS Activity Level, and significant 
relationships were also found with SF-36 Physical Functioning, and the DQ. Convergent 
relationships were of only low to moderate magnitudes. 
Table 5.52 Inter-correlation of PAMS Activity-Level scale with 
standard measures of function 
 PAMS Activity Level 
SF36 - Physical Function 0.239** 
SF36 - Physical Role Function 0.15 
SF36 - General Health 0.052 
SF36 - Vitality 0.35*** 
SF36 - Social Function -0.01 
Disability Questionnaire -0.201* 
*** p= <.001        ** p= <.01          * p= <.05 
 
5.3 Discussion – Part A 
The purpose of Part A of Study One was to develop and validate the Pain Ambulatory 
Monitoring Survey (PAMS). Each of the six domains – pain intensity, pain appraisals, 
coping, distress, function, and activity-level – were investigated separately. 
5.3.1 Pain Intensity 
The PAMS Pain-Intensity measure demonstrated adequate convergent and concurrent 
validity. Convergent validity was demonstrated by significant and moderate correlations 
with two established measures of pain intensity from the SF-36 and the MPI. The PAMS 
scale correlated only mildly with the McGill PRI-Total, reflecting the lower correlations 
the SF-36 and MPI also shared with that scale.  
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Concurrent validity of the PAMS Pain-Intensity scale was also supported by correlations 
with existing measures of function and psychological distress – constructs that are 
presumably related to pain intensity. PAMS Pain Intensity demonstrated significant 
mild/moderate correlations with the DQ, five scales of the SF-36, MPI Affective Distress, 
and the Depression and Anxiety scales of the HADS. In support of divergent validity, all 
correlations with these function- and distress- scales were notably lower than correlations 
between PAMS Pain Intensity and the SF-36 and MPI measures of pain intensity. 
5.3.2 Appraisal 
All appraisal items except pain-expectancy (which was retained as a separate scale for 
theoretical reasons) were subjected to factor analysis. Three non-orthogonal dimensions 
of appraisal were established, which clearly distinguished between distinct appraisal 
constructs – pain control self-efficacy, catastrophising, and perceived interference. In 
confirmation of the reliability of these scales, all three demonstrated high to very high 
internal consistency.  
The four PAMS appraisal scales were mildly/moderately correlated. Catastrophising 
demonstrated moderate correlations with both Pain Expectancy and Perceived 
Interference. This may reflect the shared “primary appraisal” nature of these constructs. 
However, correlations were not such that any multicollinearity could be considered. 
Amongst the appraisal scales, Pain Self-Efficacy and Perceived Interference 
demonstrated excellent internal reliability, and the Catastrophising scale was adequate. 
Convergent validity appeared to be adequately supported for the Catastrophising and 
Perceived Interference scales. Catastrophising was most strongly correlated with similar 
scales – CSQ Catastrophising, the three PCS scales, and the PCS Total score. Perceived 
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interference was most strongly related to the MPI Life Interference scale. Divergent 
validity was supported for PAMS Perceived Interference – its relationship to MPI Life 
Interference was significantly larger than relationships with any other cognitive scale. 
The divergent validity of the PAMS Catastrophising scale was not as strong. Its 
relationships with two divergent scales (PSEQ and MPI Life Interference) were not 
significantly different from its convergent relationship with CSQ Catastrophising or the 
PCS Total score. This may reflect the breadth of the PSEQ scale as a general measure of 
pain appraisals, and the similarity of the catastrophising and perceived interference 
constructs as measures of primary appraisal. 
PAMS Pain Self-Efficacy was also most strongly, and exclusively, related with a measure 
of pain self-efficacy, the PSEQ, supporting the scale’s divergent validity. However, thie 
relationship was not strong, and the scale’s correlations with the two CSQ pain-coping 
self-efficacy scales were mild – no stronger than correlations demonstrated with non-
construct specific scales. Thus, analyses of the convergent validity of the Self-Efficacy 
scale throw some question on the content measured by this scale. Further analysis 
revealed that the PAMS Pain Self-Efficacy scale was strongly correlated with a specific 
item from the PSEQ reflecting perceived ability to control pain without the use of 
medication. Thus, it appears that the PAMS Pain Self-Efficacy scale may reflect self-
efficacy for an internal-locus of pain control. It would appear that, given its moderate 
correlations with the range of PAMS scales, the PSEQ is a broader-spectrum measure of 
pain appraisal, incorporating perceptions of life control, pain control, and capacity to 
function. For the purposes of validating the PAMS Pain Self-Efficacy scale, a measure of 
internal locus of pain-control may have been more suitable. 
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5.3.3 Coping 
Two non-orthogonal factors were extracted from factor-analysis of coping items. This 
was consistent with two-factor models of coping suggested in the general coping 
literature (eg. Folkman & Lazarus, 1980) and the chronic pain literature (eg. Brown & 
Nicassio, 1987). Face-validity of the two scales suggested active-coping and passive-
coping dimensions. Both scales demonstrated adequate internal consistency.  
The two factors demonstrated convergent and divergent validity, with the Active-Coping 
scale correlating with the active coping scale of the CSQ but not the passive scale, and 
visa versa for the PAMS Passive-Coping scale. Though significant, the convergent 
correlations were somewhat lower than convergent correlations found between the 
Vanderbilt and CSQ passive- and active- coping scales (Snow Turek, et al., 1996). The 
PAMS coping scales demonstrated ambiguous relationships with the CSQ subscales, with 
the Passive-Coping scale demonstrating a small but significant correlation with CSQ 
Reinterpreting Pain Sensations (traditionally seen as an active coping strategy) and the 
Active-Coping scale demonstrating a small but significant relationship with CSQ 
Praying/Hoping (traditionally seen as a passive coping strategy). 
It may be that the CSQ passive-coping scale is not a good comparison against which to 
validate the PAMS Passive-Coping scale. Firstly, the CSQ’s content appears lacking in 
terms of a number of passive-coping strategies on which the PAMS scale focuses, namely 
medication and substance-use, activity avoidance, help-seeking, and laying/resting. 
Further, the PAMS Passive-Coping scale does not include catastrophic thinking, whilst 
catastrophising is predominant in the CSQ’s passive-coping scale (Snow Turek, et al., 
1996). Nonetheless, it is surprising that the PAMS Active-Coping scale did not 
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demonstrate a greater relationship with the CSQ active-coping subscales. A scale such as 
the Vanderbilt (Brown & Nicassio, 1987) may have been a more suitable choice for 
cross-validation purposes. 
A series of regression analyses were conducted to assess the predictive validity of the two 
PAMS coping scales. Their success in predicting distress (via the HADS Depression 
scale) and function (via the Disability Questionnaire) was compared to the predictive 
validity of the CSQ. Two formats of the CSQ were utilized in separate analyses: six of 
the original coping subscales, and Nicholas’ (1988) two-factor model. The two factor 
model was utilized because it was considered that this factor structure would provide a 
clearer comparison with the two dimensions measured by the PAMS coping scales 
(although this factor structure includes the CSQ’s catastrophising scale).  
In predicting depression, the CSQ provided superior prediction. However, variability 
accounted for by the PAMS scales was significant, and comparable to that accounted for 
by Nicholas’s (1988) two-factor version of the CSQ.  
It is noted that both versions of the CSQ involved far larger item pools than the PAMS 
scales – thereby allowing a wider measure of the coping constructs – and the six factor 
version also contained three times the scales of the PAMS. On these bases it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the CSQ demonstrated greater prediction of distress. The two-factor 
version incorporated the CSQ catastrophising scale in its passive coping factor. One 
might expect that this would allow that scale superior prediction of distress (eg. Madland, 
et al., 2000; Rosenstiel & Keefe, 1983), though this was not borne out. 
When predicting disability the PAMS scales provided superior prediction, accounting for 
three times the variance accounted for by the most predictive version of the CSQ – the 
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version consisting of Nicholas’s (1988) two-factors. Interestingly, the original scales of 
the CSQ did not demonstrate significant prediction. The superior prediction by PAMS 
coping scales is likely to be due to PAMS’s inclusion of passive coping strategies directly 
related to function, such as laying/resting, activity avoidance, and help-seeking. 
5.3.4 Distress 
Factor analysis identified a single distress factor, which was highly internally consistent. 
This scale incorporated items reflecting positive affectivity, and negative affectivity from 
the domains of frustration, anxiety and depression. The convergent validity of the scale 
was supported by moderate/high correlations with a range of measures of distress and 
emotional functioning, from the MPI, HADS, and SF-36. These correlations were 
comparable to intercorrelations found amongst those criterion measures.  
5.3.5 Function 
A range of items were subjected to factor analysis to create a measure of functioning. A 
single measure of functioning was devised by inspection of communalities. The items 
selected reflected activities of every-day life that were engaged in, or that were avoided 
either because of pain or fear that the activity might provoke pain. The scale 
demonstrated adequate internal consistency, and acceptable convergent validity 
compared to a range of outcome measures from the SF-36 and DQ. 
5.3.6 Activity-Level 
A single item reflecting activity level was utilized. It demonstrated a significant 
low/moderate correlation with the SF-36 Vitality scale, which was expected to be the 
measure of function most likely to be related to activity-level. The activity level measure 
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also demonstrated significant relationships with other measures of function from the SF-
36 and DQ, supporting its validity. Because the PAMS items were all momentary, and 
measures used for cross-validation were all recall-based, it was anticipated that this might 
reflect in lower convergent correlations. As such, it was not surprising that although 
PAMS Activity-Level demonstrated significant correlations with related constructs, these 
correlations were nonetheless in the low/moderate range.  
5.4 Results – Part B: Between-person Analyses of Coping and Appraisal  
In Part B of Study Two, the PAMS scales were employed in a conventional cross-
sectional study comparable to those conducted by Turner, et al. (2000). To test the 
predictive validity of the PAMS scales against alternate standard measures an additional 
set of regression analyses were conducted in which MPI Affective Distress and the DQ 
were employed as criterion variables and other standard scales from the MPI, CSQ and 
PSEQ were employed as predictors. The results of these analyses were compared to 
findings from the PAMS scales. In each analysis in Part B the unique contribution of 
appraisal and coping, controlling for pain intensity, was assessed by entering pain 
intensity in the first step of a hierarchical analysis, followed by appraisal and coping 
variables in steps two and three.  
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Table 5.53 Unique prediction of PAMS Distress by PAMS Appraisal 
Step R Square 
R Square 
Change Predictors Beta  
partial 
corr. 
part 
corr. 
1. Pain Intensity .139***  Pain Intensity .37*** .37 .37 
2. Coping .249*** .11*** Pain Intensity .37*** .39 .36 
   Passive Coping .34*** .36 .33 
   Active Coping -.11 -.12 -.1 
3. Appraisal .361*** .112** Pain Intensity .25* .19 .16 
   Passive Coping .24** .25 .21 
   Active Coping -.06 -.07 -.05 
   Perceived Interference -.04 -.04 -.03 
   Pain Expectancy -.15 -.12 -.1 
   Pain Self-Efficacy -.04 -.05 -.04 
   Catastrophising .42*** .37 .32 
*** p= <.001    ** p= <.01     * p= <.05 
Corr.= Correlation 
 
Scales were checked for normality, and untransformed scales were used in each case. 
Variables were also checked for linearity and homoscedasticity, and the data was deemed 
adequate. All analyses were performed with pair-wise deletion for missing values. 
For the purpose of the current project, which was largely exploratory in nature, alpha 
values equal to or less than .05 were considered significant. 
5.4.1 PAMS Distress 
Two hierarchical regression analyses were conducted with PAMS Distress as criterion. In 
the first analysis, conducted to investigate the independent role of appraisal, PAMS Pain 
Intensity was entered at step one, PAMS coping scales were entered at step two, and the 
PAMS appraisal scales were entered in the last step (see Table 5.53). The second analysis 
was conducted to investigate the role of coping in distress, and was identical to the first 
analysis except that appraisals were entered second and coping was entered last (see 
Table 5.54). 
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Table 5.54 Unique prediction of PAMS Distress by PAMS Coping 
Step R Square 
R Square 
Change Predictors Beta  
partial 
corr. 
part 
corr. 
1. Pain Intensity .139***  Pain Intensity .37*** .37 .37 
2. Appraisal  .317*** .178*** Pain Intensity .2 .16 .13 
   Perceived Interference .03 .03 .02 
   Pain Expectancy -.18 -.14 -.12 
   Pain Self-Efficacy -.08 -.09 -.07 
   Catastrophising .47*** .41 .37 
3. Coping .361*** .044* Pain Intensity .25* .19 .16 
   Perceived Interference -.04 -.04 -.03 
   Pain Expectancy -.15 -.12 -.1 
   Pain Self-Efficacy -.04 -.05 -.04 
   Catastrophising .42*** .37 .32 
   Passive Coping .24** .25 .21 
   Active Coping -.06 -.07 -.05 
*** p= <.001    ** p= <.01     * p= <.05 
Corr.= Correlation 
 
Thirty-six percent of variance in distress was accounted for by pain intensity, coping, and 
appraisal, with 13.9% attributable to pain-intensity in step one, and 22.2% attributable to 
coping and appraisal. Pain-intensity maintained its association with distress at the third 
step, being associated with greater distress. Appraisal was associated with 11.2% 
variance not attributable to pain-intensity or coping. Amongst the appraisal predictors 
catastrophising was the only significant variable, associated with greater distress. Coping 
was associated with 4.4% unique variance in distress, with passive coping being related 
to increased distress. Catastrophising was the strongest of the significant predictors. 
5.4.2 PAMS Function 
In an initial hierarchical regression analysis PAMS Function was predicted from PAMS 
Pain Intensity at step one, the PAMS coping scales at step two, and PAMS appraisal 
scales at step three (see Table 5.55). The second and third steps were reversed in a second 
analysis investigating the unique contribution of coping to functioning (see Table 5.56). 
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Table 5.55 Unique prediction of PAMS Function by PAMS Appraisal 
Step R Square 
R Square 
Change Predictors Beta  
partial 
corr. 
part 
corr. 
1. Pain Intensity .07**  Pain Intensity -.26** -.26 -.26 
2. Coping .189*** .118*** Pain Intensity -.23** -.25 -.23 
   Passive Coping -.34*** -.34 -.33 
   Active Coping -.02 -.02 -.02 
3. Appraisal .27*** .082* Pain Intensity .02 .01 .01 
   Passive Coping -.21* -.21 -.18 
   Active Coping -.02 -.02 -.02 
   Perceived Interference -.19 -.18 -.15 
   Pain Expectancy -.09 -.07 -.06 
   Pain Self-Efficacy .12 .13 .11 
   Catastrophising -.14 -.12 -.1 
*** p= <.001    ** p= <.01     * p= <.05 
Corr.= Correlation 
 
Twenty-seven percent of PAMS Function was accounted for by pain-intensity and the 
PAMS appraisal and coping scales. In step one, 7% of variance was associated with pain-
intensity. Pain was associated with lower functioning both in step one and when coping 
was added to the model, but retained no association when appraisals were entered. 
Twenty-percent of variance was associated with the appraisal and coping variables, 8.2% 
of which was unique to appraisals. Coping was not significantly associated with any 
unique variance in function. However, whilst appraisals accounted for unique variance in 
function but coping did not, the only significant predictor was passive coping, being 
related to reduced functioning. Perceived interference was associated with decreased 
function in step two of the second analysis, but this effect vanished when coping was 
entered in step three.  
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Table 5.56 Unique prediction of PAMS Function by PAMS Coping 
Step R Square 
R Square 
Change Predictors Beta  
partial 
corr. 
part 
corr. 
1. Pain Intensity .07**  Pain Intensity -.26** -.26 -.26 
2. Appraisal  .232*** .162*** Pain Intensity .04 .03 .02 
   Perceived Interference -.27** -.25 -.23 
   Pain Expectancy -.05 -.04 -.04 
   Pain Self-Efficacy .17 .17 .15 
   Catastrophising -.17 -.15 -.13 
3. Coping .27*** .038 ns Pain Intensity .02 .01 .01 
   Perceived Interference -.19 -.18 -.15 
   Pain Expectancy -.09 -.07 -.06 
   Pain Self-Efficacy .13 .13 .11 
   Catastrophising -.14 -.12 -.1 
   Passive Coping -.21* -.21 -.18 
   Active Coping -.02 -.02 -.02 
*** p= <.001    ** p= <.01     * p= <.05 
Corr.= Correlation 
 
5.4.3 PAMS Activity-Level 
A hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed to investigate the unique 
contribution of appraisal factors to the prediction of activity-level, with pain-intensity 
entered in the first step, coping in the second step, and appraisal in the third step (see 
Table 5.57). The effect of coping was investigated in a second analysis in which appraisal 
was entered in the second step, and coping in the third step (see Table 5.58). 
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Table 5.57 Unique prediction of PAMS Activity-Level by PAMS Appraisal 
Step R Square 
R Square 
Change Predictors Beta  
partial 
corr. 
part 
corr. 
1. Pain Intensity .014 ns  Pain Intensity -.12 -.12 -.12 
2. Coping .083* .069* Pain Intensity -.13 -.13 -.13 
   Passive Coping -.26** -.25 -.25 
   Active Coping .15 .14 .14 
3. Appraisal .104 ns .021 ns Pain Intensity .01 .01 .01 
   Passive Coping -.21* -.19 -.18 
   Active Coping .14 .14 .13 
   Perceived Interference -.07 -.06 -.05 
   Pain Expectancy -.08 -.06 -.05 
   Pain Self-Efficacy .07 .06 .06 
   Catastrophising -.07 -.05 -.05 
*** p= <.001    ** p= <.01     * p= <.05 
Corr.= Correlation 
 
A total of 10.4% of variance was accounted for in PAMS Activity-level. Pain-intensity 
was not significantly associated with any variance in activity-level. Whilst 9% variance 
in activity-level was associated with appraisal and coping, neither appraisal nor coping 
was significantly associated with any unique variance. Table 5.57 demonstrates that 
coping accounted for a significant portion of variance that was not related to pain-
intensity, but Table 5.58 reveals that this variance could not be considered independent of 
appraisals. Passive coping was the only predictor that appeared to have an impact on 
activity-level, associated with decreased activity.   
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Table 5.58 Unique prediction of PAMS Activity-Level by PAMS Coping 
Step R Square 
R Square 
Change Predictors Beta  
partial 
corr. 
part 
corr. 
1. Pain Intensity .014 ns  Pain Intensity -.12 -.12 -.12 
2. Appraisal  .064 ns .05 ns Pain Intensity .08 .05 .05 
   Perceived Interference -.1 -.09 -.09 
   Pain Expectancy -.07 -.05 -.05 
   Pain Self-Efficacy .09 .08 .08 
   Catastrophising -.13 -.11 -.1 
3. Coping .104 ns .041 ns Pain Intensity .01 .01 .01 
   Perceived Interference -.07 -.06 -.05 
   Pain Expectancy -.08 -.06 -.05 
   Pain Self-Efficacy .07 .08 .08 
   Catastrophising -.07 -.05 -.05 
   Passive Coping -.21* -.19 -.18 
   Active Coping .14 .14 .13 
*** p= <.001    ** p= <.01     * p= <.05 
Corr.= Correlation 
 
5.4.4 MPI Affective Distress 
Two hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted with the MPI Affective 
Distress scale as criterion.  The first was to assess the unique impact of appraisal on 
distress, and the second  to assess the unique impact of coping. In the first analysis, the 
MPI Pain Severity scale was entered first, followed by the CSQ coping scales in the 
second step, and a range of standard measures of appraisals (namely, CSQ 
Catastrophising, MPI Life Interference, and the PSEQ) in the third step (see Table 5.59). 
In the second analysis, the order of entry for the coping scales and appraisal scales was 
reversed (see Table 5.60). 
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Table 5.59 Unique prediction of MPI Affective Distress by Appraisal 
Step R Square 
R Square 
Change Predictors Beta  
partial 
corr. 
part 
corr. 
1. Pain Intensity 0.072**  MPI Pain Severity 0.27** 0.27 0.27 
2. Coping 0.152** 0.08ns MPI Pain Severity 0.33 0.33 0.32 
   CSQ Divert Attention -0.14 -0.11 -0.11 
    Reinterpret Pain Sensation 0.03 0.03 0.03 
    Ignoring Sensations 0.20 0.15 0.14 
    Praying or Hoping 0.23* 0.21 0.19 
    Coping Self Statements -0.25* -0.19 -0.18 
    Increased Beh. Activities -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 
3. Appraisal 0.304*** 0.151*** MPI Pain Severity 0.04 0.03 0.03 
   CSQ Divert Attention -0.19 -0.17 -0.14 
    Reinterpret Pain Sensation -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
    Ignoring Sensations 0.27* 0.21 0.18 
    Praying or Hoping 0.10 0.09 0.08 
    Coping Self Statements -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 
    Increased Beh. Activities -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
   MPI Life Interference 0.21 0.15 0.13 
   PSEQ  -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 
   CSQ Catastrophising 0.36*** 0.33 0.29 
*** p= <.001    ** p= <.01     * p= <.05 
Corr.= Correlation 
 
A total of 30.4% variance was explained in MPI Affective Distress. In step-one, pain-
severity was associated with 7.2% variance in distress. Whilst it was a significant 
predictor in step-one, it became non-significant when either coping or appraisal variables 
were added to the model. Appraisal and coping variables were associated with 23.2% 
variance in distress. Whilst appraisals were associated with significant unique variance 
(15.1%), coping was not. In the third step, the CSQ strategy Ignoring Sensations and 
CSQ Catastrophising were both related to increased pain, with catastrophising being the 
stronger predictor.  
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Table 5.60 Unique prediction of MPI Affective Distress by Coping 
Step R Square 
R Square 
Change Predictors Beta  
partial 
corr. 
part 
corr. 
1. Pain Intensity .072**  MPI Pain Severity 0.27** 0.27 0.27 
2. Appraisal .227*** .155*** MPI Pain Severity 0.01 0.00 0.00 
   MPI Life Interference 0.23 0.16 0.14 
   PSEQ  -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 
   CSQ Catastrophising 0.31*** 0.29 0.27 
3. Coping .304*** .077ns MPI Pain Severity 0.04 0.03 0.03 
   MPI Life Interference 0.21 0.15 0.13 
   PSEQ  -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 
   CSQ Catastrophising 0.36*** 0.33 0.29 
   CSQ Divert Attention -0.19 -0.17 -0.14 
    Reinterpret Pain Sensation -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
    Ignoring Sensations 0.27* 0.21 0.18 
    Praying or Hoping 0.10 0.09 0.08 
    Coping Self Statements -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 
    Increased Beh. Activities -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
*** p= <.001    ** p= <.01     * p= <.05 
Corr.= Correlation 
 
5.4.5 DQ 
Two hierarchical regression analyses were conducted with the DQ as criterion. In the 
first, intended to assess the unique role of appraisals in disability, pain severity was 
entered in the first step, followed by coping strategies in step two and appraisals in step 
three (see Table 5.61). In the second analysis the order of entry for the appraisal and 
coping variables was reversed (see Table 5.62). 
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Table 5.61 Unique prediction of the DQ by Appraisal 
Step R Square 
R Square 
Change Predictors Beta  
partial 
corr. 
part 
corr. 
1. Pain Intensity 0.204***  MPI Pain Severity 0.45*** 0.45 0.45 
2. Coping 0.274*** 0.07ns MPI Pain Severity 0.44*** 0.45 0.43 
   CSQ Divert Attention -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
    Reinterpret Pain Sensation 0.16 0.15 0.13 
    Ignoring Sensations -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
    Praying or Hoping 0.13 0.13 0.11 
    Coping Self Statements -0.20 -0.16 -0.14 
    Increased Beh. Activities 0.14 0.13 0.11 
3. Appraisal 0.489*** 0.215*** MPI Pain Severity 0.02 0.02 0.01 
   CSQ Divert Attention -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 
    Reinterpret Pain Sensation 0.15 0.17 0.12 
    Ignoring Sensations -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 
    Praying or Hoping 0.10 0.11 0.08 
    Coping Self Statements -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 
    Increased Beh. Activities 0.13 0.14 0.10 
   MPI Life Interference 0.49*** 0.39 0.30 
   PSEQ  -0.25* -0.22 -0.16 
   CSQ Catastrophising -0.14 -0.16 -0.11 
*** p= <.001    ** p= <.01     * p= <.05 
Corr.= Correlation 
 
Almost 50% of the variance in the DQ was accounted for by pain severity and the 
appraisal and coping scales. Pain severity was initially related to increased disability, 
accounting for 20.4% of variability. It retained this relationship when coping was added 
to the model, but not when appraisals were included. A total of 28.5% variance was 
attributable to appraisal and coping, though only appraisal appeared to account for a 
significant amount of unique variance (21.5%). In the final step, perceptions of life 
interference were related to greater disability and pain self-efficacy was related to lower 
disability. Perceived life interference was the stronger of the two predictors. 
 
181 
Table 5.62 Unique prediction of the DQ by Coping 
Step R Square 
R Square 
Change Predictors Beta  
partial 
corr. 
part 
corr. 
1. Pain Intensity 0.204***  MPI Pain Severity 0.45*** 0.45 0.45 
2. Appraisal 0.448*** 0.244*** MPI Pain Severity 0.01 0.01 0.01 
   MPI Life Interference 0.50*** 0.39 0.32 
   PSEQ  -0.25* -0.23 -0.18 
   CSQ Catastrophising -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 
3. Coping 0.489*** 0.041ns MPI Pain Severity 0.02 0.02 0.01 
   MPI Life Interference 0.49*** 0.39 0.30 
   PSEQ  -0.25* -0.22 -0.16 
   CSQ Catastrophising -0.14 -0.16 -0.11 
   CSQ Divert Attention -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 
    Reinterpret Pain Sensation 0.15 0.17 0.12 
    Ignoring Sensations -0.09 -0.09 -0.06 
    Praying or Hoping 0.10 0.11 0.08 
    Coping Self Statements -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 
    Increased Beh. Activities 0.13 0.14 0.10 
*** p= <.001    ** p= <.01     * p= <.05 
Corr.= Correlation 
 
5.5 Discussion – Part B 
In Part B of Study One, a series of hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to 
predict the PAMS Function, Activity-level and Distress scales. The unique effects of 
appraisal and coping were evaluated in separate analyses by entering each into the last 
step of the hierarchy. Mirroring Turner, et al.’s (2000) approach, the potential 
confounding effect of pain-intensity was controlled in all analyses by entering it at the 
first step of each analysis. Analogous analyses were conducted using standard measures 
of similar constructs – scales from the MPI, CSQ, DQ and PSEQ were employed to 
measure distress, functional status, appraisals, and coping strategies. These analyses of 
standard scales were done as a means of further validating the PAMS scales. Of interest 
was whether the analyses involving PAMS scales demonstrated a comparable pattern of 
findings to those found in analyses involving standard measures.  
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5.5.1 PAMS Analysis of Appraisal and Coping 
The current study is the first to investigate the concurrent effect of such a representative 
variety of appraisal and coping variables on distress, function, and activity-level whilst 
controlling for pain-intensity.  
In terms of distress, the current study found independent effects of both appraisal and 
coping, supporting a Stress and Coping model but contrasting with Turner, et al.’s (2000) 
finding that only appraisals were independently related to depression. For function, the 
current study only supported an independent role of appraisal, which again differed from 
Turner, et al.’s (2000) finding that coping but not appraisal (measured only as 
catastrophising) was independently related to disability. The current study found that 
neither coping nor appraisal were independently related to activity-level. The only 
significant predictor was passive coping, suggesting that people who tend to cope in 
passive ways are likely to be less physically active. This somewhat intuitive finding is 
well supported in the literature (eg Brown & Nicassio, 1987; Strahl, et al., 2000). Given 
that 10% of variance was accounted for by appraisal and coping factors, but neither 
appraisal nor coping played independent roles in determining activity-level, it may be 
that interactions between pain, appraisal, and coping factors play a key role in 
determining the differences between people in their physical activity levels. Jensen and 
Karoly’s (1991) findings of interactions between pain intensity and psychological factors 
are consistent with this possibility. 
Results for the analyses of distress were consistent with Turner, et al.’s (2000), Robinson, 
et al. (1997), and Geisser, et al.’s (1994) findings that catastrophising was an important 
predictor of distress even after controlling for a range of appraisal variables and coping 
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strategies. As anticipated, those who reported greater catastrophising were likely to be 
more distressed.  
That other appraisal predictors appeared to be unrelated to distress (when entered with 
catastophising and coping variables) was interesting, especially considering other cross-
sectional studies that have demonstrated a role for such appraisal variables as pain self-
efficacy (eg. Strahl, et al., 2000) and perceived interference (eg. Rudy, et al., 1988; 
Catley, 1999). Previous findings relating to the relationship between passive coping and 
distress (eg. Brown & Nicassio, 1987; Snow-Turek, et al., 1996) were supported by the 
current analyses, though unlike previous studies no beneficial effect was found for active 
coping (cf. Brown & Nicassio, 1987; Mercado, et al., 2000).  
Passive coping was the only significant individual predictor of function and activity-level 
in the current study, though collectively coping was not associated with significant 
unique variance. As expected, those who reported greater use of passive strategies tended 
to report poorer functioning and lower activity levels. Such an effect is well supported in 
the literature (eg. Strahl, et al., 2000).  
The current study found that appraisal variables appeared to play no role in predicting 
function or activity-level when entered simultaneously with active and passive coping. It 
would appear to be the first study to have done such analyses and established such a 
finding. Findings from the current study that pain self-efficacy was unrelated to function 
contrasts with literature (eg. Buckelew, et al., 1995) that supports the role of this 
construct and theoretical expectations on the basis of Social Learning Theory. That 
catastrophising appeared to play no role in differentiating people on the basis of 
functional status was supportive of studies such as Turner, et al. (2000) and Geisser, et al. 
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(1994).  The relationship between perceived interference and function has been neglected 
in the literature, so the lack of current findings to support the construct is noteworthy. 
It is noted that, considering the number of variables investigated, the analyses reported 
above may have had inadequate power to reveal effects for certain predictors. 
5.5.2 Comparison of Findings from Standard Measures 
Analyses of PAMS Distress, Function and Activity-Level scales were compared to 
analyses of distress and function measured via standard scales. Of interest was the 
proportion of variance accounted for in outcomes measures, proportion of variance 
uniquely attributable to appraisal and coping, and the individual predictors identified as 
important. 
Somewhat more variance was accounted for in PAMS Distress than MPI Affective 
Distress. The literature has reported R-square values closer to those found for the PAMS 
scale when predicting distress from similar sets of predictors – Jensen & Karoly (1991) 
and Geisser, et al. (1994) reported R-squares of 34% and 38%, though Turner, et al. 
(2000) obtained greater prediction than was obtained in the current analyses, with an R-
square of 51% with coping, appraisal, pain, and demographic predictors. PAMS Distress 
may be a more internally consistent measure than the MPI scale, thereby potentially more 
sensitive. Kerns, et al. (1985) reported an alpha reliability of 0.73 for the MPI scale 
compared to 0.92 for the PAMS scale. In addition, the item-content of PAMS Distress 
appears to cover a wider range of affective states than the MPI. 
Significantly more variance was accounted for in the DQ than PAMS Function and 
Activity-Level. By contrast, when predicting functional disability from similar sets of 
predictors Jensen & Karoly (1991) reported an R2  lower than was found in the current 
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study (20%), whilst Turner, et al. (2000) and Geisser, et al. (1994) reported values 
between those found here – 42% and 41% respectively. 
One explanation for the poorer prediction of the PAMS scales than the DQ may be that 
the DQ appears to be a more internally-consistent measure than PAMS Function (eg. 
Jarvikoski, et al., 1995), and may also be more reliable than the PAMS Activity-Level 
scale. The conservative findings for PAMS scales compared to the DQ may also be 
related to their specificity and momentary nature. PAMS Function was designed as a 
measure of hour-to-hour functioning, and measures involvement in and avoidance of 
specific behaviors. The content of the DQ appears to be somewhat more diverse, and less 
behaviourally specific, perhaps making it a more liberal criterion to predict. The PAMS 
scales are also momentary indices, thereby providing temporally and contextually 
specific measures whereas the item content of the DQ is more generalised. Considering 
the full range of potential determinants of hour-to-hour functioning and activity-level (eg. 
time of day and day of week, prioritizing of tasks, procedural obstructions to completing 
certain tasks) which are likely to be “averaged over” when measuring function on gross 
recall-based measures, it is perhaps unsurprising that less variance was explained in the 
PAMS scale. Finally, function is measured in PAMS by having participants recall their 
functioning in the hours immediately prior to completing the monitoring entry. The 
PAMS pain and appraisal variables, on the other hand, are measured at the moment of the 
monitoring entry. Therefore, part of the poorer prediction of PAMS Function may have 
been because of the “back-to-front” temporal sequencing of these variables. Perhaps if 
function were assessed in the time-frame following assessment of predictors (as is done 
in Study 2) prediction of this criterion would improve.  
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The amount of explained variance in distress that was attributable to appraisal and coping 
variables was comparable between the analyses of PAMS Distress and MPI Affective 
Distress (23% versus 22%, respectively). In the literate, proportions of variance 
attributable to appraisal and coping have been as low as 8% (Geisser, et al.,1994), and as 
high as 43% (Turner, et al., 2000), though Jensen & Karoly (1991) reported a similar 
proportion to that found in the current study – 20%.  However, findings for the MPI scale 
were not entirely consistent with findings for PAMS in that no significant independent 
relationship was found between coping and distress. Although both analyses of distress 
pointed to the importance of catastrophising as a factor that promotes distress, 
interpretational differences between the analyses became more apparent when it came to 
the role of coping strategies. Analyses of the MPI distress scale revealed that distress was 
greater amongst those who tended to ignore the pain – contrasting with the effect of 
passive coping observed in the PAMS analysis. There were noteworthy differences in the 
sets of predictors that may account for the differing interpretations – whereas passive 
coping appears to be more adequately assessed in the PAMS model (including strategies 
such as activity avoidance, help-seeking, and medication usage), the original CSQ scales 
are more focused on cognitive strategies and strategies traditionally seen as active. 
The finding in the MPI analyses regarding ignoring sensations does not appear to have a 
precedent in the literature. Jensen and Karoly (1991) found that ignoring sensations was 
related to distress, though that study found an effect in the opposite (negative) direction. 
Robinson, et al. (1997) found that Praying/Hoping was related to increased distress, 
however no such effect was found in the current analyses. Jensen and Karoly (1991) also 
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found effects for coping self-statements and increased behavioural activities that were not 
found in the current study. 
The proportions of variance attributable to sets of predictors appeared to differ notably 
between the PAMS and standard-measure analyses of function and activity, though 
findings for PAMS Activity-Level appeared to be more divergent from PAMS Function 
than PAMS Function was from the DQ. This may suggest substantive differences – 
different processes may operate in the prediction of activity-level than function or 
disability. Less variance was attributable to appraisal and coping in the PAMS Function 
(20%) analyses and, especially, the PAMS Activity-Level (9%) analyses, compared to the 
DQ (28%). However, values similar to each of these have been reported in the literature – 
Jensen & Karoly (1991) reported 14% of variance was attributable to appraisal and 
coping factors, Geisser, et al. (1994) reported 8%, and Turner, et al. (2000) reported 34%. 
Despite these differences between the PAMS and DQ analyses, the interpretation of the 
PAMS Function and DQ analyses was similar – pain was related to disability, and 
appraisals contributed uniquely to disability however coping did not. In contrast, neither 
pain, appraisal, nor coping appeared to contribute uniquely to the prediction of PAMS 
Activity-Level.  
In terms of the predictors themselves, noteworthy differences were apparent.  Whereas 
PAMS Passive-Coping was the only significant predictor of function and activity-level in 
the PAMS analyses, perceived interference and pain self-efficacy were the only 
significant predictors for the DQ. Differences in scale-content may account for the 
differential pattern of predictors. Namely, passive coping strategies – assessed by PAMS 
but not the CSQ – may account for the effect of appraisals such as self-efficacy and 
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perceived interference, potentially explaining why these factors were important in the 
analysis of the DQ but not in analyses of PAMS Function or Activity-Level. That is, low 
pain self-efficacy and high perceptions of interference may promote passive coping, and 
passive coping per se may be more proximally related to functional impairment. 
Analyses of the DQ provided some interesting findings that are supported by the 
literature – such as the relationship between pain self-efficacy and disability (Buckelew, 
et al., 1995) – and previously unreported, such as the relationship between perceived 
interference and function. The current study did not support a role for CSQ coping 
strategies in predicting function, contrasting with studies such as Robinson, et al. (1997) 
who found that ignoring sensations and coping self-statements were related to increased 
function. Interestingly, Jensen and Karoly (1991) found the same effect for those 
predictors, and for diverting attention – though only for individuals with less intense pain. 
This leaves open the possibility that if interactions between CSQ coping strategies and 
pain-intensity were investigated in the current study an effect may have been found. 
In general the PAMS scales provided more conservative prediction than the standard 
measures. This may be related to the narrow conceptual focus PAMS scales were 
designed to have. PAMS scales were developed to reflect specific constructs, thus, for 
example, PAMS Pain Self-Efficacy appears to be a narrower measure of pain self-
efficacy that the PSEQ.  
Other noteworthy differences between the PAMS predictors and standard predictors may 
account for differences in predictive strength. Firstly, a larger number of predictors were 
included in the standard-measures models. Specifically, all six CSQ coping subscales 
were included to provide a comprehensive coverage of coping domains. The active and 
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passive dimensions of the CSQ could have been used, except that CSQ Catastrophising 
(which is incorporated in the CSQ passive-coping scale) was maintained as a separate 
predictor for the sake of comparison with PAMS Catastrophising. Additionally, the fact 
that coping was disaggregated in the standard-measures model and aggregated in the 
PAMS model may have allowed for specific coping-effects that were missed in the 
PAMS model. The standard measures involve greater item-pools that the PAMS scales 
and, in cases such as the PSEQ, are likely to cover wider construct-domains than their 
respective PAMS scales.  
In Part B of Study Two, PAMS was applied in a standard cross-sectional questionnaire-
based study investigating the unique effect of appraisal and coping factors in predicting 
adaptation to chronic pain. No previous study has investigated this set of predictors 
simultaneously, and the relationship between certain predictors and outcomes (such as the 
relationship between perceived interference and functioning) has also been neglected. 
Whilst the current study reinforced some established findings, such as the importance of 
appraisal styles (especially catastrophising) in distress and the effect of passive coping on 
functioning and distress, other findings conflicted with established literature and with the 
analyses conducted in the current study that employed standard questionnaires. Some of 
these differences may be attributable to the specific set of predictors and criterion 
measures employed. For example, the PAMS criterion variables may differ from the 
standard measures in terms of internal consistency, and the PAMS predictors differ from 
standard scales in their momentary nature and narrow conceptual focus. Also, a wider 
range of coping scales were used in the analyses involving standard questionnaires, 
though passive coping appears to have been more adequately assessed in the PAMS 
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analyses. Reassuringly, although there were some differences between the PAMS and 
standard measure analyses in the total proportions of variance accounted for and the 
proportions attributable to psychological factors, similar analyses in the literature appear 
to provide an adequate precedent for the findings of the PAMS analyses. 
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6 STUDY 2 – THE INDEPENDENT ROLE OF PAIN APPRAISALS AND COPING 
IN DISTRESS, FUNCTION AND ACTIVITY LEVEL 
The purpose of Study Two was to investigate whether appraisal and coping were related, 
within-people, to momentary adaptational status in a chronic pain population. Analyses 
relevant to these focal questions are reported in Part B of Study Two.  
Specifically, Study Two aimed to address two questions previously raised only in the 
cross-sectional literature (Jensen & Karoly, 1991; Turner, et al., 2000). The first question 
concerned whether the effects of appraisal and coping were independent of the 
relationship between pain-intensity and adjustment. Jensen and Karoly (1991) stated that 
when investigating the effect of psychological variables on adjustment, pain-intensity 
may act as a confounding “third variable”, and its effect should therefore be controlled. 
The second question was whether the effect of appraisal on adjustment is independent of 
coping, and visa versa for coping. Turner, et al. (2000) make the point that identifying 
independent roles of coping and appraisal is important not only on theoretical grounds, 
but for defining and refining therapeutic approaches to managing chronic pain. Despite 
this, few cross-sectional or EMA studies have investigated the relative effect of 
appraisals and coping in the same study (cf. Grant, 1998; Keefe, et al., 1997; Turner, et 
al., 2000).  
These hypotheses were guided by Stress and Coping theory (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), 
and on the basis of this heuristic model it was predicted that both appraisals and coping 
would have independent effects on adjustment to chronic pain, and these effects would 
not be attributable to pain-intensity. These predictions are supported by a limited body of 
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research in the EMA literature. Keefe, et al. (1997) and Grant, et al. (2002) demonstrated 
that certain appraisal variables were related to same-day mood and that these effects were 
independent of both pain intensity and coping strategies. Similarly, studies by Grant and 
colleagues, Keefe and colleagues, and Affleck, Urrows, et al. (1992) demonstrated that 
coping strategies were related to same-day mood and that those effects were independent 
of the effects of pain-intensity. Keefe and colleagues’ and Grant and colleagues’ work 
also demonstrated that these effects of coping were not due to appraisal, although only a 
limited range of possible appraisal variables were investigated (pain coping self-efficacy 
in both studies and catastrophising and general pain self-efficacy in Grant and colleagues’ 
study). In the only study reporting cross-lag analyses, Keefe and colleagues reported that 
coping accounted for a small but significant amount of variance in next-day mood that 
was not attributable to pain-coping self-efficacy or pain intensity. However, pain-coping 
self-efficacy was not related to next-day mood when entered simultaneously with pain-
intensity and coping efforts.  
It is recognized that although more complex models could be tested regarding the 
relationship between coping, appraisal, and adjustment (eg. Jensen & Karoly, 1991; 
Catley, 1999) it was not the aim of this study to do so. As an early study in the field of 
within-person stress-and-coping models of chronic pain, the aim was merely to establish 
the independent roles of appraisals and coping in a within-person context. 
The current study involves analyses of three separate outcome measures, thus 
acknowledging the multidimensional nature of adjustment and the need to assess it via 
multiple outcomes. Adjustment was assessed in terms of emotional and physical 
functioning. Emotional functioning was operationalised as Distress – an empirically 
193 
developed index reflecting non-clinical affect, composed of measures of positive affect 
and negative emotions from the domains of depressed mood, anxiety and 
anger/frustration. Physical functioning was operationalised as two separate outcome 
variables: Function (an empirically derived measure of engagement in and avoidance of 
functional activities) and Activity Level.  
Same-lag analyses were conducted for the distress and activity-level outcomes, however 
because function was measured by asking participants to recall their function in the 
between-lag interval it was not considered appropriate to assess same-lag effects for that 
outcome. However, of specific interest to the current study was whether appraisal and 
coping had an effect on adjustment across time-lags – that is, are psychological predictors 
measured at one point in time associated with adjustment in subsequent hours. Cross-lag 
analyses were conducted for all three outcome measures. It was anticipated that larger 
effects would be found in same-lag than cross-lag analyses – for example Keefe, et al., 
(1997) accounted for 6.1% of PA in same-lag analyses but only 2% in cross-lag analyses. 
However, cross-lag analyses were not conducted to look for carry-over effects of the 
predictors, but rather to investigate the causal-direction of observed effects (see Bateman 
& Strasser, 1984). Same-lag analyses do not allow for such speculation. Keefe, et al. 
(1997) also employed cross-lag analyses with the rationale that “stronger causal 
inferences may be drawn from… findings of lagged, or carry-over, effects of one day’s 
coping on the next day’s pain and mood” (p40). 
A full outline of specific hypotheses for each outcome variable is provided below, for 
both the same-lag and cross-lag analyses. In the absence of clearer theoretical predictions 
and relevant empirical findings, identical hypotheses were tested for each measure of 
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adaptation and for both same-lag and cross-lag analyses. Thus, where catastrophising, for 
example, was presumed to be detrimental to mood it was expected that it would also be 
detrimental to physical/social functioning. However, it was nonetheless suspected that 
differential findings may result between outcome measures or across time-lags, either in 
terms of the focal hypotheses or the effects of specific predictors. 
The instrument used to conduct multiple daily assessments of these constructs, PAMS, 
was developed and validated in Study One. Amongst the specific psychological 
predictors included in PAMS were four measures of pain appraisal (catastrophising, pain 
self-efficacy, pain expectancy, and perceived interference) and two classes of pain coping 
strategy (active and passive coping). The predictors investigated were broadly guided by 
a Stress and Coping framework (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984), but were also selected as a 
representative sample of important appraisal and coping constructs, or – as Tennen and 
Affleck (1996) quoted from Casablanca – a “round up [of the] usual suspects” (p155). 
Each predictor has demonstrated an important relationship with adjustment in prior 
empirical research, and they are suggested by a number of theoretical models.  
Although the specific effects of the appraisal and coping factors were not the focal issue 
in the current study, they were nonetheless of interest. Beck’s (1967) cognitive theory of 
emotional disorders suggests that catastrophising will be positively related to distress, and 
such an effect was confirmed in Grant’s (1998) across-day EMA study (see section 
4.4.2). Cross-sectional studies suggest that the relationship between catastrophising and 
distress is independent of coping (eg. Turner, et al., 2000; Geisser, et al., 1994). A cross-
sectional relationship between catastrophising and function has also been supported (eg. 
Robinson, et al., 1997), but other studies leave open the possibility that coping accounts 
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for that effect (eg. Turner, et al., 2000; Geisser, et al., 1994). Regression analyses in 
Study One consistently linked catastrophising to distress but not functioning, when 
controlling for both pain intensity and coping strategies. 
Perceived interference has been strongly linked to distress in studies by Rudy, et al. 
(1988), Jacob, et al. (1993), Maxwell, et al. (1989) and Catley (1999). According to these 
authors, the reduced experience of positive reinforcement implied by perceived pain-
related life-interference ties the construct to depression according to Lewinsohn’s (1974) 
behavioral model of depression. Regression analyses in Study One linked perceived 
interference (measured by the MPI) to impaired functioning – measured by both the DQ 
and the PAMS Function scale – but not to distress. However, differences in perceptions 
of life interference did not distinguish between people of differing adaptational status 
when PAMS factors were analysed. 
Pain self-efficacy (or, perceptions of ability to control or cope with pain) is linked 
directly to distress according to Seligman’s (1972) Learned Helplessness theory of 
depression and Locus of Control Theory (eg. Smith, 1970; Calhoun, et al., 1974), and to 
adjustment via its effect on coping strategy usage according to Social Learning Theory 
(eg. Bandura, 1986; Jenson and Karoly, 1991). EMA studies suggest that pain coping 
self-efficacy and general pain self-efficacy are related to reduced distress (eg. Grant, 
1998). Keefe, et al. (1997) demonstrated that whereas the effect of pain control self-
efficacy on emotional functioning does not appear to be due to pain-intensity or coping 
strategy usage in same-lag analyses, the same cannot be said for cross-day lagged 
analyses. Cross-sectional findings by Jensen and Karoly (1991) support Keefe, et al.’s 
cross-lag analyses and are consistent with a Social Learning Theory interpretation – the 
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effect of pain coping self-efficacy on distress was attributable to coping. Cross-sectional 
studies have also linked pain self-efficacy to functioning (eg. Strong, et al., 1990; 
Buckelew, et al., 1995; Strahl, et al., 2000). Regression analyses in Study One linked pain 
self-efficacy (as measured by the PSEQ) to improved function, controlling for pain-
intensity and coping strategies. However, no effect of pain self-efficacy on distress was 
observed in either analysis of the PAMS Distress or MPI Affective Distress scales.  
A number of studies have linked pain expectancy to performance in laboratory exercises, 
according to expectancy theory (Dolce, et al., 1986; Turk, 1992). Whilst high pain 
expectancies have been linked to reduced performance (eg. Lackner, et al., 1996; 
Cromber, et al., 1996), behavioural avoidance has also been linked to pain expectancies 
that under-predict subsequent pain (Murphy, et al., 1997). Whilst pain expectancy has not 
been strongly linked to distress, Murphy, et al. (1997) reported that high pain 
expectancies during task performance were associated with anxiety. Unfortunately, 
analyses in Study One provided no support for the role of pain expectancies in predicting 
distress or function. 
Passive coping has been consistently linked to both impaired emotional and 
physical/social functioning (eg. Brown & Nicassio, 1987; Bishop and Warr, 2003; Strahl, 
et al., 2000; Snow Turek, et al., 2000). Active-coping has been linked to improved 
emotional and physical/social functioning (eg. Brown & Nicassio, 1987; Bishop and 
Warr, 2003), but has also been linked to impaired functioning (Snow Turek, et al., 2000). 
In Study One, passive coping was linked to greater distress, poorer functioning, and 
lower activity-levels. Active-coping did not appear to be associated with any of the three 
adaptational indices.  
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Thus, it would be expected on the basis of theory and prior research that certain appraisal 
and coping variables will be associated with greater distress and impairment in function 
and activity-engagement (eg. catastrophising, perceived interference, pain expectancy, 
passive coping), whereas others will be associated with the opposite effects (eg. pain self-
efficacy and active coping). However, the appraisal and coping factors outlined above 
have never been investigated simultaneously prior to the cross-sectional regression 
analyses in Study One. As such there is little precedent for hypotheses about their unique 
effects. Thus, in Study Two the relative within-person effect of each appraisal and coping 
factor on the three indices of adjustment was approached on an exploratory basis and no 
specific predictions were made. 
Separate analyses were conducted for each of the three criterion variables, and results are 
presented first for Distress, then Function, and finally Activity Levels. For each outcome 
measure, same-lag analyses were conducted followed by cross-lag analyses – except for 
Function, for which the measurement protocol was not conductive to same-lag analyses. 
The focal hypotheses concerned whether appraisals and coping are independently related 
to adjustment, so to rule out the possibility that the effects of appraisal and coping were 
attributable to extraneous variables certain potential confounding variables were 
covaried. Pain intensity and time-of-day during the same lag as the outcome measure 
were covaried in all analyses. Pain intensity in the same-lag as the predictors (lag1) was 
also covaried in cross-lag analyses to remove the possible influence it may have had on 
the criterion at lag2. Other more procedural covariates are described in the Data Structure 
and Analyses subsection of the Method section (Section 6.1.5). 
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Methodological analyses were conducted prior to focal analyses, in Part A of Study Two. 
It was anticipated, based on prior EMA studies with chronic pain populations (eg. 
Feldman, et al., 1999; Stone, et al., 2003, Keefe, et al., 1997), that the percentage 
compliance rate for the current study would be high. However, it is noted that almost all 
prior studies (cf. Grant, 1998) offered monetary incentives for compliance whereas the 
current study did not. This may have impacted negatively on compliance in the current 
study. 
It was anticipated that summary scores of the PAMS scales would be correlated with 
standard measures of their respective constructs and with respective scales of the PAMS-
R – a one-week recall version of PAMS. However, it was also anticipated, based on prior 
empirical findings (eg. Lousberg, et al., 1997; Peters, et al., 2000), that reduced 
correlations would be found because of discrepancies in method – summary scales of 
momentary ratings are likely to diverge somewhat from recall-based measures. Thus, it 
was anticipated that summary PAMS scales would demonstrate higher convergent 
relationships with the PAMS-R scales (with which they presumably share measure-
related variance but not method-related variance) than the standard questionnaires. 
It was anticipated, based on prior findings of EMA studies in chronic pain populations, 
that reactivity effects would not be prominent (eg. von Baeyer, 1994; Peters, et al., 2000; 
Cruise, et al., 1996). However, the possibility of reactivity was not ruled out, either in 
terms of drift in mean-levels of ratings (eg. Stone, et al., 2003) or changes in variability in 
ratings (eg. Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987) across the monitoring period. 
The following focal hypotheses were made about the prediction of within-person 
adaptation (for distress and activity-level only) from appraisal and coping: 
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A. It was hypothesised that both coping and appraisals would contribute to the 
prediction of same-lag adaptation beyond what was accounted for by pain and time-
of-day. This was assessed via comparison of a full model involving both the control 
variables and either coping or appraisal to a restricted model including only the 
control variables. 
B. It was hypothesised that the effect of coping on adaptation would be independent of 
appraisal, and would therefore remain significant after the addition of appraisal to 
the model. Similarly, it was hypothesised that the effect of appraisal would be 
independent of and largely uninfluenced by coping. 
Regarding the possible cross-lag relationship between appraisal and adaptation (for 
distress, function, and activity-level): 
C. It was anticipated that, after the effect of covariates was accounted for, appraisals 
(lag1) would be associated with adaptation in subsequent hours (lag2). For the 
purpose of testing this hypothesis a full model composed of appraisal and control 
variables was compared to a restricted model containing only the control variables. 
D. It was hypothesised that coping behaviours engaged in between the time of the 
appraisals and measurement of the adaptation outcome (that is, lag2 coping) would 
not fully account for the effect of the appraisals, and that the effect of the appraisals 
would be largely unchanged by the addition of lag2 coping to the model.  
Regarding the possible cross-lag relationship between coping and adaptation (for distress, 
function, and activity-level): 
E. It was anticipated that, after the effect of covariates was accounted for, coping 
behaviours (at lag1) would be associated with subsequent adaptation (lag2). For the 
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purpose of testing this hypothesis a full model composed of coping and control 
variables was compared to a restricted model containing only the control variables. 
F. It was hypothesised that appraisals measured in the period between measurement of 
coping and subsequent adaptation (lag1 appraisals) would not fully account for the 
effect of coping on subsequent adaptation (at lag2), and that the effect of coping 
would be largely unchanged by the addition of lag1 appraisals to the model. 
A set of analyses was conducted to clarify the effect of specific coping behaviours on 
subsequent adaptation. The dichotomously coded items constituting the coping scales 
were included as separate predictors, but only for coping scales that were found to be 
significant predictors of the outcome measure in prior analyses. Their effect on lag2 
adaptation was assessed controlling for the covariates in the control model. There were 
no specific hypotheses regarding these analyses, though it was expected that specific 
coping behaviours would demonstrate a relationship with subsequent adaptation. 
A final set of cross-lag analyses were concerned with the relative predictive importance 
of lag1 appraisal and coping in predicting subsequent adaptation. Lag1 appraisal and 
coping variables found to predict the outcome measure in prior analyses were included 
simultaneously in a model for comparison of effects.  
6.1 Method 
6.1.1 Participants 
Subjects were literate English-speakers who lived within two-hours travelling time of the 
University of Queensland. Those with severe medical or psychiatric conditions for whom 
participation may have caused added stress were not asked to participate, though no 
participants were deemed to meet this exclusion criterion. 
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Prior to becoming involved in the project, participants were told they would be given an 
opportunity to receive comprehensive feedback about their monitoring data if they 
indicated that they were willing to have their PDA-output labelled for identification. All 
participants signed a consent form indicating that they wished to receive feedback. A 
description of the content of feedback forms and an example of such a form can be found 
in Appendix G. After subjects were given feedback, their output file was de-identified to 
ensure confidentiality. No monetary incentive was offered for participation. 
Fifty-five participants (67% female) were recruited who had experienced bodily pain, not 
due to cancer, for three months or longer. Twenty-eight of these were recruited from the 
sample used in the pilot study (the “old” cohort) – five from the student sample, 17 from 
the community sample, and six from the clinical sample.  Seventeen participants from the 
“new” cohort were from a student sample, three were from a clinical sample, and five 
were recruited from the community. Questionnaire booklets were completed by only 48 
of the 55 participants. 
Ages for the total sample ranged from 17 years to 74 years (M=39.1, SD=17.7). 
Frequency data relating to marital status, education level, employment status, 
professional background, and source of income can be found in Appendix C, Table C.1 
(for the total sample and broken down according to gender, cohort, and the three sample 
sources). Descriptive statistics for continuous variables, including standardized 
questionnaires, can be found in Appendix C, Table C.3 (for the whole sample) and Table 
C.5 (broken down according to sample source and gender). Descriptive data for the 
PAMS-R questionnaire, and for summary scales (average scores and standard deviations 
of the full dataset) of the PAMS monitoring can be found in Appendix C, Table C.4 (for 
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the whole sample) and Table C.6 (for PAMS-R scores broken down according to gender, 
cohort, and sample source).  
Participants predominantly reported being married (39.6%) or single (37.5%). Thirty-nine 
percent of participants reported having some form of tertiary education, followed by 
31.9% with a senior high-school education, and 19% with a junior high-school education. 
Thirty-six percent of participants reported being involved in some form of work (Full- or 
part-time, casual, or voluntary), with the largest proportion of workers doing part-time 
work (35%). Twenty-three percent described themselves as students, 17% as 
unemployed, and 12% as retired. In terms of sources of income, the largest group 
(37.5%) described their primary source of income as wages/salary, followed by 27% on a 
disability pension, 18.7% living on a partner’s income, and 12.5% on savings or 
investments. No participants reported supporting themselves via worker’s compensation 
payments. Almost nineteen percent of participants described their profession as a 
machine operator or driver, manual worker, or tradesperson. Equal numbers of 
participants (12.5%) described themselves as a manager/administrator, paraprofessional, 
or as being in sales/personal services. The next largest professional group was 
administrative assistants (10.4%). 
The vast majority of participants (93%) described their pain as being “Always present 
with varied intensity”. In terms of factors associated with the onset of pain, the largest 
group indicated that they knew of no clear reason for their pain onset (31%). Twenty-five 
percent indicated that it was related to work, and 12.5% indicated that it was after a non-
work accident (at home or in a car). The most frequently reported locations of pain were 
lower back (56% of participants), neck and upper leg (each 42%), and head (31%).  
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Narcotic- and simple- analgesics were the most common form of medication reported 
(each 39.6%), followed by anti-depressants (27%, including SSRI, tricyclic, and others), 
and NSAIDs (16.6%). Consultations with medical and allied-health professionals for the 
pain problem was most frequently reported for GPs (81%), and physiotherapists (70.8%). 
Almost 42% of participants reported attending a pain clinic. Sixteen percent of 
participants indicated that they had previously been involved in some form of litigation 
for their pain condition (worker’s compensation, third-party compensation, or other), all 
of whom indicated that they had been successful in that action. One participant indicated 
that he was involved in a worker’s compensation claim at the time of the study, and one 
indicated he was involved in some other form of litigation. 
Differences between genders, participant-sources, and old versus new participants 
(“cohort”) were investigated for all demographic and pain-related variables. Chi-square 
comparisons were conducted for nominal and ordinal variables. Sample sources were 
compared on categorical variables via three sets of pair-wise chi-square tests. T-tests and 
F-tests were conducted to compare continuous variables. In the case of sample source, 
test-wise Bonferroni adjustments were used for post-hoc comparisons.  
As might be expected, the student sample appeared to differ from the other two samples 
on a number of demographic variables, whereas the community and clinical samples did 
not appear to differ significantly. Students were younger than the other two groups 
F(2,45)=37.832, p<.001. Participants with more than a senior high-school education were 
more prevalent in the community, χ2(5)=14.67, p=.012, and clinical, χ2 (5)=13.139, 
p=.022, samples than the student sample. Students were also more likely to be single than 
those from the community sample, χ2 (5)=20.23, p<.001. They were more likely than both 
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the community, χ2 (1)=4.659, p=0.31, and clinical, χ2 (1)=8.29, p=.004, samples to report 
earning an income from a wage or salary. 
Students also appeared to differ along a number of pain-related dimensions. Students 
reported shorter pain histories, F(2,43)=4.06, p=.024, and fewer sites of regular pain,  
F(2,45)=5.8, p=.006, than the community sample, but not the clinical sample. Compared 
to the clinical sample, but not the community sample, students demonstrated lower bodily 
pain on the SF-36, F(2,45)=4.41, p=.018, and lower levels of minimum weekly pain on 
the PAMS-R , F(2,45)=5.027, p=.011, greater pain self-efficacy on the PSEQ 
F(2,45)=3.279, p=.047, and greater tendency to cope via Ignoring Sensations on the 
CSQ, F(2,45)=3.821, p=.029. Students were less likely than the community group to 
report pain in the upper legs, χ2 (1)=7.84, p=.005. Students were less likely to report 
experiencing constant pain than both the community, χ2 (5)=26.7, p<.001, and clinical, χ2 
(5)=11.274, p=.046, samples. Use of narcotic analgesics, χ2 (1)=5.44, p=.02, was less 
prevalent in the student group than the clinical group. Students were less likely than both 
community and clinical groups to have visited a range of health professionals, with fewer 
students attending orthopedic surgeons, χ2 (1)=3.28, p=.07, and rheumatologists, χ2 
(1)=9.38, p=.002, than the community group. They were less likely than both groups to 
have attended a pain clinic (community χ2 (1)=5.39, p=.02; clinical χ2 (1)=18.756, 
p<.001).  
Students also differed in functional status. They reported fewer depressive symptoms on 
the HADS than both community and clinical samples, F(2,45)=6.092, p=.005, and higher 
Physical Functioning on the SF-36, F(2,45)=13.477, p<.001. Compared to the clinical 
group, but not the community sample, students demonstrated less disability on the DQ, 
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(2,45)=5.091, p=.01, and more improvement and/or stability in their one-year health 
status according to SF-36 Health Transition, F(2,45)=4.1, p=.023. According to the 
PAMS-R, students demonstrated lower levels of minimum weekly activity F(2,45)=5.96, 
p=.005, and higher levels of maximum weekly activity, F(2,45)=6.1, p=.005, than the 
clinical but not the community samples. 
The community and clinical groups appeared to be more similar in terms of pain-related 
factors, although the community group was less likely to have attended a pain clinic, χ2 
(1)=6.261, p=.012. The clinical group reported greater use of medications on a regular 
basis on the PAMS-R than the student or community groups, F(2,45)=13.477, p<.001. 
Males and females were very similar in terms of demographic variables, with the only 
significance difference being in occupation – women were less likely to describe 
themselves as a tradesperson or manual laborer χ2 (9)=18.056, p=.035. 
On pain-related and adaptation variables some gender differences were apparent. Females 
were less likely to have attended a chiropractor, χ2 (1)=3.927, p=.048, or occupational 
therapist, χ2 (1)=3.927, p=.048. When recalling how “down” their mood was when their 
mood was at its best (on the PAMS-R), males’ minimum “down” mood was worse (that 
is, they were more “down”) than females, t(46)=2.79, p=.008. Males also reported lower 
average use of prn medication (medication taken as required) on the PAMS-R, t(43)=-
3.039, p=.004. 
The cohort groups also appeared to differ in a number of ways. Participants from the new 
cohort were younger in age t(46)=2.52, p=.015. The new cohort consisted of significantly 
fewer people who had attended an orthopedic surgeon, χ2 (1)=4.9, p=.027, or 
psychologist χ2(1)=6.97, p=.008. They reported shorter pain histories t(44)=2.12, p=.039, 
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fewer sites of regular pain t(46)=2.08, p=.043, and lower levels of reported minimum 
pain according to the PAMS-R t(46)=2.781, p=.008. 
6.1.2 Procedure 
Data collection was conducted via Casio E-11 palm-held computers. These PDAs operate 
on the Windows CE platform, weigh 6.6oz, and have a 3.1 by 2.4 inch grey-scale screen. 
They use “pen-based navigation” rather than a keyboard, allowing for a flexible and user-
friendly interface. 
The experimenter delivered the PDA to participant’s homes, at which time he explained 
the use of the PDA and helped the participant complete one example entry. Participants 
were given “trouble-shooting” information, a spare set of batteries, an instruction booklet 
for use of the PDA (see Appendix H), and a power-cord and recharging “cradle”. All 
participants read an information sheet about the project and signed a consent form (see 
Appendix I). In addition, subjects were asked to sign a “Computer Responsibility Form” 
on which they consented to liability for lost or damaged computers (see Appendix J). All 
participants signed this form, however no computers were lost or damaged.  
Participants were asked to begin the project on the following day, however they were free 
to commence monitoring on the day the PDA was delivered as its alarms had already 
been programmed to begin sounding. Similarly, participants were only asked to monitor 
for one week, however they were free to continue responding to alarms on the eighth day 
until the experimenter was able to collect the PDA. Thus, participants were able to 
conduct monitoring on up to nine days.  
Data was collected in subjects’ natural environment at a frequency of eight times per day.  
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Waking hours, between 8 am and 10 pm, were broken into eight 105 minute blocks. 
Alarm signals were programmed to occur at a random time once during each block with 
the one stipulation that no two signals would occur within 30 minutes. Feedback 
indicated that on occasions the PDA skipped an alarm for one block, and this may have 
been because two alarms had been programmed for within 30 minutes of each other. 
In a pilot project the EMA monitoring protocol was tested on four participants with 
chronic pain. Pilot-study participants were given one minute to respond to alarms before 
the PDA switched itself off. They carried the PDA for one week, completing a version of 
PAMS in early development. Participants left no entries incomplete. A 74% compliance 
rate was obtained (ie. percentage of alarms opened), with 23% of alarms timing-out and 
only 3% being dismissed. Feedback indicated that participants often missed an entry 
because alarms were not loud enough and did not ring for long enough. Because the 
alarms were already set at maximum volume, the amount of time given to participants to 
respond to alarms was extended for the project per se. 
For the project, alarms were programmed to sound repeatedly for one minute, and then 
once per minute for 10 minutes. A visual display indicated how much time had elapsed 
since the alarm began to ring. After 10 minutes the PDA automatically switched itself of 
(or, “Timed-out”). An alarm sound was selected that was not considered irritating, but 
which should have been sufficient to attract attention. 
When participants responded they were given the option to Open, Postpone, or Dismiss 
the alarm. They were asked to dismiss as few alarms as possible, and only when their 
circumstances were such that opening the alarm would be unsafe for the participant or the 
PDA, or if it would be impossible for them to complete the PDA within the maximum 
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postponement period (such as if they were driving). If the postpone option was selected, 
participants were given the options to postpone the alarm for one, five, ten or fifteen 
minutes. The length of time between the onset of the alarm and selection of the postpone 
option was taken into consideration so that participants were not offered postponement 
periods that would put their entry more than 20 minutes after the initial onset of the 
alarm. 
If participants did not operate the PDA for one minute whilst completing an entry, the 
PDA was programmed to emit a beep to attract the participant’s attention. The PDA 
beeped each minute, and switched itself off after four minutes. 
PDAs were rendered inoperable between alarms so, for example, the participants could 
not use the PDA as a personal organizer or make an unsolicited entry. Likewise, during 
entries no other functions on the PDA were operable. 
Participants were asked to complete a questionnaire booklet on the eighth day. 
6.1.3 EMA Survey 
When an alarm was responded to with the “Open” option the PDA commenced the 
PAMS monitoring program – an electronic version of the scales developed in Study One. 
A complete copy of the PAMS protocol can be found in Appendix K. One item was 
presented per screen. Participants were unable to return to previous items and were 
unable to commence the next item unless they had responded to the current item. 
Questions were presented at the top of each screen, with the response system below. Four 
types of screen were presented: 
a) Message screens: occasional message screens appeared, analogous to instructions 
between sets of questions on a paper-an-pencil questionnaire. For example, 
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participants were reminded to answer questions according to their state at the time 
of the alarms, or to answer questions regarding the period between alarms.  
The remaining screen-types depended on the response format of the question being 
asked. 
b) Sliding-scale: Instead of manual GRS scales for continuous items, respondents 
used a stylus-pen to slide a bar along a line corresponding to 0-100 ratings. They 
were given feedback about what percentage number they had selected. 
Descriptors were anchored to ranges on the rating scale, and these descriptors 
were given at the bottom of the screen. For example, when asked “How calm and 
peaceful were you feeling?” a rating between 0 and 20 returned a descriptor of 
“Not at all”. 
c) Check-box: For the majority of dichotomous items, participants simply used the 
stylus-pen to endorse a check-box situated next to each item. Once endorsed, a 
tick-mark appeared in the check box. One, none, or any combination of check-
boxes could be selected. 
d) Option-box: For one item relating to the nature of any medication use, 
participants were given a forced-choice of only one of three options. 
6.1.4 Measures 
Participants completed a questionnaire booklet at the end of the monitoring week, 
including a feedback form about the project, the PAMS-R, and the demographics and 
pain-history questionnaire administered in Study One. A complete copy of the PAMS-R 
and project feedback-form can be found in Appendix L. Participants also completed the 
McGill PRI, CSQ, MPI-Part One, PCS, SF-36, DQ, PSEQ, and HADS. 
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6.1.4.1 Pain Ambulatory Monitoring Survey – Recall Version (PAMS-R) 
To compare between momentary- and recalled- reports, and to assist in assessing the 
PAMS scales, a paper-and-pencil version of the PAMS scale was developed in which 
items were worded in a one-week recall format. For some scales (such as pain, activity-
level, and certain mood items) participants were asked to indicate their average, 
maximum, and minimum state during the week. When summary-scales were calculated 
for the Distress scale, only the “average” item of these ratings was used.  
Because of the item’s momentary nature, the Pain Expectancy item was not included on 
the PAMS-R scale.  
Dichotomous items on the PAMS (related to the coping and function scales) were 
converted into seven-point likert scales similar to the CSQ.  
6.1.5 Data Structure and Analysis 
6.1.5.1 Structure of the Data Set 
Only fully completed entries were included in the dataset. Approximately six entries were 
excluded because participants abandoned the entry part-way through.  
The data set was modified to allow for cross-lag analyses. Lag2 variables were entered on 
the same row as corresponding lag1 entries by copying predictor and criterion variables 
from the next adjacent row. Thus, each row in the data set of momentary recordings 
consisted of a dyad of lag1 and lag2 values, the latter being copied from the following 
row. 
The full data set was used for analyses of compliance, reactivity, and convergent validity.  
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For focal analyses of distress, functioning and activity-level, a reduced dataset was 
employed. Namely, rows were deleted in which the lag1 entry in each dyad was made 
more than three hours prior to the lag2 entry (three hours being the maximum time 
between adjacent alarms during data-collection). Hence, no rows of data were maintained 
where a comparison between lag1 and lag2 was comparing between morning and evening 
or between evening on one day and morning on the subsequent day. The resultant 
average gap between entries was 104.4 minutes (SD 37.8), with a minimum of 31.68 
minutes and a maximum of three hours. Fifty percent of entries were separated by 
between one and two hours.  
To ensure greater comparability between same-lag and cross-lag analyses the outcome 
variable was derived from the lag2 data set for both types of analyses (as opposed to 
predicting adaptation from the lag1 dataset for same-lag analyses and from the lag2 
dataset for cross-lag analyses). 
Two participants had made no entries within three hours of each other, and were deleted 
from all subsequent analyses, leaving 53 participants. A total of 1363 data-points (that is, 
1363 lag1/lag2 dyads) remained, averaging 25.7 data-points per person (SD 12.01), with 
a maximum of 46. Entries were made over a total of 333 monitoring days, averaging 6.28 
days per person (SD 2.16), with a maximum of eight and a minimum of one. On average, 
participants made 4.12 entries per day (SD 1.94), with a maximum average of nine and a 
minimum of one. See section 6.2.1 for an analysis of compliance rates for the full dataset.  
6.1.5.2 Multi-Level Modelling and the Random Intercept Model 
Schwartz and Stone (1998) described three types of questions addressed by EMA 
research. The questions addressed in the current study resembled the second of these – 
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“Do situational characteristics (within-person factors) predict fluctuations among 
assessments” or “How [do] changes from one assessment to another in predictors relate 
to changes in outcome measures?”  (p7). In terms of statistical analysis, Schwartz and 
Stone recommended the use of multilevel modelling (MLM) for analyses of EMA data. 
MLM is suitable for hierarchically structured data where units at one level are clustered 
within higher order units. Variance in the outcome variable can thus be partitioned into 
that which is attributable to variation between higher-order units and that which is 
attributable to variation within higher-order units (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). In cases 
such as the current project, two hierarchical levels are investigated, with individuals as 
the level-2 unit of analysis and measurement occasions clustered within individuals as the 
level-1 unit of analysis.  Thus, variance in dependent measures is partitioned into 
between- and within-subject variance. The variance-components model includes no 
predictors, and demonstrates the partitioning of variance into between- and within-subject 
components. Total variance is calculated as the sum of the between- and within- person 
variance. Inspection of this model is important for establishing the utility of a multi-level 
model – conventional analyses may be more appropriate if the vast majority of variance 
in the dependent measure is between-subjects. Because the current project was concerned 
with within-person predictors of within-person outcomes, the focus of analyses will be on 
within-person variance accounted-for. Further, it was not expected that between-person 
variation would be accounted for because the predictor variables were centred around 
individual means, thereby removing mean differences between individuals. The rationale 
for this variable transformation will be elaborated below. 
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Like conventional regression models, multilevel models include an intercept, a set of 
predictors with corresponding coefficients, and a residual term. However, in repeated-
measures models of multi-level analyses (such as EMA data) intercepts are allowed to 
vary between people. As such, a separate intercept is calculated for each individual. The 
intercept term is thereby composed of an average intercept (representing the average 
score on the outcome measure) and a person-dependent deviation from the average 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).  
For the type of questions addressed by the current study Schwartz and Stone (1998) 
recommend treating the mean scores of each individual as a random effect – what 
Snijders and Bosker (1999) refer to as a random intercept model. The aim of the current 
project, and of much EMA research, is to generalize findings from the specific 
individuals included in the study to populations as a whole. Thus, the intercept terms are 
treated as random effects – they are viewed as a sample from a larger population and 
parameters are calculated estimating the mean and variance of the "true" intercept 
(Schwartz & Stone, 1998).  
Because the repeatedly-measured scores of individuals in an EMA project come from 
within the same individual they share variance and are thus non-independent. Whereas 
this would be a problem in conventional analyses treating each observation as 
independent, the issue is circumvented in random intercept models because the person-
specific intercepts account for all between-person differences (Schwartz & Stone, 1998).  
The random-intercept model assumes that person-specific intercepts are uncorrelated 
with the predictors included in the model. For this reason, Schwartz & Stone (1998) 
recommend centring scores on predictors around each person’s mean (ie. subtracting the 
214 
individual’s mean on that predictor from the score at each time-point). This method 
removes all between-person variance from the predictor, and the intercept can be treated 
as a random effect without concern for biased estimates of within-person effects.  
Although values of the intercept, per se, were not of primary concern in the current 
project, an additional benefit of person-centring predictors is that it allows for clear 
interpretation of intercept terms. Namely, intercepts represent the mean score on the 
criterion for that individual when all predictors are at their average value. Similarly, when 
person-centred predictors are used, slopes are interpreted as the effect of a predictor on 
the criterion when all other predictors are at their mean value (Raudenbush & Bryk, 
2002). Except for dichotomous variables (which were left uncentred) all variables were 
person-centred in the current project. 
Predictors can be introduced at level-1 (ie. pertaining to the measurement occasions) and 
level-2 (ie. pertaining to the individual) of a two-level multi-level model, though in the 
current study only level-1 predictors were of interest. In MLM, slopes representing the 
effect of level-1 predictors can also be treated as fixed or random (Snijders & Bosker, 
1999), however in random-intercept models – as used in the current study – slopes are 
fixed. In this case, coefficients pertaining to the average slope between the predictors and 
the criterion are estimated (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). These slopes were of primary 
interest in the current study, permitting it to answer the kind of within-person questions 
described by Schwartz and Stone (1998), above. The ratio of a slope parameter to its 
standard error provides a t-statistic that can be used to test the null hypothesis that the 
population value of the coefficient is zero (Schwartz & Stone, 1998). Coefficients were 
standardised in the current study by multiplying the coefficient by the ratio of the 
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standard deviation of the predictor to the standard deviation of the criterion (see Snijders 
and Bosker, 1999). This was done because no variables, except dichotomous variables, 
were measured on an inherently meaningful scale. Where relevant, the unstandardised 
coefficients of dichotomous variables are reported in text. The interested reader can 
convert standardized coefficients back to raw units using the standard deviation reported 
in Table D.7 of Appendix D (for the reduced three-hour data set). 
A number of methods are available for estimating the parameters of a multilevel model 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). Full-maximum likelihood-estimation was used in the 
current study.  
To test the significance of changes in variance-accounted for by groups of variables 
added to a restricted model (analogous to R-squared change in hierarchical multiple 
regression) the deviance test was used. Using full-maximum likelihood-estimation this 
test can be used to assess change-in-fit when fixed parameters are added to a model, 
where the restricted model is nested within the full model (Schwartz & Stone, 1998). This 
test is based on the ratio of the log-likelihood estimate of the full model to that of the 
nested-model, producing a test statistic with chi-square distribution and degrees of 
freedom equal to the number of parameters added to the nested model (Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002). 
Focal analyses and analyses of reactivity were conducted using MLM via the statistical 
program HLM for Windows version 5.05 (Raudenbush, Bryk & Congdon, 2001).  
For HLM, separate databases are used for the level-1 and level-2 data. The level-1 
database was set-up with each row consisting of one monitoring (lag1/lag2) dyad. 
Measurement occasions were ordered chronologically in ascending order, with entries 
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nested within individuals. The first column designated the subject ID to whom that 
measurement occasion belonged, thus allowing HLM to link the level-1 data-points to 
corresponding units (ie. persons) within the level-2 data.  
6.1.5.3 Covariates 
Covariates included in the analyses differed for same-lag and cross-lag analyses. In both 
types of analysis pain and time-of-day were covaried. Time-of-day was dummy-coded as 
evening versus working-hours, with pre-working hours as a reference category. This 
method was used to allow for potential differential effects of evening and morning, as 
opposed to measuring time-of-day on a linear scale. 
In the case of cross-lag analyses, the criterion variable at lag1 was covaried as a means of 
controlling for first-order autocorrelation effects (Keefe, et al., 1997). This approach 
serves to rule out the possibility that the cross-lagged effects of appraisals and coping are 
only by virtue of their effect on the criterion-variable at lag1. 
In certain cross-lag analyses lag1-to-lag2 change scores for the focal predictor variables 
were covaried. These scores were calculated by subtracting the lag1 scores from the lag2 
scores, providing a measure of change in the predictor across lags. Change-scores were 
included to remove possible effects associated with regression to the mean. That is, when 
a lag1 score is high the corresponding lag2 score is likely to be lower, and visa versa for 
low lag1 scores. Thus, change scores tend to be negatively correlated with lag1 scores. If 
this effect is not statistically controlled it may obscure the effect of the lag1 variable, with 
cross-lag change variables acting as suppressor variables. Co-varying these scores may 
facilitate greater interpretability of the lag1 scores, revealing their impact on the lag2 
criterion by removing the effect of systematic changes over lags. Affleck, et al. (1994) 
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and Brissette and Cohen (2002) followed a similar rationale in their cross-lag analyses, 
though they covaried the actual next-lag scores rather than the change scores. Affleck, et 
al. (1994) acknowledged that their approach was statistically conservative, possibly 
underestimating the predictive importance of the lag1 predictor, but was nonetheless 
prudent for isolating unique effects on the lag2 criterion. 
Lag2 pain and lag2 time-of day were covaried in same-lag analyses of distress and 
activity level (where the criterion variables, also, were located in the lag2 data set). In 
cross-lag analyses of distress and activity-level, lag2 pain and time-of-day were covaried, 
as well as pain at lag1 and the criterion variable at lag1. In most cross-lag analyses, cross-
lag change variables were included for the focal predictors in order to facilitate 
interpretation of effects. 
By virtue of the way in which function was measured (ie. asking participants to recall 
their between-lag activities and activity-avoidance) same-lag analyses were not 
considered viable for that outcome measure, and a different set of covariates was used for 
cross-lag analyses. Analyses of function covaried lag1 but not lag2 pain, lag1 time-of-
day, and lag1 function. Lag2 pain and lag2 time-of-day were not considered appropriate 
covariates because although they were recorded concurrently with ratings of function, 
they purportedly “occurred” after the time reported function was supposed to have taken 
place. Nevertheless, the potential importance of covariates at both lags was assessed 
empirically prior to dismissing them from further analyses (see Section 6.4.2.1). Cross-
lag change variables for predictors were also employed in most analyses of function. 
Variables were inspected for linearity, and no noteworthy deviations were found. 
Homoscedasticity amongst the level-one variables across level-two units (that is, between 
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people) and in predictor variables over levels of criterion variables was also assessed, and 
the data was found to be adequate.  
Squared-transformations of lag1 and lag2 Function were performed to reduce significant 
skew. The squared-values of these variables were used in all analyses. Inspection of 
variable distributions revealed that no other variable would benefit from transformation. 
There was no missing data in the level-one data set. Although participants made differing 
numbers of entries and made entries at different times, such a data structure at level-two 
presents no problems for multi-level analysis (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). 
For the purpose of the current project, which was largely exploratory in nature, alpha 
values equal to or less than .05 were considered significant.  
6.2 Results – Part A: Compliance, Convergent Validity, and Analysis of Reactivity 
Part A of Study Two is concerned with issues relating to use of the EMA methodology – 
compliance rate, convergent validity with conventional questionnaire measures, and the 
possibility of measurement reactivity. All analyses were performed with pair-wise 
deletion for missing values. 
6.2.1 Compliance 
A total of 2019 entries were obtained. Participants provided an average of 36.7 entries 
(SD=15.7), with a minimum of four and a maximum of 62 entries per person. Entries 
were made over between one and nine days, though one participant monitored on 14 days 
because he completed an additional week after his PDA malfunctioned. Participants 
completed em\ntries on an average of 6.85 days (SD=2.29), with a total of 377 
monitoring days over all subjects. On average, 7.11 entries were made per day 
(SD=1.64), with a maximum of nine and a minimum of two.  
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There was an average gap of 271 minutes between entries (SD=258), with a minimum of 
31.7 and a maximum of 1406 minutes. 
6.2.1.1 Alarms 
The alarms delivered by the PDA and participants’ responses to them were analysed from 
alarm-files stored on the PDAs (see Table 6.1). Such files were not generated for two 
participants for unknown reasons, and they were not included in these analyses. For the 
remaining 53 participants, a total of 3018 alarms were signalled over 377 monitoring 
days, averaging 8 alarms per person per day, including voluntary midnight alarms. A 
65% compliance rate was obtained – 1962 alarms were opened, averaging 5.2 entries per 
person per day. Three-quarters of participants opened more than thirty alarms, with half 
of the participants opening at least forty-two. 
Approximately six percent of the total alarms were dismissed, and 28.5% timed-out. No 
entries were postponed. Twenty alarms (0.66% of the total) were not completed due to 
technical problems, probably lack of battery power. 
When not including voluntary midnight alarms a slightly higher compliance rate –  70.1% 
– was obtained. Of the 2687 alarms that were sounded (averaging 7.12 per day), 1886 
alarms were opened (averaging 5 per day). Of the non-midnight alarms, 24.6% timed-out 
and 4.6% were dismissed. 
Compliance was further assessed by excluding midnight alarms and investigating only 
the first seven days of monitoring – commencing from both the first day monitoring was 
commenced and from the first day participants were expected to commence monitoring. 
It was expected that such indices would provide a more accurate indication of compliance 
given that participants were only asked to perform seven days of monitoring and were 
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only expected to commence monitoring on the morning of the day after the PDA was 
delivered. A compliance rate of 71.6% was found for the first seven days of monitoring 
commencing from the day of the first entry, and a 69.3% compliance rate was found for 
the seven days commencing from the day after the device was delivered. 
Table 6.1  Alarms and response to alarms (total, and without including midnight alarms)  
        Percentiles   
  Sum Min Max Mean SD 25 50 75 % of total 
Total Days  377 2 12 7.11 1.89 7 8 8   
Alarms  3018 8 85 56.94 15.86 52 61 67   
Open  1962 4 64 37.02 15.58 30.5 42 48 65%  
Dismiss  175 0 33 3.30 5.11 0 2 5 5.8%  
Time-out  861 0 38 16.25 9.52 8.5 16 23.5 28.52%  
Error  20 0 4 0.38 0.77 0 0 1 0.66%  
Without inclusion of voluntary midnight alarms 
Alarms  2687 7 77 50.70 14.17 46 55 60   
Open  1886 4 57 35.58 14.74 29 41 46 70.2%  
Dismiss  123 0 27 2.32 4.24 0 1 3.5 4.6%  
Time-out  662 0 33 12.49 8.69 5 13 18.5 24.6%  
Error  16 0 4 0.30 0.72 0 0 0 0.59%  
 
Figure 6.1 displays the average per-person distribution of opened alarms over nine days 
of monitoring. The non-parametric Friedman Test was used to test for differences 
between monitoring-days in response rate. A significant difference was found, χ2 
(8)=128.79, p<.001. Post-hoc pair-wise Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests were conducted to 
look for specific differences. Testing indicated that entries rose from the first to second 
day, falling again by the third day, and then remaining constant until a progressive 
reduction over the seventh, eighth and ninth days of monitoring. Specifically, more 
entries were made on the second day of monitoring than any other day (for day two 
versus day three, the next highest day, Z=-2.8, p=.005). Day nine demonstrated fewer 
entries than all other days (day nine versus day eight Z=-4.49, p<.001), and day eight had 
fewer entries than all preceding days (day eight versus day seven Z=-3.63, p<.001).  
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Figure 6.2. Alarms opened over monitoring days one to nine 
 
Entries appeared to begin to drop-off by day seven, which demonstrated significantly 
fewer entries compared to the two highest days, day two Z=-3.95, p<.001, and day three 
Z=-2.24, p=.025. 
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Figure 6.3. Alarms opened over weekdays 
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Figure 6.2 displays the average per-person distribution of opened alarms over days of the 
week. The Friedman Test revealed no significant difference, χ2 (6)=6.62, p=.358. 
Analyses revealed that monitoring days varied systematically with day-of-the-week, (χ2 
(78)=716.56, p<.001). Table 6.2 suggests that more people commenced monitoring on a 
Sunday than on any other day of the week. 
Table 6.2 Frequency of entries over monitoring days and week-days. 
 Monitoring Day 
Weekday 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Mon 31 94 19 21 39 29 26 15 
Tues 25 42 86 22 17 40 27 12 
Wed 26 32 35 86 24 17 39 21 6 
Thurs 46 31 26 35 81 22 18 25 
Fri 23 78 29 31 35 77 23 12 3 
Sat 19 25 63 19 33 40 62 17 
Sun 77 24 19 48 27 28 23 43 5 
 
 
Figure 6.3 displays the average per-person distribution of opened alarms over the nine 
time-slots. In this figure, time-slot zero represents the voluntary midnight alarms. 
According to the Friedman Test a significant difference existed, χ2 (8)=86.05, p<.001. 
Post-hoc pair-wise Wilcoxon Signed Rank tests revealed that people were less likely to 
respond to the voluntary midnight alarm, but were equally responsive during all other 
timeslots. That is, fewer alarms were opened at time-slot zero than all other timeslots (for 
time zero versus time four, the next lowest ranking timeslot, Z=-5.27, p<.001). No other 
significant differences were found.  
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Figure 6.4. Alarms opened over daily timeslots (timeslot 0 represents the voluntary 
midnight entry) 
 
A number of correlates of response-rates were found (see Appendix D, Table D.1 for full 
details). Older age was related to fewer opened alarms (r=-0.37, p<.01). People who 
worked (on either a full-time, part-time, casual or voluntary basis) were likely to open 
more alarms  (r=.29, p<.05). The proportion of timed-out alarms was lower for people 
who reported experiencing constant pain (r=-0.32, p<.05) and people who were more 
disabled according to the DQ (p=-0.32, p<.05).  
Participants were asked to indicate why they believed they dismissed alarms and allowed 
alarms to time-out. Correlates of these attributions were also inspected (for full details see 
Appendix D, Tables D.2 to D.5).  
The three most frequently reported reasons for dismissing responses (each endorsed by 
18% of participants) was that their location was not safe to use the PDA and that it would 
either have been either impossible or inconvenient to open the alarm at the time it rang 
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(see Table 6.3). A lower proportion of participants indicated that it would have been 
either impossible or inconvenient to respond to the alarm for at-least 30 minutes after it 
sounded, or that they were too exhausted to respond to the alarm. Reassuringly, the least 
frequent reasons for dismissing entries was that the participant was either too distressed 
or in too much pain to make an entry. 
Table 6.3 Attributions for dismissed entries 
 Endorsement  
Rate (%)  
Location was not safe for the PDA 18 
Physically impossible for at-least 
30mins  
10 
Physically impossible at that time 18 
Inconvenient for at-least 30 mins 10 
Inconvenient at that time 18 
Physically exhausted 10 
Psychologically distressed eg. 
tense, stressed, down 
6 
Pain was too bad  4 
Other  16 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 
No participants endorsed the item “I just 
couldn’t be bothered”. 
 
People who completed a larger number of monitoring days were more likely to indicate 
that they dismissed entries because the location was not safe for the PDA (t(48)=-2.52, 
p=.015) and because it would have been inconvenient to make an entry for at least 30 
minutes (t(48)=-2.19, p=.033). People who reported that they dismissed entries because 
they were distressed displayed a greater tendency to dismiss entries (t(46)=5.63, p<.001), 
and were likely to make fewer entries (t(48)=6.1, p<.001) over fewer entry days 
(t(48)=6.84, p<.001). Those who indicated that they dismissed alarms because it would 
have been inconvenient to make an entry at the time it sounded were likely to report 
higher average functioning (t(48)=-2.21, p=.032) and activity-levels (t(48)=-2.13, 
p=.038) in their PAMS monitoring. People who indicated that they dismissed entries 
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because their pain was too bad at the time of the alarm were likely to report higher bodily 
pain according to the SF-36 (t(48)=2.32, p<.025).  
The most frequently reported reasons for missing (timed-out) alarms – in order of 
endorsement rate – was that the PDA was not in the room and so the alarm was not heard, 
the participant was out and not carrying the PDA, the PDA was in the room but the alarm 
was not loud enough, and their location was not safe to use the PDA (see Table 6.4). The 
least frequent reason for missing an alarm was that the person was in too much pain, or 
they were too distressed or exhausted. 
Those who did report that they missed alarms because they were too distressed were 
likely to dismiss a greater proportion of alarms (t(46)=3.15, p=.003), but were no more 
likely to miss alarms (t(46)=2.48, p=ns). These participants were likely to make fewer 
entries (t(48)=2.17, p=.035) over fewer days (t(48)=2.96, p=.005), and were likely to be 
more distressed according to the MPI (t(48)=-2.02, p=.049) and more anxious according 
to the HADS (t(48)=-3.01, p=.004). Those who reported that they missed entries because 
the PDA did not ring for long enough (16% of participants) were likely to have had the 
PDA for more days (t(486)=-2.16, p=.035) but were not more likely to have made entries 
on more days (t(48)=-.753, p=ns). These people were likely to report experiencing less 
pain on the MPI (t(48)=2.26, p=.028). People who reported experiencing lower pain, 
according to both the MPI and the SF-36 (but not according to average PAMS scores) 
were more likely to report that they missed alarms because it would have been 
inconvenient to make an entry at the time of the alarm (t(48)=2.4, p=.021 for MPI; 
t(48)=-2.31, p=.025 for SF-36), or because the PDA was not in the room with them and 
they did not hear the alarm (t(48)=2.88, p=.006 for MPI; t(48)=-2.55, p=.014 for SF-36).  
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Table 6.4 Attributions for missed entries 
 
Endorsement  
Rate (%) 
  
Location was not safe for the PDA 24 
Physically impossible at that time 10 
Inconvenient at that time 20 
Physically exhausted 8 
Psychologically distressed eg. tense, 
stressed, down 
8 
Pain was too bad 4 
PDA in the room & not loud enough 36 
PDA not in the room & didn’t hear it 42 
Out & not carrying the PDA  40 
Did not ring for long enough 16 
Other 16 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 
The items “I just couldn’t be bothered” and “It was 
too embarrassing to answer it, so I ignored it” were 
not endorsed 
 
6.2.2 Convergent Validity of PAMS 
It was anticipated that the average of PAMS scales would be correlated significantly with 
related scales, measured via standard questionnaires. A full table of correlations between 
average scores from PAMS monitoring (except Pain Expectancy, for which there were no 
comparison measures) and standard measures can be found in Appendix D, Table D.6. 
Table 6.5 Relationship between standard 
questionnaires and average ratings on the PAMS Pain 
Intensity scale  
Scale 
PAMS  
Pain-Intensity 
McGill PRI 0.37** 
MPI Pain Severity 0.56*** 
SF36 Bodily Pain -0.58*** 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 
 
As anticipated, PAMS Pain Intensity demonstrated a significant relationship in the 
moderate range with both MPI Pain Severity and SF-36 Bodily pain (r=.56, p<.001, and 
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r=-.58, p<.001 respectively). It was somewhat less related to the McGill PRI scale (r=.37, 
p<.01). 
PAMS Distress was highly related to MPI Affective Distress, and moderately/highly 
related to all other measures of distress (see Table 6.5).  
Table 6.5 Relationship between standard 
questionnaires and average ratings on the PAMS 
Distress scale  
Scale PAMS Distress 
HADS Anxiety 0.69*** 
 Depression 0.62*** 
MPI Affective Distress 0.85*** 
SF-36 Mental Health -0.7*** 
 Emotional Role Funct -0.44** 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 
 
Convergent correlations for the PAMS appraisal scales can be found in Table 6.6. As 
anticipated, PAMS Pain Self-Efficacy demonstrated a significant relationship with the 
PSEQ, and was unrelated to all non-domain measures. However, the correlation with the 
PSEQ was in the low/moderate range. Further, other PAMS appraisal scales obtained 
correlations with the PSEQ that were comparable to that obtained by PAMS Pain Self-
Efficacy. 
Table 6.6 Relationship between standard questionnaires and average 
ratings on the PAMS appraisal scales  
 PAMS Appraisal 
Scale 
Pain Self 
Efficacy 
Perceived 
Interference Catastrophising 
MPI Interference -0.17 0.72*** 0.39** 
 Life-Control 0.22 -0.18 -0.33* 
PCS Total -.114 .267 .585** 
 Rumination -0.16 0.27 0.51*** 
 Magnification -0.15 0.27 0.58*** 
 Helplessness -0.17 0.31* 0.61*** 
PSEQ  0.34* -0.43** -0.32* 
CSQ Catastrophising -0.24 0.28 0.56*** 
 Control over Pain 0.13 -0.13 -0.29* 
 Ability to Dec. Pain 0.23 0.01 -0.11 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 
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PAMS Catastrophising was significantly related to each of the standard measures 
anticipated, namely the three scales of the PCS, the PCS Total, and CSQ Catastrophising. 
These correlations were in the high/moderate range. PAMS Catastrophising demonstrated 
significant correlations with three measures of divergent constructs. Testing suggested 
that, although apparently lower, the relationships with these scales were not significantly 
divergent from the correlations between PAMS Catastrophising and PCS Total (for MPI 
Life Control t(42)=1.51, p=ns; MPI Life Interference t(42)=1.72, p=ns; and CSQ Control 
Over Pain t(42)=1.43, p=ns) or CSQ Catastrophising (for MPI Life Control t(42)=1.13, 
p=ns; MPI Life Interference t(42)=1.42, p=ns; and CSQ Control Over Pain t(42)=1.39, 
p=ns). 
As anticipated, PAMS Perceived Interference was strongly related to MPI Life 
Interference, and this correlation significantly exceeded the highest non-domain specific 
correlation (vs. PSEQ t(42)=3.94, p<.001).  
Table 6.7 Relationship between CSQ scales and 
average ratings on the PAMS coping scales 
 PAMS Coping 
CSQ Scale Passive Active 
Passive 0.31* 0.24 
Active 0.16 0.33* 
Divert Attention 0.3* 0.57*** 
Rein. Pain Sens. 0.10 0.33* 
Ignoring Sensations 0.20 0.02 
Praying or Hoping 0.29* 0.3* 
Coping Self Statements -0.11 0.14 
Increased Beh. Act. 
0.13 0.4** 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 
 
Convergent correlations for both PAMS coping scales can be found in Table 6.7. 
Comparisons with the CSQ Passive and Active Coping scales supported the convergent 
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and divergent validity of the PAMS coping scales. PAMS Passive Coping was 
significantly correlated with the CSQ Passive Coping scale, but not CSQ Active Coping 
whereas the opposite was true for PAMS Active Coping. However, convergent 
relationships were not strong (r=.31 and .41 respectively). PAMS Passive Coping 
demonstrated a low/moderate correlation with CSQ Praying/Hoping, which is 
traditionally seen as a passive coping strategy. However, this relationship was no stronger 
than the relationship between Praying/Hoping and PAMS Active Coping (t(41)=0.04, 
p=ns). 
PAMS Active Coping demonstrated a number of significant relationships with CSQ 
coping subscales, with the highest being in the high/moderate range with CSQ Divert 
Attention. However, this relationship was not significantly greater than the significant 
relationship between Divert Attention and PAMS Passive Coping (t(41)=1.98, p=ns). 
Table 6.8 Relationship between standard questionnaires and 
average ratings on PAMS Function and Activity-Level 
 PAMS scale 
Scale Function Activity 
SF-36 Physical Funct 0.46** -0.07 
 Physical Role Funct 0.28* -0.09 
 General Health 0.36* -0.06 
 Vitality 0.15 -0.02 
 Social Funct 0.46** -0.03 
 Health Transition -0.15 0.28* 
DQ  -0.69*** -0.04 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 
 
Convergent correlations for both PAMS Function and Activity-Level scales are presented 
in Table 6.8. 
PAMS Functioning demonstrated significant low to moderate correlations with a number 
of SF-36 measures of health and physical functioning, and a high/moderate correlation 
with the DQ.  
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Amongst the standard measures of function, PAMS Activity-Level was only related to 
SF-36 Health Transition, though this correlation was in the low/moderate range.  
6.2.2.1 Relationship Between Average PAMS Scales and PAMS-R Scales 
To assess the relationship between data collected via repeated momentary assessment and 
the kind of recalled data typical of standard questionnaire-based studies, the average 
PAMS values were compared to a one-week recall version (PAMS-R) of the PAMS 
scales (see Table 6.9). Pain expectancy was not measured in the PAMS-R, so was not 
included in these analyses. 
Table 6.9 Correlation between PAMS-R and average PAMS scales 
 PAMS scale 
PAMS-R Scale 
Pain-
Intensity Distress 
Self 
Efficacy Catas. 
Perc. 
Interfere 
Passive  
Coping 
Active 
Coping Function 
Activity-
Level 
Average Pain 0.67*** 0.4** -0.27 0.51*** 0.47** 0.13 0.27 -0.23 0.22 
Distress 0.29* 0.86*** -0.13 0.47** 0.37** 0.33* 0.07 -0.14 -0.01 
Self Efficacy -0.34* -0.06 0.73*** -0.27 -0.3* -0.28 -0.32* 0.39** -0.05 
Catastrophising 0.38** 0.6*** -0.21 0.85*** 0.4** 0.28 0.20 -0.15 0.11 
Perc. Interference 0.44** 0.44** -0.28* 0.47** 0.81*** 0.31* 0.36* -0.33* 0.05 
Passive Coping 0.17 0.35* -0.15 0.16 0.18 0.62*** 0.17 -0.23 -0.03 
Active Coping 0.32* 0.03 -0.26 0.18 0.34* 0.49*** 0.68*** -0.20 0.05 
Function -0.26 -0.26 0.38** -0.42** -0.51*** -0.43** -0.4** 0.68*** 0.13 
Average Activity 0.14 -0.07 0.01 0.02 -0.14 -0.15 -0.03 0.35* 0.57*** 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 
 
The magnitude of correlations between momentary-scales and their recalled versions was 
consistently greater than relationships with any other scale, though for PAMS Pain 
Intensity and Passive Coping these differences were not always significant. The 
relationship between PAMS Pain Intensity was greater than with all other PAMS-R 
scales (vs PAMS-R Catastrophising t(38)=2.62, p=0.013) except Perceived Interference 
(t(38)=1.96, p=ns). The relationship between PAMS Passive Coping and PAMS-R 
Passive Coping was not significantly greater than between PAMS Passive Coping and 
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PAMS-R Function (t(38)=0.83, p=ns), Active Coping (t(38)=1.11, p=ns), Perceived 
Interference (t(38)=1.72, p=ns), Self-Efficacy (t(38)=1.59, p=ns), or Catastrophising 
(t(38)=1.94, p=ns). 
Likewise, the magnitude of relationships between recall-based scales and their 
momentary counterparts were greater than with other momentary scales, though not 
significantly so for the Passive, Active and Function scales. PAMS-R Passive Coping 
demonstrated a significant relationship with PAMS Distress, and this was not 
significantly different to the relationship between the two passive coping scales 
(t(38)=1.53, p=ns). PAMS-R Active Coping was significantly associated with PAMS 
Passive Coping and Perceived Interference, and these relationships were not significantly 
less than between the active coping scales (t(38)=1.21, p=ns; t(38)=1.88, p=ns 
respectively). Of the five significant relationships between PAMS-R Function and PAMS 
scales other than function (vs Perceived Interference t(38)=1.11, p=ns; Passive Coping 
t(38)=1.22, p=ns; Self-Efficacy t(38)=1.95, p=ns; Active Coping t(38)=1.89, p=ns; and 
Catastrophising t(38)=2.1, p=042) only the relationship with Catastrophising was 
significantly lower than the relationship between the two function scales. 
Table 6.10 Accuracy and direction of errors in recall of continuously-measured PAMS 
scales (PAMS-R score minus PAMS average score) 
 Overestimations Accuracy: M (SD)  
  N (%) Total Overestimations Underestimations 
Pain 44 (88%) 11.11 (12.34) 13.1 (11.79) -3.56 (1.91) 
Distress 36 (72%) 5.85 (8.94) 9.74 (6.82) -4.18 (5.07) 
Self-Efficacy 15 (30%) -8.84 (19.21) 11.54 (14.14) -17.57 (13.69) 
Catastrophising 39 (78%) 7.62 (11.24) 11.17 (9.9) -4.96 (4.82) 
Perceived 
Interference 41 (82%) 9.68 (14.67) 13.47 (13.02) -7.63 (7.61) 
Activity-level 44 (88%) 12.31 (12.32) 15.29 (9.68) -9.58 (5.28) 
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The accuracy of recall was assessed for PAMS scales measured as continuous variables 
by subtracting PAMS average-scores from their respective PAMS-R scores (see Table 
6.10). On PAMS-R the majority of participants (between 72% and 88%) overestimated 
their weekly pain, distress, catastrophising, pain-related interference, and activity-levels, 
and underestimated their self-efficacy (70%) compared to average weekly ratings. Chi-
square tests demonstrated that the difference in frequency between over-estimators and 
under-estimators was significant for all variables (p<.005). On average, those who 
overestimated tended to be out by 12.4% on the measurement scales (ranging from 9.7% 
for Distress to 15.3% for Activity-Level) and those who underestimated tended to be out 
by 8% (ranging from 3.6% for pain to 17.6% for self-efficacy). 
6.2.3 Reactivity 
6.2.3.1 Drift In Mean Levels 
Reactivity to monitoring was assessed for pain-intensity, distress, function, and activity-
level. Three-level hierarchical linear modelling was used, with monitoring-entry at level 
one (a within-day level), day at level two (an across-day level), and person at level three. 
For each outcome variable three separate analyses were conducted investigating a 
variance-components model, a model investigating drift across entries, and a model 
investigating drift across days. 
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Table 6.11 Reactivity to Pain-Intensity Measures; unstandardized coefficient 
(S.E.) 
 Model   
Predictor 
1 
Var. Components 
2 
Monitoring entry 
3 
Monitoring day 
Intercept 45.05 (2.09)*** 44.15 (2.22) *** 43.94 (2.22) *** 
Entry  0.05 (0.04) ns  
Day   0.37 (0.24) ns 
Variance 
Between-Person 218.85 (46.54%) 218.38  220.29  
Between-Day 69.32 (14.73%) 68.58  68.3  
Within-Day 182.18 (38.73%) 182.23 182.22  
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 
Percentage of total variance in the variance components model is in brackets  
 
Analyses of Pain-Intensity (see Table 6.11) revealed non-significant effects for entry-
number and monitoring-day.  
Inspection of the variance-components model revealed that the majority of variance in 
pain intensity (53.46%) was within person, with 72.4% of within-person variance being 
within-days.  
Table 6.12 Reactivity to Distress Measures; unstandardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model   
Predictor 
1 
Var. Components 
2 
Monitoring entry 
3 
Monitoring day 
Intercept 37.45 (2.03) *** 38.14 (2.13) *** 36.83 (2.13) *** 
Entry  -0.04 (0.04) ns  
Day   0.21 (0.22) ns 
Variance 
Between-Person 208.02 (51.65%) 207.27 207.89 
Between-Day 62.72 (15.57%) 63.16 62.42 
Within-Day 132.03 (32.78%) 131.86 132.05 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 
Percentage of total variance in the variance components model is in brackets 
 
Analyses of Distress (see Table 6.12) revealed non-significant effects for both entry-
number and monitoring-day. 
Within-person variance accounted for 48.35% of variance in distress, with 67.8% of that 
variance being within-days. 
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Table 6.13 Reactivity to Function Measures; unstandardized coefficient 
(S.E.) 
 Model 
Predictor 
1 
Var. Components 
2 
Monitoring entry 
3 
Monitoring day 
Intercept 61.03 (2.05)*** 60.8 (2.16) *** 60.5 (2.15) *** 
Entry  0.01 (0.03) ns  
Day   0.18 (0.23) ns 
Variance 
Between-Person 212.02 (47.63%) 212.19  211  
Between-Day 55.26 (12.41%) 55.27  55.22  
Within-Day 177.82 (39.95%) 177.81 177.8 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Percentage of total variance in the variance components model is in brackets 
 
Analyses of Function (see Table 6.13) revealed non-significant effects for entry-number 
and monitoring-day. 
The majority of variance in Function was within-person (52.37%), with the majority of 
that variance (76.3%) being within-day.  
Table 6.14 Reactivity to Activity-level measures, including co-variation of day-of-the-week; 
unstandardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model    
Fixed Effect 
1 
Var. Components 
2 
Monitoring entry 
3 
Monitoring day 
4 
Mon. day (week day) 
Intercept 34.9 (1.58) *** 33.72 (1.74) *** 33.21 (1.72) *** 34.25 (1.75) *** 
Entry  0.06 (0.04) ns   
Day   0.56 (0.22) * 0.59 (0.22) ** 
Weekend    -3.59 (1.08) *** 
Variance 
Between-Person 119.63 (25.36%) 120.83  120.36 121.73 
Between-Day 29.12 (6.17%) 27.98  27.42 23.71 
Within-Day 322.83 (68.46%) 322.95  322.74  322.79 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Percentage of total variance in the variance components model is in brackets 
 
Analyses of activity-level (see Table 6.14) revealed a significant effect of monitoring-
day, but not entry-number. Monitoring days were associated with a progressive increase 
in activity-level, with each day associated with an average increase of 0.56 percentage 
points in activity level ratings. Monitoring day accounted for 5.8% of between-day 
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variance, and 0.22% of total variance in activity-level. Because monitoring days varied 
systematically with day-of-the-week (see Table 6.2), it was considered that the effect of 
monitoring day on drift in activity-level ratings may have been confounded by week-day 
effects. An additional analysis covarying a week-day effect (a dichotomous variable 
reflecting weekdays versus weekend) revealed independent effects of weekday and 
monitoring day, with the effect of monitoring day largely unchanged compared to the 
previous analysis. Weekends were associated with an average decrease in activity level of 
3.59 percentage points, accounting for an additional 12.77% between-day variance and 
6.88% total variance to that accounted for by monitoring day. Two alternative analyses 
were conducted where day-of-the-week was entered as six dummy-coded day-of-the-
week variables, and as a single linear function from Monday to Sunday. In both analyses 
the interpretation of the monitoring day effect remained unchanged. 
The majority of variance in Activity-Level (74.63%) was within-person, and of this the 
vast majority was within-days (91.73%). 
To summarise, activity-level ratings appeared to drift upwards over monitoring days, and 
this effect was not attributable to day-of-the-week. These findings provide evidence of a 
reactivity effect in participants’ ratings of their activity-level. 
6.2.3.2 Drift In Variability 
As a further assessment of reactivity effects, change in variability over the monitoring 
period was assessed by calculating standard-deviations of pain, distress, activity and 
function for the first 50% of entries versus the second 50% (see Table 6.15). Only 
participants with more than ten entries who had participated for four or more days were 
included in this analysis (n=47). 
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Table 6.15 Standard deviations for 
first and second half of entries 
 Half of monitoring 
 First Second 
Pain 14.37 13.24 
Distress 12.61 10.96 
Activity 18.39 16.05 
Functioning 13.04 13.11 
 
Paired-sample t-tests were used to compare across halves of the monitoring period.  
Significant differences were found for distress t(46)=2.68, p=.01, and activity t(46)=2.88, 
p=.006, but not pain t(46)=1.97, p=ns, or function t(46)=-.08, p=ns, suggesting that over 
the course of monitoring participants tended to provide less diverse ratings of their 
distress and activity-levels. These findings suggest that reactivity may have influenced 
participants’ ratings of activity-level and distress. 
6.3 Discussion – Part A 
6.3.1 Compliance 
Part A of Study Two began with an investigation of compliance and exploratory analyses 
of the factors associated with compliance. In EMA studies with chronic pain patients, 
compliance rates between 76% (for adolescents with sickle cell disease; Gil, et al., 2003) 
and 97.6% (for women with RA; Keefe, et al., 1997) have been reported, though most 
compliance rates appeared to fall in the early nineties (eg. Feldman, et al., 1999; Stone, et 
al., 2003; Catley, 1999). It is noted that all of these studies provided monetary incentives 
for compliance whereas the current study did not.  
A somewhat lower compliance rate of 71.6% was found in the current study for the first 
seven days of monitoring, not including voluntary midnight alarms. Participants made an 
average of five entries per day out of the eight “compulsory” 8am to 10pm alarms. Fifty-
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percent of participants completed a total of at least 42 entries (including midnight 
alarms), and 25% completed at least 48 entries.  
Like Peters, et al., (2000), it was found that a minority of unopened alarms were 
voluntarily dismissed – only 4.6% of 8am-10pm alarms. The majority of unopened 
alarms (24.6% of total alarms) “timed out” after the designated 10 minutes. According to 
participants’ attributions for timed-out alarms, the most common reason was that the 
alarm on the PDA was not loud enough. It is also possible that the lack of a monetary 
incentive for participation or compliance may have detracted from compliance.  
Analyses revealed equal compliance over the daily alarm timeslots, except for lower 
compliance with the voluntary midnight alarm. Day-of-the-week did not appear to have 
an impact on compliance. Participants appeared to make the most entries on the second 
day of monitoring, and entry-rates appeared to remain stable until the seventh day, after 
which it continued to wane. The second day may have had more entries than the first 
because many participants commenced monitoring part-way through the day their PDA 
was delivered (their “first” day according to analyses), whereas the day after that was 
strictly the first day they were scheduled to commence monitoring.  
Compliance was better amongst younger participants and those involved in some form of 
work. Also, participants who reported experiencing constant pain and were more disabled 
were less likely to allow the PDA to time-out. These people may have spent more time in 
the one location with the PDA nearby. Consistent with this, people reporting more pain 
were less likely to report the reason for missing alarms as being because the PDA was not 
in the room or because it did not ring for long enough. 
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Few people reported that they missed or dismissed alarms because they were too 
distressed to make an entry. Those who did report this were less compliant than other 
participants. Those who reportedly missed alarms because of distress did indeed appear 
to be more distressed than others. 
Finally, it was interesting to observe that people who were more compliant with 
monitoring were more likely to report their reasons as being those for which they were 
instructed to dismiss entries – the location was not safe for the PDA and/or it would have 
been inconvenient to make an entry for at least 30 minutes. 
6.3.2 Convergence 
The convergence between summary scores of PAMS monitoring and recall-based paper-
and-pencil questionnaires was also investigated in Part-A of Study Two. On one hand, it 
was anticipated that scores from the average PAMS scales would diverge from standard 
measures because of variance due to method – that is, summary scores from the 
momentary PAMS ratings would presumably provide a more accurate reflection of 
weekly states than recall-based measures. However, it was hoped that the summary 
PAMS scales would demonstrate some degree of convergence with the standard scales as 
a means of supporting convergent validity. To potentially disentangle variance due to 
differing measures and variance due to method, both standard questionnaires and a one-
week recall-based version of the PAMS scales (PAMS-R) were compared to the average 
of momentary ratings. It was considered that the PAMS summary scores and PAMS-R 
scales would share a greater amount of measure-variance, and differences between the 
two would presumably reflect method variance. 
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All correlations between PAMS scales and their respective PAMS-R scales were of 
higher magnitude than correlations with divergent PAMS-R scales, though testing 
revealed significant overlap with other PAMS-R scales for the Pain Intensity and Passive 
Coping scales. Average PAMS scales appeared to demonstrate comparable or superior 
convergent validity compared to available data from similar comparisons in other studies. 
The PAMS Pain Intensity scale correlated r=.67 with the PAMS-R scale. This was 
somewhat higher than correlations with standard pain scales (r=.56 and –0.58 with the 
MPI and SF-36 pain scales, respectively). Such convergent scores compared favourably 
to a correlation between momentary and recalled MPI pain severity scales of only r=.4 
reported by Peters, et al. (2000). Catley (1999) reported a momentary/recall convergence 
more similar to the current study (r=.65), whereas Lousberg, et al. (1997) reported a 
somewhat higher convergence of r=.75. 
The PAMS Distress scale correlated r=.86 with the PAMS-R scale, which was 
comparable to the excellent convergence with the MPI Affective Distress scale (r=.85). A 
number of other studies reported convergence between momentary and recalled measures 
of distress, but none were comparable to that reported here. In fact, momentary and recall 
versions of the MPI Affective Distress scale have demonstrated smaller (r=.42; Peters, et 
al., 2000) to non-significant (r=.2; Lousberg, et al.,1997) correlations. Catley (1999) 
reported correlations of r=.5 and –0.39 between the BDI and momentary measures of NA 
and PA, respectively. 
PAMS Pain Self-Efficacy correlated r=.73 with the PAMS-R scale, but correlated 
significantly only with the PSEQ, at r=.34. PAMS Perceived Interference, on the other 
hand, correlated r=.81 with the PAMS-R scale and r=.72 with MPI Life Interference. This 
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compares well to the lower momentary/recall correlations of r=.34 (Peters, et al., 2000) 
and r=.6 (Lousberg, et al., 1997) reported for this scale. PAMS Catastrophising correlated 
r=.85 with the PAMS-R, and between r=.51 (PCS Rumination) and r=.61 (PCS 
Helplessness) with other catastrophising scales. The PAMS scale correlated r=.56 with 
CSQ Catastrophising, which was lower but comparable to the r=-0.66 reported by Peters, 
et al. (2000). The PAMS Catastrophising scale demonstrated correlations with a range of 
other appraisal-related measures, including MPI Life Control, MPI Life Interference, and 
CSQ Control Over Pain, perhaps reflecting the broad spectrum and predictive importance 
of the catastrophising construct (for example, the PCS contains subscales reflecting 
primary appraisal and secondary, control-related, appraisals of pain). Convergence 
between momentary and recall versions of the PAMS Pain Expectancy scale were not 
conducted because of the inherently momentary nature of that variable and because no 
comparable standard-measures were available. 
PAMS Passive- and Active- Coping correlated r=.62 and 0.68 with the relevant PAMS-R 
scales, respectively. This was comparable to Stone’s (1998) reported average correlation 
of 0.6 between momentary and recall versions of the scales of the Ways of Coping 
questionnaire. Peters, et al. (2000) reported lower convergence for CSQ scales. Their 
positive self-talk scale did not correlate significantly, and their diverting attention and 
ignoring/denying pain scales correlated r=.41 with recall versions. PAMS Passive Coping 
correlated significantly with CSQ Passive Coping (r=.31), CSQ Divert Attention (r=-0.3) 
and Praying or Hoping (r=.29). It is noted that the CSQ scales do not appear to provide a 
good comparison, content-wise, with the passive coping scale used in the current study. 
For PAMS Active Coping, significant correlations were found with CSQ Active Coping 
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(r=.41) and with the CSQ scales Divert Attention (r=.57) and Praying or Hoping, 
Reinterpret Pain Sensations, and Increased Behavioural Activity (r=.3 to 0.44).  
PAMS Function correlated 0.68 with the PAMS-R Function scale. Its relationships with 
the DQ (r=-0.69) was comparable, possibly suggesting significant method-variance in the 
assessment of function. This would appear to make sense on the basis that functioning is 
likely to vary within and across days depending on tasks that need doing, time-of-day, 
and other procedural factors that may be reflected in momentary, but not recalled-based, 
ratings. PAMS Function correlated r=.46 with SF-36 Physical Functioning – less than the 
r=.73 correlation reported by Peters, et al. (2000) for momentary and recall versions of 
that SF-36 scale. It also correlated significantly (between r=.28 and 0.46) with the SF-36 
scales Role Functioning – Physical, General Health, and Social Functioning. By 
comparison, using the MPI, Lousberg, et al. (1997) reported a non-significant 
relationship between momentary and recall “general activity” scales, and an r=.4 
relationship for “household chores”. 
PAMS Activity-Level demonstrated the lowest convergence with PAMS-R (r=.57) – 
suggesting that activity-level is likely to be highly susceptible to recall error. The scale 
correlated with only one standard measure – SF-36 Health Transition (r=.28). SF-36 
Vitality was expected to provide the best convergent validation of PAMS Activity-Level, 
and the correlation with Health Transition was unexpected. 
The lack of convergence between PAMS-R and average PAMS scales was attributable to 
participants over-estimating all variables during recall, except self-efficacy which was 
predominantly under-estimated. Thus, the majority of participants tended to recall their 
pain and distress as being worse than they were according to momentary ratings, and 
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their appraisals as being excessively negative, but their functioning (as measured by 
activity-level) as being better than it was. Activity-level tended to be particularly prone to 
over-estimation, demonstrating the highest average degree of inaccuracy (15.3 points on 
the 100-point measurement scale), whereas self-efficacy appeared most liable to be 
under-estimated (being out by 17.6 points on average). 
6.3.3 Reactivity 
Prior to focal analyses, preliminary multi-level analyses were conducted to rule out the 
possibility that systematic changes in monitoring ratings were associated with the process 
of monitoring per se. Self-monitoring may cause individuals to focus on their pain, 
functioning, and/or mood-states, thereby altering ratings as monitoring progresses. For 
example, Tennen, et al. (2000) provide the example of a person whose usual coping 
strategy of distraction might be disrupted by the self-focused attention required from 
EMA participants. No such reactivity to monitoring has been reported in studies of 
chronic pain except by Stone, et al. (2003), who found that pain-ratings decreased over 
the course of monitoring for participants completing three entries per day, and increased 
for those completing six entries per day. If such reactivity to monitoring exists it should 
reveal itself by analysing criterion variables as a function of the number of monitoring 
entries completed (ie. entry number) or time since monitoring commenced (eg. 
monitoring day) (eg. Peters, et al., 2000; Cruise, et al., 1996). Thus, entry-number and 
monitoring-day were entered separately as possible predictors of pain-intensity, distress, 
function, and activity-level ratings.  
No reactivity was observed for pain-intensity, distress, or function measures. However, 
ratings of activity level increased over monitoring days. This affect was not attributable 
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to day-of-the-week. It is possible that participants initially under-estimated their activity 
levels and shifted their average ratings upwards as monitoring progressed, for example, to 
accommodate a lack of moments of higher activity. Alternatively, the study may have 
initially interfered with participant’s functioning but as monitoring progressed they may 
have become familiar with study procedures, incorporated monitoring into their daily 
routine, and gradually resumed usual levels of activity. However, if the latter explanation 
were the case, systematic increases in the function scale might also have been expected. 
Reactivity in the activity-level measure accounted for a notable amount of variance 
between days – almost 6%, though this was somewhat less than the almost 13% 
accounted for by day-of-the-week. In terms of total variance, reactivity accounted for 
only 0.22% of variance in activity-level, compared to almost 7% accounted for by day-
of-the-week.  
Rather than systematic drifts in ratings, reactivity may reduce variability in ratings – such 
as by participants progressively scoring more ratings towards the midline. Fatigue or 
boredom with the study procedure may be mechanisms by which this could occur. 
Csikszentmihalyi and Larson (1987), for example, found that whilst mean levels of 
psychological variables did not change between the first and second halves of the 
monitoring week, their variability decreased. This possibility was tested in the current 
study by comparing the standard deviation for each of the four criterion measures 
between the first and second half of entries. Distress and activity-level ratings 
demonstrated decreased variability in the second half of monitoring. Csikszentmihalyi 
and Larson (1987) interpreted such findings as reflecting participant’s developing better 
“anchoring” to the response categories – suggesting that decreased variability may be 
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associated with less random variability in ratings. Alternatively, participants’ responses 
may drift towards the midline as the process of monitoring becomes more demanding.  
6.4 Results – Part B: Within-Person Analyses of Coping and Appraisal 
Part B of Study Two focused on the key analyses of the current project, addressing the 
question of whether pain coping and appraisal independently predict distress, functional 
status and activity-level in the daily lives of those with chronic pain.  
Distress was analysed first, followed by functioning and activity level.  
For each outcome a series of preliminary analyses are reported. Firstly, a variance-
components model was calculated to determine the percentages of variance in the 
outcome measure that occurs on a within-person basis prior to the inclusion of any 
predictors. This model provides a baseline for determining the effect of subsequent 
predictors in terms of the proportion of within-person variance they account for. The 
control models are reported next, in which covariates were added to the prediction 
equation (analogous to the first step in a hierarchical regression analysis). These models 
were investigated after the variance-components models so that the impact of key coping 
and appraisal variables could be assessed in subsequent analyses in terms of additional 
variance accounted for beyond that accounted for by the covariates in the control model.  
For the outcomes of distress and activity-level, same-lag analyses were conducted after 
the preliminary analyses. Finally, cross-lag analyses are conducted for each outcome 
variable. For both same-lag and cross-lag analyses the independent effect of the appraisal 
variables was investigated first, followed by the independent effect of the coping 
variables. 
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The first-order relationships between the outcome variables and each of the key 
predictors at both lag1 and lag2 were calculated, using the data-set consisting of only 
entries separated by no more then three hours, to determine the utility of these variables 
for inclusion in the focal hierarchical analyses (see Appendix D, Table D.8). All variables 
demonstrated some predictive utility at both lag one and lag two. 
Descriptive statistics for the reduced dataset of entries made within three hours can be 
found in Table D.7 in Appendix D. The first-order relationships between all key 
predictors in the three-hour dataset can be found in Appendix D, tables D.9 (for outcomes 
at lag 1) and D.10 (for outcome sat lag 2). The relationship between key predictors and 
entry-number was also assessed (see Appendix D, Tables D.9 and D.10), given the 
finding that the activity-level outcome varied over the course of the monitoring week. No 
variable demonstrated a reactivity effect, thus entry-number was ruled-out as a possible 
confound and was not covaried in subsequent analyses. 
6.4.1 Distress 
6.4.1.1 Variance-Components and Control Models 
Inspection of the variance components model revealed that 42.7% of variance in lag2 
distress was at the within-subjects level (see Table 6.16, model 1). The control model for 
cross-lagged analyses, composed of all co-variates, was compared to the variance-
components model, as was a control-model for same-lag analyses, composed only of 
covariates at lag2 (see Table 6.16). All covariates demonstrated significant effects. 
Table 6.16 Variance-components model and control model for lag2 
Distress: standardized coefficient (S.E.) 
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 Model   
Fixed Effect 
1 
Var. Components 
2 
Control (cross-lag) 
3 
Control (same-lag) 
Intercept 37.08 (2.18)*** 41.33 (2.68)*** 42.13 (2.75)*** 
Distress  0.34 (0.03)***  
Lag2 Evening  -0.11 (1.65)** -0.14 (1.76)** 
Lag2 Work Hrs.  -0.1 (1.64)* -0.12 (1.75)** 
Pain  -0.16 (0.02)***  
Lag2 Pain  0.48 (0.02)*** 0.53 (0.02)*** 
Variance 
Between-Person 237.93 (57.3%) *** 241.62 *** 240.55*** 
Within-Person 177.23 (42.7%) 107.73  122.99  
Deviance (df) 11101.98 (3) 10449.5 (8) 10623.05 (6) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Percentage of total variance in the variance components model is in brackets 
 
The variables in model two of Table 6.16, the cross-lag control-model, collectively 
accounted for 39.21% of the within-person variance in the variance-components model. 
Model three accounted for 30.6% of within-person variance. Both model two (χ2 
(5)=652.47, p<.001) and three (χ2 (3)=478.93, p<.001) provided a significantly better fit 
than model one. In both model two and three, same-lag pain was the strongest predictor, 
with greater pain associated with greater distress. Prior distress also displayed a strong 
relationship to lag2 distress in model two, with high prior distress associated with high 
current distress.  
Interestingly, in model two, pain in the previous lag was negatively associated with 
distress. Given that lag2 pain-intensity was also included in this model it would not 
appear that this effect could be due to regression-towards the mean from lag1 pain-
intensity to lag2 pain-intensity.  
Both time-of-day variables were also significant, with evening and working-hours 
associated with reduced distress compared to pre-work hours. Inspection of the 
unstandardised coefficients for model two revealed that, relative to pre-work hours, 
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working hours were associated with an average decrease in distress of 4.19%, and 
evening hours with a decrease of 4.68%. 
6.4.1.2 Same lag-Analyses 
A first set of analyses was conducted to address Hypotheses A and B outlined in the 
introduction to Section 6 – testing whether distress was related to concurrent appraisals 
and coping efforts made in the same time-lag, controlling for the effect of time-of-day 
and concurrent pain (see Table 6.17).  
Table 6.17 Same-lag analysis of lag2 Distress: standardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model    
Lag2 Fixed 
Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Appraisals 
3 
Coping 
4 
Full 
Intercept 42.13 (2.75)*** 39.8 (2.66)*** 41.87 (2.74)*** 39.78 (2.66)*** 
Evening -0.14 (1.76)** -0.08 (1.61) ns -0.13 (1.75)** -0.08 (1.61) ns 
Work Hours. -0.12 (1.75)** -0.06 (1.59) ns -0.11 (1.74)** -0.06 (1.6) ns 
Pain 0.53 (0.02)*** 0.2 (0.03)*** 0.5 (0.02)*** 0.2 (0.03)*** 
Pain Self Efficacy  -0.09 (0.02)***  -0.09 (0.02)** 
Catastrophising  0.25 (0.03)***  0.25 (0.03)*** 
Pain Expectancy  0.06 (0.03)*  0.06 (0.03)* 
Perc. Interference  0.2 (0.02)***  0.2 (0.02)*** 
Passive Cope   0.09 (0.03)*** 0.01 (0.02) ns 
Active Cope   0 (0.02) ns 0 (0.02) ns 
Variance 
Between-Person 240.55*** 242.02*** 240.6*** 242.01*** 
Within-Person 122.99  101.48  121.18  101.46  
Deviance (df) 10623.05 (6) 10371.11 (10) 10603.63 (8) 10370.91 (12) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
 
Model two was compared to model one to determine whether lag2 appraisals accounted 
for variance in lag2 distress beyond what was accounted for by the control variables. 
Model two accounted for 42.74% of within-person variance, contributing an additional 
12.14% to that explained by the control model. The effect of coping was examined by 
comparing model three to model one. Model three explained 31.62% of within-person 
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variance, accounting for only 1.02% more than the control model. Both models two (χ2 
(4)=251.93731, p<.001) and three (χ2 (2)=19.42, p<.001) provided a significantly better 
fit than model one. 
Inspection of model two reveals that catastrophising was the strongest appraisal predictor, 
followed by perceived interference. The predictor with the smallest, though still 
significant effect, was pain expectancy. These three predictors were associated with 
increased distress. Self-efficacy was associated with lower distress.  
In model three only passive coping was significantly related to lag2 distress, with greater 
passive coping being associated with increased distress. 
The separate effects of appraisal and coping, controlling for the other, was examined by 
comparing the full model (model four) with model two and three, respectively. Model 
four provided a significantly better fit than model three (χ2 (2)=232.72, p<.001), but not 
model two (χ2 (2)=0.206, p=ns). It accounted for 42.75% of within-person variance, 
11.13% more than model three, and only 0.01% more than model two. Thus, it appeared 
that whilst the addition of coping to appraisals did not significantly improve prediction of 
lag2 distress, appraisals contributed significant independent prediction of lag2 distress 
beyond that associated with coping. Further, whilst Passive Coping became non-
significant with the addition of appraisals, the addition of coping to the model did not 
alter the coefficients associated with lag2 appraisals.  
The addition of appraisals in model two appeared to account for more than half of the 
effect of pain on distress, though pain still appeared to have an effect on distress 
independently of the appraisals included in the analysis. The addition of appraisals 
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reduced the effect of time-of-day to a non-significant level. The addition of coping (in 
model three) appeared to have no substantial impact on the effect of pain or time-of-day. 
Table 6.18 Cross-lag analysis predicting lag2 Distress from lag1 appraisals: standardized 
coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model    
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Appraisal 
3 
∆ Appraisal 
4 
Full 
Intercept 41.33 (2.68)*** 41.37 (2.68)*** 39.52 (2.61)*** 39.03 (2.6)*** 
Lag1 Distress 0.34 (0.03)*** 0.36 (0.03)*** 0.43 (0.02)*** 0.35 (0.03)*** 
Lag2 Evening -0.11 (1.65)** -0.11 (1.64)** -0.07 (1.52) ns -0.05 (1.5) ns 
Lag2 Work Hrs. -0.1 (1.64)* -0.1 (1.63)** -0.06 (1.51) ns -0.05 (1.48) ns 
Pain -0.16 (0.02)*** -0.11 (0.03)*** 0 (0.02) ns -0.07 (0.02)* 
Lag2 Pain 0.48 (0.02)*** 0.5 (0.02)*** 0.3 (0.02)*** 0.21 (0.03)*** 
Pain Self Efficacy  -0.02 (0.02) ns  -0.08 (0.03)* 
Catastrophising  -0.06 (0.03) ns  0.13 (0.04)*** 
Pain Expectancy  -0.1 (0.03)***  -0.02 (0.03) ns 
Perc. Interference  0.04 (0.03) ns  0.14 (0.03)*** 
∆ Self Eff.   -0.05 (0.02)** -0.08 (0.02)*** 
∆ Catastroph   0.12 (0.03)*** 0.16 (0.03)*** 
∆ Expectancy   0.08 (0.02)*** 0.07 (0.03)*** 
∆ Perc. Int.   0.07 (0.02)*** 0.1 (0.02)*** 
Variance 
Between-Person 241.62*** 241.7*** 242.75*** 243.02*** 
Within-Person 107.73 105.97 90.94 87  
Deviance (df) 10449.5 (8) 10427.91 (12) 10227.46 (12) 10169.48 (16) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Cross-lag change values are referred to with the symbol ∆ 
 
To summarise, same-lag analyses of PAMS Distress supported Hypothesis A as it relates 
to the Distress outcome – both coping and appraisals were associated with distress 
independently of pain and time-of-day effects. However, Hypothesis B was only partly 
supported – the relationship between appraisals and distress could not be attributed to 
coping, however there was no evidence to suggest that the association between coping 
and distress was not due to the effect of appraisals on distress. 
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6.4.1.3 Cross-lag Analyses 
Appraisals. The following analyses were conducted to test Hypothesis C and D (see the 
beginning of section 6). A first set of cross-lag analyses were conducted as a test of 
Hypothesis C, to determine whether appraisals at lag1 were associated with distress at 
lag2 (see Table 6.18).  
The strongest predictor of lag2 distress, in all four analyses, was prior distress. The 
effect-size of this co-variate was not attenuated by the addition of the appraisal variables. 
Lag2 pain-intensity was the next strongest predictor of lag2 distress, though the addition 
of change-in-appraisal (model three and four) appeared to account for some of the effect 
of same-lag pain. Lag1 pain was also related to subsequent distress, though in a negative 
direction. This effect appeared to be attenuated by the inclusion of the cross-lag appraisal 
variables in subsequent models. 
The control model was compared to a model that also included lag1 appraisals (model 
two) to investigate the effect of appraisals at lag1. Model two was a significantly better fit 
than model one (χ2 (4)=21.6, p<.001). It accounted for 40.21% of within-person variance, 
which was 0.99% more than the control model. Model two revealed that only pain-
expectancy was associated with lag2 distress, such that higher pain expectancies were 
associated with less subsequent distress. 
To provide further support for the hypothesis that prior appraisals would be associated 
with unique variance in subsequent distress, a full model incorporating appraisals, 
change-in-appraisals, and control variables (model four) was compared to a restricted 
model without the appraisal variables (model three). Model four was a significantly better 
fit than model three (χ2 (4)=57.98, p<.001), supporting a unique effect of lag1 appraisals. 
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It accounted for 50.91% of within-person variance in the variance-components model – 
2.22% more than the variance accounted for by model three. 
To clarify the unique effect of specific lag1 appraisal predictors coefficients associated 
with lag1 appraisals were compared between models two and four. The pattern of 
predictors altered after change-in-appraisals were co-varied in model four. Perceived 
interference became the strongest of the three significant predictors, followed by 
catastrophising. Both were associated with increased subsequent distress. Self-efficacy 
was associated with decreased subsequent distress, and pain expectancy became non-
significant as a predictor.  
The following set of analyses was conducted to test Hypothesis D by determining 
whether coping accounted for the effect of appraisals on subsequent distress (see Table 
6.19). Change-in-appraisal variables were included to clarify the interpretation of lag1 
effects.  
It was expected that lag1 appraisals would account for significant unique variance in lag2 
distress even once coping was included in the model. This was tested by comparing a full 
model with lag1 appraisals, lag2 coping, and control variables (model three) to a model 
without appraisals (model two). Model three provided a significantly better fit than model 
two (χ2 (4)=50.87, p<.001), accounting for an additional 1.92% of variance. Model three 
accounted for a total of 50.92% of within-person variance, compared to 48.99% 
accounted for by model three. Thus, it appears that lag1 appraisals accounted for a small 
amount of unique variance in subsequent distress that was not due to coping or to 
dynamic changes in appraisal between the two lags.  
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Table 6.19 Cross-lag analysis predicting lag2 Distress from lag1 appraisals, covarying 
lag2 coping: standardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model   
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Coping 
3 
Full 
Intercept 39.03 (2.6)*** 39.36 (2.61)*** 0 (2.96)*** 
Distress 0.35 (0.03)*** 0.42 (0.02)*** 0.35 (0.03)*** 
Lag2 Evening -0.05 (1.5) ns -0.06 (1.52) ns -0.05 (1.5) ns 
Lag2 Work Hrs. -0.05 (1.48) ns -0.05 (1.51) ns -0.05 (1.49) ns 
Pain -0.07 (0.02)* 0 (0.02) ns -0.07 (0.02)* 
Lag2 pain-intensity 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.29 (0.02)*** 0.2 (0.03)*** 
Pain Self Efficacy -0.08 (0.03)*  -0.07 (0.03)* 
Catastrophising 0.13 (0.04)***  0.13 (0.04)** 
Pain Expectancy -0.02 (0.03) ns  0.01 (0.03) ns 
Perc. Interference 0.14 (0.03)***  0.13 (0.03)** 
Lag2 Pass. Cope  0.05 (0.02)** 0.02 (0.02) ns 
Lag2 Act. Cope  -0.01 (0.02) ns -0.01 (0.02) ns 
∆ Self Eff. -0.08 (0.02)*** -0.05 (0.02)*** -0.07 (0.02)*** 
∆ Catastroph 0.16 (0.03)*** 0.12 (0.03)*** 0.16 (0.03)*** 
∆ Expectancy 0.07 (0.03)*** 0.08 (0.02)*** 0.08 (0.03)*** 
∆ Perc. Int. 0.1 (0.02)*** 0.06 (0.02)*** 0.09 (0.02)*** 
Variance 
Between-Person 243.02*** 242.75*** 240.9*** 
Within-Person 87  90.4 (27.1%) 86.99 
Deviance (df) 10169.48 (16) 10219.66 (14) 10168.79 (18) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Cross-lag change values are referred to with the symbol ∆ 
 
To determine whether the effect of the individual appraisals was influenced by the 
addition of coping, a model involving lag1 appraisals and change-in-appraisals (model 
one – identical to model four in Table 6.18) was compared to a model also including lag2 
coping (model three). A comparison of model one to model three reveals no note-worthy 
changes in the effect of the appraisal variables when coping was included in the model. 
To summarise, analyses of distress supported Hypotheses C and D – appraisals evidenced 
a significant association with subsequent distress, and this effect was attributable to 
neither pain-intensity, time-of-day, nor coping. 
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Table 6.20 Cross-lag analysis predicting lag2 Distress from lag1 coping: standardized 
coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model    
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Coping 
3 
∆ Coping 
4 
Full 
Intercept 41.33 (2.68)*** 41.33 (2.68)*** 41.36 (2.69)*** 41.11 (2.68)*** 
Distress 0.34 (0.03)*** 0.33 (0.03)*** 0.34 (0.03)*** 0.33 (0.03)*** 
Lag2 Evening -0.11 (1.65)** -0.11 (1.65)** -0.11 (1.66)** -0.11 (1.65)** 
Lag2 Work Hrs. -0.1 (1.64)* -0.1 (1.63)* -0.1 (1.64)* -0.09 (1.64)* 
Pain -0.16 (0.02)*** -0.16 (0.02)*** -0.16 (0.02)*** -0.16 (0.02)*** 
Lag2 Pain 0.48 (0.02)*** 0.48 (0.02)*** 0.48 (0.02)*** 0.46 (0.02)*** 
Passive Cope  0.05 (0.02)*  0.11 (0.03)*** 
Active Cope  -0.02 (0.02) ns  -0.03 (0.02) ns 
∆ Passive Cope   0.02 (0.02) ns 0.07 (0.02)*** 
∆ Active Cope   0.01 (0.02) ns -0.01 (0.02) ns 
Variance 
Between-Person 241.62*** 241.64*** 241.63*** 241.66*** 
Within-Person 107.73  107.24  107.56 106.13 
Deviance (df) 10449.5 (8) 10443.53 (10) 10447.39 (10) 10429.81 (10) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Cross-lag change values are referred to with the symbol ∆ 
 
Coping. The following analyses were conducted to test Hypotheses E and F (see the 
beginning of Section 6) as they relate to the outcome of Distress. The initial set of 
analyses, conducted to test Hypothesis E, examined the effect of lag1 coping on 
subsequent distress controlling for pain-intensity and time-of-day (see Table 6.20).  
The effect of lag1 coping on lag2 distress was first examined by comparing the effect of 
adding lag1 coping (model two) to the control model (model one). Model two accounted 
for 39.49% of within-person variance, only 0.28% more than was accounted for by the 
control model. However, model two was a significantly better fit than model one (χ2 
(2)=5.97, p=.049). Passive coping was the only significant coping predictor in model two, 
with use of a greater number of passive coping strategies associated with greater distress. 
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Table 6.21 Cross-lag analysis predicting lag2 Distress from lag1 coping, co-varying lag1 
appraisals: standardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model   
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Appraisals 
3 
Full 
Intercept 41.11 (2.68)*** 41.09 (2.68)*** 41.39 (2.68)*** 
Distress 0.33 (0.03)*** 0.36 (0.03)*** 0.36 (0.03)*** 
Lag2 Evening -0.11 (1.65)** -0.12 (1.65)** -0.11 (1.64)** 
Lag2 Work Hrs. -0.09 (1.64)* -0.1 (1.63)* -0.09 (1.63)* 
Pain -0.16 (0.02)*** -0.11 (0.03)*** -0.11 (0.03)*** 
Lag2 Pain 0.46 (0.02)*** 0.49 (0.02)*** 0.48 (0.02)*** 
Passive Cope 0.11 (0.03)***  0.11 (0.03)*** 
Active Cope -0.03 (0.02) ns  -0.03 (0.02) ns 
Pain Self Efficacy  -0.02 (0.02) ns -0.01 (0.02) ns 
Catastrophising  -0.06 (0.03) ns -0.67 (0.03)* 
Pain Expectancy  -0.1 (0.03)*** -0.1 (0.03)*** 
Perc. Interference  0.05 (0.03) ns 0.02 (0.03) ns 
∆ Passive Cope 0.07 (0.02)*** 0.02 (0.02) ns 0.07 (0.02)*** 
∆ Active Cope -0.01 (0.02) ns 0 (0.02) ns -0.01 (0.02) ns 
Variance 
Between-Person 241.66*** 241.7*** 241.74*** 
Within-Person 106.13  105.84 104.28  
Deviance (df) 10429.81 (12) 10426.28 (14) 10406.75 (16) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Cross-lag change values are referred to with the symbol ∆ 
 
The collective contribution of lag1 coping, controlling for change-in-coping, was 
assessed by adding change-in-coping to the model (model four) and comparing it to the 
model without coping (model three). Model four accounted for only 0.81% more within-
person variance than model three, accounting for a total of 40.12%. Nonetheless, model 
four fit the data significantly better than model three (χ2 (2)=17.57, p<.001), suggesting 
that coping at lag1 had a small but significant independent effect on lag2 distress. 
Finally, the unique effect of coping at lag1 on distress at lag2 was further explored by re-
examining the coefficients of the coping variables once change-in-coping was controlled 
(model four). The addition of change-in-coping more than doubled the effect of passive 
coping, suggesting that the suppressing effect of the change scores had been removed.  
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Prior distress and lag2 pain remained the strongest predictors of subsequent distress, and 
lag1 pain and time-of-day also maintained significant effects. Interestingly, the coping 
and change-in-coping variables appeared to have no impact on the relationship between 
the control variables and lag2 Distress.  
The influence of appraisals on the coping/distress relationship was investigated to test 
Hypothesis F (see Table 6.21). Cross-lag change variables for coping were covaried to 
facilitate interpretation of the lag1 coping effects. The full model was a better fit than 
model two (χ2 (2)=19.53, p<.001). The full model contributed an additional 0.88% unique 
within-person variance to the 40.28% accounted for by model two. Namely, it appears 
that coping at lag1 contributed a small but significant amount of variance to the 
prediction of subsequent distress, controlling for appraisals, and for cross-lag change and 
the other control variables. 
A comparison of the coping coefficients in models one and three revealed that the role of 
passive coping was not influenced by the addition of lag1 appraisal variables to the 
model, and active coping remained non-significant. 
Passive-coping, not active coping, was associated with distress in previous analyses, so a 
final set of analyses examined the role of individual passive coping behaviours (see Table 
6.22). The full model accounted for 39.98% of within-person variance, a contribution of 
only 0.77% to that already accounted for by the control model. Nevertheless, significance 
testing indicated that the full model provided a significantly better fit than the control 
model (χ2(7)=18.804, p=.009). Specifically, use of medication on an as-required basis 
was associated with greater subsequent distress. Inspection of unstandardised coefficients 
reveals that use of such medication was associated with, on average, a 2.23% increase in 
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distress over subsequent hours. Avoidance of activity was also a significant positive 
predictor. This strategy was associated with, on average, a 2.62% increase in distress over 
subsequent hours. 
Table 6.22 Relationship between lag1 coping strategies and lag2 Distress: 
standardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model  
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Full 
Intercept 41.33 (2.68)*** 40.59 (2.68)*** 
Distress 0.34 (0.03)*** 0.33 (0.03)*** 
Lag2 Evening -0.11 (1.65)** -0.11 (1.65)** 
Lag2 Work Hrs. -0.1 (1.64)* -0.1 (1.63)** 
Pain -0.16 (0.02)*** -0.17 (0.02)*** 
Lag2 Pain 0.48 (0.02)*** 0.48 (0.02)*** 
Alcohol  0.01 (2.35) ns 
Medication  0.04 (1.01)* 
Sedative  0.01 (2.65) ns 
Lay/Rest  0 (0.7) ns 
Avoid Activity  0.05 (0.81)** 
Hope/Pray  0.01 (0.8) ns 
Tell self it doesn't hurt -0.02 (1.09) ns 
Variance  
Between-Person 241.62*** 232.16***  
Within-Person 107.73 106.37  
Deviance (df) 10449.5 (8) 10430.7 (15)  
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
 
In summary, Hypotheses E and F, as they related to the Distress outcome, were 
supported.  Coping demonstrated an effect on subsequent distress that was not 
attributable to pain-intensity, time-of-day, or appraisals. Passive coping – and avoidance 
of activity and use of as-required medication specifically – were associated with 
increased distress in subsequent hours. 
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Table 6.23 Prediction of lag2 Distress from lag1 appraisals and coping: standardized 
coefficient (S.E.)  
 Model  
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Full 
Intercept 41.33 (2.68)*** 39.14 (2.61)***  
Distress 0.34 (0.03)*** 0.34 (0.03)***  
Lag2 Evening -0.11 (1.65)** -0.06 (1.51) ns  
Lag2 Work Hrs. -0.1 (1.64)* -0.05 (1.5) ns  
Pain -0.16 (0.02)*** -0.08 (0.02)**  
Lag2 Pain 0.48 (0.02)*** 0.22 (0.02)***  
Pain Self Efficacy  -0.07 (0.03)*  
Catastrophising  0.13 (0.04)***  
Perc. Interference  0.12 (0.03)***  
Passive Cope  0.03 (0.03) ns  
∆ Self Eff.  -0.08 (0.02)***  
∆ Catastroph  0.19 (0.03)***  
∆ Perc. Int.  0.11 (0.02)***  
∆ Passive Cope  0.02 (0.02) ns  
Variance 
Between-Person 241.62*** 242.89***  
Within-Person 107.73 88.74  
Deviance (df) 10449.5 (8) 10195.39 (16)  
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Cross-lag change values are referred to with the symbol ∆ 
 
Coping and Appraisals. In the last set of analyses of lag2 distress, the appraisals that 
were found to be significant in analysis four of Table 6.18 and the coping strategies that 
were found to be significant in analysis four of Table 6.20 were entered together to assess 
their relative effect (see Table 6.23). Thus, catastrophising, self-efficacy, perceived 
interference, and passive-coping were included. Change-scores were included to facilitate 
the interpretation of effects. 
Inspection of Table 6.23 reveals that the model including key appraisal and coping 
variables (model two) accounted for 49.93% of within-person variance in lag2 Distress, 
adding 10.72% to the within-person variance accounted for by the control model. The fit 
of the full model was significantly better than that of the control model (χ2 (8)=254.11, 
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p<.001). Catastrophising was the strongest lag1 predictor, followed by perceived 
interference and pain self-efficacy. With appraisals in the model, passive coping was non-
significant as a predictor. Thus, whilst the psychological variables contributed unique 
prediction of lag2 distress this effect appeared to be attributable to appraisal only. 
6.4.2 Function 
Function-squared (correcting for non-normal distribution) was used as the outcome 
variable for all analyses of functioning. 
6.4.2.1 Variance-Components and Control Models 
Initial analyses were conducted to determine the proportion of within-person variance in 
functioning (the variance-components model), and how much of that variance was 
accounted for by the covariates (the control model).  
Because function was measured retrospectively – such that the activities reportedly 
engaged in or avoided presumably occurred between entries – it was considered best to 
determine empirically whether control variables should be located at lag1 or lag2. For the 
same reason, same-lag analyses of Function were not conducted.  
Initial HLM analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between lag2 function 
and potential confounding variables, including pain-intensity at both lags, function at 
lag1, and time-of-day at both lags. Only the lag1 predictors demonstrated significant 
effects and were thus included as co-variates in subsequent analyses. There was a 
significant autocorrelation effect (standardized coefficient=0.33, p<.001). Lag1 pain-
intensity was associated with reduced function (standardized coefficient=-0.06, p<.05). 
Evening at lag1 (standardized coefficient=-0.12, p<.001), but not working hours 
(standardized coefficient=-0.04, p=ns) was associated with lag2 Function. As anticipated, 
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at lag2 neither time-of-day (standardized coefficient<.001, p=ns for evening; 
standardized coefficient= 0.07, p=ns for working-hours) nor pain (standardized 
coefficient= -0.03, p=ns) were related to lag2 Function. 
Table 6.24 Variance-components and control models for lag2 
function: standardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model   
Fixed Effects 
1 
Var. Components 
2 
Control 
 
Intercept 4165.41 (222.42)*** 4599.66 (261.55)***  
Lag1 Function2  0.34 (0.03)***  
Evening  -0.15 (164.59)***  
Work Hrs  -0.07 (155.53)*  
Pain  -0.06 (2.71)*  
Variance 
Between-Person 2433117.99 (48.7%)*** 2423341.52***  
Within-Person 2558842.9 (51.3%) 2223097.81  
Deviance (df) 24139.15 (3) 23954.19 (7)  
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Percentage of total variance in the variance components model is in 
brackets 
 
According to the variance-components model, lag2 function varied slightly more at the 
within-subjects level (51.3% of variance) than it did between subjects. 
The control model (model two), composed of the covariates for all subsequent analyses 
of function, was compared to the variance-components model (see Table 6.24). 
The control model provided a significantly better fit than model one (χ2 (4)=184.96, 
p<.001), accounting for 13.12% of within-person variance. Function at lag1 was the 
strongest predictor of subsequent function. Time of day at lag1, predominantly evening-
hours, was also a significant predictor. Because the dependent variable was transformed, 
unstandardized coefficients for time-of-day were not inspected because on that scale their 
interpretation was not meaningful. Pain at lag1 was the weakest predictor, though it was 
significant – greater pain was associated with lower functioning in the next lag. 
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6.4.2.2 Cross-lag Analyses 
Appraisals. A set of analyses was conducted to test Hypotheses C and D (see the 
introduction to Section 6) as they relate to the outcome of functioning. The following set 
of cross-lag analyses were intended to determine whether appraisals at lag1 were 
associated with function at lag2, as predicted according to Hypothesis C (see Table 6.25).  
Appraisals were related to lag2 function, controlling for pain and time-of-day. Model two 
was a significantly better fit than model one (χ2 (4)=11.66, p=.02), though it accounted 
for 13.89% of within-person variance – only 0.77% more than what was accounted for by 
the control model. Model two reveals that only pain expectancy was significantly related 
to lag2 function, such that high pain expectancies were, unexpectedly, associated with 
better function. 
Lag1 appraisals were associated with lag2 function beyond the effect of cross-lag 
changes in appraisal – model four was a significantly better fitting model than model 
three (χ2 (4)=13.33, p=.01). It predicted 15.46% of within-person variance, contributing 
an additional 0.86% to that accounted for by model three. Controlling for change-in-
appraisals had no noticeable impact on the effect of expectancy, however catastrophising 
became significant – associated with reduction in lag2 function. 
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Table 6.25 Cross-lag prediction of lag2 Function from lag1 appraisals: standardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model    
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Appraisal 
3 
∆ Appraisal 
4 
Full 
Intercept 4599.66 (261.55)*** 4602.29 (261.45)*** 4609.51 (260.91)*** 4614.24 (260.76)*** 
Lag1 Function2 0.34 (0.03)*** 0.33 (0.03)*** 0.35 (0.03)*** 0.33 (0.03)*** 
Evening -0.15 (164.59)*** -0.15 (164.46)*** -0.16 (163.48)*** -0.16 (163.21)*** 
Work Hrs -0.07 (155.53)* -0.08 (155.31)* -0.08 (154.25)* -0.08 (154)* 
Pain -0.06 (2.71)* -0.08 (3.81)* -0.1 (2.87)*** -0.08 (3.79)* 
Pain Self Efficacy  -0.03 (3.33) ns  -0.01 (4.1) ns 
Catastrophising  -0.07 (4.62) ns  -0.14 (5.69)** 
Pain Expectancy  0.11 (4.07)**  0.12 (5.02)** 
Perc. Interference  -0.02 (3.56) ns  -0.04 (4.25) ns 
∆ Self Eff.   0.03 (2.9) ns 0.03 (3.59) ns 
∆ Catastroph   -0.02 (3.81) ns -0.06 (4.73)* 
∆ Expectancy   -0.05 (3.39)* 0 (4.22) ns 
∆ Perc. Int.   -0.03 (3.11) ns -0.04 (3.76) ns 
Variance 
Between-Person 2423341.52*** 2424055.89*** 2424274.84*** 2425002.46*** 
Within-Person 2223097.81 2203418.9  2185425.79  2163332.75 
Deviance (df) 23954.19 (7) 23942.53 (11) 23931.76 (11) 23918.43 (15) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Cross-lag change values are referred to with the symbol ∆ 
 
There did not appear to be any noteworthy or systematic effect of adding the appraisal 
variables to the relationship between the control variables and lag2 function. 
Table 6.26 displays analyses regarding Hypothesis D, investigating the possible role of 
coping in accounting for the effect of appraisals at lag1 on lag2 function. Cross-lag 
change scores for appraisals were covaried to facilitate interpretation of the lag1 effects. 
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Table 6.26 Cross-lag prediction of lag2 Function by lag1 appraisals, co-varying lag2 coping: 
standardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model   
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Coping 
3 
Full 
Intercept 4614.24 (260.76)*** 4558.54 (259.96)*** 4565.58 (282.9)*** 
Lag1 Function2 0.33 (0.03)*** 0.32 (0.03)*** 0.32 (0.04)*** 
Evening -0.16 (163.21)*** -0.14 (161.75)*** -0.14 (172.4)*** 
Work Hrs -0.08 (154)* -0.07 (152.08)* -0.07 (144.72)* 
Pain -0.08 (3.79)* -0.06 (2.89)* -0.08 (4.24) ns 
Pain Self Efficacy -0.01 (4.1) ns  -0.05 (4.83) ns 
Catastrophising -0.14 (5.69)**  -0.12 (7.23) ns 
Pain Expectancy 0.12 (5.02)**  0.12 (7.7) ns 
Perc. Interference -0.04 (4.25) ns  0.01 (4.83) ns 
Lag2 Pass. Cope  -0.16 (3.34)*** -0.16 (3.98)*** 
Lag2 Act. Cope  0 (2.62) ns 0 (2.45) ns 
∆ Self Eff. 0.03 (3.59) ns 0.02 (2.86) ns 0 (3.81) ns 
∆ Catastroph -0.06 (4.73)* -0.01 (3.76) ns -0.06 (5.64) ns 
∆ Expectancy 0 (4.22) ns -0.04 (3.35) ns 0 (4.22) ns 
∆ Perc. Int. -0.04 (3.76) ns -0.01 (3.07) ns -0.01 (3.84) ns 
Variance 
Between-Person 2425002.46*** 2429130.04*** 2429771.88*** 
Within-Person 2163332.75  2114655.46  2095175.32  
Deviance (df) 23918.43 (15) 23888.63 (13) 23876.49 (17) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Cross-lag change values are referred to with the symbol ∆ 
 
Appraisal appeared to account for unique variance beyond what was accounted for by the 
coping variables. Model three accounted for a total of 18.12% of within-person variance. 
It provided a better fit than model two (χ2 (4)=12.14), p=.016), accounting for an 
additional 0.76% within-person variance compared to model two. However, with the 
addition of coping in model three, none of the effects associated with the appraisal or 
change-in-appraisal variables reached significance. Passive coping, on the other hand, 
was significant in both models two and three. That is, although appraisals accounted for 
significant amounts of variance in lag2 function despite the addition of coping to the 
model, none of the individual appraisal predictors remained significant. 
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In summary, the above analyses support Hypotheses C and D, suggesting that appraisals 
are significantly associated with subsequent functioning and that their effect is not due to 
pain-intensity or coping, however there was no clear effect of any specific appraisal 
variables once coping was controlled. 
Coping. The following analyses were conducted to investigate Hypotheses E and F as 
they relate to functioning. An initial set of analyses was conducted to test Hypothesis E 
by examining the effect of lag1 coping on subsequent function (see Table 6.27).  
The addition of lag1 coping appeared to account for the effect of lag1 pain-intensity on 
lag2 function – in both models two and four lag1 pain-intensity did not reach 
significance. The effect of working-hours on lag2 function also vanished when change-
in-coping was incorporated in the model. Neither the effects of lag1 Function nor 
Evening appear to be influenced by the coping variables. 
 
Table 6.27 Cross-lag prediction of lag2 Function by lag1 coping: standardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model    
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Coping 
3 
∆ Coping 
4 
Full 
Intercept 4599.66 (261.55)*** 4594.42 (261.18)*** 4556.3 (261.62)*** 4543.04 (260.35)*** 
Lag1 Function2 0.34 (0.03)*** 0.32 (0.03)*** 0.35 (0.03)*** 0.31 (0.03)*** 
Evening -0.15 (164.59)*** -0.15 (163.73)*** -0.14 (164.79)*** -0.13 (162.19)*** 
Work Hrs -0.07 (155.53)* -0.07 (154.83)* -0.06 (155.45) ns -0.06 (152.88) ns 
Pain -0.06 (2.71)* -0.04 (2.78) ns -0.07 (2.7)* -0.02 (2.75) ns 
Passive Cope  -0.07 (3.42)**  -0.19 (4.26)*** 
Active Cope  -0.06 (2.54)*  -0.03 (3.13) ns 
∆ Passive Cope   -0.06 (2.7)** -0.15 (3.35)*** 
∆ Active Cope   0.03 (2.29) ns 0.01 (2.81) ns 
Variance 
Between-Person 2423341.52*** 2424516.48*** 2425792.53*** 2429244.46*** 
Within-Person 2223097.81  2196694.4  2202106.51  2129546.8  
Deviance (df) 23954.19 (7) 23938.52 (9) 23941.78 (9) 23897.85 (11) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Cross-lag change values are referred to with the symbol ∆ 
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Initial analyses revealed an effect of lag1 coping on lag2 function. Model two was a 
significantly better fit than model one (χ2 (2)= 15.67, p=.001). It accounted for 14.15% of 
the within-person variance in lag2 function, 1.03% more than was accounted for by 
model one. Inspection of model two demonstrates that both passive and active coping 
were significantly and negatively related to lag2 function. 
The effect of lag1 coping was not entirely attributable to change-in-coping across lags. 
Model four accounted for 2.84% more within-person variance than model three, 
accounting for a total of 16.78% within-person variance, and provided a significantly 
better fit than model three (χ2 (2)= 43.93, p<.001).  
The unexpected effect of active coping vanished once change-in-coping was added to the 
model, but the effect of passive coping more than doubled. These findings suggest that 
there was significant suppression obscuring the relationship between lag1 coping and 
lag2 function, which may have been due to regression-to-the-mean.  
A series of analyses presented in Table 6.28 tested Hypothesis F – that the effect of lag1 
coping would be independent of the effects of lag1 appraisal. Change-in-coping was 
included in the model to clarify the lag1 effects. This hypothesis was supported – model 
three was a significantly better fit than model two (χ2 (2)=49.14, p<.001). It accounted for 
17.82% of within-person variance – 3.14% more than what was accounted for by model 
two. A comparison of models one and three reveals that the addition of lag1 appraisals to 
the model did not alter the pattern of results for lag1 coping in any note-worthy way. 
Active coping remained non-significant in both analyses, and passive coping maintained 
a significant positive relationship. 
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Table 6.28 Cross-lag analysis predicting lag2 Function from lag1 coping, co-varying lag1 appraisals: 
standardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model   
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Appraisal 
3 
Full 
Intercept 4543.04 (260.35)*** 4559.99 (261.49)*** 4550.07 (260.07)*** 
Lag1 Function2 0.31 (0.03)*** 0.34 (0.03)*** 0.31 (0.03)*** 
Evening -0.13 (162.19)*** -0.14 (164.61)*** -0.13 (161.69)*** 
Work Hrs -0.06 (152.88) ns -0.07 (155.19)* -0.07 (152.32)* 
Pain -0.02 (2.75) ns -0.08 (3.8)* -0.08 (3.73)* 
Pain Self Efficacy  -0.03 (3.32) ns -0.05 (3.27) ns 
Catastrophising  -0.08 (4.6) ns -0.06 (4.52) ns 
Pain Expectancy  0.11 (4.05)** 0.11 (3.97)*** 
Perc. Interference  -0.02 (3.55) ns 0.03 (3.53) ns 
Passive Cope -0.19 (4.26)*** -0.21 (4.38)*** 
Active Cope -0.03 (3.13) ns -0.03 (3.11) ns 
∆ Passive Cope -0.15 (3.35)*** -0.06 (2.69)*** -0.15 (3.38)*** 
∆ Active Cope 0.01 (2.81) ns 0.03 (2.29) ns 0.01 (2.8) ns  
Variance 
Between-Person 2429244.46*** 2426443.52*** 2430156.44*** 
Within-Person 2129546.8  2183049.98  2102747.23 
Deviance (df) 23897.84 (11) 23930.38 (13) 23881.24(15) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Cross-lag change values are referred to with the symbol ∆ 
 
Table 6.29 contains analyses investigating the relationship between specific passive 
coping behaviors and lag2 function, controlling for the usual covariates. Once again, 
because passive coping and not active coping was associated with lag1 Function in model 
four of Table 6.27, only passive coping behaviors were examined in more detail. 
The full model accounted for 14.2% of variance in the variance-components model, 
6.27% more than the control model, and provided a significantly better fit than the 
control model (χ2 (7)=18.7985, p=.009). The only coping strategy whose coefficient 
reached significance was laying-down/resting, which was associated with decreased 
function at lag2. Once again, unstandardised coefficients were not inspected because their 
interpretation was not meaningful on the transformed lag2 function scale. 
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Table 6.29 Relationship between lag1 coping strategies and lag2 Function: 
standardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model  
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Full 
Intercept 4599.66 (261.55)*** 4825.08 (263.39)*** 
Lag1 Function2 0.34 (0.03)*** 0.31 (0.03)*** 
Evening -0.15 (164.59)*** -0.16 (164.3)*** 
Work Hrs -0.07 (155.53)* -0.08 (155.31)* 
Pain -0.06 (2.71)* -0.04 (2.82) ns 
Alcohol  -0.03 (337.92) ns 
Medication  0.01 (145) ns 
Sedative  0 (377.31) ns 
Lay/Rest  -0.05 (102.91)* 
Avoid Activity -0.03 (117.23) ns 
Hope/Pray  -0.04 (112.28) ns 
Tell self it doesn't hurt -0.03 (156.28) ns 
Variance 
Between-Person 2423341.52*** 2307913.57*** 
Within-Person 2223097.81 2195543.48 
Deviance (df) 23954.19 (7) 23935.39 (14) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
 
Thus, Hypotheses E and F were supported as they related to the outcome of functioning. 
The relationship between coping and subsequent functioning was unattributable to pain-
intensity, time-of-day, or appraisals. Specifically, the passive coping strategy of laying 
down and resting appeared to have the most detrimental impact on functioning. 
Coping and Appraisals. In the last set of analyses of lag2 function, the appraisals that 
were found to be significant in analysis four of Table 6.25 and the coping strategies that 
were found to be significant in analysis four of Table 6.27 were entered together to assess 
their relative effect (see Table 6.30). Thus, catastrophising, pain expectancy, and passive-
coping were included. Change-scores were included to facilitate the interpretation of 
effects. 
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Table 6.30 Prediction of lag2 Function by lag1 appraisals and coping: 
standardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model  
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Full 
Intercept 4599.66 (261.55)*** 4575.38 (259.62)*** 
Lag1 Function 2 0.34 (0.03)*** 0.31 (0.03)*** 
Evening -0.15 (164.59)*** -0.14 (160.98)*** 
Work Hrs -0.07 (155.53)* -0.07 (151.5)* 
Pain -0.06 (2.71)* -0.05 (3.57) ns 
Catastrophising -0.1 (5.15)* 
Pain Expectancy  0.12 (4.72)** 
Passive Cope -0.19 (4.25)*** 
∆ Catastroph -0.06 (4.21)* 
∆ Expectancy 0 (4.01) ns 
∆ Passive Cope -0.13 (3.37)*** 
Variance 
Between-Person 2423341.52*** 2429180.74*** 
Within-Person 2223097.81 2100499.81 
Deviance (df) 23954.19 (7) 23879.81 (13) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Cross-lag change values are referred to with the symbol ∆ 
 
Testing indicated that the full model was a significantly better fit than the control model 
(χ2 (6)=74.38, p<.001). It accounted for a total of 17.91% within-person variance – 4.79% 
more than was accounted for by the control model. All three lag1 psychological 
predictors were significant. Passive coping – the strongest predictor – and catastrophising 
demonstrated negative associations with functioning, whereas pain expectancy 
demonstrated an unexpected positive association.  
6.4.3 Activity-Level 
6.4.3.1 Variance Components and Control Models 
Again, a variance-components model was calculated to determine what proportion of the 
variance in the activity-level outcome was within-people. A control model composed of 
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the covariate variables was then calculated to determine the proportion of within-person 
variance attributable to these factors. 
Lag2 activity-level varied at the within-subjects level notably more than it varied between 
people (70% of variance). 
The control model for cross-lagged analyses (model two), composed of all co-variates, is 
compared to the variance-components model in Table 6.31, as is a control-model for 
same-lag analyses (model three), composed only of covariates at lag2. All control 
variables demonstrated significant effects. 
Table 6.31 Variance-components and control models for lag2 Activity-Level: 
standardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model   
Fixed Effects 
1 
Var. Components 
2 
Control (cross-lag) 
3 
Control (same-lag) 
Intercept 34.73 (1.73)*** 26.46 (3.09)*** 25.99 (3.14)*** 
Lag1 Activity-Level  0.21 (0.03)***  
Lag2 Evening  0.12 (2.69)* 0.13 (2.76)* 
Lag2 Work Hrs.  0.24 (2.67)*** 0.26 (2.74)*** 
Pain  -0.13 (0.03)***  
Lag2 Pain  0.21 (0.03)*** 0.18 (0.03)*** 
Variance 
Between-Person 137.96 (30%) *** 137.98*** 137.17*** 
Within-Person 321.67 (70%) 287.81 304.12 
Deviance (df) 11859.29 (3) 11712.84 (8) 11785.15 (6) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Percentage of total variance in the variance components model is in brackets 
 
Both model two (χ2 (5)=146.44, p<.001) and model three (χ2 (3)=74.13, p<.001) provided 
a significantly better fit than the variance-components model – they accounted for 
10.53% and 5.46% of within-person variance in the variance-components model, 
respectively.  
In both models the strongest predictor was working-hours. Unstandardised coefficients 
reveal that in model two working-hours were associated with, on average, an increase in 
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activity of 10.71%, relative to pre-work hours. Evening was also significant, accounting 
for an average 5.42% increase in activity compared to pre-work hours. In model two, 
Activity at lag1 and pain at lag2 were also strong predictors, both being associated with 
increased activity at lag2. Pain at lag1 was a significant predictor, associated with 
decreased activity at lag2. 
6.4.3.2 Same-lag Analyses 
A set of analyses was conducted to test Hypothesis A (see the beginning of section 6) by 
investigating whether activity-level was related to concurrent appraisals and prior coping 
efforts made in the same time-lag, controlling for the effect of time-of-day and concurrent 
pain (see Table 6.32).  
Table 6.32 Same-lag analysis of lag2 Activity-Level: standardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model     
Lag2 Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Appraisals 
3 
Coping` 
4 
Full  
Intercept 25.99 (3.14)*** 26.14 (3.13)*** 26.89 (3.13)*** 26.8 (3.12)*** 
Evening 0.13 (2.76)* 0.13 (2.75)* 0.12 (2.74) ns 0.12 (2.73)* 
Work Hrs. 0.26 (2.74)*** 0.25 (2.72)*** 0.23 (2.73)*** 0.23 (2.71)*** 
Pain 0.18 (0.03)*** 0.17 (0.04)*** 0.23 (0.03)*** 0.18 (0.04)*** 
Pain Self Efficacy 0.12 (0.04)** 0.1 (0.04)*  
Catastrophising 0 (0.05) ns  0.01 (0.05) ns 
Pain Expectancy 0.21 (0.05)*** 0.21 (0.05)*** 
Perc. Interference  -0.1 (0.04)*  -0.07 (0.04) ns 
Passive Coping  -0.14 (0.04)*** -0.13 (0.04)*** 
Active Coping  0.1 (0.03)** 0.09 (0.03)** 
Variance 
Between-Person 137.17*** 137.56*** 137.52*** 137.89*** 
Within-Person 304.12 296.89  298.47  292.11 
Deviance (df) 11785.15 (6) 11753.58 (10) 11760.59(8) 11732.33 (12) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
 
Inspection of models two to four reveals that the effect of the control variables was 
largely unaffected by the introduction of the coping and appraisal variables. It appears 
that coping may have suppressed the effect of pain on activity to some degree, evidenced 
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by a slight increase in the effect of pain in model three. However, this effect vanished 
with the reintroduction of appraisals in model four. 
Appraisals accounted for significant variance beyond the effect of control variables.  
Model two accounted for 7.7% of within-person variance, 2.25% more than was 
accounted for by the control model. Model two provided a significantly better fit than 
model one (χ2 (4)=31.57, p<.001). Coping also appeared to predict Activity-Level 
significantly, beyond what was accounted for by the control variables. Model three 
accounted for 7.21% of within-person variance – 1.76% more than the control model. 
The difference between the models appeared to be significant (χ2 (2)=24.56, p<.001). 
Both self-efficacy and active coping were associated with increased activity, as predicted. 
Also as predicted, passive coping was associated with decreased activity. Although pain 
expectancy was significant, as anticipated, it was – perhaps counter-intuitively – 
associated with increased activity. Pain expectancy was the strongest of the psychological 
variables in the model, and its positive effect was almost as great as the influence of 
working-hours on activity-level. A comparison between models two, three, and four 
revealed that whereas perceived interference was associated with reduced activity in 
model two, this association vanished with the addition of coping in model four. 
Analyses also tested Hypothesis B, predicting that the effects of coping and appraisal on 
activity-level would be independent of each-other. Model four accounted for 9.19% of 
within-person variance – 1.49% more than was accounted for by model two, and 1.98% 
more than model three. Model four provided a significantly better fit than model two (χ2 
(2)=21.25, p<.001), and model three (χ2 (4)=28.26, p<.001). Thus, both coping and 
appraisal appeared to contribute independently to the prediction of Activity-Level. 
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In summary, Hypotheses A and B were supported. The significant relationship between 
appraisals and concurrent activity was attributable to neither pain-intensity, time-of-day, 
nor coping. Similarly, the significant relationship between coping and activity was not 
due to pain-intensity, time-of-day, or appraisals. 
Table 6.33 Cross-lag prediction lag2 Activity-Level from lag1 appraisals: standardized 
coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model    
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Appraisal 
3 
∆ Appraisal 
4 
Full 
Intercept 26.46 (3.09)*** 26.48 (3.08)*** 26.22 (3.08)*** 26.39 (3.07)*** 
Lag1 Activity-Level 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.2 (0.03)*** 0.22 (0.03)*** 0.2 (0.03)*** 
Lag2 Evening 0.12 (2.69)* 0.12 (2.68)* 0.13 (2.68)* 0.13 (2.67)* 
Lag2 Work Hrs. 0.24 (2.67)*** 0.24 (2.66)*** 0.25 (2.65)*** 0.24 (2.64)*** 
Pain -0.13 (0.03)*** -0.12 (0.04)** -0.12 (0.04)** -0.12 (0.04)** 
Lag2 Pain 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.22 (0.03)*** 0.2 (0.04)*** 0.19 (0.04)*** 
Pain Self Efficacy  -0.09 (0.04)*  0.03 (0.05) ns 
Catastrophising  -0.04 (0.05) ns  -0.03 (0.07) ns 
Pain Expectancy  0.09 (0.05)*  0.22 (0.06)*** 
Perc. Interference  -0.15 (0.04)**  -0.15 (0.05)** 
∆ Self Eff.   0.1 (0.03)*** 0.1 (0.04)*** 
∆ Catastroph   0.01 (0.04) ns 0 (0.06) ns 
∆ Expectancy   0.05 (0.04) ns 0.13 (0.05)*** 
∆ Perc. Int.   0.05 (0.04) ns 0 (0.04) ns 
Variance 
Between-Person 137.98*** 138.21*** 138.32*** 138.59*** 
Within-Person 287.81 284.49 283.22 278.62  
Deviance (df) 11712.84 (8) 11697.63 (12) 11691.82 (12) 11670.32 (16) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Cross-lag change values are referred to with the symbol ∆ 
 
6.4.3.3 Cross-lag Analyses 
Appraisals. The following analyses set out to test Hypotheses C and D as they related to 
the activity-level outcome. An initial set of analyses, conducted across-lags, was intended 
to determine whether appraisals at lag1 were associated with activity at lag2, as proposed 
by Hypothesis C (see Table 6.33).  
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The effect of the control variables on lag2 activity-level did not appear to be influenced 
by the inclusion of lag1 pain appraisals. 
The effect of appraisals on subsequent activity was investigated by comparing model two 
to model one. Appraisal was associated with Activity-Level – model two was a 
significantly better fit than model one (χ2 (4)=15.21, p=.005). It accounted for 11.56% of 
within-person variance – 1.03% more than was accounted for by the control model. 
Model two revealed three significant appraisal predictors, though only the strongest of 
the predictors, perceived interference, was in the predicted direction. Pain expectancy 
was associated with increased activity at lag2, and self-efficacy was associated with 
decreased activity. 
The effect of change-in-appraisals on the relationship between lag1 appraisals and lag2 
activity-level was investigated next, and, as predicted, lag1 appraisal appeared to 
maintain its relationship with lag2 activity-level. Model four provided a significantly 
better fit than model three (χ2 (4)=21.5, p<.001). It accounted for 13.38% of within-
person variance, contributing an additional 1.43% unique variance above that accounted 
for by model three. When change-in-appraisals were controlled the effect of self-efficacy 
vanished, suggesting that regression-to-the-mean may account for the effect seen in 
model two. Perceived interference remained significant in the predicted direction, 
however the unexpected effect of pain expectancy increased, making it the strongest of 
the appraisal predictors. Catastrophising appeared to have no lagged effect on activity in 
either model two or four. 
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Table 6.34 Cross-lag prediction of lag2 Activity-Level by lag1 appraisals, co-
varying lag2 coping: standardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model   
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Coping 
3 
Full 
Intercept 26.39 (3.07)*** 26.94 (3.07)*** 27 (3.06)*** 
Lag1 Activity-Level 0.2 (0.03)*** 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.19 (0.03)*** 
Lag2 Evening 0.13 (2.67)* 0.12 (2.66)* 0.12 (2.66)* 
Lag2 Work Hrs. 0.24 (2.64)*** 0.23 (2.65)*** 0.22 (2.63)*** 
Pain -0.12 (0.04)** -0.1 (0.04)* -0.13 (0.04)** 
Lag2 Pain 0.19 (0.04)*** 0.23 (0.04)*** 0.2 (0.04)*** 
Pain Self Efficacy 0.03 (0.05) ns  0.01 (0.05) ns 
Catastrophising -0.03 (0.07) ns  -0.02 (0.07) ns 
Pain Expectancy 0.22 (0.06)***  0.22 (0.06)*** 
Perc. Interference -0.15 (0.05)**  -0.12 (0.05)* 
Lag2 Pass. Cope  -0.12 (0.04)*** -0.12 (0.04)*** 
Lag2 Act. Cope  0.09 (0.03)* 0.09 (0.03)* 
∆ Self Eff. 0.1 (0.04)*** 0.09 (0.03)*** 0.09 (0.04)** 
∆ Catastroph 0 (0.06) ns 0.02 (0.04) ns 0.01 (0.06) ns 
∆ Expectancy 0.13 (0.05)*** 0.05 (0.04)* 0.13 (0.05)*** 
∆ Perc. Int. 0 (0.04) ns 0.05 (0.04) ns 0.01 (0.04) ns 
Variance 
Between-Person 138.59*** 138.62*** 138.86*** 
Within-Person 278.62 278.94 274.9  
Deviance (df) 11670.32 (16) 11671.86 (14) 11652.75 (18) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Cross-lag change values are referred to with the symbol ∆ 
 
The hypothesis that the cross-lag relationship between appraisal and activity-level is not 
due to coping (as proposed by Hypothesis D) was examined in Table 6.34. Change-in-
appraisal variables were included to facilitate interpretation of the lag1 effects. The 
hypothesis was supported – model three fit the data better than model two (χ2 (4)=19.11, 
p=.001), suggesting that coping did not account for the effect of appraisals on subsequent 
activity. Model three accounted for 14.54% of within-person variance – 1.26% more than 
model two. Inspection of the specific effects in models one and three revealed that the 
only impact of the inclusion of lag2 coping on the appraisal/activity relationships was a 
small decrement in the effect of perceived interference. 
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To summarise, appraisals were related to subsequent activity-level and this effect was 
due to neither time-of-day, pain-intensity (as predicted according to Hypothesis C) nor 
coping (thus supporting Hypothesis D). 
Coping. Analyses were performed to test Hypotheses E and F as they relate to the 
outcome of Activity-Level.  
The following set of analyses was conducted to test Hypothesis E by examining the effect 
of lag1 coping on subsequent activity (see Table 6.35). The relationship between lag2 
evening and increased activity-level appeared to be accounted for by coping and change-
in-coping variables. Otherwise, the effect of the control variables on lag2 activity-level 
did not appear to be influenced by the coping variables. 
In Table 6.35, the effect of coping on lag2 activity-level was inspected by comparing 
model two to model one. Model two was a significantly better fit than model one (χ2 
(2)=11.1, p=.004), accounting for 11.28% of within-person variance. It contributed a 
further 0.76% unique variance beyond what was accounted for by the control model. 
Coping appeared to account for significant variance even once change-in-coping was 
included in the model. Model four accounted for 1.11% more within-person variance than 
model three, predicting a total of 12.58% of within-person variance. Model four provided 
a better fit than model three (χ2 (2)=16.49, p=.001). Model two revealed that only passive 
coping at lag1 was associated with lag2 activity-level. This pattern did not change once 
change-in-coping variables were added in model four.  
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Table 6.35 Cross-lag prediction of lag2 Activity-Level by lag1 coping: standardized 
coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model    
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Coping 
3 
∆ Coping 
4 
Full 
Intercept 26.46 (3.09)*** 26.75 (3.08)*** 27.37 (3.09)*** 27.74 (3.07)*** 
Lag1 Activity-Level 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.22 (0.03)*** 0.21 (0.03)*** 
Lag2 Evening 0.12 (2.69)* 0.12 (2.68) ns 0.1 (2.69) ns 0.1 (2.67) ns 
Lag2 Work Hrs. 0.24 (2.67)*** 0.24 (2.66)*** 0.22 (2.67)** 0.21 (2.66)*** 
Pain -0.13 (0.03)*** -0.11 (0.03)** -0.13 (0.03)*** -0.11 (0.03)** 
Lag2 Pain 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.22 (0.03)*** 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.25 (0.03)*** 
Passive Cope  -0.07 (0.04)*  -0.16 (0.05)*** 
Active Cope  -0.05 (0.03) ns  0.04 (0.04) ns 
∆ Passive Cope   -0.02 (0.03) ns -0.09 (0.04)*** 
∆ Active Cope   0.08 (0.03)*** 0.09 (0.03)*** 
Variance 
Between-Person 137.98*** 138.1*** 138.15*** 138.37*** 
Within-Person 287.81  285.38  284.78  281.21  
Deviance (df) 11712.84 (8) 11701.74 (10) 11698.95 (10) 11682.46 (12) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Cross-lag change values are referred to with the symbol ∆ 
 
Table 6.36 displays analyses aimed at evaluating the possible role of lag1 appraisals in 
the coping/activity-level relationship, thus testing Hypothesis F. Cross-lag change-in-
coping variables were once again included to clarify interpretation of lag1 effects. The 
full model provided a better fit than model two, the model without lag1 coping (χ2 
(2)=14.76885, p=.001). Model three accounted for 13.41% of within-person variance – 
0.98% more than model two. Thus, it appears that coping at lag1 had an effect on lag2 
activity-level beyond what was accounted for by intervening (lag1) appraisals. A 
comparison of models one and three revealed that the effect of passive coping appeared 
largely uninfluenced by the addition of appraisals to the model. 
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Table 6.36 Cross-lag prediction of lag2 Activity-Level by lag1 coping, co-varying lag1 
appraisals: standardized coefficient (S.E.)  
 Model   
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Appraisals 
3 
Full 
Intercept 27.74 (3.07)*** 27.37 (3.08)*** 27.75 (3.07)*** 
Lag1 Activity-Level 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.2 (0.03)*** 
Lag2 Evening 0.1 (2.67) ns 0.11 (2.68) ns 0.1 (2.67) ns 
Lag2 Work Hrs. 0.21 (2.66)*** 0.22 (2.66)** 0.21 (2.65)** 
Pain -0.11 (0.03)** -0.12 (0.04)** -0.12 (0.04)** 
Lag2 Pain 0.25 (0.03)*** 0.22 (0.04)*** 0.24 (0.04)*** 
Pain Self Efficacy  -0.08 (0.04) ns -0.1 (0.04)* 
Catastrophising  -0.04 (0.05) ns -0.03 (0.05) ns 
Pain Expectancy  0.09 (0.05)* 0.09 (0.05)* 
Perc. Interference  -0.14 (0.04) ns -0.11 (0.04)* 
Passive Cope -0.16 (0.05)***  -0.15 (0.05)*** 
Active Cope 0.04 (0.04) ns  0.04 (0.04) ns 
∆ Passive Cope -0.09 (0.04)*** -0.02 (0.03) ns -0.09 (0.04)** 
∆ Active Cope 0.09 (0.03)*** 0.08 (0.03)** 0.09 (0.03)** 
Variance 
Between-Person 138.37*** 138.36*** 138.56*** 
Within-Person 281.21 281.71 278.55 
Deviance (df) 11682.46 (12) 11684.79 (14) 11670.02 (16) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Cross-lag change values are referred to with the symbol ∆ 
 
Table 6.37 reports analyses regarding the effect of individual coping behaviours on lag2 
activity-level, controlling for the covariates. Again, only passive strategies were included 
due to the lack of effect for active coping demonstrated in model four of Table 6.35. 
The full model accounted for 11.72% of within-person variance, adding 1.2% unique 
variance to that accounted for by the control model. The full model provided a 
significantly better fit than the control model (χ2 (9)=89.436, p<.001). Specifically, lower 
activity at lag2 was associated with prior use of sedative medications, and the appraisal 
strategy of telling one-self that the pain does not hurt. Inspection of unstandardised 
coefficients revealed that these strategies were associated with an average decrease in 
activity of 10.55% and 4.6% respectively.  
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Thus, for analyses of activity-level both Hypotheses E and F were supported – coping 
was significantly related to activity-level and the effect was not attributable to pain-
intensity or appraisals. Passive coping (in particular, use of sedatives and denial of the 
pain) appeared to be the key coping factor associated with reduced activity-levels. 
Table 6.37 Relationship between lag1 coping strategies and lag2 
Activity-Level: standardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model  
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Full 
Intercept 26.46 (3.09)*** 27.53 (3.16)*** 
Lag1 Activity-Level 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.21 (0.03)*** 
Lag2 Evening 0.12 (2.69)* 0.13 (2.69) ns 
Lag2 Work Hrs. 0.24 (2.67)*** 0.25 (2.67)*** 
Pain -0.13 (0.03)*** -0.11 (0.04)** 
Lag2 Pain 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.22 (0.03)*** 
Alcohol  -0.02 (3.83) ns 
Medication  -0.02 (1.64) ns 
Sedative  -0.06 (4.29)* 
Lay/Rest  -0.02 (1.16) ns 
Avoid Activity -0.03 (1.31) ns 
Hope/Pray  0 (1.27) ns 
Tell self it doesn't hurt -0.07 (1.77)** 
Variance 
Between-Person 137.98*** 139.76*** 
Within-Person 287.81 283.96  
Deviance (df) 11712.84 (8) 11695.72 (15) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
 
Coping and Appraisals. In the last set of analyses of lag2 Activity-Level the appraisals 
that were found to be significant in analysis four of Table 6.33 and the coping strategies 
that were found to be significant in analysis four of Table 6.35 were entered together to 
assess their relative effect (see Table 6.38). Thus, pain expectancy, perceived 
interference, and passive coping were included. Change-scores were included to facilitate 
the interpretation of effects. 
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The full model provided a significantly better fit than the control model (χ2 (6)=42.69, 
p<.001). It accounted for a total of 13.4% within-person variance, contributing 2.87% 
unique variance beyond what was accounted for by the control model. All three 
predictors were significant. The strongest, pain expectancy, was positively related to 
subsequent activity. Passive coping, the next strongest, was negatively correlated, as was 
perceived interference.  
Table 6.38 Prediction of lag2 Activity-Level by lag1 appraisals 
and coping: standardized coefficient (S.E.) 
 Model  
Fixed Effects 
1 
Control 
2 
Full 
Intercept 26.46 (3.09)*** 26.35 (3.06)*** 
Lag1 Activity-Level 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.19 (0.03)*** 
Lag2 Evening 0.12 (2.69)* 0.13 (2.66)* 
Lag2 Work Hrs. 0.24 (2.67)*** 0.24 (2.63)*** 
Pain -0.13 (0.03)*** -0.1 (0.04)* 
Lag2 Pain 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.16 (0.04)*** 
Pain Expectancy  0.23 (0.06)*** 
Perc. Interference  -0.11 (0.05)* 
Passive Cope -0.15 (0.05)*** 
∆ Expectancy 0.13 (0.05)*** 
∆ Perc. Int.  -0.01 (0.04) ns 
∆ Passive Cope -0.08 (0.04)** 
Variance 
Between-Person 137.98*** 138.61*** 
Within-Person 287.81 278.58 
Deviance (df) 11712.84 (8) 11670.15 (14) 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
Cross-lag change values are referred to with the symbol ∆ 
 
In summary, previous analyses revealed that appraisals and coping demonstrated 
significant independent effects on subsequent activity-level. The above analyses 
demonstrated the key appraisal and coping factors that are associated with activity-levels 
in subsequent hours – pain expectancy, passive coping, and perceptions of life 
interference. 
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6.5 Discussion – Part B 
In Study Two, the PAMS instrument was administered to 55 participants via PDA, with 
entries signalled by alarms up to nine times per day for up to nine days. Fifty-three 
participants provided sufficient data for use in focal analyses. Part B of Study Two 
addressed the focal hypotheses of the current project. It was anticipated that pain 
appraisals and coping would account for significant variance in each of the three 
outcomes assessed – distress, function, and activity level. Concurrent (same-lag) 
relationships between the psychological variables and the indices of adjustment were 
investigated for distress and activity-level (which were both measured on a momentary 
basis), and delayed (cross-lag) effects were investigated for all three outcomes. The key 
hypotheses (outlined in the introduction to Study Two) predicted that appraisal and 
coping would have effects beyond the separate effect of pain-intensity on adaptation. To 
test these hypotheses pain intensity was covaried in all analyses. Also, it was 
hypothesized that appraisal and coping would demonstrate separate effects. To test this, 
the effect of appraisal and coping were assessed in separate analyses whilst controlling 
for the other. To further control for extraneous sources of variance, time-of-day was 
controlled, and in cross-lag analyses first-order autocorrelation was also controlled.  
No specific hypotheses were made about the relative effect of specific appraisal and 
coping predictors, though theory and prior research did allow for speculation. To 
facilitate the interpretation of the individual effects in certain cross-lag analyses, cross-lag 
change variables were entered for the relevant appraisal or coping variables. It was hoped 
that this might control for possible cross-lag regression-to-the-mean effects that may have 
otherwise suppressed the true effect of the lag1 variables. 
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Prior to focal analyses a number of exploratory analyses were conducted in Part One of 
Study Two to address methodological issues relating to compliance, convergent validity, 
and reactivity effects.  
The current chapter will review the findings of Part B of Study Two. Implications for the 
focal hypotheses of the current research will be discussed first – in Sections 6.5.1 and 
6.5.2. In the following section, 6.5.3, findings will be discussed as they relate to each 
specific outcome and predictor variable. The importance of specific predictors for each of 
the three outcome variables will be discussed first. Section 6.5.3.4 will conclude by re-
examining these same findings on a predictor-by-predictor basis. In this chapter, current 
findings will be discussed with reference to the hypotheses of the current study and to 
previous relevant research. An examination of implications of the current findings for 
theoretical models of adaptation to chronic pain will be deferred until Chapter 7 – the 
General Discussion. 
6.5.1 Independence of Appraisal and Coping From Pain Intensity 
The current study set out to address two key issues in a Stress and Coping model of 
adjustment to chronic pain. The first issue, addressed by Hypotheses A, C, and E, was 
whether appraisal and coping were related to adaptation outcomes above-and-beyond the 
potential direct effect of pain on adaptation.  
Three EMA studies support the notion that appraisal and coping are related to emotional 
functioning independently of pain-intensity. Affleck, Urrows, et al. (1992) found that 
summary-measures of daily coping strategy use were associated with trends in mood after 
controlling for both average pain levels and pain trends. Keefe, et al. (1997) found that 
appraisal (pain control self-efficacy) and coping, entered together, accounted for 
281 
significant variance in positive and negative affectivity, controlling for pain intensity – 
though the effects of each were not assessed separately. Grant, et al. (2002) also 
demonstrated that, entered together after control for daily changes in pain-intensity, 
appraisals (catastrophising and pain-coping self-efficacy) and coping (distraction and 
ignoring) were related to evening mood. No prior studies have investigated the same 
question with function and/or activity-level as the outcome variables – this is the first to 
do so.  
Both same-lag analyses (for distress and activity-level) confirmed the hypothesis, 
revealing that appraisal and coping had significant effects whilst controlling for pain 
intensity. Cross-lag analyses also confirmed the hypothesis. For all three outcome 
variables, appraisal and coping factors at lag1 were related to lag2 adaptation 
independently of the effects of pain-intensity (at either lag) on adaptation. 
Controlling for pain-intensity, appraisal and coping accounted for 12.14% and 1.02% 
(respectively) within-person variance in same-lag distress – a total of 12.15%. This 
compared favourably to Keefe, et al.’s (1997) finding that, controlling for pain intensity, 
3.8% of within-person variance in NA and 6.1% in PA was accounted for by coping and 
pain-coping self-efficacy.  
In cross-lag analyses, total within-person variance accounted for by lag1 appraisal and 
coping variables was not calculated, however appraisal and coping were associated with 
2.22% and 0.81% (respectively) of within-person variance in next-lag distress after 
controlling for pain intensity, cross-lag change effects, and other control variables. These 
proportions of within-person variance accounted-for were comparable to Keefe, et al.’s 
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(1997) finding that coping and pain-coping self-efficacy, together, accounted for 2% of 
within-person variance in next-day PA. 
Compared to distress, a lower proportion of variance in same-lag activity-level was 
accounted for by both appraisals and coping, controlling for pain-intensity – only 3.7%. 
Appraisal and coping accounted for 2.25% and 1.76% unique variance, respectively. In 
cross-lag analyses, the percentages of within-person variance accounted for by appraisal 
and coping, controlling for pain-intensity and cross-lag effects, were 1.43% and 1.11% 
respectively. Because the current study is the first to do such analyses of within-person 
activity-level in chronic pain, there are no studies against which to compare variance 
accounted-for. 
After controlling for the effect of a number of variables including cross-lag change 
variables and pain-intensity, appraisal and coping were associated with 0.86% and 2.84% 
within-person variance in next-lag functioning, respectively. Once again, no comparison 
studies were available. 
In summary, Study Two supported Hypotheses A, C, and E. Same-lag analyses suggested 
that appraisal and coping are related to a person’s adaptational status (measured as 
distress and activity-level) at any given moment, and that these effects cannot be 
attributable to the intensity of momentary pain. Although the effects were smaller, cross-
lag analyses supported the notion that appraisal and coping are causally related to 
changes in adaptational status (operationalised as distress, function, and activity-level) in 
the course of every-day life, independently of momentary pain-intensity. 
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6.5.2 Separate Effects Of Appraisal And Coping 
The second question investigated, tested via Hypotheses B, D, and F, was whether 
appraisal and coping have independent effects on adaptation. Like Turner, et al. (2000), 
the independent effects of appraisal were evaluated by controlling for coping, and visa 
versa for analyses of coping.  
Appraisal contributed independently to the prediction of same-lag distress and activity-
level when coping was covaried. It was associated with 11.13% unique within-person 
variance in distress. This was consistent with Grant’s (1998) findings: 12% of within-
person variance in night-time depressed mood and 10% in night-time anxious mood was 
accounted for by appraisal variables (though neither pain intensity nor coping were 
covaried).  
Contrary to expectations, the relationship between coping and same-lag distress appeared 
to be attributable to appraisals. Coping was uniquely related to only 0.01% within-person 
variance in distress. Such a finding appears to support the primacy of appraisals in 
determining momentary affect (see Lazarus, 1991). By comparison, Grant (1998) 
reported that 1% within-person variance in night-time depressed and anxious mood was 
attributable to coping, covarying appraisals (but not pain intensity). Further investigation 
may reveal mediation effects whereby passive coping prompts changes in appraisal 
(reappraisal) – such as reduced pain self-efficacy – and re-appraisals are associated with 
momentary changes in mood-state. Alternatively, it may be that appraisal had an 
artificially larger relationship with distress because both were measured momentarily, 
whereas coping was measured in a short-latency recall manner. However, if this were the 
case, one might expect to see the same effect when appraisal was covaried in the activity-
284 
level analyses. That was not found – coping contributed independently to the prediction 
of activity-level when appraisal was covaried – accounting for 1.49% unique variance. 
Appraisal also accounted for a small amount of unique variance in activity-level – 2.24%.  
In the current study, cross-lag analyses confirmed hypotheses that the effects of appraisal 
and coping on adaptation are independent. Coping accounted for unique variance in lag2 
distress (0.88%), function (3.14%) and activity-level (0.98) after controlling for appraisal. 
Keefe, et al.’s (1997) study supports the notion that coping variables are significantly 
associated with lag2 (in their case, next-day) distress after controlling for pain-intensity 
and pain-coping self-efficacy appraisals. In the current study appraisal, also, was 
associated with unique within-person variance in next-lag distress (1.92%), function 
(0.76%), and activity-level (1.26%) after covarying coping.  
In contrast with the current finding that appraisal was independently related to subsequent 
distress, Keefe, et al. (1997) did not find a significant cross-lag effect of appraisal 
independent of coping or pain-intensity. They investigated the effect of only one 
appraisal variable – pain-coping self-efficacy. Pain self-efficacy was a significant cross-
lag predictor in the current study. These discrepant findings may be related to the 
different time-lags investigated – whilst the current study found a delayed effect of 
appraisal over a period of hours, Keefe and colleagues found no such effect across days.  
Although appraisal was associated with significant unique variance in lag2 function after 
coping was controlled, no individual appraisal predictors remained significant. Thus, 
although interpretation of these findings is ambiguous, it might be considered that the 
cross-lag effect of appraisal on functioning is attributable to coping. 
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In summary, same-lag analyses revealed that the relationship between appraisal and 
momentary adaptational status (operationalised as distress and activity-level) was not 
attributable to the use of coping strategies. Cross-lag analyses were consistent with 
theorising that the effect of appraisal on momentary adaptational status (measured as 
distress, function, and activity-level) is a causal one. Similar conclusions could be drawn 
regarding the independent effects of coping on adaptation – except when adaptation was 
operationalised as distress. The findings for this outcome were more complex. A unique 
effect of coping was demonstrated in cross-lag analyses – supporting a causal effect of 
coping on distress that is independent of appraisal – however no effect was observed in 
same-lag analyses. Such a pattern of results may suggest that coping has a delayed effect 
on mood-states but that any more temporally proximal effects are better attributed to 
correlated appraisal processes. 
6.5.3 Specific Predictors of Adaptational Outcomes 
6.5.3.1 Distress 
Time of day. Distress displayed a decreasing daily trend, such that both evening-hours 
and working-hours were associated with lower distress than pre-working hours. 
First-order autocorrelation. A positive relationship was observed between lag1 and 
lag2 distress, suggesting a degree of stability in distress throughout the day. 
Pain-intensity. Same-lag pain-intensity was associated with greater distress, 
confirming similar findings by a number of authors (eg. Catley, 1999; Vendrig & 
Lousberg, 1997). The impact of pain-intensity on distress appeared to be ameliorated by 
the inclusion of appraisals in the model, but was still a significant predictor. That is, 
whilst to some degree appraisals of pain, rather than pain per se, appear to account for 
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distress, pain intensity (or other unmeasured factors) nonetheless appears to directly 
influence distress to some degree.  
Lag1 pain demonstrated an unexpected negative effect on lag2 distress. Such an effect is 
inconsistent with other cross-lag analyses by Gil, et al. (2003) and Feldman, et al. (1999), 
though these authors investigated cross-day effects. The current study is the first to 
investigate such an effect across hours. The lagged effect of pain on distress appeared to 
be reduced by appraisal variables, and in some cases with cross-lag appraisals the effect 
of lag1 pain was accounted for. This finding may be attributable to the analytic strategy 
rather than any substantive effect. Given that lag2 and lag1 pain were entered together in 
all analyses, lag1 pain is left to explain residual variance in distress after controlling for 
the positive effect of same-lag pain. Thus, the interpretation of the negative effect of lag1 
pain may be that an increase in pain from lag1 to lag2 (given that lag2 pain is statistically 
held at an average) is associated with greater distress at lag2. 
Psychological Predictors. Distress was likely to be greater when pain self-efficacy 
was low, and catastrophising, pain expectancy, and perceived interference were high. 
Coping-strategies preceding measurement of mood (but in the same lag) appeared to have 
no effect when analysed simultaneously with appraisals. Analyses of the simultaneous 
effects of key psychological predictors in the previous lag revealed that subsequent 
distress was likely to be greater if self-efficacy was low, and catastrophising and 
perceived interference were high in the preceding hours. Consistent with cognitive 
theories of emotions (eg. Beck, 1967), these findings suggest a causal effect of 
catastrophising, self-efficacy, and perceived interference on distress. Coping in the 
previous lag (specifically, passive coping) appeared to have an effect when lag1 
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appraisals, but not cross-lag change in appraisals, was covaried. A possible interpretation 
of this is discussed later in this chapter when findings regarding passive-coping are 
discussed in more depth.  
6.5.3.2 Function 
Time of day. Function demonstrated a declining rate over the day, with both evening-
hours and working-hours associated with reduced function compared to pre-work hours. 
This may reflect greater engagement in self-care behaviours and less task avoidance in 
pre-work hours. 
First-order autocorrelation. A positive first-order autocorrelative effect was observed 
– function in lag1 was associated with greater function at lag2. Once again, this suggested 
that functional status across hours is to some degree stable. 
Pain-intensity. Pain intensity at lag1 was related to reduced function at lag2. This 
reflects Linton’s (1985) finding of a negative pain/function relationship in the majority of 
people who demonstrated a relationship between daily pain and daily engagement in 
ADLs. However, the effect of pain intensity appeared to be reduced or, in certain 
analyses, accounted for by coping and/or change-in-coping variables. This suggests that 
people’s capacity to perform functional tasks, or, people’s tendency to avoid such duties, 
may be related to how they cope with the pain rather than the intensity of the pain per se. 
For example, people may be more likely to cope with severe pain via passive coping 
strategies (eg. Watkins, et al., 1999) that directly interfere with capacity to perform 
activities. This hypothesis warrants further direct testing. 
Psychological Predictors. In cross-lag analyses, prior use of passive coping strategies 
was associated with impaired functioning. Poor functioning was also associated with 
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higher prior catastrophising and lower pain expectancies. Possible reasons for this 
positive effect of pain expectancies are explored below, when the findings for pain 
expectancy are discussed specifically. However, these appraisals were non-significant 
when lag2 passive-coping was covaried – only lag1 passive coping appeared to be 
independently related to next-lag functioning. Thus, the effect of catastrophising and pain 
expectancy appeared to be attributable to coping strategies used more proximally to the 
functional tasks. 
6.5.3.3 Activity-Level 
Time of day. Time-of-day effects suggested that activity-level increased from pre-
work-hours to working hours, and then reduced to a medium-level in the evening. 
First-order autocorrelation. A positive first-order autocorrelative effect was apparent, 
with greater activity at lag1 associated with greater activity at lag2. 
Pain-intensity. Same-lag pain intensity was associated with increased activity, 
suggesting that pain may be exacerbated by simultaneous activity. Vendrig and Lousberg 
(1997), whose study also involved same-lag analyses of within-day pain/activity-level 
relations, found the same effect in the majority of participants who demonstrated a 
pain/activity relationship. The opposite effect was found for lag1 pain – like the findings 
for function, prior pain was associated with decreased subsequent activity. One 
interpretation of this effect, consistent with fear-avoidance models of pain (Vlaeyen & 
Linton, 2000) is that people may reduce their activity-level to recover from pain (or, to 
avoid a further exacerbation). The effect of lag1 and lag2 pain-intensity on activity-levels 
appeared relatively uninfluenced by cognitive and coping predictors at either lag. Thus, 
unlike results for function, there appears to be a direct effect of pain experienced in 
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previous hours on physical activity-level that is not mediated by the psychological 
variables investigated. Such a pattern of results suggests that whereas pain directly 
influences activity per se, engagement in functional activities in more influenced by 
coping factors. 
Psychological Predictors. Higher activity-levels were associated with high pain self-
efficacy and pain expectancies. Use of active-coping in the same time-lag was also 
associated with greater activity-levels and passive coping strategies with reduced activity. 
When key predictors were analysed simultaneously in cross-lag analyses, greater activity 
levels were associated with lower use of passive coping, lower perceptions of life 
interference, and high pain expectancies in the preceding hours. Again, the unexpected 
effects of pain expectancy on activity-level are discussed below. 
6.5.3.4 Roles of Individual Predictors 
Catastrophising. The current study supports work by Grant, et al. (2002) suggesting 
that catastrophising was positively related to within-person distress, and that the effect is 
attributable to neither pain-intensity nor coping. An effect of catastrophising was 
observed for both same-lag and cross-lag distress, controlling for pain-intensity. The 
cross-lag effect was observed after the influence of cross-lag change was removed, and 
remained when coping was covaried.  
A cross-lag effect of catastrophising was also observed for function, but this effect 
appeared to be attributable to lag2 coping. Although no within-person studies have 
investigated the relationship between catastrophising and function, previous cross-
sectional studies also failed to demonstrate that catastrophising was related to function 
beyond the effect of covariates such as pain-intensity and coping strategy usage (Turner, 
290 
et al., 2000; Geisser, et al., 1994). Likewise, no effect of catastrophising on activity-level 
was observed, suggesting that catastrophising may play a key role only in its effect on 
emotional functioning. 
Pain Self-Efficacy. Grant (1998) found a negative effect of pain-coping self-efficacy 
on night-time anxious and depressed mood, and an unexpected positive effect of general 
pain self-efficacy on night-time depression. When pain-intensity was controlled the 
positive effect of general pain self-efficacy vanished but the effect of pain-coping self-
efficacy remained (Grant, et al., 2002). Keefe, et al. (1997) also demonstrated that pain-
coping self-efficacy was associated with reduced same-day NA and increased PA, and 
established that these effects were independent of coping and pain intensity. The current 
study found that pain self-efficacy was related to decreased distress, controlling for pain-
intensity and after controlling for coping.  
After controlling cross-lag change effects, a cross-lag effect of self-efficacy was also 
observed for distress. This effect, also, was not related to coping strategy usage. In 
contrast, Keefe, et al. (1997) found no cross-lag relationship between pain-coping self-
efficacy when it was analysed simultaneously with coping and controlling for pain-
intensity. However, it is noted that Keefe, et al’s (1997) cross-lag analyses were 
concerned with across-day effects, rather then the across-hours effect observed in the 
current study. 
The relationship between pain self-efficacy and activity-levels appeared to be restricted 
to momentary processes, thus limiting speculation about causality. It was related to 
higher concurrent levels of activity, controlling for co-occurring pain levels. Pain self-
efficacy demonstrated an unexpected cross-lag effect – associated with reduced next-lag 
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activity – but the effect vanished once cross-lag change effects were controlled. As such, 
it would appear that the relationship between pain self-efficacy and lowered subsequent 
activity-levels may have been attributable to artefactual cross-lag regression-to-the mean 
effects. That is, if same-lag self-efficacy is linked to higher activity, high prior self-
efficacy is likely to appear to be related to reduced subsequent activity-level merely 
because lag2 self-efficacy is likely to be closer to the mean than lag1 self-efficacy.  
Pain self-efficacy demonstrated no cross-lag effect with functioning, contrasting with 
predictions based on Social Learning Theory and a body of cross-sectional research (eg. 
Strahl, et al., 2000; Strong, et al., 1990) that supports a relationship between pain self-
efficacy and functioning. However, this study is the first to investigate the relationship 
between pain self-efficacy and functioning on a within-person basis. The current findings 
suggest that factors such as an individual’s appraisal of the likelihood of experiencing a 
pain flare-up, the meaning they assign to the pain, and dysfunctional means of coping 
with the pain may be more important in determining their selection of and engagement in 
activities than their appraisal of their ability to cope with the pain. Alternatively, pain 
self-efficacy may be related to functioning only in closer time-frames (such as it is in 
same-lag analyses of activity-level). As suggested by Social Learning Theory (Bandura, 
1986), it may be related to behavioural engagement and maintenance only on a moment-
by-moment basis.  
Perceived Interference. The current study is the first to examine the relationship 
between perceptions of pain-related life-interference and momentary adaptational status. 
The variable was associated with same-lag and next-lag distress (once cross-lag change 
effects were removed), suggesting a casual relationship. Such findings support cross-
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sectional studies that demonstrate a key role of perceptions of life interference, separate 
from the effects of pain intensity, in depression amongst people with chronic pain 
(Catley, 1999; Rudy, et al., 1988; Jacob, et al., 1993; Maxwell, et al., 1998). Furthermore, 
the effect of perceived interference on distress at both time-lags was independent of the 
effects of coping. 
The chronic pain literature, both cross-sectional and within-person, has neglected the 
relationship between perceptions of life-interference and physical/social functioning. 
Perceived interference was a significant same-lag predictor of activity-level, being 
associated with reduced activity. However, this effect vanished when coping was 
covaried. The time-frames over which the variables were measured precludes a 
mediation-type model whereby perceptions of interference lead to inactivity via 
dysfunctional coping. A more likely model is a “third variable” model whereby prior 
passive coping (passive, not active, coping was associated with both same- and cross-lag 
activity levels) contributes to the subsequent perception of life-interference and, 
separately, disruption of activities.  
Perceived interference was related to next-lag activity-levels independently of pain-
intensity and coping. Thus, the relationship between perceived interference and activity 
engagement appears to be a delayed one. This effect may be explainable via a 
behavioural-habituation framework – a possibility elaborated on in Section 7.3.5.  
In contrast with the findings for activity-level, perceived interference appeared to be 
unrelated to next-lag functioning. Again, a potential interpretation of this finding will be 
discussed in Section 7.3.5. 
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Pain Expectancy. In the context of chronic pain, investigations of pain expectancy 
have been restricted to laboratory-based studies interested in engagement in or avoidance 
of activities (eg. exercise tasks). This study is the first to investigate “free-flowing” 
expectancies in the natural environment, and the first to investigate the direct relationship 
between pain expectancies and emotional functioning.  
Pain expectancy was associated with increased same-lag distress, and this effect was due 
to neither actual pain intensity nor coping. The only available precedent for such a result 
was Murphy, et al’s (1997) finding that during task performance expectations of 
increased pain were associated with anxiety. In the current study, the relationship with 
concurrent distress may reflect anxious anticipation of subsequent pain, or it may also 
reflect more “depressive” emotions relating to feelings of helplessness or hopelessness 
about the predicted pain experience. It may be interesting to disaggregate the distress 
measure to investigate the differential effect of pain expectancies on a range of emotional 
states. No effect, however, was observed in cross-lag analyses after cross-lag change 
effects were removed, suggesting that the negative effect was probably attributable to 
regression-to-the-mean at lag2. Thus, the relationship between distress and pain 
expectancies appeared to be a momentary one, and the causal direction of the effect 
cannot be clarified. Rather than pain expectancies influencing momentary mood, pain 
expectancies may be influenced by current mood-states and the cognitive-biases that 
accompany negative affect (eg. Teasdale & Barnard, 1993).  
Pain expectancies were related to improved lag2 function until coping was covaried. A 
mediation model may account for this finding. For example, expectations that pain will 
increase may prompt use of coping strategies that reduce (or avoid) subsequent pain – 
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thereby facilitating improved functioning – or use of coping strategies that are activity-
based (eg. stretching, pleasant activities, exercise).  
Pain expectancy was associated with increased same-lag and next-lag activity-levels. 
These effects were independent of both pain-intensity and coping. Perhaps the most 
obvious interpretation, with the delayed effects of pain expectancies suggesting a causal 
role, is that expectations of higher pain generate greater involvement in activity. 
However, this interpretation appears to run counter to previous findings and theoretical 
expectations. For example, pain-expectancy theory suggests that high expectations of 
pain should be associated with avoidance of activity and decreased task-performance 
(Dolce, et al., 1986), and this position has been supported by a number of laboratory 
studies (eg. Lackner, et al., 1996; Crombez, et al., 1996). On the other hand, Murphy, et 
al.’s (1997) findings appear to suggest that the effect of pain expectancies on subsequent 
effort expenditure depends on whether the prediction was an over- or under- estimation 
of subsequent pain. Namely, they found that over-prediction of pain on a first 
experimental trial was associated with better performance on subsequent trials. This 
finding may shed light on the cross-lag findings in the current study. In the current study, 
pain at both lags was covaried in all analyses involving pain expectancies, and variables 
were centred at each individual’s average score. Therefore, positive coefficients for pain 
expectancy refer to the effect on the outcome measure of a given pain expectancy when 
current and subsequent pain are at average levels. Thus, low free-floating pain 
expectancies are likely to be under-predictions of subsequent (average) pain, and an 
expectation that pain will decrease relative to current (average) pain. Consistent with 
Murphy and colleague’s findings, such under-predictions were associated with 
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subsequent behavioural avoidance. This interpretation should be tested in further analyses 
to explicitly test the impact of relative pain expectancies (ie. relative to actual subsequent 
pain) on activity-level. Alternatively, an interaction term could be added whereby the 
hypothesis tested would suggest that subsequent activity-levels will be lowest when both 
pain expectations are low and subsequent pain is high. Such an analysis may also reveal a 
lagged interaction effect of pain expectancies on function and distress (namely, under-
predictions may be associated with subsequent distress). 
The relationship between pain expectancies and same-lag activity may reflect 
participant’s heuristic for predicting future pain. Given the strong belief amongst many 
chronic pain patients that activity is linked to pain (eg. Linton, 1985), high current 
activity-levels may serve as a basis for an expectation of high subsequent pain, and this 
may account for the positive same-lag relationship observed between the two. 
The fact that pain-expectancy demonstrates a positive relationship with distress but also 
with activity-level provides a good example of the potential differential effects that may 
be observed across indices of adjustment, and justifies the inclusion of multiple outcomes 
in the current study.  
Coping Strategies. The current study is the first to investigate the effect of passive- 
and active- coping on momentary adaptational status in chronic pain, though three 
previous studies have demonstrated that coping strategies in general are related to daily 
mood. Keefe, et al., (1997) found that coping (measured via scales of the Daily Coping 
Inventory) demonstrated independent effects on both same-day and next-day PA and NA. 
These effects were not due to pain-intensity or pain coping self-efficacy. Specifically, 
pain reduction efforts were associated with increased negative affect (NA) and reduced 
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positive affect (PA) on the same-day, venting of emotions was associated with increased 
NA, and coping via distraction and seeking emotional support were related to increased 
PA. Pain-reduction efforts, seeking emotional support, and relaxation were related to 
improved next-day PA, and seeking spiritual support was associated with increased next-
day NA. 
Affleck, Urrows, et al. (1992) found that, controlling for average pain and pain trending 
(but not appraisals), coping was related to an upward trend in mood over monitoring days 
(specifically, the diversity of strategies used and coping via seeking emotional support). 
Grant, et al. (2002) found that distraction coping (measured via the CSQ) was related to a 
decrease in night-time depression and anxiety, ignoring pain was related to decreased 
night-time depression, and that these effects were independent of pain and appraisals. 
Grant (1998), who controlled for appraisals but not pain-intensity, also found that 
praying/hoping was related to increased depression and anxiety but only on days with 
high average pain.  
Passive Coping. Cross-sectional studies have demonstrated that passive coping is 
associated with poorer emotional functioning (eg. Brown and Nicassio, 1987; Mercado, 
et al., 2000). However, the current study found that on a within-person basis passive 
coping was associated with greater distress prior to controlling for appraisal, though not 
after appraisals were controlled. This may suggest a mediation model whereby passive 
coping induces negative appraisal processes (such as reinforced perceptions of life 
interference, and lessened sense of internal locus of pain control), which have a more 
proximal (or indeed, momentary) impact on mood. This finding reinforces the notion of 
the primacy of cognition in generating affective states (eg. Lazarus, 1999). However, the 
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cross-lag analyses revealed a delayed effect of passive-coping that was not attributable to 
appraisals, which would suggest that such strategies, per se, have a delayed detrimental 
impact on mood. Specifically, use of pain medication on an as-required basis and 
avoidance of activity were the key passive-coping strategies predicting next-lag distress. 
Contrasting with this finding, Focht, et al. (2002) did not find a relationship between 
earlier medication usage and momentary negative affect, though interestingly prior 
medication usage was related to increased pain reports.  
The effect of lag1 passive coping found in the current project may require further 
investigation. Whilst lag2 appraisals were co-varied in the same-lag analysis, which 
found no effect for coping, lag1 appraisals were covaried in cross-lag analyses. Thus, the 
effect of passive coping on next-lag distress may be attributable to appraisal processes 
occurring concurrently with the distress but not to appraisal processes prior to that. Such 
a conclusion would appear to be supported by analyses where passive coping and key 
appraisal predictors were analysed simultaneously, including their respective cross-lag 
change variables (see Table 6.23). The effect of lag1 passive coping on lag2 distress 
vanished when it was included in this model, and this would appear to be attributable to 
the covariation of the cross-lag change-in-appraisal variables.  
Passive coping was associated with reduced same-lag and next-lag activity-levels 
(possibly suggesting a causal role), and with next-lag functioning.  These effects were not 
attributable to appraisal variables or pain-intensity. Specifically, laying-down/resting was 
associated with impaired lag2 functioning, and use of sedative medications and pain 
denial (“tell myself it does not hurt”) were associated with reduced lag2 activity-levels. 
These findings were confirmatory of cross-sectional studies demonstrating a link between 
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greater use of passive coping and higher levels of disability and impaired social/physical 
functioning (eg. Brown & Nicassio, 1987; Evers, et al., 2003; Strahl, et al., 2000). 
Active Coping. In the majority of cross-sectional studies active-coping has been 
associated with less emotional dysfunction (eg. Bishop & Warr, 2003; Mercado, et al., 
2000) and reduced disability and greater physical/social function (eg. Strahl, et al., 2000; 
Bishop & Warr, 2003; Brown & Nicassio, 1987). In all analyses of the current study 
active coping was unrelated to distress. It demonstrated an initial relationship with poor 
function that, though unpredicted, does have a precedent in the literature (Snow Turek, et 
al., 1996). However, this effect vanished once cross-lag change effects were covaried, 
and may have been attributable to cross-lag artefacts. Such a finding leaves open the 
possibility that active-coping strategies may have more proximal effects on engagement 
in functional activities, a possibility supported by the additional finding that active-
coping had a same-lag effect on  activity-level. Active coping in the lag immediately 
preceding activity ratings was associated with higher levels of activity, as would be 
predicted by cross-sectional findings (eg. Bishop & Warr, 2003; Snow-Turek, el al., 
2000). No cross-lag effect for active coping was observed. Perhaps the most obvious 
interpretation of the discrepant same-lag and cross-lag analyses of active-coping and 
activity-level is the difference in time-lags – active-coping strategies may have a 
“therapeutic window” picked up by the same-lag analyses, but not by the cross-lag 
analyses. However, it is noted that same-lag and cross-lag models contained a different 
set of covariates, potentially complicating this interpretation (only the cross-lag model 
controlled for activity and pain at time one). 
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To summarise, Study Two revealed that appraisal and coping were related to adaptational 
status in the everyday lives of people with chronic pain, and that these effects were at 
least partly independent and unattributable to factors such as time-of-day and momentary 
pain intensity. Furthermore, there was strong support for the notion that appraisal and 
coping play a casual role in adaptational status, though in the case of the relationship 
between coping and emotional distress findings were better interpreted as a delayed effect 
of coping on distress. At the level of individual predictors, a number of findings 
supported previous EMA findings and cross-sectional models of adaptation to chronic 
pain. There were also a number of unexpected findings that may have theoretical 
implications. These will be discussed in the following chapter. 
In the final chapter the findings of Studies One and Two will be reviewed and integrated, 
and implications will be discussed. Methodological issues will be addressed – including 
compliance rates, the value of conducting within-person studies of chronic pain, the 
utility of taking repeated measures within days (as opposed to once-per-day measures), 
and the value of investigating cross-lag effects. Implications of the current findings for 
specific theoretical models will be examined next, as will potential future “lines-of-
enquiry” for EMA studies of adaptation to chronic pain. Finally, the applied implications 
of the current studies for clinical practice will be discussed. 
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7 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
7.1 Overview of the Current Research 
The current research was conducted with the broad aim of addressing the question of 
whether appraisal and coping are independently related to the adaptational status of 
individuals with chronic pain throughout the course of their every-day lives (that is, their 
momentary adaptational status). The specific hypotheses (reiterated below) were guided 
by the framework for understanding adaptation to chronic pain provided by Lazarus and 
Folkman’s (1984) Stress and Coping theory.  
The current study adopted EMA methodology to investigate within-person momentary 
adaptation status in a chronic pain sample. However it did not investigate effects across 
days, but across hours, and was the first study in the area to do so. The current study 
contributed uniquely to existing literature in a number of additional ways: it adopted 
PDAs as monitoring instruments, investigated a wider range of psychological predictors, 
investigated multiple indices of adjustment (incorporating physical as well as 
psychological functioning), and conducted cross-lag analyses to investigate delayed 
effects of predictors. The current study addressed the relationship between pain 
expectancies and distress, and between perceptions of life-interference and functional 
status. These relationships have been neglected in the chronic pain literature, and the 
constructs of pain expectancy and perceived interference have not been investigated at all 
as they relate to within-person momentary adaptational status. The current study sought 
to redress this problem. Also, physical functioning as an index of adjustment has been 
overlooked in the within-person chronic pain literature, but was investigated in the 
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current study. The theoretically important passive- and active- coping dimensions 
investigated in the current study have also been neglected in the within-person chronic 
pain literature.  
The PAMS was developed and validated in Study One. It was designed for use in EMA 
studies to measure constructs proposed by a Stress And Coping perspective on adaptation 
to chronic pain – pain intensity, appraisals (pain self-efficacy, pain expectancy, 
catastrophising, and perceived interference), coping (passive- and active- coping), and 
adaptation (measured as distress, function, and activity-level). With this in mind, a 
minimum set of items were selected, with each item measuring constructs in real-time (ie 
“What is happening now?”) or short latency recall (ie “What happened since the last 
alarm?”). Scales demonstrated adequate to excellent internal consistency, convergent 
validity, and, where assessed, predictive validity. The Pain Self-Efficacy scale appeared 
to reflect pain self-efficacy for an internal locus of pain control, as opposed to general 
pain self-efficacy as measured in such scales as the PSEQ. Conventional cross-sectional 
analyses involving the PAMS scales revealed that appraisal and coping factors accounted 
for approximately 22% of the variance in distress, that appraisals were uniquely 
associated with distress, and that catastrophising was a key appraisal factor associated 
with distress. These findings were confirmed by similar analyses involving standard 
questionnaires, although a greater amount of variance was accounted for in the PAMS 
Distress outcome, and conflicting findings regarding the role of coping and pain in 
distress were observed. Namely, coping was uniquely associated with distress in the 
PAMS analyses but not the Multidimensional Pain Inventory (MPI) analyses. These 
differences may have been attributable to the inclusion of a measure of passive coping in 
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the PAMS whilst the construct was inadequately assessed by the standard questionnaires. 
Analyses of PAMS Function suggested that appraisals were uniquely associated with 
functioning, but coping was not. Pain-intensity was also related to a significant 
proportion of variance in functioning when entered in the first step of a hierarchical 
analysis, however this effect appeared to be attributable to appraisal factors. Similar 
analyses of the Disability Questionnaire (DQ) supported these findings, however a 
greater proportion of variance was explained in the DQ, and pain-intensity and 
psychological factors appeared to play a larger role in predicting function when measured 
by the DQ. In addition, the analyses disagreed on the proportion of variance in functional 
disability that was uniquely attributable to appraisals, and on the specific predictors 
associated with functional disability. The outcome of the PAMS analyses suggested that 
appraisals played a lesser role in influencing functioning, and it was passive-coping that 
was chiefly associated with disability. The outcome of the DQ analyses, on the other 
hand, suggested that two appraisal factors – perceived interference and pain self-efficacy 
– were the key predictors. These differences in interpretation may also have been due to 
inadequate assessment of passive coping in the DQ analyses. 
In Study Two, three dimensions of adaptation were assessed – psychological distress, 
functioning (a composite reflecting involvement in a range of activities of daily living), 
and activity-level. This range of outcomes was investigated in acknowledgement of the 
importance of selecting multiple indicators of adjustment (eg. Weber, 1997). Presumably, 
factors influencing adjustment may have differential effects depending on the outcome 
being assessed. For example, Jensen and Karoly (1991) identified different roles for 
coping and control appraisals for activity-level and distress. 
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Same-lag analyses were conducted with distress and activity-level as outcome variables. 
A same-lag analysis was not conducted for function because that factor was measured in 
a short-latency recall fashion (the predictors, many of which were measured on a 
momentary basis, should be considered to have occurred after the time-point the 
functional behaviours presumably occurred, thereby complicating the interpretation of 
same-lag analyses). However, the causal relationships between factors measured at the 
same time-point cannot be established using the current methods. Within limits (for 
example, the effect of unmeasured third-variables), cross-lag analyses can be used to 
more adequately investigate causal relationships (Bateman & Strasser, 1984). Cross-lag 
analyses were used in Study Two in an attempt to untangle the possible direction of the 
relationship between appraisals, coping and adjustment. In these analyses, variables at 
lag1 were used to predict outcome variables at lag2, controlling for the outcome variable 
at lag1. In certain analyses the effect of change in key predictors from lag1 to lag2 was 
also covaried in order to isolate the unique effect of the predictor at lag1. 
This chapter will first address methodological issues relevant to the current research, 
including shortcomings of the current study, implications for future use of this 
methodology arising from the findings of the current study, and suggestions for future 
research design. Secondly, the findings of the current study will be discussed in terms of 
implications for theoretical models of adjustment to chronic pain. Recommendations for 
future research into intra-individual models of adjustment to pain will also be presented. 
Finally, implications of the current research for applied settings will be discussed, 
including applications of PAMS for daily-diary monitoring with chronic pain patients. 
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7.2 Methodological Implications 
7.2.1 Compliance Issues 
Even without considering voluntary midnight diary entries, compliance was relatively 
low in the current study in comparison with other EMA studies with chronic pain samples 
(eg. Stone, et al., 2002; Peters, et al., 2000). The large majority of missing entries was 
due to timing-out of the alarm, rather than deliberate dismissal of entries.  
Aside from reduced data-pools, the key problem with low compliance is the potential 
context-relatedness of non-compliance (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987). That is, if 
missing entries are non-randomly distributed relative to other measured variables or, even 
worse, important but unmeasured variables, this may introduce bias in study findings. In 
the current case, data may be non-representative if people missed entries whilst in high 
degrees of pain, emotional distress, or whilst involved in certain functional activities or 
coping behaviours. There is no way to determine the context-relatedness of missed 
entries in the current study, or of determining the likelihood of biases resulting from 
systematic non-compliance. However, it was established that compliance was not related 
to day of the week or time of day (except for lower compliance with voluntary midnight 
alarms). There were fewer completed entries after the seventh day of monitoring, 
demonstrating that participants were generally willing to comply with the duration of the 
project. Though there appeared to be fewer entries on the first day of monitoring, this was 
likely to be due to certain participants voluntarily beginning monitoring part-way through 
the day prior to their formal commencement. 
Compliance rates appeared to be related to certain participant characteristics. Older 
participants were less likely to respond to alarms. Participants in some form of work 
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demonstrated greater compliance and those in greater pain and with greater disability 
were less likely to miss alarms, suggesting that compliance may be greater amongst those 
who are less mobile during the day. 
One conclusion, drawn from participant feedback, was that the alarms on the PDAs may 
have been too quiet. Thus, a natural recommendation for future research is to ensure that 
monitoring devices have sufficient volume to signal participants within the home 
environment. 
A second factor that may have influenced compliance was the current study’s lack of a 
monetary incentive. Whilst most EMA studies with chronic pain populations provide 
some form of monetary incentive, the current study did not. A monetary reward for 
participants may be a further recommendation for future research in this area.  
7.2.2 Value of a Within-Person Approach 
Whilst EMA has advantages over cross-sectional approaches, the methodology 
nonetheless has a number of potential problems. Reactivity is an example of one such 
potential problem. A participant’s responses to diary entries may systematically increase 
or decrease (or, “drift”) over the course of monitoring or may demonstrate progressive 
changes in variability. It is considered that a reactivity effect has occurred if such 
systematic changes can be attributed to the process of monitoring itself. Few studies have 
reported clear reactivity effects for pain ratings (eg. Peters, et al., 2000; cf. Stone, et al., 
2003), and no such effect was observed in the current study. 
The current study found that over monitoring days ratings on the activity-level variable 
tended to drift upwards and become more similar. Distress ratings, also, became less 
variable over monitoring days. Though such reactivity effects do not appear to be 
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common, they have nevertheless been reported (eg. Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987). 
One possibility is that these changes reflect actual changes in participants’ states resulting 
from monitoring. For example, activity may have been disrupted early in monitoring and, 
as subjects became familiar with procedures, their activity returned to usual levels. 
Alternatively, the reactivity effects may reflect artefacts of the measurement process. 
Namely, artificial drifts in and reduced variability of ratings may result from boredom or 
fatigue arising from involvement in the project.  
A tendency for participants to progressively provide more similar ratings (thereby 
resulting in a reduction in the variability of ratings) may occur in response to increased 
introspective-awareness during the self-monitoring process. Such a tendency may 
manifest itself as participants familiarise themselves with self-monitoring. That is, they 
may begin monitoring assuming large variability in their subjective experience, but after 
the intensive introspective process of self-monitoring may become aware of the 
“sameness” of their experience. Alternatively, in the course of encountering more 
extreme states as the monitoring week progresses participants may direct their usual 
ratings more towards the midline to accommodate the more diverse experiences. An 
obvious but seemingly wasteful approach may be to provide some days self-monitoring 
rehearsal before collecting monitoring data. 
Artefactual measurement drift is likely to be more common in less stable scales, such as 
those that are poorly anchored. The activity-level scale in the current project is likely to 
be such a scale – verbal anchors were provided along the graphical-rating scale, but these 
were not concrete anchors such as “lifting 10kg”, or “walking” versus “running”. Better 
anchoring of this scale may reduce measurement-reactive drift.  
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If reactivity is a demonstrable risk in an EMA study it may pose a risk to the validity of 
findings. In the current study the effect of systematic drifts in activity-level ratings over 
the course of monitoring were small – accounting for only 0.22% of total variance in 
activity-level. Fortunately, predictor variables did not demonstrate a reactivity effect, so it 
was unlikely that such an effect may have confounded the interpretation of analyses of 
activity-level. Hence, monitoring-day or entry-number were not controlled in any of the 
focal analyses. 
Despite such methodological concerns, a number of authors recognise the value of 
within-person studies over cross-sectional studies. Grounds for such recommendations 
include limitations in recall and judgement accuracy in cross-sectional research (eg. 
Torgangeau, 2000), enhanced ecological validity of EMA data (eg. Hormuth, 1986), and 
the inability of cross-sectional approaches to address inherently within-person questions 
(Tennen & Affleck, 1996). The potential risks to validity of reactivity in EMA studies 
should be weighed up against the risks to internal validity (such as recall biases) and 
external validity of using cross-sectional studies to address within-person questions. 
The current study confirmed findings of recall and judgement errors when cross-sectional 
questionnaires are used as summaries of weekly phenomena. A comparison between the 
average PAMS scales and a recall-based paper-and-pencil version of the same items (the 
PAMS-R) revealed that whilst each recall-based scale was correlated with its respective 
momentary scale, the degree of relationship varied amongst the scales. Namely, recall of 
pain intensity, activity-level, and passive and active coping strategies demonstrated 
greater discrepancy with momentary ratings. Other authors have reported low to non-
significant correlations between recalled and momentary reports of coping (eg. Peters, et 
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al., 2000; Stone, et al., 1998) and functioning (eg. Lousberg, et al., 1997; Peters, et al., 
2000).  All continuously-measured scales were over-estimated by the majority of 
participants (except self-efficacy, which was under-estimated significantly more 
frequently), with activity-level and self-efficacy seeming particularly prone to mis-
estimation. Pain-ratings, also, tended to be over-estimated by 13% on the rating scale. 
A large body of cross-sectional research suggests that a range of appraisal and coping 
factors are associated with differential adaptation between people (see Jensen, Turner, 
Romano & Karoly, 1991). However, Lazarus (1993) stated that because processes of 
coping and adaptation vary over time and depend on contexts, within-person designs 
must be used to investigate these processes. Further, Tennen and Affleck (1996) warn 
that within- and between- person studies address different questions, and between-person 
analyses may reveal effects of differing size and direction compared to within-person 
analyses. Indeed, the current study revealed that sizable proportions (41% to 75%) of 
variance in pain-intensity, distress, function, and activity-level were within-person.  
A comparison between the findings relating to distress and activity-level in Study One 
and the same-lag analyses of distress and activity-level in Study Two highlights the 
potentially different results provided by within- and between- person studies.  
The between- and within- person analyses differed in the proportions of variance 
accounted for and the apparent role of specific predictors. In Study One, participants 
reporting greater pain, catastrophising, and use of passive coping were likely to report 
greater distress. Pain-intensity and catastrophising also demonstrated an independent 
effect on distress in the same-lag within-person analyses of Distress in study two. 
However, passive coping appeared to play no role when controlling for appraisals. In 
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addition, a number of additional appraisal variables appeared to be related to momentary 
mood though they demonstrated no effect in the between-person analyses, namely pain 
self-efficacy, perceived interference, and pain expectancy.  
In terms of variance-accounted-for, in between-person analyses pain intensity, entered 
alone, accounted for 14% of variance in PAMS Distress. The psychological predictors 
accounted for an additional 22% variance – appraisals were associated with 11% unique 
variance in Distress, and coping with 4.4% (with the remainder being shared variance). A 
total of 36% variance in Distress was accounted for. By contrast, first-order within-
person analyses (reported in Appendix D, Table D.8) revealed that same-lag pain was 
associated with 30% of within-person variance. In within-person analyses, the 
psychological predictors accounted for a further 17.5% within-person variance – 
appraisals were associated with 12% unique within-person variance and coping with only 
1%. A total of 42.7% within-person variance was accounted for.  
In analyses of activity-level, differences in interpretation were apparent between the two 
levels of analysis. Between-subjects analyses revealed that passive coping was the only 
significant predictor. Passive coping was also strongly related to activity-level in same-
lag within-subjects analyses, however pain expectancy was the strongest predictor. Pain 
self-efficacy and active-coping were also significant predictors. Some differences were 
also apparent in terms of variance-accounted for, with between-person analyses 
suggesting a greater role for psychological predictors in general and coping in particular. 
In between-subjects analyses 10% of variance was accounted for – 1.4% attributable to 
pain-intensity before other predictors were entered (though this was non-significant), and 
9% attributable to psychological predictors. Appraisal was associated with 2% unique 
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variance, and coping with 4%, though neither amount reached statistical significance. By 
comparison, same-lag within-person analyses revealed that appraisal and coping were 
associated with almost 2% and 1.5% within-person variance respectively. A total of 9.2% 
within-person variance was accounted for, with almost 4% of this attributable to the 
psychological predictors. In first-order analyses, pain-intensity at lag2 was associated 
with 2.6% within-person variance in activity-level. 
In summary, for both outcomes a wider range of (appraisal) factors appeared to be 
important in influencing momentary adaptational status than were involved in between-
person differences in adaptation. In the case of distress, whereas passive coping appeared 
to distinguish between people in terms of distress-levels, passive coping appeared to be 
unrelated to momentary distress levels when appraisals were controlled on a within-
person basis. 
There were some important consistencies in variance-accounted for between the within-
person and between-person analyses of distress and activity-level. For distress and (to a 
lesser extent) activity-level, more total variance was accounted for on a within-person 
basis than was accounted for between people, though it is noted that the within-person 
analysis also accounted for time-of-day effects. Appraisal and coping factors, together, 
appeared to be less important in same-lag within-person analyses than between-person 
analyses. Instead, in the distress analyses pain-intensity appeared to play a greater role on 
a within-person basis than it did between-people. Appraisal accounted for comparable 
amounts of unique within- and between- person variance, though coping appeared to be 
less important on a within-person basis than it was between people. 
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A brief review of the literature appears to support the differences found between 
proportions of variance-accounted-for in study one and two. In fact, Jensen and Karoly’s 
(1991) cross-sectional study demonstrated very similar proportions of variance accounted 
for to those found in Study One. Pain intensity accounted for 13% of variance in 
psychological functioning, and psychological predictors contributed an additional 21%, 
accounting for a total of 34%. Pain intensity accounted for 6% variance in activity-level, 
with psychological predictors contributing a further 14% to account for a total of 20%. 
Turner, et al. (2000) reported that pain intensity accounted for 6% of variance in 
depression, with catastrophising and coping accounting for an additional 43% – a total of 
51%. Pain intensity accounted for 8% variance in disability, with catastrophising and 
coping contributing a further 34% to account for a total of 42%. Few studies have 
reported variance accounted for by pain-intensity on a within-day basis. Vendrig and 
Lousberg (1997) reported that 4.8% of variance in positive mood was accounted for by 
pain-intensity. They reported an even lower effect of pain on activity-level (0.01% 
variance). Keefe, et al. (1997) reported smaller within-person effects of psychological 
variables than the current study. Coping and pain-coping self-efficacy accounted for 
3.8% unique within-person variance in same-day negative mood and 6.1% in same-day 
positive mood after controlling for pain-intensity (negative mood was also controlled in 
the latter analysis). Grant (1998) reported proportions of variance in mood attributable to 
coping and appraisal variables that were more comparable to those found in the current 
study, though it is noted that she did not control the effects of pain-intensity. Grant found 
that appraisal and coping variables and morning depressed mood accounted for 36% 
within-person variance in night-time depressed mood, with 13% attributable to the 
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psychological variables. Twenty-nine percent of within-person variance in night-time 
anxious mood was accounted for, with 18% within-person variance attributable to 
morning anxious mood and a further 11% attributable to coping and appraisal. 
The above review demonstrates the differences between a within-person and a between-
person approach, and lends weight to the importance of within-person approaches. 
Unfortunately, such comparisons were not the focus of the current study, and analyses 
were not conducted for the purpose of direct comparison between studies one and two. A 
more systematic comparison may further reinforce the point, with between- and within- 
person analyses conducted within the same data-set. Of course, the sample size (that is, 
the level-2 data-set) of such analyses would have to be sufficient to support these 
between-person analyses. In the current study it was not. 
7.2.3 Value of a Within-Day Approach 
The current study demonstrated that, whilst almost all (c.f. Catley, 1999) within-person 
studies involving Stress-And-Coping models of adjustment to chronic pain have been 
conducted on an across-day basis (eg. Grant, 1998; Keefe, et al., 1997), the majority of 
within-person variance occurred within-days. As part of analyses of reactivity, HLM was 
used to calculate a variance-components model whereby variance in each of the outcome 
variables was partitioned into between-person, across-day, and within-day components. 
For all but one measure, at least half of variance was within-person (54% for pain-
intensity, 41% for distress, 50% for function, and 75% for activity-level), and in the case 
of activity-level three-quarters of variance was within-person. Further, in all cases the 
majority of within-person variance was found to be within-day (72% for pain-intensity, 
68% for distress, 76% for function, and 92% for activity-level). Activity-level, in 
313 
particular, demonstrated far more variation within-days than between-days or between-
people. These findings suggest that large amounts of important information relating to 
variation in these states is missed when studies make comparisons across days or, even 
more-so, between people. 
The current study identified a number of discrepant findings in comparison with daily 
studies of adjustment to chronic pain. For example, whereas Keefe, et al. (1997), Affleck, 
Urrows, et al. (1992) and Grant (1998) reported relationships between same-day coping 
and mood, the current study found no relationship between mood and coping on an 
hourly basis (though it is noted that the current study explicitly covaried a number of 
appraisal variables that were not investigated in previous studies).  
The difference between processes that operate over hours and over days might be further 
explored in subsequent studies by simultaneously investigating effects across three levels 
of a multi-level model – within-day, across day, and between person (as was done in the 
current study for analyses of reactivity). Such analyses might reveal that momentary 
measurement of certain constructs is redundant given the predominant daily effects of 
those variables. For example, use of passive coping strategies may have no noteworthy 
independent effect on concurrent mood-states, but may be related to daily mood tone. 
7.2.4 Value of Cross-lag Analyses 
As well as same-lag analyses, Keefe, et al. (1997) used cross-lag analyses to look for 
delayed-effects of psychological predictors, thereby supporting the casual role of these 
variables. Although they investigated different (cross-day) time-lags, theirs is the only 
other study to use cross-lag analyses to explore appraisal and coping factors in adaptation 
to chronic pain. Effects observed in same-lag analyses that are mirrored in cross-lag 
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analyses may suggest a causal relationship. For example, the current study found that 
appraisals (specifically, self-efficacy, catastrophising, and perceived interference) were 
associated with same-lag distress, but were also predictive of next-lag distress. Passive 
coping was also predictive of activity in both same and cross-lag analyses.  
Whilst cross-lag analyses might reveal delayed effects of predictors and suggest causal 
effects, the proportions of variance-accounted-for are likely to be smaller. This was true 
of the current study.  In same-lag analyses appraisals accounted for 12.14% of within-
person variance in distress, and 2.25% in activity-level, but in cross-lag analyses the 
unique effect of previous-lag appraisals accounted for only 2.25% of within-person 
variance in distress and 1.43% in activity-level. Similarly for coping: 1.02% of the 
within-person variance in same-lag distress and 7.21% in same-lag activity-level was 
accounted for, but unique previous-lag effects only accounted for 0.81% and 1.11% 
respectively. A similar pattern was reported by Keefe, et al. (1997). Whilst they reported 
accounting for 6.1% of variance in same-day positive mood, they accounted for only 2% 
of next-day positive mood. In a separate set of analyses, their predictors accounted for 
12.2% of same-day pain, but only 1.5% of next-day pain. 
Issues of causality appear to have been particularly relevant to the study of pain and 
activity, where effects in both directions have been observed in previous studies (eg. 
Linton, 1985; Vendrig & Lousberg 1997). Namely, pain has been associated with 
increased activity – which might be explained on the basis that activity promotes pain – 
and with decreased activity – presumably because pain discourages involvement in 
activity. A negative relationship might also be argued on the basis that certain forms of 
activity, such as stretching, may lead to pain reduction, and that general activity might, 
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over time, lead to improvement in pain conditions due to reduced physical 
deconditioning. Despite the fact that people experiencing pain tend to demonstrate strong 
beliefs that activity and pain are linked, other analyses have found no such association 
(Linton, 1985). The current study found that pain was associated with reduced activity in 
subsequent hours. Thus, cross-lagged analyses in the current study provided support for a 
directional relationship between pain and activity. Whilst pain and activity-level were 
positively related in same-lag analyses in the current study, subsequent analyses could 
clarify the cross-lagged effect of activity on pain, investigating whether previous-lag 
activity is associated with increased next-lag pain. 
Use of cross-lag analyses begs the question of what time-lag is the most appropriate to 
investigate (Bateman & Strasser, 1984). That is, in what kind of time-frame is the 
phenomenon of interest supposed to have a delayed effect? For some of the variables 
examined in the current study, effects may be different or more pronounced over days 
rather than hours. For example, Feldman, et al. (1999) reported a reciprocal relationship 
between depression and pain over days. Similarly, effects of activity on pain may occur 
overnight rather than over hours. Such temporal effects require further investigation. 
Cross-lag analyses may also be of value for demonstrating different momentary and 
delayed effects. Keefe, et al. (1997) reported, for example, that pain-coping self-efficacy 
was the strongest of their predictors of same-day mood but was unrelated to next-day 
mood. In the current study, pain expectancy appeared to have a momentary effect on 
mood, but no delayed effect. Similarly, self-efficacy and active coping demonstrated only 
proximal effects on activity-levels. By comparison, whereas perceived interference 
appeared to have no immediate relationship with activity-level, higher perceptions of life-
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interference tended to impair activity-levels over a period of hours. Further research 
based on avoidance theory (eg. Asmundson, et al., 1999) may demonstrate that 
immediate reinforcing effects of passive coping on mood contrast with delayed 
detrimental effects. Again, such issues could be investigated in three-level multi-level 
models comparing cross-lag effects across hours to those across days. 
7.3 Theoretical Implications 
7.3.1 Stress and Coping Theory 
The key hypotheses of the current study related to Stress and Coping Theory, and were 
concerned with whether appraisal and coping were independently associated with 
momentary adaptational status in chronic pain, and whether the effects of each were 
independent of pain intensity. Jensen and Karoly (1991) noted that “few researchers have 
dealt with the potential confounding effects of pain intensity” and identified that 
“perceived pain intensity may well act as a powerful ‘third variable’ that influences both 
coping efforts and adjustment” (p431). Their cross-sectional investigation of coping and 
pain-coping self-efficacy dealt with this issue by covarying pain-intensity, and that 
approach was taken in the current project. Turner, et al. (2000) noted that the relationship 
of appraisals (in their case, catastrophising) and coping to adjustment were usually 
investigated separately. They state that psychological factors “may interact reciprocally 
and dynamically over time… yet it is important to examine whether [they] independently 
predict patient adjustment” (p 116), and thus need to be investigated within the same 
analyses. Beyond the theoretical importance of such research, Turner and colleagues 
stated that it may have important applications for developing and targeting psychological 
treatments for chronic pain. Like Turner and colleagues’ cross-sectional study, the 
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current study covaried the effects of coping to identify the unique effect of appraisals, 
and covaried appraisals to identify unique effects of coping. These key hypotheses would 
appear to be supported theoretically according to Stress and Coping Theory, which holds 
that appraisal and coping have interacting yet independent effects on adjustment, and it is 
these factors rather than the stressor that influence adjustment (Lazarus and Folkman, 
1984). 
The cross-sectional literature has demonstrated mixed support for the above hypotheses. 
In general, support has been found for an independent effect of coping (Turner, et al., 
2000; Geisser, et al., 1994) and appraisal (Jensen & Karoly, 1991) on indices of physical 
functioning and for independent effects of appraisal on distress, but less support has been 
demonstrated for an independent effect of coping on distress (Geisser, et al., 1994; 
Turner, et al., 2000). The cross-sectional analyses conducted in Study One of the current 
research supported the independent effect of appraisal on distress and functioning, but in 
contrast with previous findings an independent effect of coping was found for distress but 
not functioning. These differential findings may relate to discrepancies in the coping 
variables investigated (namely, more adequate assessment of passive coping in the 
current study). This possibility appears to be supported by analyses of MPI Affective 
Distress in Study One. These analyses were more consistent with prior findings – the 
CSQ scales failed to demonstrate an independent effect of coping on distress. 
Little work has been done to address these issues on a within-person basis. A number of 
authors have established that the intra-individual effects of appraisal and coping are 
independent of pain-intensity (eg. Grant, et al., 2002; Keefe, et al., 1997, Affleck, 
Urrows, et al., 1992). In terms of the independence of appraisal and coping, independent 
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effects of appraisal on same-day mood have been reported (Keefe, et al., 1997), though 
somewhat more support has been found for independent effects of coping on mood 
(Keefe, et al., 1997, Grant, 1998). Keefe, et al. (1997) also reported that coping, but not 
appraisal, had a carry-over effect on next-day mood. No studies have investigated within-
day effects of appraisal and coping on function-related outcomes. 
In Study Two of the current research, appraisal demonstrated a relationship with 
emotional functioning that was not attributable to pain intensity or coping. A delayed 
effect of appraisal on distress was also observed, suggesting that the effect of appraisals 
may be causal. The short-term effect of coping on emotional functioning appeared to be 
attributable to the effect of proximal appraisals on distress, and although coping 
(specifically, passive coping) demonstrated a delayed effect on distress, there was some 
suggestion that this effect, too, was attributable to appraisals occurring concurrently with 
the experience of distress. This possibility requires further testing. 
Physical functioning (measured both as functioning and activity-level) was associated –  
to some extent independently –  with both appraisal and coping. The effects of appraisal 
and coping were not attributable to pain intensity, and delayed effects of both suggested 
that their effects were causal. The current study was the first to establish such a finding. 
The current research demonstrated that both appraisal and coping are important elements 
for understanding adjustment to chronic pain. They appear to have effects on adjustment 
that are separate from the effects of pain intensity, and delayed effects of each suggest 
that their effects may be causal. Additionally, they appear to have separate effects, 
although this depends on the outcome being evaluated. Appraisal and coping had 
independent effects only when investigating indices of physical functioning, however 
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mood appeared to be predominantly responsive to appraisal processes. This finding is 
consistent with Stress and Coping Theory – Lazarus (1991) stated that cognition is “both 
a necessary and sufficient condition [for emotion]. Sufficient means that thoughts are 
capable of producing emotions; necessary means that emotions cannot occur without 
some kind of thought” (p353). 
7.3.2 Self-Efficacy and Models of Control Appraisals 
The importance of a person’s perceptions of control over pain has been highlighted by a 
number of models linking pain and depression – including Locus of Control theory 
(Calhoun, et al., 1974) and Seligman’s (1972) theory of Learned Helplessness. Also, a 
person’s perception that they are capable of controlling or coping with pain – referred to 
as pain self-efficacy – is a crucial factor in models of pain based on Social Learning 
Theory. Pain self-efficacy is purportedly related directly to an individual’s engagement in 
and maintenance of functional activities and coping behaviours (Jensen, Turner, Romano, 
& Karoly, 1991). Thus pain self-efficacy may be linked to emotional distress indirectly, 
via coping. 
A number of cross-sectional studies have supported direct links between pain-control 
constructs (eg. Crisson & Keefe, 1988; Strahl, et al., 2000) and distress. However, cross-
sectional research has also suggested that those who are more self-efficacious when it 
comes to their pain are likely to be less distressed only because of their use of coping 
strategies (Jensen & Karoly, 1991), thus supporting a Social Learning Theory 
interpretation. An established link between self-efficacy and behavioural outcomes, such 
as activity-level and reduced functional disability, also supports a Social-Learning 
perspective (eg. Jensen & Karoly, 1991; Strong, et al., 1990). 
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In contrast with the above findings, cross-sectional analyses in Study One of the current 
research found that there was no relationship between self-efficacy and any index of 
adjustment. A note-worthy difference between this and previous studies is that the current 
study was the first to investigate the relationship between pain self-efficacy and 
adjustment whilst controlling for a wide range of other key appraisal and coping factors. 
On a within-person basis, however, Study Two found that pain self-efficacy was directly 
related to distress, and it also demonstrated a delayed effect that suggested the effect of 
pain self-efficacy on distress might be causal. Such a finding supports previous within-
person research that has investigated pain-control appraisals (eg. Grant, 1998; Keefe, et 
al., 1997), and suggests that distress is ameliorated during and after periods of perceived 
capacity to cope with or control pain without relying on external sources. Such findings 
support Locus of Control theory and a Learned Helplessness perspective. 
The current study was the first to also investigate the within-person relationship between 
pain self-efficacy and functioning. On an intra-individual basis, activity-levels were 
higher during periods of high pain self-efficacy – thus supporting Social Learning 
Theory. However, pain self-efficacy demonstrated no delayed effect on activity-level or 
functioning, thus there was no evidence to support a causal effect of pain self-efficacy on 
physical functioning.  
In summary, whilst none of the within-person effects of pain self-efficacy on adjustment 
translated into between-person effects in the current study, support was found for an 
effect of pain self-efficacy appraisals on momentary mood. Less support was found for 
the intra-individual effect of this construct on physical functioning. Thus, whilst Locus of 
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Control and Learned Helplessness theories were supported, less support was found for a 
Social Learning Theory perspective.  
7.3.3 Catastrophising and Cognitive Theories of Emotional Disorders 
According to cognitive theories of emotional disorders (eg, Beck, 1967), dysfunctional 
thinking is directly responsible for the onset of negative emotional states. This view is 
also consistent with Stress and Coping Theory in that Lazarus (2000; 1991) supports the 
necessity for cognition in the generation of emotion. In the context of chronic pain, the 
key cognitive construct representing dysfunctional thinking has been pain 
catastrophising. For example, fear-avoidance models suggest catastrophising, via pain-
related fear and the resulting behavioural avoidance, contribute to both depression and 
disability (Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000). Cross-sectional studies (eg Robinson, Henson, & 
Geisser, 1994; Turner, et al., 2000) support the model – people who demonstrate high 
levels of catastrophic thinking tend to be more distressed than others, even after 
controlling for factors such as pain intensity and coping. The role of catastrophising in 
same-day emotional states has also been demonstrated in previous within-person studies 
of chronic pain (Grant, 1998). 
The current study confirmed previous cross-sectional and intra-individual findings, thus 
supporting cognitive theories of emotional disorders as applied to chronic pain 
populations. In Study One, distress was greater in those evidencing more catastrophic 
thinking. In Study Two, distress was greater during moments when catastrophic thinking 
was apparent, and this style of thinking also demonstrated delayed effects on mood over 
subsequent hours. The latter finding suggests that catastrophic thinking plays a causal 
role in its relationship with distress. 
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Previous cross-sectional research also suggests that “catastrophisers” are more 
functionally disabled than “non-catastrophisers” (eg. Robinson, et al., 1997), although the 
link with function has been less supported than the link with distress, and there is some 
evidence that any link with functioning may be attributable to the use of coping strategies 
(eg. Geisser, et al., 1994; Turner, et al., 2000). Such an interpretation would be consistent 
with a fear-avoidance perspective, where avoidance behaviour can be seen as a form of 
passive coping. 
Interestingly, Study One of the current research found no differences in functioning or 
activity-level between people differing in their tendency to catastrophise, either before 
coping was covaried or after. In Study Two, the current study also failed to support any 
link between catastrophising and activity-level on an intra-individual level. 
Catastrophising demonstrated a delayed effect – it was related to subsequent functioning 
– though this effect was not apparent when passive coping measured in the same 
timeframe as functioning was covaried. Although this needs further direct testing, this 
pattern suggests a mediation model consistent with fear-avoidance models, whereby the 
effect of catastrophising on function was attributable to subsequent passive coping 
behaviours. 
In summary, the findings of the current study suggest that at an intra-individual level, 
pain catastrophising is linked to emotional distress, as suggested by Beck (1967), but not 
directly to activity-engagement or functional disability. 
7.3.4 Expectancy Theory 
Expectancy theory suggests that behavioural engagement and performance in functional 
tasks will reduce if individuals expect an increase in pain (Dolce, et al., 1986), a view 
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also proposed by recent fear-avoidance models where anxious-anticipation of pain is 
accorded a central role in disability (Asmundson, Norton, & Vlaeyen, 2004). Laboratory 
studies have confirmed this hypothesis (eg. Lackner, et al., 1996), however 
match/mismatch effects have also been reported (Murphy, et al., 1997) whereby 
subsequent performance is suppressed after an under-prediction of the pain involved in a 
task. 
The current study was the first to investigate the effect of free-floating pain expectancies 
in a naturalistic setting on a within-person basis. Pain expectancies were related to 
concurrent activity-levels, suggesting that people may formulate their pain expectancies 
on the basis of their current activity-levels. This would appear to be consistent with 
Linton’s (1985) finding that people strongly believed that pain is linked to activities. 
Cross-lag findings were consistent with a match/mismatch perspective. When people 
predicted that their pain in subsequent hours would be low (representing an under-
prediction because subsequent pain was statistically controlled and held at an average), 
both activity-levels and engagement in functional activities were suppressed over 
subsequent hours. An alternative explanation for this finding is that people may be quite 
accurate in their predictions: if people judge their pain expectancies on their knowledge 
of the activities they have to perform over coming hours, a relationship between 
expectations of high pain and an increase in activity would merely refect the playing-out 
of what might be referred to as their activity-expectancies. Future studies might benefit 
from controlling for such activity-expectancies to control for this alternative explanation 
and reveal the true lagged-effect of pain expectancies. 
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The current study is also the first to investigate the relationship between free-floating 
pain expectancies and emotional distress. It was revealed that when people expected to 
experience increased pain they became more emotionally distressed. This was consistent 
with Murphy, et al.’s (1997) finding that pain expectancies were related to the experience 
of anxiety. 
Interestingly, pain expectancy appeared to play no role in differentiating between people 
in the cross-sectional studies in Study One of the current research. Such a discrepancy 
supports the need for within-person studies and, in particular, within-person studies of 
variables that fluctuate on an intra-individual basis – such as pain expectancy. 
In summary, the current study supported prior findings relating to expectancy theories of 
pain, but highlighted the importance of examining the match or mismatch between 
expectancies and subsequent experience for understanding the functional consequences 
of pain expectancies. 
7.3.5 Perceived Interference and Behavioural Models of Depression 
According to Lewinsohn’s (1974) behavioural model of depression, depressed mood is 
related to a limitation in access to positive reinforcement. On the basis of this model 
Rudy, et al. (1988) suggested that, given that chronic pain imposes limitations on 
individuals’ involvement in rewarding activities of every-day life, those who perceive 
greater life-interference resulting from their pain should also demonstrate greater 
symptoms of depression. A number of cross-sectional studies have supported this 
hypothesis (Rudy, et al., 1988; Maxwell, et al., 1998; Jacob, et al., 1993).  
The current study was the first to investigate the relative effect of this variable when 
analysed with a wide range of other key predictors of distress. The cross-sectional 
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analyses presented in Study One failed to support the above findings, showing that 
relative to these other predictors perceived interference displayed no effect.  
The current study is the first to investigate the within-person role of perceived 
interference. In contrast with the cross-sectional findings, on an intra-individual level 
perceived interference was the second strongest of the psychological predictors of 
distress. It also demonstrated a delayed effect, supporting its purported causal effect on 
distress. 
The current study was also the first to investigate the potential role of perceived 
interference in activity engagement and physical functioning. In Study One it 
demonstrated no effect in differentiating between people on the basis of activity-level or 
functioning. Interestingly, the construct was related to functioning, though this effect 
appeared to be attributable to the effect of coping behaviours. Within-person analyses 
revealed that perceived interference had a delayed effect on activity level, such that 
moments of reduced activity were likely to be preceded by moments of heightened 
perceptions of life-interference. 
A behavioural model may also explain why perceived life interference demonstrated a 
delayed effect on activity-level. Namely, behavioural engagement may undergo 
extinction after periods where it is perceived that activity has not been rewarded (as 
reflected in the perception of interference due to pain). Another way of expressing this is 
that perceptions of life interference may act as a disincentive for subsequent expenditure 
of effort. If this model is viable, subsequent studies may find an interaction effect 
whereby maximal lag2 activity-levels are observed when high levels of lag1 activity (ie. 
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the response) are accompanied by low perceived interference (reflecting absence of 
punishment, and representing a greater incentive for lag2 effort). 
No delayed effect of pain interference on functioning was observed. This seeming 
inconsistency with the activity-level findings may reflect a differential role of perceived 
interference on subsequent key (ie. “living-related”) activities than on subsequent general 
activity. For example, more powerful contingencies (such as task priorities) may operate 
to influence engagement in key activities, which over-ride the disincentive process 
described above. That is, whereas a person may come to feel that there is “no point going 
for a walk in the park”, they may continue to go to work or do house-chores “because I 
have to”. 
In summary, the current study supported a behavioural model of depression and chronic 
pain, demonstrating that momentary changes in perception of life interference were 
associated with, and possibly cause, fluctuations in mood state. Furthermore, perceptions 
of life interference also appeared to influence momentary levels of physical engagement. 
7.3.6 Theoretical Models of Coping: Active and Passive Coping 
Theoretical models of coping with chronic pain have distinguished between active and 
passive coping (Brown and Nicassio, 1987; Katz, et al., 1996). Avoidant ways of reacting 
to pain, incorporated under the umbrella of passive coping, are directly related to 
disability according to fear-avoidance models of chronic pain. Whilst passive coping has 
been strongly linked to both emotional dysfunction and functional disability in cross-
sectional studies, the findings for active coping have been less consistent (eg. Brown & 
Nicassio, 1987; Mercado, et al., 2000; Strahl, et al., 2000; Snow-Turek, et al., 1996). It 
has been linked to improved emotional and physical functioning, though it has also been 
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associated with a greater frequency of null results (eg. Evers, et al., 2003) and even with 
negative outcomes (Snow Turek, et al., 1996). The current study found no between-
persons effect for active coping on any measure of adaptation. However, an effect for 
passive coping was apparent – those who reported greater use of passive coping were 
more distressed, less active, and more functionally disabled.  
Whilst a number of within-person studies have demonstrated that various coping 
strategies (usually measured by the CSQ) are related to same day (Keefe, et al., 1997; 
Grant, et al., 2002) and next day (Keefe, et al., 1997) distress, the current study was the 
first to investigate the within-person effects of active and passive coping, and the first to 
investigate physical functioning outcomes. 
In Study Two of the current research, active-coping appeared to play no role except for a 
short-term effect on activity level. This effect may have been attributable to the activity 
involved in the strategies themselves (such as distracting activities, exercises, or 
stretching). As mentioned, this effect did not translate into a between-person effect 
whereby those who demonstrated more active coping were more physically active in 
general. 
The apparent absence of findings for active coping in the current study seems surprising, 
given the amount of research attention dedicated to active coping strategies (Katz, et al., 
1996; Jensen, Turner, Romano, & Karoly, 1991).  A number of issues that may have 
implications for these findings should be noted. Firstly, as stated by Rosenstiel and Keefe 
(1983) and Robinson, et al. (1997), participants’ understanding of reported coping 
behaviours may not be consistent with the definition of such strategies as understood by 
the researcher, implied in the questionnaire, or taught in coping-skills training. Further, 
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people’s application of such strategies may vary widely in terms of technique, 
persistence, ability, and skill. That is, skilled application of relaxation techniques may be 
more efficacious than application of a “naïve” relaxation technique (eg. closing one’s 
eyes), or an appropriate relaxation technique that is practiced at an inadequate frequency 
or applied for an inadequate duration (eg. Hoodin, Brines, Lake, Wilson, & Saper, 2000). 
Similarly, cognitive-coping techniques may be more effective for those with high 
capacity for dissociation, opportunity to absorb themselves in the technique (eg. Marino, 
Gwynn & Spanos, 1989; Devine & Spanos, 1990), or imagery ability (Leichter, 1988; 
Kwekkeboom, 2000). Such factors are not assessed by coping scales, and were not 
evaluated in the current study. The apparent effectiveness of coping may differ if active-
coping strategies are defined in a consistent manner, the application of the technique is 
assessed, and if participant’s skill-level and ability is gauged where relevant (eg. for 
relaxation, mindfulness, and imagery). 
Passive coping evidenced a short term relationship with activity-level, and delayed 
effects on both activity-level and functioning – suggesting a casual relationship with 
these indices of physical and social functioning. A subset of passive coping strategies 
appeared to be linked to subsequent (next lag) physical functioning: use of sedatives was 
linked with reduced subsequent activity-level, as was denial of the pain (“I tell myself it 
doesn’t hurt”), whereas laying down and resting was related to task avoidance and 
impaired functioning. 
Passive coping did not evidence a short-term effect on distress that was separable from 
the more powerful effect of appraisals. A delayed effect of passive coping was apparent, 
though this too may have been better explained by appraisals occurring more proximally 
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to the distress. These findings suggest a mediation effect whereby passive coping 
influences appraisal processes, which subsequently influence distress. Such a model 
should be tested explicitly. Two passive coping strategies appeared to play some role in 
subsequent distress: taking as required medication, and avoiding activity. The first 
strategy may induce distress in subsequent hours via detracting from internal pain-control 
self-efficacy, whereas the second of these strategies may contribute to distress by fuelling 
a sense of life-interference. 
In summary, the current study strongly supported the effect of passive coping on physical 
and social functioning, but was less clear about its effects on emotional functioning. No 
apparent benefits of active coping were observed apart from some effect on physical 
activation. The current study appeared to support Keefe, et al.’s (1987) position that 
positive adjustment to chronic pain is more dependent on avoiding passive coping than 
engaging in active-coping. 
7.3.7 Future Research Directions 
The current study investigated a sample of appraisal and coping factors suggested by both 
theoretical models and prior empirical findings. Expectations about the specific effect of 
these predictors were relatively straight-forward, with certain variables expected to be 
detrimental and other expected to be adaptive on the basis of theory and previous 
findings. These variables were investigated in order to test more general hypotheses 
regarding the independent relationship between appraisal, coping, and adjustment. 
Further research is needed regarding the effect and mode of action of these predictors on 
momentary adaptational status. In such research, appraisal and coping variables should be 
selected on the basis of a theoretical rationale, though exploratory studies such as this one 
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may guide this process. Furthermore, the proposed relationship of appraisal and coping 
variables to various outcomes, and their supposed mechanism of action, ought to be 
tested on a case-by-case basis based on appraisal-specific theoretical models. For 
example, specific models of catastrophising suggest that it may influence adaptation and 
pain perception via attentional mechanisms (eg. van Damme, et al., 2004). Models of 
pain expectancy might investigate the “match/mismatch” effect of over- or under- 
predictions of pain suggested by the current study. A model of pain expectancy based on 
avoidance theory might suggest that high pain expectancies will contribute to reduced 
functioning only when accompanied by a belief that activity leads to exacerbated pain.  
7.3.7.1 Models of Coping 
A number of models may be employed to understand the relationship between coping and 
adjustment, and testing such models explicitly may reveal effects that were not observed 
in the current study.  
A direct-effects model was assumed in the current project – certain coping strategies are 
likely to have direct implications for adaptational outcomes (see Example A in Figure 
7.1). Examples of this might include positive engagement in activities, the immediate 
effects of alcohol consumption on mood, social-support seeking leading to reduced 
distress, and activity avoidance, social solicitation, and use of sedatives and opioids 
reducing engagement in activities of daily living. However, different effects of coping 
may be revealed by testing alternate, more complex, models of coping. Such models 
include those in which the effect of coping is moderated by appraisal, mediated by 
appraisal, mediated by pain, or moderated by pain (see Figure 7.1). 
 
331 
Figure 7.1 Alternate Models of Coping with Chronic Pain 
 
An example of an appraisal moderation model (Example B in Figure 7.1) might suggest 
that active coping is more effective when approached with a high sense of self-efficacy or 
an expectancy of success (eg. Marino, et al., 1989). Similarly, detrimental effects of 
passive coping may be reduced when such activities are engaged in with a sense of 
control. For example, an individual might consume medication out of a sense of 
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desperation and with an external locus of pain control. Such a coping behaviour might 
reinforce a low sense of personal control, and contribute to reduced mood. Alternatively, 
an individual might approach medication usage in a self-regulated manner and with a 
high sense of personal control, having carefully chosen to commence medication use. For 
such an individual, coping via use of medication may not be associated with a degraded 
sense of personal control, and hence there may be no medication/distress relationship. 
Indeed, passive-coping strategies such as activity avoidance and use of pain-medications 
involve behaviours over which individuals have a high degree of perceived control. Thus, 
it is likely that such strategies may be often associated with a high sense of personal 
control over pain. Indeed, Linton (1985) illustrated that people with chronic pain strongly 
endorse the belief that activity and pain are related – that certain activities will promote 
pain and certain activities will reduce it. By contrast, cognitive-coping, whilst seen as an 
adaptive strategy because it approaches the pain problem rather than avoiding it, may be 
engaged in with a lower sense of pain-control. Thus, coping strategies should be 
investigated independently of constructs such as pain self-efficacy and outcome 
expectancy, contrasting with established definitions of coping (eg. Snow Turek, et al., 
1996) whereby passive coping is associated a priori with low personal control and active 
coping with high personal control. 
A model in which the effect of coping on adaptation is mediated by appraisal would 
suggest that coping strategies contribute to reappraisals, and reappraisals subsequently 
influence momentary adaptational status (Example C in Figure 7.1). For example, the 
mechanism of many active coping techniques may be via changes in pain-coping self-
efficacy or outcome expectancy (Rokicki, Holroyd, France, Lipchik, France & Kvaal, 
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1997; Kongstvedt, 1987). As another example, passive-coping may have a detrimental 
effect on internal-locus of pain-control, and this cognitive change may have a more 
proximal impact on adaptational states. The current findings for lag1 passive coping 
appear to suggest such a model, and this deserves to be tested directly. 
As well as direct effects on the adaptational outcome itself and potential effects involving 
appraisal, coping may have indirect effects on adaptation via pain – as suggested by a 
mediation model of pain and coping (Example D in Figure 7.1). Examples of possible 
direct effects of coping on pain include the pharmacological impact of medication use, 
mechanical effects of activity avoidance, and attentional effects of cognitive techniques. 
According to a pain-mediation model, changes to the pain experience itself then 
purportedly impacts on distress and function. 
A number of cross-sectional studies (eg. Jensen & Karoly, 1991) and one EMA study 
(Grant, 1998), have supported models whereby pain-intensity moderates the impact of 
coping on distress (Example F in Figure 7.1). Grant (1998) found that on high-pain days 
coping via ignoring sensations was more strongly associated with improved night-time 
depressed mood, and praying/hoping was associated with worsened night-time depressed 
and anxious mood. On low-pain days, distraction coping had a stronger beneficial effect 
on night-time anxiety. Thus, it appears that the effect of coping on within-person 
adaptation depends to some degree on pain intensity. Such analyses in the current study 
might have revealed differential effects, such as an effect for active coping. Namely, 
strategies for coping actively with pain may be effective – thereby beneficially impacting 
on adaptation – only at low-levels of pain. 
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A further interesting possibility is that active and passive coping may interact. Lazarus 
(2000) stated that he believed emotion- and problem- focused coping “are interdependent 
and work together, one supplementing the other in the overall coping process” (p.669). 
Thus, active coping may, for example, demonstrate a beneficial effect only in the absence 
of passive strategies, or the detrimental impact of passive strategies may be ameliorated 
by use of active strategies.  
A related issue is potential temporal sequencing of coping strategies. For example, 
according to the “fallback hypothesis” discussed by Tennen, et al. (2000), emotion-
focussed strategies may be more readily adopted if problem-focussed strategies have also 
been attempted. Thus, lagged effect may be observed whereby passive-coping is more 
prevalent at lag2 if accompanied by high reported levels of lag1 active-coping. 
Additional interaction effects may exist whereby this “fallback” only occurs when lag1 
active coping “fails”, as reflected by a cross-lag increase in pain or distress. 
7.3.7.2 Models of Appraisal 
Investigating similar models of appraisal might reveal interesting and complex processes. 
Pain-moderation models (see Figure 7.2, Example B), whereby the impact of appraisals 
on adaptation depends on pain intensity, have been supported in the cross-sectional 
literature (eg. Jensen and Karoly, 1991), and investigated but not supported in the within-
person literature (eg. Grant, 1998).  
A pain-mediation model of appraisal (see Example C in Figure 7.2) would suggest that 
appraisal influences adaptation (partly or entirely) via direct effects on the pain 
experience. A model suggesting full mediation of appraisal by pain-intensity, though 
logically sound, would not be supported on theoretical grounds according to social 
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learning theory (Bandura, 1977) and cognitive theories of emotion (Beck, 1967). 
However, partial mediation may be demonstrable. Although no known studies have 
tested such a model in its entirety, a number of cross-sectional (eg. Sullivan, Bishop, & 
Pivik, 1995; Robinson, et al., 1997) and within-person (eg. Grant, 1998; Banks, 1998) 
studies have linked catastrophising to the intensity of experienced pain. The mechanism 
linking catastrophising to pain experience may be attention modulation (Van Damme, 
Crombez, & Eccleston, 2002). Keefe, et al. (1997) also demonstrated that pain-coping 
self-efficacy was associated with both same- and next- day pain intensity.  
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Figure 7.2 Alternate Models of Appraisal and Chronic Pain 
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Stress and Coping theory (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984) suggests that the impact of 
appraisals on adjustment may be partially or even fully mediated by coping behaviours 
(see Example D in Figure 7.2). For example, findings of the current study suggested that 
the delayed effect of catastrophising and pain expectancy on functioning may be 
mediated by subsequent passive coping. Social-learning theory (Bandura, 1977) would 
also support a coping-mediation model as it relates to self-efficacy and outcome 
expectancies. Jensen and Karoly’s (1991) work suggested such a model cross-sectionally 
– pain-coping self-efficacy appeared to have no relationship with distress once coping 
strategy usage was controlled. However, no support was found in the current study for a 
model of pain self-efficacy whereby its effect is mediated by coping. 
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Figure 7.3 An Integrated Model of Momentary Adaptation To Chronic Pain 
 
7.3.7.3 Integrated Stress and Coping Models 
By testing both mediation-based and moderation-based models, Catley (1999) 
investigated interesting and complex models of the interaction between appraisal, 
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affective, and pain processes, though only her moderation model involved momentary 
processes. Subsequent within-person studies should be aimed at more directly testing 
general models of adaptation to pain derived from the perspective of Stress and Coping 
theory. For example, an integrated model (see Figure 7.3) might suggest that both 
momentary appraisals and coping strategies mediate the effect of pain-intensity (the 
stressor) on various indices of adjustment, though pain may maintain a direct effect as 
well. Further, the impact of appraisals on adjustment may be both direct and mediated by 
coping. An integrated model might also demonstrate that changes in adaptation outcomes 
feed back to alter the stressor itself and the appraisal/coping process. Research supporting 
a link between mood and activity-level and subsequent pain are consistent with such 
theorising (eg. Feldman, et al., 1999; Focht, et al., 2002). 
7.3.8 Integration of Between- and Within- Person Approaches 
Given sufficient level-two sample sizes, multi-level modelling applied to EMA data 
allows the researcher to simultaneously investigate within-person processes and between 
person differences (Schwartz and Stone, 1998). For example, when level-one predictors 
are person-centred, the mean of the untransformed variable for that person can be 
included as a level-two predictor (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Such a model allows the 
researcher to compare the separate effect of the predictor on within-person fluctuations in 
the outcome variable and between-person differences on the outcome variable. In the 
current context, such an approach may fruitfully address a number of pertinent questions. 
The most basic questions to address with such an approach involve direct-effects. What is 
the relationship between momentary appraisals and stable cognitive factors such as 
beliefs and commitments? Is it necessary to understand momentary fluctuations in 
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appraisal to understand people’s mood, or is it sufficient to know their “average” 
appraisals, or, beliefs? Such questions may lead to more complex models.  For example, 
in her moderation analysis, Catley (1999) conceptualised her appraisal variables as stable 
trait-like factors. Her model suggested that momentary pain influences momentary mood, 
and that general cognitive constructs (namely, beliefs relating to life-control and life-
interference) influence the nature of the momentary pain/affect relationship. An 
alternative model, testable via the methods described above, would suggest that we need 
to understand more than just general beliefs to understand momentary fluctuations in pain 
– that momentary changes in appraisal are associated with mood fluctuations even when 
controlling for average appraisals. Such a model would be supported by Stress and 
Coping theory (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). 
Another of the many possible questions that could be addressed by a simultaneous cross-
level approach concerns a pain-moderation model. Jensen and Karoly’s (1991) research 
supported a pain-moderation model whereby the adaptive effect of pain-coping self-
efficacy and certain coping strategies depended on the amount of pain the person usually 
experienced. Grant (1998) demonstrated the same model, but on a within-day basis. 
Jensen and Karoly’s work suggests that people who report that they usually use a given 
coping strategy and who experience low levels of pain are likely to be better adjusted, 
whereas Grant’s (1998) findings demonstrate that when a person is having a low pain day 
and they are using a certain coping strategy, they are likely to experience better night-
time mood. Does the effect of coping differ depending on the average level of pain a 
person tends to experience, or is the moderating effect of pain-intensity on coping a 
momentary process? Research distinguishing these between- and within- person 
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interpretations would have non-trivial implications. The first alternative would suggest 
that certain strategies should be advised for some people but not others, whilst the other 
suggests that people may benefit from learning which strategies to use at different levels 
of pain experience.  
As well as averaged level-one predictors, other variables relating to the person can be 
entered at level two to integrate the between- and within- person approaches. Such an 
approach could be used to address questions of whether there are person-factors that 
modify the within-person relationship between pain, appraisal, coping, and adaptation. 
Affleck, Tennen, et al. (1992) have already taken such an approach to investigate the 
effects of neuroticism on the within-person pain/mood relationship. Besides basic 
demographic characteristics, other potentially fruitful person-level mediators may involve 
clinical versus non-clinical status, differences between pain conditions, pain history, and 
bodily pain locations. 
7.3.9 Wider Outcome Assessment 
Aside from the current study, the current literature on momentary adaptational status in 
chronic pain is limited to emotional outcomes. Our understanding of the processes 
involved in adaptation to pain would benefit from exploration of diverse outcomes, 
including subsequent pain, function in various roles (family, work, community), and 
health-care utilisation. In terms of the current project, more in-depth exploration of 
emotional outcomes may be warranted – the PAMS distress measure could conceivably 
be broken down into PA and NA components, or separate indices reflecting anxiety, 
frustration, and depressed mood. Certain predictors may have selective effects on such 
affective outcomes, as suggested by studies involving PA and NA (eg. Catley, 1999; 
340 
Keefe, et al., 1997). For example, pain expectancy may specifically induce anxiety and 
perceived interference may selectively induce depressed mood. Subsequent research 
might reveal that certain active-coping strategies might demonstrate an effect on positive 
or negative affect where no effect was apparent on the PAMS’s general measure of 
distress. 
7.3.10 Limitations of the Current Research 
 
Thus far this chapter has overviewed the findings of the current study and discussed 
methodological and theoretical implications. In the discussion of these implications a 
number of caveats have been raised, in terms of limitations of the current research. For 
example, Section 7.2.1 described the relatively low compliance with monitoring obtained  
from participants in the current study, Section 7.2.2 discussed the problem of reactivity to 
measurement, and how such a phenomena was apparent in the activity-level and distress 
measures used in Study Two,  and Section 7.2.4 described the need for further 
exploration of the time-frame of delayed effect in lagged-analyses. Section 2.3 reported a 
number of hypotheses that were not tested in the current study, and potentially viable 
models of coping and adaptation to chronic pain that are worthy of further investigation. 
Section 7.3.9 described the need to assess a wider variety of possible outcomes, including 
a more diverse array of indices of emotional-functioning. 
 A number of other limitations, not explicitly raised earlier in this chaper, bear 
mentioning at this point. 
Firstly, it may be argued that the validity of a number of PAMS scales was not suitably 
established, and that this requires further attention. As anticipated, factor analysis of the 
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coping scales indicated two dimensions, which respectively reflected passive- and active- 
types of responses to pain. The resulting scales composed 15 of the 23 original items 
analysed, but accounted for only 26.6% of total variance. Thus, it is clear that there are 
important dimensions of coping not captured by the current scales. Thus may account for 
the relative lack of effect observed for Active Coping in the current project, where 
strategies such as information-seeking, talking and venting emotions, and problem-
solving were not measured. In terms of convergent validity, whilst ratings in EMA 
studies are not meant to be stable (that is, they are meant to reflect drifts in the 
participant’s experience and internal-states), average scores should nonetheless reflect 
cross-sectional measurements of the same constructs taken on well-established scales. All 
scales demonstrated significant relationships with relevant standard scales, though in 
some cases these correlations were not strong. For example, average of ratings from the 
PAMS passive- and active coping scales, discussed above, correlated only r=.31 and 
r=.41 with the CSQ passive- and active- coping scales, respectively. The average of 
ratings from the PAMS Self-Efficacy scale correlated only  r= .34 with another measure 
of pain self-efficacy, the PSEQ. The activity-level scale also did not correlate well with 
other questionnaire-based measures of functioning. In each of these cases the convergent 
validity of scales may have been better supported by the use of alternate, more suitable, 
convergent scales. Namely, the PAMS Pain Self-Efficacy scale appears to have been a 
measure of internal locus of pain control and may have benefited from comparison with a 
scale more reflective of this construct than the PSEQ. Similarly, active and passive 
coping may have been better assessed using the Vanderbilt scales, and the activity-level 
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measure may have been more prudently compared to ambulatory measures of activity 
(such as via accelerometry or a pedometry).   
In terms of divergent validity, the PAMS Catastrophising scale demonstrated a lack of 
specificity in its relationship to standard measures of appraisal-type constructs, in both 
studies one and two. Specifically, as well as substantial relationships with other 
catastrophising scales it demonstrated similarly significant relationships with a measure 
of perceived life-interference in both studies, a measure of pain self-efficacy in study one, 
and, in study two, measures of perceived life-control and perceived pain control. This is 
perhaps unsurprising given the presumably important role of catastrophising and the wide 
birth of the construct (for example, the PCS has three scales reflecting helplessness, 
rumination, and magnification). In addition, it would be anticipated that many of these 
constructs, being from the realm of primary appraisals of pain, would share a large 
amount of variance.  
The findings of the current study must be evaluated in light of the psychometics short-
comings of the scales noted above, particularly the relatively strong findings for 
catastrophising (which, as a scale, may be too wide in its content coverage), and the weak 
findings for pain self-efficacy and active coping (which would appear too narrow in their 
content focus). 
Secondly, it might be suggested, given the large level-one sample size of Study Two 
(n=1363 in the focal analyses), that the current study was over-powered. This would 
potentially risk liberal findings and interpretations, especially given that an alpha-value of 
0.05 was adopted as the criteria for significance in all analyses. This criterion was 
adopted due to the exploratory nature of the current study, and it is recommended that 
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further studies of this type, testing specific theoretical models, adopt more stringent 
control of error-rates. Nonetheless, when considering the findings of the large cross-
sectional literature in this field, and the findings of the few within-person studies that 
have been conducted, it is not considered that the findings of the current study were 
overly-liberal. Though many effects were quite small the majority were theoretically 
consistent. In fact, that many predictors that demonstrate strong effects in the literature 
failed to demonstrate an effect that reached statistical significance in the current study, 
when analysed concurrently with other important predictors, argues against the notion of 
these analyses being over-powered. **** 
A third potential issue relating to the current research is the heterogeneity of the chronic 
pain sample investigated. Authors have noted that the psychological correlates of pain are 
similar across a wide range of conditions and bodily-locations (Philips & Rachman, 
1996), and much research into psychological factors is conducted on heterogeneous pain 
samples (eg. Geisser, et al., 1994; Jensen, Turner, Romano & Lawler, 1994). However, it 
is also cautioned that effects may differ depending on the typical characteristics of a 
given condition (Jensen, Turner, Romano & Karoly, 1991; Turk & Okifuji, 2002). For 
example, some studies suggest that, compared to rheumatoid and osteo- arthritis where 
active coping is associated with better functioning and passive-coping with worse 
(Zautra, Burleson, Smith, Blalock, Wallston, & Devellis, 1995), both passive- and active- 
coping have been associated with impaired functioning amongst those with fibromyalgia 
syndrome (Nicassio, Schoenfeld-Smith, Radojevic & Schuman, 1995). The current study 
consisted of a sample of predominantly back-pain, arthritis, and neck and shoulder pain 
patients. Unfortunately, sample sizes were too small within each of these groups to make 
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sufficiently powerful between-groups comparisons to test the constancy of the within-
person effects observed. Any differences that may exist between diagnostic groups may 
have reduced the sensitivity of analyses and contributed to null-findings or the observed 
small effect sizes. Subsequent research would benefit from focussing investigations on a 
diagnostically homogenous sample or, given sufficient sample sizes, compare within-
person effects across diagnostic groups. 
Finally, it is worth noting that certain decisions were made in the course of the current 
study regarding the selection of covariates for the multi-level analyses that may have 
influenced the findings and could limit the generalisability of conclusions, namely control 
of autocorrelation and cross-lag effects. 
An important issue in repeated-measures multi-level analysis is the control of 
autocorrelation (West & Hepworth, 1991), and this is commonly performed by covarying 
the lag-1 value of the lag2 criterion variable (eg. Keefe, et al., 1997; Suls, Wan, & 
Blanchard, 1994). However, given that lag1 and lag2 outcome variables demonstrated a 
high degree of relationship (see Table D.8) it is likely that lag1 values may have 
accounted for much of the effect of other  key predictors before the key predictors were 
entered into the analysis. This may account for the generally low levels of prediction 
observed for the psychological variables here and in Keefe, et al.’s (1997) study. 
However, by failing to account for autocorrelation effects studies with cross-lag analysis 
would be unable to rule out the possible interpretation that previous-lag predictors are 
associated with lag2 outcomes only by virtue of their same-lag relationship with the 
outcome. Further studies may be able to approach this problem systematically by 
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investigating predictors without controlling for autocorrelation prior to adding the 
covariate to observe any interpretational changes.  
In study two, cross-lag change variables were utilised in certain cross-lag analyses to 
control for potential regression-to-the mean effects on the predictors in lag1. The effect of 
a predictor at lag2 on a lag2 outcome is likely to be stronger than the effect of the same 
predictor at lag1. Because it is likely that the predictor at lag1 and the lag1/lag2 change 
score for that predictor would share a negative relationship (when the lag1 value is high 
the lag2 value is likely to be lower, and visa versa) failing to control for these effects may 
mean that the observed relationship between the lag1 predictor and outcome would be 
suppressed. Such controls are important for clarifying the nature of the effect of the lag1 
predictor, but may underestimate its effect (Affleck, Tennen, et al., 1994). This issue 
appears to be of some concern for the proper interpretation of results from repeated-
measures multi-level model designs. One solution, which might be borne in mind in 
studies employing a similar analytic approach, would be to enter the lag1 predictor/s 
alone when the variance-accounted-for in lag2 outcomes is of key interest, but to covary 
cross-lag change variables or lag2 values (eg. Affleck, Tennen, et al., 1994) when 
investigating the nature of the effect of lag1 predictors. With regard to the second option, 
it must be noted that the meaning of the co-efficient/s of the focal predictor/s are 
interpreted as the (mean across-person) effect of the predictor on the outcome when other 
predictors in the analysis are held at zero. Thus, the interpretation of the coefficient of the 
lag1 predictor will change depending on which type of covariate is included to control 
cross-lag regression effects. In the case where an untransformed cross-lag change 
variable is covaried, the coefficient of the focal predictor can be interpreted as the (mean 
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cross-person) effect when the lag1 and lag2 values are identical (that is, when no change 
takes place in the predictor across lags). When mean-centred lag2 values are covaried the 
meaning of the coefficient for the lag1 predictor is translated as the (mean across-person) 
effect of the predictor on the criterion when the predictor is at its mean level at lag2 
(which, on average, will mean that the predictor will have decreased in value across lags 
for a high lag1 value and increased across lags for a low lag1 value).  It seems that further 
discussion and clarification of these issues is called for in the within-person literature. 
 
7.4 Applied Implications 
Whereas cross-sectional studies suggest that people who differ in terms of certain 
cognitive or coping variables differ along dimensions of adaptation, they can not 
demonstrate that such factors, as they change within people, are associated with changes 
in adaptational status. Within-person studies conducted over days, though they 
demonstrate that changes in psychological mechanisms are associated with changes 
within the person, do not reveal the momentary relationship between those processes. 
Momentary within-person studies, such as the current study, are able to demonstrate such 
micro-level relationships.  
Micro-level findings reveal factors that, if modified in real-time, may produce associated 
changes in the momentary experience and behaviour of the individual. Such findings can 
be used to suggest strategies aimed at modifying these psychological processes as they 
occur.  
In terms of momentary mood, the current study demonstrated that self-efficacious 
thoughts relating to one’s internal ability to cope with pain are directly related to positive 
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changes in mood. On the other hand, catastrophic thoughts about the meaning and 
consequences of pain, and thoughts about the negative impact of pain on one’s life were 
directly related to negative shifts in mood. Expecting that pain would become worse in 
subsequent hours appeared to be related to negative shifts in mood, though the causal 
direction of this effect was not as clear. The current study suggested that coping 
behaviours play a lesser role than proximal thoughts in emotional responses to pain. 
However, there was some suggestion that engaging in passive coping strategies, such as 
taking pain medications on an as required basis, and avoiding activity, were associated 
with negative shifts in mood soon afterwards. This effect may be because such 
behaviours have a detrimental effect on the momentary thought-processes described 
above.  
The current study suggested that both appraisals and coping responses need to be 
managed to improve physical functioning and involvement in physical activity. Disability 
in the daily lives of participants appeared to be predominantly (and, potentially, causally) 
related to recent use of passive coping strategies, including use of sedative medications, 
denial of the pain, and the tendency to cope via laying down and resting.  
Active coping appeared to have no effect on distress and little influence on functioning 
and activity except for a short-term relationship with increased activity. This was 
unexpected considering the large body of research literature concerned with active coping 
(Jensen, Turner, Romano, & Karoly, 1991; Katz, et al., 1996) and the focus on active 
skills in coping skills training for pain management (eg. Philips & Rachman, 1996; Turk, 
Meichenbaum, Genest, 1983). However, it is acknowledged that the impact of active 
coping-strategies on pain intensity itself was not examined, and this may be where these 
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strategies are most effective (eg. Brown & Nicassio, 1987). Furthermore, the exact 
behaviours engaged in by participants when they report active coping was not assessed in 
the current study. Reports of coping were taken at “face value”, and this may complicate 
interpretation along the lines argued by Robinson, et al. (1997). That is, if the current 
study was able to control the nature and quality of participants’ application of active 
coping a different pattern of results may have emerged. Subsequent research should aim 
to address such shortcomings. 
Moments characterised by expectations of increased pain were associated with increased 
activity and reduced disability over subsequent hours. This was likely to be because when 
people over-predict the pain resulting from their daily activities they “rebound” with a 
surge in activity. The resulting increase in involvement in functional activities may be 
because after such a “rebound” the individual is less inclined to use passive coping 
strategies to cope with their pain. This possibility requires further investigation.  
Moments during which the individual believed they were internally capable of coping 
with pain were characterised by increased activity, though the causal direction of this 
effect was not suggested.  
When people perceived that the pain was interfering with their life they appeared to 
become less active over subsequent hours. This may have been because of hopelessness 
associated with the process of behavioural extinction – when people perceive that their 
efforts are not rewarded they subsequently invest less energy.  
Finally, moments of catastrophic thinking about the pain were associated with greater 
functional disability over subsequent hours. This effect may occur because 
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catastrophising prompts individuals to cope passively with their pain, such as by laying 
down and resting.  
The findings of the current study support training in and practice of cognitive and 
behavioural skills for pain management. If individuals are proficient at recognising and 
modifying appraisals they may be more likely to act on detrimental thought processes in 
real-time. Similarly, individuals who have incorporated active strategies for managing 
pain into their daily routine and who avoid passive coping habits are likely to 
demonstrate better momentary adaptational status. Individuals skilled in self-management 
strategies for their pain may display lower average levels of daily distress and disability, 
but may also demonstrate fewer acute moments of adverse momentary adaptational 
experience. Such predictions are open to empirical examination, and momentary EMA 
studies appear well-suited to address them. 
Predominant findings from the coping analyses in the current study support Keefe, et al.’s 
(1987) suggestion that successful management of psychosocial adjustment to chronic 
pain is less about what active strategies one uses and more about what unhelpful 
strategies one avoids. In line with this, the current study found that use of pain 
medications on a regulated basis, avoiding use of sedative medications, and use of pacing 
strategies aimed at regulating activities, resting at appropriate times, and acknowledging 
the pain as it occurs are beneficial strategies.  
In terms of cognitive approaches, techniques aimed at rationalising expectations of pain 
would appear to benefit individuals’ emotional and physical functioning. Techniques may 
be applied to enable participants to more accurately predict the probable pain elicited by 
regular activities. Cognitive-therapy techniques, including behavioural experiments, may 
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be helpful in reducing catastrophising and improving daily mood and functioning. Such 
techniques may also be useful for rationalising perceptions of life interference, thereby 
improving mood and reducing inactivity. However, varying degrees of life-interference 
can be expected with chronic pain conditions (eg. Kerns & Jacob, 1993). Scheduling of 
pleasant-events and recreational and occupational therapies may alleviate this to some 
degree. Finally, strategies to enhance a sense of self-efficacy may improve mood and 
increase activity. Systematic use of active-coping strategies to “experiment” with pain 
control may enhance an individuals’ sense of their ability to manage pain without relying 
on external sources (eg. O’Leary, Shoor, Lorig & Holman, 1988). 
Interestingly, the current study found that a unique and important predictor of momentary 
mood and function was pain itself. Thus, the current project supported multi-disciplinary 
approaches to managing pain and psychosocial adjustment to pain. Quality-of-life in 
general, and quality of daily-life in particular, may be best served by combined 
approaches to manage pain itself and the cognitive and behavioural patterns that maintain 
distress and dysfunction. 
7.4.1 Use of PAMS Monitoring in Treatment 
Repeated momentary measurement of pain patients using PAMS may prove to have 
clinical utility. For the same reasons that EMA approaches have advantages over 
questionnaire-based studies for research purposes they have potential advantages for 
clinical applications: the quality of the data provided by PAMS, and the methodology’s 
capacity to address questions that cannot be answered by conventional questionnaires. 
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In most current rehabilitation and pain treatment settings, patients are expected to 
complete a battery of questionnaires aimed at assessing, amongst other things, the pain 
condition, physical and psychological adjustment, beliefs and appraisals, and coping.  
EMA data collected on these indices is likely to be less prone to recall inaccuracies and 
judgement biases on the part of the patient, and the data obtained by EMA is likely to be 
more ecologically validity (that is, more relevant to the “real life” contexts patients must 
return to). 
Furthermore, questionnaires are limited in their ability to assess within-person 
phenomena, such as the covariation of internal states. The only way to assess such issues 
with cross-sectional questionnaires or clinical interviews is to ask patients about them 
directly. Such an approach is likely to have questionable validity – it has been shown that 
recall of states such as pain and mood are inaccurate and biased (eg. Lousberg, et al., 
1997), and it is also likely that patients’ have limited insight into the covariation of such 
states. Shiffman, et al. (1994) showed, for example, that whilst participants reported that 
there was no relationship between their drinking and smoking, such a relationship was 
apparent according to EMA monitoring. 
The current study used an automated feedback system that analysed each participant’s 
PAMS data and provided a customised report (see Appendix G). A system involving 
automated feedback from EMA monitoring, implemented as part of a pre-admission 
assessment battery for pain treatment centres, could prove useful for planning and 
evaluating customised treatment plans. The current system, developed to provide 
feedback to participants regarding their PAMS data, needs validating. However, this 
system, or a similar one, could be used to assess such factors as patient’s pain/mood 
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relationship and pain/activity relationship, and factors that may prompt coping 
behaviours such as medication use or activity-avoidance. 
Further research may reveal that personalised treatment plans, involving delivery of 
treatment modules on the basis of PAMS diary data, may reduce the time and cost 
involved in pain management treatments and may have beneficial effects on other key 
outcomes as well. Such a finding would be a positive practical outcome of the kind of 
research reported here, and would help reduce the costs to society and the personal cost to 
individuals of what is a widespread and disabling problem. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A.1 Comparison between PAMS Emotional Distress Items and Items from Established Scales 
PAMS items Source items 
Right now I feel calm and peaceful SF-36, q9d: “Have you felt calm and peaceful?” 
How down do I feel right now?          SF-36, q9f: “Have you felt down?” 
I am depressed at this moment         Peters, et al. (2000):”Right now I feel depressed” 
How anxious do I feel right now?          MPI: q28 “During the past week how tense or anxious have you 
been?” 
How irritable do I feel right now?          MPI: q26 “In the past week how irritable have you been?” 
I feel tense or 'wound up' right now         MPI: q28 “During the past week how tense or anxious have you 
been?”; HADS: “I feel tense or ‘wound up’” 
I feel cheerful right now         HADS: “I feel cheerful” 
 
 
Table A.2 Comparison between PAMS Pain Appraisal Items and Items from Established Scales 
PAMS items Source items 
Pain Self-Efficacy 
At the moment I am able to cope with the 
pain without medication          
PSEQ: “I can cope with my pain without medication” 
I'm capable of controlling the amount of pain 
I experience (without medication)         
CSQ: “Based on all the things you do to cope, or deal with, 
your pain, on an average day, how much control do you 
feel you have over it?” 
Right now I feel I'm capable of decreasing the 
pain without using medication          
CSQ: “Based on all the things you do to cope, or deal with, 
your pain, on an average day, how much are you able to 
decrease it? 
At this moment I believe I am able to do the 
things I need to do today         
PSEQ: “I can still do many of the things I enjoy doing, 
such as hobbies or leisure activities, despite the pain”, “I 
can do most of the household chores (eg. tidying-up, 
washing dishes etc), despite the pain”, “I can do some form 
of work, despite the pain (“work” included housework, paid 
and unpaid work)”, “I can gradually become more active, 
despite the pain” 
I believe I'm capable of engaging in physical 
activity (eg, work, chores, shopping)         
Catastrophising 
Right now I think that having the pain is 
terrible and I can't stand it anymore         
PCS: q3 “Its terrible and I think its never going to get any 
better”, q5 “I feel I can’t stand it anymore” 
Right now I wonder whether something 
serious may happen because of the pain         
PCS: q11 “I wonder whether something serious may 
happen” 
Perceived Pain Interference 
At the moment I am accomplishing less than I 
would like because of the pain         
SF-36, 4a: “Accomplished less than you would like” 
Right now I am finding it difficult to perform 
day-to-day activities because of the pain         
SF-36, 4d: “Had difficulty performing the work or other 
activities (for example, it took extra effort) 
Right now I feel I'm limited in the kinds of 
activities I can perform, because of the pain         
SF-36, 4c: “Were limited in the kind of work or other 
activities” 
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Table A.3 Comparison between PAMS Function Items and Items from Established Scales 
PAMS items Source items 
Activity Engagement 
Sit down DQ: “I sit down for most of the day because of my pain” 
Lie down PBQ: “Lie down/rest/sleep”; DQ: “Because of my pain I lie down to rest more 
often” 
Stand up PBQ: “Avoid standing”; Peters, et al. (2000): Right now I am capable of 
standing”; DQ “I only stand up for short periods of time because of my pain” 
Nap or rest PBQ: “Lie down/rest/sleep” 
Dress or bathe myself SF-36, 3j: “Bathing or dressing yourself” 
Bend, kneel or stoop  SF-36, 3f: “Bending, kneeling, or stooping”; DQ “Because of my pain, I try 
not to bend or kneel down” 
Carry or push an object SF-36, 3c: “Lifting or carrying groceries” 
Lift an object SF-36, 3c: “Lifting or carrying groceries” 
Walked 100 meters SF-36, 3i: “Walking 100 meters” 
Walked half a kilometer SF-36, 3h: “Walking half a kilometer” 
Walked more than 1km SF-36, 3g: “Walking more than a kilometer” 
Climbed 1 flight of steps SF-36, 3e: “Climbing one flight of stairs” 
Climbed several flights SF-36, 3e: “Climbing several flights of stairs” 
Activity Avoidance 
Housework/chores PBQ: “Avoid housework”, “Avoid odd jobs in house”;  MPI “How much has 
your pain changed your ability to do household chores” 
Yardwork/gardening PBQ: “Avoid gardening”; DQ: “Because of my pain, I am not doing any of the 
jobs that I usually do around the house”, “I avoid heavy jobs around the house 
because of my pain”  
Work (paid or unpaid) PBQ: “Avoid going to work” 
Shopping PBQ: “Avoid shopping” 
Cooking PBQ: “Avoid cooking” 
Visiting PBQ: “Avoid visiting” 
Dress or bathe myself DQ “I get dressed more slowly than usual because of my pain”, “I have trouble 
putting on socks (or stockings) because of my pain”, “Because of my pain, I 
get dressed with help from someone else” 
Driving PBQ: “Avoid travel in cars” 
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Table A.4 Comparison between PAMS Pain Coping Items and Items from Established Scales 
PAMS items Source items 
Coping Behaviours & Relaxation 
Did an activity/stretched CSQ: “I do something active, like household chores or 
projects 
Divert Attention 
Did something I enjoy CSQ: “I think of things I enjoy doing” 
Think of pleasant things  CSQ: “I try to think of something pleasant” 
Distract myself from pain  CSE: “Distract myself from the pain” 
Kept myself busy CSE: “Keep busy to deal with the pain” 
Ignore 
Ignore the pain CSQ: ”I ignore it”; CSE: “Ignore the pain” 
Pretend it isn't there CSQ: “I pretend it is not there” 
Tell myself it doesn't hurt  CSQ: “I tell myself it doesn’t hurt” 
Reinterpret 
Try to feel distant from it CSQ: “I try to feel distant from the pain, almost as if the pain 
was in somebody else’s body” 
I don't think of it as pain CSQ: “I don’t think of it as pain but rather a dull or warm 
feeling” 
Substance Use 
Drank alcohol PBQ: “Have alcohol” 
Taken pain medication as part of a regular 
schedule PBQ: “Take prescribed medication”, “Take unprescribed 
medication” Taken pain medications that were not part 
of a regular schedule 
Communication 
Talked to partner/friend PBS: “Tell friend”, “Tell someone in family” 
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Table A.5 Frequency Counts of Demographic Variables According To Gender and Sample Source 
  Gender  Sample   Total 
  Male Female Clinical Comm. Student  
 N 53 70 33 63 27 124 
        
Sample 
Source 
Clinical 19 14 - - - 33 
Community 24 39 - - - 63 
 Student 10 17 - - - 27 
Marital 
Status 
Single 15 21 8 11 18 37 
Married 26 35 19 39 3 61 
 Separated 3 1 2 1 1 4 
 Divorced 2 7 3 6 0 9 
 De Facto 6 5 1 5 5 11 
 Widow/er  0 1 0 1 0 1 
Education Primary 6 2 4 4 0 8 
 Junior Secondary 12 16 12 15 1 28 
 Senior Secondary 12 23 11 11 14 36 
 Certificate/Diploma 16 15 5 21 5 31 
 Bachelor Degree 5 12 2 8 7 17 
 Higher Degree 2 1 0 3 0 3 
Employment 
Status 
Full-time 10 9 3 15 1 19 
Part-time 8 9 1 10 6 17 
 Casual 2 4 0 3 3 6 
 Voluntary 0 7 2 5 0 7 
 Home duties 10 14 11 13 0 24 
 Retraining 2 0 1 1 0 2 
 Student 7 14 1 3 17 21 
 Unemployed 5 5 8 3 0 11 
 Retired 9 8 7 10 0 17 
Profession Manager/Administrator 6 3 1 5 3 9 
 Professional 4 6 4 6 0 10 
 Para-professional 3 11 4 9 1 14 
 Tradesperson 12 4 8 6 2 16 
 Administrative Assistant 3 13 5 7 4 16 
 
Sales and Personal 
Services 7 10 3 8 6 17 
 
Machine Operator or 
Driver 3 5 2 6 0 8 
 Manual Worker 7 2 1 7 1 9 
 Never Had A Job 2 7 0 0 9 9 
 Other 6 9 5 9 1 15 
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Table A.5 continued… 
  Gender  Sample   Total 
  Male Female Clinical Comm. Student  
Source Of 
Income 
Worker's Comp 2 1 2 1 0 3 
Age Pension 2 2 2 2 0 4 
 Wages/Salary 20 23 4 24 15 43 
 Unemployment benefits 3 4 3 3 1 7 
 Superannuation 2 0 1 1 0 2 
 Sickness benefits 4 3 5 3 0 8 
 Invalid Pension 12 18 16 13 1 30 
 Partner's Income 6 14 3 14 3 20 
 Supporting Parent's 1 5 1 0 5 6 
 Savings/Investments 7 6 1 6 6 13 
 Other 4 10 3 7 4 14 
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Table A.6 Frequency Counts of Pain Variables According To Gender and Sample Source 
  Gender  Sample   Total 
  Male Female Clinical Comm. Student  
 N 53 70 33 63 27 124 
Pain 
Topography 
Always present, same intensity 2 1 3 0 0 3 
Always present, varied intensity 37 42 28 42 10 79 
 Usually present but short pain-free periods 2 10 0 11 1 12 
 Often present, but pain-free periods of up to 
several hours 
5 8 2 6 5 13 
 Often present, but pain-free much of the day 3 4 1 3 3 7 
 Occasionally present, but not every day 4 3 0 1 6 7 
 Rarely present - days or weeks between pain 
episodes 
0 2 0 0 2 2 
       
Pain Cause Work Accident 10 7 9 8 1 17 
 Work - other 4 3 1 6 0 7 
 Home Accident 3 6 3 5 1 9 
 Car Accident 8 14 4 17 1 22 
 Post-surgical 7 6 9 2 2 13 
 After an illness 2 5 2 3 2 7 
 No clear reason 10 22 5 14 13 32 
 Other 9 7 1 8 7 16 
Pain 
Locations 
Head 17 23 6 25 9 40 
Jaw 2 1 2 0 1 3 
 Facial 7 15 6 11 5 22 
 Neck 7 15 13 40 9 22 
 Shoulders 12 18 8 17 5 30 
 Upper back 6 19 6 15 4 25 
 Lower back 19 32 11 29 11 51 
 Chest 2 5 2 2 3 7 
 Arms 5 21 5 18 3 26 
 Hands 5 21 6 13 1 26 
 Abdomen 4 10 2 8 4 14 
 Genitals 4 1 0 5 0 5 
 Buttocks 9 17 7 16 3 26 
 Upper Leg 13 24 9 22 6 37 
 Lower Leg 6 10 5 9 2 16 
 Feet 9 11 4 12 4 20 
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Table A.6 continued… 
  Gender  Sample   Total 
  Male Female Clinical Comm. Student  
Medication 
usage 
Sedatives, hypnotics 5 8 2 9 2 13 
Anti-anxiety 5 8 3 6 1 13 
 Antidepressant – Tricyclic 8 11 9 10 0 19 
 Antidepressant - SSRI 3 15 8 8 2 18 
 Antidepressant - other 8 4 5 6 1 12 
 Anti-migraine 0 1 0 1 0 1 
 Anticonvulsants 6 7 11 2 0 13 
 Narcotics 20 37 19 32 6 57 
 Simple analgesics 21 25 20 19 7 46 
 Combination analgesics 6 7 0 9 4 13 
 NSAIDS 4 15 1 13 5 19 
 Anti-rheumatoid 1 3 1 2 1 4 
 Topical Analgesics 0 2 0 2 0 2 
Pain-related 
treatments 
Acupuncturist 24 34 22 28 9 58 
Anesthetist 11 18 14 12 3 29 
 Chiropractor 20 32 13 32 8 52 
 Homeopath 6 17 6 13 4 23 
 Hypnotherapist 3 5 3 2 3 8 
 Neurologist 20 31 17 29 5 51 
 Neurosurgeon 21 16 13 25 0 37 
 OT 22 26 26 21 2 48 
 Orthopedic Surgeon 28 32 22 32 6 60 
 Physiotherapist 43 53 30 52 15 96 
 Psychologist 24 28 25 24 4 52 
 Psychiatrist 22 25 24 20 4 47 
 Rheumatologist 22 25 5 18 2 47 
 Pain Clinic 27 31 31 23 5 58 
 GP 27 31 32 57 18 58 
 Other 14 17 3 20 8 31 
Current pain- 
or injury- 
related 
litigation 
None 44 60 29 49 27 104 
Worker's Compensation 1 2 2 1 0 3 
Third-party compensation 5 7 2 10 0 12 
Other 3 1 1 3 0 4 
Previous 
pain- or 
injury- related 
litigation 
None 38 53 23 44 25 91 
Worker's Compensation 9 7 5 11 0 16 
Third-party compensation 1 8 2 5 2 9 
Other 4 2 3 3 0 6 
Outcome of 
previous 
litigation 
Successful 10 11 5 14 2 21 
Unsuccessful 4 6 5 5 0 10 
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Table A.7 Descriptive statistics for the total sample. 
 N Min. Max. M SD  Skew Std.  
Skew 
Kurt. Std.  
Kurt. 
Time taken to complete PAMS 115 5 680 39.25 76.76  6.10 26.99 45.19 101.11 
Age 123 14 78 42.17 15.34  -0.08 -0.37 -0.87 -2.01 
Pain Duration 122 0.17 58.17 10.12 11.66  2.26 10.33 5.74 13.20 
Total Pain Sites 123 1 50 12.44 10.20  1.69 7.77 3.04 7.01 
Regular Sites 123 0 50 6.61 7.10  2.47 11.33 10.53 24.33 
Primary Sites 123 0 50 5.01 6.64  3.33 15.26 16.95 39.15 
Radiating sites 123 0 41 5.83 7.73  2.07 9.48 4.82 11.12 
McGill PRI – Total 123 0.01 0.89 0.41 0.18  0.00 0.00 -0.64 -1.49 
MPI - Pain Severity 121 0.67 6 3.83 1.15  -0.81 -3.66 0.18 0.42 
MPI - Affective Distress 121 0.67 6 3.21 1.21  -0.11 -0.48 -0.51 -1.17 
MPI - Interfere 121 0.09 6 3.91 1.34  -0.72 -3.25 -0.04 -0.10 
MPI - Support 112 0 6 4.19 1.51  -1.03 -4.50 0.40 0.87 
MPI - Life-Control 121 0 6 3.21 1.21  -0.32 -1.43 -0.21 -0.47 
PCS - Rumination 121 0 16 7.82 4.37  0.13 0.60 -0.76 -1.75 
PCS - Magnification 121 0 12 4.07 3.15  0.57 2.59 -0.24 -0.54 
PCS - Helplessness 121 0 24 10.06 5.61  0.36 1.64 -0.26 -0.60 
PSEQ 121 3 58 32.66 13.31  -0.29 -1.32 -0.66 -1.52 
CSQ - Catastrophising 118 0 36 12.40 8.70  0.59 2.64 -0.25 -0.57 
CSQ - Control over Pain 120 0 5 2.73 1.43  -0.39 -1.77 -0.37 -0.85 
CSQ - Ability to Decrease Pain 120 0 5 2.33 1.32  -0.19 -0.84 -0.54 -1.24 
CSQ - Divert Attention 118 0 62 14.89 9.89  0.95 4.26 3.20 7.23 
CSQ - Reinterpret Pain Sensation 118 0 34 7.95 6.84  1.07 4.78 1.38 3.11 
CSQ - Ignoring Sensations 118 0 34 13.89 7.64  0.16 0.73 -0.64 -1.44 
CSQ - Praying or Hoping 118 0 36 11.88 8.82  0.45 2.00 -0.56 -1.27 
CSQ - Coping Self Statements 118 3 36 21.14 7.17  -0.16 -0.71 -0.44 -1.00 
CSQ - Increased Beh.Activities 118 0 35 16.03 6.92  -0.15 -0.67 0.12 0.27 
HADS - Anxiety 122 1 20 9.51 4.39  0.14 0.63 -0.60 -1.39 
HADS - Depression 122 0 20 7.25 4.35  0.53 2.40 -0.32 -0.74 
SF36 - Phy Funct 121 10 30 20.50 5.47  0.15 0.69 -1.01 -2.31 
SF36 - Phy Role Funct 120 4 8 4.80 1.27  1.39 6.30 0.65 1.47 
SF36 - Bodily Pain 118 2 10.4 5.11 1.76  0.62 2.77 -0.08 -0.19 
SF36 - General Health 119 6 25 15.66 5.13  -0.06 -0.28 -1.15 -2.62 
SF36 - Vitality 118 4 21 11.44 4.21  0.16 0.70 -0.89 -2.01 
SF36 - Social Funct 118 4 24 15.98 4.36  -0.10 -0.43 -0.46 -1.05 
SF36 - Em Role Funct 118 3 6 4.21 1.21  0.41 1.82 -1.42 -3.22 
SF36 - Men Health 118 10 29 19.81 5.08  -0.23 -1.03 -0.93 -2.10 
SF36 - Health Transition 120 1 5 3.18 1.09  -0.06 -0.26 -0.52 -1.19 
DQ 121 0 23 10.69 5.95  0.24 1.10 -1.05 -2.41 
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Table A.8 Descriptive statistics according to gender and source: M (SD) 
  Gender  Source   
  Male Female Clinical Community Student 
Time taken to complete PAMS 43.73 (102.34) 35.56 (46.77) 37.37 (58.71) 49.78 (96.75) 17.54 (19.99) 
Age  43.34 (15.64) 41.29 (15.16) 48.61 (11.85) 46.17 (13.28) 25 (10.65) 
Pain Duration 10.38 (12.27) 9.92 (11.25) 11.84 (12.23) 11.05 (12.76) 5.87 (6.5) 
Total Pain Sites 11.17 (9.39) 13.4 (10.75) 11.48 (7.94) 15.24 (11.84) 7.07 (5.17) 
Regular Sites 5.55 (6.21) 7.41 (7.65) 5.3 (6.16) 8.11 (8.25) 4.7 (4.04) 
Primary Sites 4.74 (6.15) 5.21 (7.02) 4.61 (6.07) 5.92 (7.86) 3.37 (3.04) 
Radiating sites 5.62 (7.47) 5.99 (7.98) 6.18 (6.74) 7.13 (9.16) 2.37 (2.8) 
McGill PRI - Total 0.41 (0.2) 0.41 (0.18) 0.4 (0.19) 0.44 (0.17) 0.36 (0.19) 
MPI Pain Severity 3.57 (1.21) 4 (1.06) 4.15 (1.04) 4.04 (0.93) 2.95 (1.3) 
 Affective Distress 2.99 (1.31) 3.36 (1.12) 3.11 (1.22) 3.23 (1.18) 3.27 (1.31) 
 Interfere 3.88 (1.45) 3.93 (1.26) 4.26 (0.96) 4.22 (1.23) 2.78 (1.38) 
 Support 4.31 (1.58) 4.07 (1.45) 4.28 (1.8) 4.41 (1.21) 3.62 (1.61) 
 Life-Control 3.34 (1.17) 3.13 (1.25) 3.4 (1.41) 3.26 (1.07) 2.86 (1.24) 
PCS Rumination 7.96 (4.68) 7.6 (4.05) 9.04 (4.83) 7.81 (4.29) 6.41 (3.62) 
 Magnification 3.98 (3.2) 4.03 (3) 4.31 (3.71) 4.15 (2.86) 3.63 (3.15) 
 Helplessness 10.12 (6.39) 9.96 (5.01) 11.53 (5.66) 10.37 (5.45) 7.59 (5.32) 
PSEQ  33.15 (14.55) 32.62 (12.18) 28.5 (12.74) 30.95 (13) 41.54 (10.84) 
CSQ Catastrophising 10.98 (9) 13.39 (8.4) 13.45 (9.14) 11.87 (9) 12.39 (7.66) 
 Control over Pain 2.85 (1.38) 2.63 (1.48) 2.52 (1.46) 2.8 (1.38) 2.81 (1.52) 
 Ability to Decrease Pain 2.45 (1.23) 2.23 (1.4) 2.19 (1.35) 2.43 (1.22) 2.24 (1.53) 
 Divert Attention 13.86 (9.71) 15.73 (10.09) 15.97 (9.95) 15.53 (10.84) 12.24 (7.06) 
 Reinterpret Pain Sens. 7.71 (6.52) 8.26 (7.11) 7.55 (6.81) 7.67 (7.63) 9.04 (4.87) 
 Ignoring Sensations 15.08 (6.81) 13.18 (8.05) 12.45 (7.92) 14 (7.45) 15.3 (7.73) 
 Praying or Hoping 10.85 (8.63) 12.69 (9.02) 11.96 (9.82) 11.55 (8.68) 12.52 (8.21) 
 Coping Self Statements 20.85 (7.64) 21.55 (6.73) 20.06 (8.19) 22.01 (6.48) 20.44 (7.44) 
 Increased Beh. Activities 15.45 (7.11) 16.53 (6.83) 18.39 (7.45) 16.21 (6.27) 12.94 (6.75) 
HADS Anxiety 8.48 (4.49) 10.23 (4.19) 10.44 (4.63) 9.07 (4.19) 9.44 (4.56) 
 Depression 7 (4.46) 7.39 (4.3) 8.63 (4.39) 7.41 (4.44) 5.22 (3.37) 
SF-36 Physical Functioning 21.4 (5.71) 19.92 (5.21) 19.36 (4.9) 19.13 (5.28) 25 (4.11) 
 Role Functioning - Phy 5.06 (1.49) 4.62 (1.05) 4.55 (1.31) 4.6 (1.11) 5.56 (1.31) 
 Bodily Pain 5.17 (1.92) 5.08 (1.66) 4.61 (1.46) 4.82 (1.55) 6.32 (1.98) 
 General Health 16.43 (4.97) 15.15 (5.23) 14.73 (5.56) 15.96 (5.18) 16.06 (4.45) 
 Vitality 12.33 (4.5) 10.83 (3.93) 11.82 (4.27) 10.96 (4.28) 12.15 (4) 
 Social Functioning 15.67 (5.07) 16.24 (3.81) 14.4 (3.62) 15.48 (4.54) 19 (3.21) 
 Role Functioning – Em. 4.45 (1.24) 4.06 (1.17) 3.9 (1.08) 4.31 (1.3) 4.33 (1.11) 
 Mental Health 20.63 (5.5) 19.24 (4.75) 19.41 (5.15) 19.9 (5.26) 20.04 (4.75) 
 Health Transition 3.35 (1.18) 3.04 (1.01) 3.32 (1.19) 3.29 (1.05) 2.78 (1.01) 
DQ  9.92 (5.78) 11.09 (5.95) 12.41 (5.73) 11.38 (5.9) 6.88 (4.76) 
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APPENDIX B 
Demographics and Pain History Questionnaire 
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APPENDIX C 
Table C.1. Frequency counts of demographic variables according to gender and sample source 
  Total Sample   Gender  Cohort  
   Clin. Comm. Student Male Female Old New 
 N 53 11 20 22 16 37 28 25 
Sex Female 37 6 16 15   21 16 
 Male 16 5 4 7   8 8 
Sample 
Source 
Clinical 11    5 6 6 5 
Community 20    4 16 17 3 
 Student 22    7 15 5 17 
Marital 
Status 
Single 18 1 2 15 4 14 8 10 
Married 19 6 12 1 8 11 13 6 
 Separated 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 1 
 Divorced 2 1 1 0 0 2 2 0 
 De Facto 6 2 2 2 1 5 2 4 
 Widow/er  1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Education Primary 4 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 
 Junior Secondary 9 3 6 0 1 8 7 2 
 Senior Secondary 15 1 3 11 3 12 8 7 
 Certificate/Diploma 11 2 5 4 4 7 6 5 
 Bachelor Degree 5 1 2 2 3 2 3 2 
 Higher Degree 3 1 0 2 2 1 0 3 
Employment 
Status 
Full-time 5 1 3 1 2 3 5 0 
Part-time 6 0 2 4 2 4 2 4 
 Casual 4 0 2 2 1 3 3 1 
 Voluntary 2 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 
 Home duties 4 1 2 1 0 4 3 1 
 Retraining 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
 Student 11 1 2 8 3 8 4 7 
 Unemployed 8 4 2 2 5 3 4 4 
 Retired 6 3 3 0 2 4 3 3 
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Table  C.1 continued… 
  Total Sample   Gender  Cohort  
   Clin. Comm. Student Male Female Old New 
Profession Manager/Administrator 6 1 3 2 3 3 3 3 
 Professional 4 2 1 1 1 3 2 2 
 Para-professional 6 1 5 0 0 6 5 1 
 Tradesperson 2 2 0 0 2 0 1 1 
 Administrative Assistant 5 0 1 4 0 5 2 3 
 
Sales and Personal 
Services 
6 0 2 4 2 4 3 3 
 
Machine Operator or 
Driver 
4 1 2 1 1 3 3 1 
 Manual Worker 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 
 Never Had A Job 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
 Other 10 3 3 4 2 8 6 4 
Source Of 
Income 
Worker's Comp 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Age Pension 3 2 1 0 1 2 2 1 
 Wages/Salary 18 1 5 12 6 12 9 9 
 Unemployment benefits 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Superannuation 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
 Sickness benefits 3 0 2 1 1 2 3 0 
 Invalid Pension 13 5 7 1 3 10 9 4 
 Partner's Income 9 3 3 3 3 6 3 6 
 Supporting Parent's 4 0 0 4 3 1 0 4 
 Savings/Investments 6 0 2 4 1 5 3 3 
 Other 4 0 1 3 1 3 2 2 
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Table C.2 Frequency counts of pain variables according to gender, sample source, and cohort 
   Sample   Gender  Cohort  
  Total Clin. Comm. Student Male Female Old New 
Pain 
Topography 
Always present, same intensity 2 1 0 1 1 1 0 2 
Always present, varied 
intensity 29 8 18 3 8 21 23 6 
 Usually present but short pain-
free periods 6 1 0 5 3 3 1 5 
 Often present, but pain-free 
periods of up to several hours 6 1 0 5 0 6 3 3 
 Often present, but pain-free 
much of the day 4 0 0 4 3 1 0 4 
 Occasionally present, but not 
every day 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Rarely present - days or weeks 
between pain episodes 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
         
Pain Cause Work Accident 7 1 4 2 3 4 5 2 
 Work - other 5 1 3 1 2 3 3 2 
 Home Accident 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 
 Car Accident 3 1 1 1 1 2 3 0 
 Post-surgical 4 3 1 0 2 2 3 1 
 After an illness 2 1 0 1 0 2 0 2 
 No clear reason 15 2 6 7 3 12 8 7 
 Other 9 1 2 6 3 6 4 5 
Pain Locations Head 15 2 5 8 5 10 8 7 
Jaw 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
 Facial 11 1 4 6 3 8 7 4 
 Neck 20 6 9 5 7 13 12 8 
 Shoulders 10 1 6 3 2 8 6 4 
 Upper back 6 3 1 2 2 4 3 3 
 Lower back 27 7 12 8 8 19 18 9 
 Chest 2 2 0 0 2 0 1 1 
 Arms 11 4 7 0 3 8 9 2 
 Hands 7 1 6 0 2 5 6 1 
 Abdomen 6 3 3 0 2 4 6 0 
 Genitals 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 Buttocks 11 3 4 4 2 9 6 5 
 Upper Leg 20 4 12 4 6 14 13 7 
 Lower Leg 5 2 2 1 3 2 4 1 
 Feet 8 0 8 0 2 6 6 2 
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Table C.2 continued… 
   Sample   Gender  Cohort  
  Total Clin. Comm. Student Male Female Old New 
Medication usage Sedatives, hypnotics 5 1 3 1 0 5 5 0 
Anti-anxiety 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 
 Antidepressant – Tricyclic 6 4 2 0 2 4 5 1 
 Antidepressant - SSRI 5 0 2 3 0 5 4 1 
 Antidepressant - other 2 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Anti-migraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Anticonvulsants 2 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 
 Narcotics 19 7 8 4 3 16 11 8 
 Simple analgesics 19 4 8 7 7 12 9 10 
 Combination analgesics 4 0 2 2 1 3 2 2 
 NSAIDS 8 1 5 2 1 7 5 3 
 Anti-rheumatoid 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
 Topical Analgesics 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pain-related 
treatments 
Acupuncturist 18 3 9 6 7 11 12 6 
Anaesthetist 11 4 4 3 5 6 7 4 
 Chiropractor 16 3 6 7 8 8 8 8 
 Homeopath 7 1 4 2 2 5 5 2 
 Hypnotherapist 5 1 2 2 2 3 4 1 
 Neurologist 19 7 7 5 7 12 13 6 
 Neurosurgeon 6 3 2 1 4 2 5 1 
 OT 16 7 7 2 8 8 12 4 
 Orthopaedic Surg 20 5 10 5 6 14 15 5 
 Physio 34 7 15 12 12 22 20 14 
 Psychologist 14 4 6 4 5 9 12 2 
 Psychiatrist 15 5 7 3 6 9 11 4 
 Rheumatologist 12 2 9 1 2 10 8 4 
 Pain Clinic 20 10 8 2 7 13 14 6 
 GP 39 9 18 12 12 27 24 15 
 Other 14 2 6 6 5 9 8 6 
Current pain- or 
injury- related 
litigation 
Worker's Compensation 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Third-party compensation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Previous pain- or 
injury- related 
litigation 
Worker's Compensation 5 0 3 2 2 3 3 2 
Third-party compensation 4 0 2 2 1 3 3 1 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Successful outcome of previous litigation 
 
8  5 3 2 6 6 2 
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Table C.3 Descriptive statistics for the total sample. 
  
Min. Max. M SD  Skew 
Std.  
Skew Kurt. 
Std.  
Kurt. 
Age  17 74 39.10 17.68  0.16 0.47 -1.39 -2.06 
Pain Duration  0.58 40.75 9.27 8.82  1.72 4.92 3.31 4.81 
Total Pain Sites  1 36 10.65 8.97  1.27 3.71 1.00 1.49 
Regular Sites  0 18 5.73 4.82  1.03 3.00 0.22 0.33 
Primary Sites  0 18 4.13 3.98  1.67 4.88 2.80 4.15 
Radiating sites  0 36 7.71 9.29  1.65 4.81 2.17 3.22 
McGill PRI – Total  0 0.84 0.40 0.20  0.20 0.59 -0.65 -0.96 
MPI - Pain Severity  1.33 5.67 3.77 1.02  -0.42 -1.23 -0.31 -0.45 
MPI - Affective Distress  0 5.67 2.90 1.32  -0.28 -0.82 -0.75 -1.11 
MPI - Interfere  0 5.82 3.59 1.45  -0.55 -1.60 -0.20 -0.29 
MPI - Support  0 6 3.97 1.60  -0.94 -2.66 0.38 0.54 
MPI - Life-Control  0 5.5 3.42 1.19  -0.40 -1.16 0.18 0.27 
PCS - Rumination  0 16 6.42 4.02  0.23 0.68 -0.78 -1.15 
PCS - Magnification  0 12 3.10 2.79  1.23 3.58 1.72 2.55 
PCS - Helplessness  0 23 8.13 5.52  0.70 2.03 0.18 0.26 
PSEQ  10.5 60 37.40 12.75  -0.20 -0.57 -0.73 -1.08 
CSQ - Catastrophising  0 33 9.29 8.12  0.97 2.83 0.93 1.37 
CSQ - Control over Pain  0 6 3.03 1.61  -0.29 -0.84 -0.42 -0.62 
CSQ - Ability to Decrease Pain  0 6 2.10 1.30  0.41 1.20 0.78 1.16 
CSQ - Divert Attention  0 32 14.14 9.56  0.28 0.83 -1.16 -1.72 
CSQ - Reinterpret Pain Sens.  0 28 7.23 8.00  1.16 3.39 0.41 0.60 
CSQ - Ignoring Sensations  0 36 19.06 8.56  -0.09 -0.26 -0.67 -1.00 
CSQ - Praying or Hoping  0 27 10.52 7.55  0.31 0.89 -0.75 -1.11 
CSQ - Coping Self Statements  6 36 22.89 7.28  -0.35 -1.01 -0.15 -0.23 
CSQ - Increased Beh.Activities  3 32 16.54 7.29  0.08 0.24 -0.93 -1.38 
HADS - Anxiety  0 19 8.29 4.37  0.26 0.76 -0.23 -0.34 
HADS - Depression  0 18 5.75 4.31  1.08 3.13 0.85 1.27 
SF36 - Phy Funct  10 30 21.49 5.72  -0.25 -0.72 -0.79 -1.18 
SF36 - Phy Role Funct  4 8 4.85 1.43  1.45 4.24 0.58 0.86 
SF36 - Bodily Pain  3 10.4 5.79 1.80  0.61 1.77 0.20 0.30 
SF36 - General Health  5 25 15.12 5.03  0.17 0.48 -0.75 -1.12 
SF36 - Vitality  4 21 12.08 4.00  0.07 0.19 -0.51 -0.75 
SF36 - Social Funct  8 24 16.50 4.43  -0.23 -0.68 -0.66 -0.98 
SF36 - Em Role Funct  3 6 4.46 1.24  0.03 0.08 -1.63 -2.41 
SF36 - Men Health  10 29 20.50 5.15  -0.34 -0.98 -0.96 -1.43 
SF36 - Health Transition  1 5 3.00 1.11  0.00 0.00 -0.76 -1.12 
SF36 – Mental Health Factor  4.58 20.69 13.43 3.95  -0.26 -0.76 -0.59 -0.88 
SF36 – Physical Health Factor  3.38 18.1 10.33 3.67  0.06 0.16 -0.44 -0.65 
DQ  0 20 9.29 5.14  0.27 0.80 -0.35 -0.52 
n=48 for all variables, except  MPI – Support (n=45) and Pain Duration (n=46) 
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Table C.4 Descriptive statistics of PAMS and PAMS-R for the total sample. 
  
Min. Max. M SD  Skew 
Std.  
Skew Kurt. 
Std.  
Kurt. 
PAMS-R 
 Average Pain  24 83 55.85 14.73  -0.32 -0.94 -0.37 -0.54 
 Minimum Pain  0 101 28.46 22.00  0.85 2.48 0.91 1.36 
 Maximum Pain  28 97 74.04 13.56  -1.15 -3.36 1.83 2.71 
 Distress  6.5 83.38 42.81 17.59  -0.16 -0.45 -0.38 -0.57 
 Self-Efficacy  2.67 100 48.98 28.28  -0.14 -0.41 -1.19 -1.77 
 Perceived Interference  1 100 58.52 24.74  -0.81 -2.36 0.36 0.53 
 Catastrophising  6 88.67 36.47 20.77  0.44 1.28 -0.85 -1.27 
 Passive Coping  0.29 4 2.20 0.99  -0.13 -0.36 -1.01 -1.45 
 Active Coping  0.38 5.75 3.16 1.34  -0.29 -0.81 -0.50 -0.73 
 Function  0.6 5.85 3.63 1.28  -0.40 -1.15 -0.45 -0.65 
 Average Activity  10 78 47.71 14.85  -0.72 -2.09 0.35 0.52 
 Minimum Activity  0 56 17.10 15.10  1.06 3.10 0.32 0.47 
 Maximum Activity  23 99 67.88 18.55  -0.60 -1.76 0.21 0.31 
PAMS – Average Scores 
 Pain  12.36 82 46.06 16.29  0.03 0.08 -0.15 -0.23 
 Distress  9.45 81.13 38.03 15.83  0.09 0.28 -0.19 -0.29 
 Self-Efficacy  4.4 100 57.45 21.85  0.11 0.32 -0.31 -0.47 
 Catastrophising  4.95 69.48 29.53 15.70  0.39 1.16 -0.62 -0.94 
 Pain Expectancy  10.5 70.95 45.95 15.11  -0.56 -1.66 -0.35 -0.53 
 Perceived Interference  1.73 90.35 49.57 22.63  -0.53 -1.58 -0.35 -0.53 
 Passive Coping  0 38.31 15.80 11.28  0.52 1.59 -0.86 -1.33 
 Active Coping  0 67.95 25.92 19.10  0.38 1.11 -0.92 -1.37 
 Functioning  13.19 85.97 60.93 16.38  -0.89 -2.64 0.47 0.71 
 Activity-Level  6 66.92 35.81 13.27  -0.05 -0.15 -0.62 -0.93 
PAMS – Standard Deviation of Scores 
 Pain  0.96 38.4 14.67 7.36  1.25 3.76 2.36 3.60 
 Distress  0.74 31.65 12.74 6.18  1.14 3.42 1.65 2.51 
 Self-Efficacy  0 37.92 13.18 7.56  0.90 2.64 1.59 2.38 
 Catastrophising  0 29.8 12.49 7.18  0.77 2.26 0.17 0.25 
 Pain Expectancy  0.82 30.76 11.03 6.32  1.14 3.33 1.52 2.26 
 Perceived Interference  1.14 33.58 14.26 7.66  0.58 1.70 0.15 0.23 
 Passive Coping  0 20.12 12.26 4.68  -0.59 -1.76 0.12 0.18 
 Active Coping  5.58 33.73 15.27 6.50  0.78 2.25 0.74 1.09 
 Functioning  0 28.12 13.72 6.13  0.57 1.65 0.03 0.04 
 Activity-Level  0.9 31.05 16.61 6.30  -0.26 -0.75 0.30 0.45 
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Table C.5 Descriptive statistics according to sample, gender and cohort groups: M (SD) 
 Sample 
Clinical Comm. Student 
Gender 
Male Female 
Cohort 
Old New 
Age 49.55 
(15.76) 
50.78 
(10.26) 
22  
(8.17) 
38.73 
(17.61) 
39.27 
(17.98) 
44.48 
(15.97) 
32.19 
(17.72) 
Pain Duration 12.3 
(11.98) 
12.13 
(8.9) 
5.13 
(4.99) 
9.02 
(10.66) 
9.4  
(7.97) 
11.61 
(9.09) 
6.24 
(7.63) 
Total Pain Sites 10.82 
(9.63) 
14.17 
(8.25) 
7.21 
(8.34) 
9.6  
(9.7) 
11.12 
(8.74) 
13.44 
(9.21) 
7.05  
(7.4) 
Regular Sites 5.45 
(4.28) 
8.33 
(5.73) 
3.42 
(2.67) 
5.53 
(5.14) 
5.82 
(4.75) 
6.96 
(5.65) 
4.14  
(2.9) 
Primary Sites 3.73 
(3.1) 
5.11 
(5.38) 
3.42 
(2.67) 
4.2  
(4.59) 
4.09 
(3.75) 
4.44 
(4.69) 
3.71 
(2.88) 
Radiating sites 8.82 
(10.1) 
9.33 
(10.06) 
5.53 
(8.04) 
6.67 
(9.63) 
8.18 
(9.25) 
9.59 
(10.17) 
5.29 
(7.59) 
McGill PRI – Total 0.44 
(0.22) 
0.38 
(0.22) 
0.41 
(0.17) 
0.41 
(0.21) 
0.4  
(0.2) 
0.42 
(0.22) 
0.38 
(0.16) 
MPI - Pain Severity 4.06 
(0.87) 
3.98 
(1.09) 
3.4  
(0.98) 
3.4  
(1.3) 
3.94 
(0.84) 
3.93 
(0.96) 
3.57 
(1.09) 
MPI - Affective Distress 2.79 
(1.73) 
3  
(1.3) 
2.86 
(1.14) 
3.11 
(1.41) 
2.8  
(1.29) 
2.81 
(1.35) 
3  
(1.31) 
MPI - Interfere 4.03 
(1.35) 
3.94 
(1.37) 
3.01 
(1.44) 
3.18 
(2.02) 
3.78 
(1.08) 
3.89 
(1.23) 
3.22 
(1.64) 
MPI - Support 4.9  
(1.32) 
3.71 
(1.79) 
3.71 
(1.45) 
4.07 
(1.77) 
3.93 
(1.54) 
4.01 
(1.73) 
3.93 
(1.48) 
MPI - Life-Control 3.34  
(1.7) 
3.63 
(0.97) 
3.28 
(1.06) 
3.27 
(1.24) 
3.49 
(1.18) 
3.44 
(1.25) 
3.39 
(1.13) 
PCS - Rumination 5.91 
(4.25) 
6.5  
(4.38) 
6.63  
(3.7) 
6.8  
(3.3) 
6.24 
(4.34) 
6  
(4.09) 
6.95 
(3.96) 
PCS - Magnification 2.55  
(2.3) 
3.39 
(3.85) 
3.16 
(1.77) 
2.47 
(2.26) 
3.39 
(2.99) 
2.7  
(2.97) 
3.62 
(2.52) 
PCS - Helplessness 8.36 
(5.59) 
8  
(6.44) 
8.11 
(4.79) 
8.47 
(4.88) 
7.97 
(5.85) 
7.37 
(5.21) 
9.1  
(5.87) 
PSEQ 29.46 
(10.55) 
38.31 
(12.54) 
41.13 
(12.66) 
38.51 
(17.25) 
36.89 
(10.39) 
36.76 
(11.05) 
38.21 
(14.91) 
CSQ - Catastrophising 7.82 
(6.52) 
9.89 
(10.76) 
9.58  
(6.1) 
7  
(7.23) 
10.33 
(8.39) 
9.52 
(8.54) 
9  
(7.74) 
CSQ - Control over Pain 2.45 
(1.69) 
3.61  
(1.5) 
2.82 
(1.56) 
3.5  
(1.55) 
2.82 
(1.61) 
3  
(1.75) 
3.07 
(1.43) 
CSQ - Ability to Decrease Pain 1.73 
(1.27) 
2.22 
(1.17) 
2.21 
(1.45) 
2.4  
(1.51) 
1.97 
(1.19) 
1.81 
(1.21) 
2.48 
(1.34) 
CSQ - Divert Attention 17.36 
(11.62) 
13.42 
(9.89) 
12.95 
(7.92) 
12.13 
(9.09) 
15.05 
(9.76) 
14.99 
(9.45) 
13.05 
(9.81) 
CSQ - Reinterpret Pain Sensation 7  
(8.72) 
6  
(6.89) 
8.53 
(8.75) 
8  
(7.68) 
6.88 
(8.23) 
7.52 
(7.95) 
6.86 
(8.24) 
CSQ - Ignoring Sensations 14.73 
(8.99) 
17.78 
(8.69) 
22.79 
(6.89) 
21.27 
(10.02) 
18.06 
(7.77) 
18.11 
(8.37) 
20.29 
(8.86) 
CSQ - Praying or Hoping 8.91 
(7.23) 
11.06 
(8.74) 
10.95 
(6.75) 
8.87 
(5.72) 
11.27 
(8.22) 
11.04 
(7.11) 
9.86 
(8.22) 
CSQ - Coping Self Statements 21.27 
(9.54) 
22.44 
(6.1) 
24.24 
(7.01) 
23.63 
(7.67) 
22.55 
(7.2) 
23.85 
(6.69) 
21.64 
(7.98) 
CSQ - Increased Beh. Activities 17.82 
(6.82) 
16.11 
(6.22) 
16.21 
(8.66) 
13.8 
(7.05) 
17.79 
(7.15) 
17.3 
(6.91) 
15.57 
(7.81) 
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Table C.5 continued… 
 Sample 
Clinical Comm. Student 
Gender 
Male Female 
Cohort 
Old New 
HADS – Anxiety 14.8 
(9.48) 
16.72 
(7.44) 
11.05 
(5.74) 
14.13 
(8.96) 
13.99 
(7.1) 
15.25 
(8.18) 
12.48 
(6.74) 
HADS - Depression 7.53 
(4.79) 
9.33 
(4.61) 
7.74 
(3.91) 
8.07 
(4.08) 
8.39 
(4.56) 
8.77 
(4.74) 
7.67 
(3.88) 
SF36 - Phy Funct 7.27  
(5.1) 
7.39 
(4.34) 
3.32 
(2.45) 
6.07 
(5.24) 
5.61  
(3.9) 
6.48 
(4.72) 
4.81 
(3.63) 
SF36 - Phy Role Funct 18.06 
(4.69) 
19.09 
(5.43) 
25.74 
(3.67) 
22.47 
(6.01) 
21.04 
(5.63) 
20.07 
(5.4) 
23.3 
(5.74) 
SF36 - Bodily Pain 4.36 
(1.21) 
4.89 
(1.53) 
5.11 
(1.45) 
5.4  
(1.72) 
4.61 
(1.22) 
4.89 
(1.45) 
4.81 
(1.44) 
SF36 - General Health 4.85 
(1.29) 
5.48 
(1.45) 
6.63 
(2.03) 
6.37 
(2.47) 
5.52 
(1.36) 
5.36 
(1.37) 
6.34 
(2.14) 
SF36 - Vitality 12.53 
(3.6) 
15.55 
(5.88) 
16.22 
(4.52) 
16.43 
(5.91) 
14.53 
(4.55) 
15.41 
(4.8) 
14.76 
(5.4) 
SF36 - Social Funct 11.82 
(3.49) 
11.5 
(4.46) 
12.79 
(3.92) 
11.87 
(4.66) 
12.18 
(3.75) 
12.07 
(4.46) 
12.1 
(3.43) 
SF36 - Em Role Funct 14  
(4.0) 
16.44 
(4.83) 
18  
(3.77) 
16.53 
(5.63) 
16.48 
(3.87) 
16  
(4.15) 
17.14 
(4.8) 
SF36 - Men Health 4  
(1.26) 
4.5  
(1.29) 
4.68 
(1.16) 
4.33  
(1.4) 
4.52 
(1.18) 
4.48 
(1.25) 
4.43 
(1.25) 
SF36 - Health Transition 21.27 
(5.92) 
19.56 
(4.87) 
20.95 
(5.09) 
19.67 
(5.94) 
20.88 
(4.8) 
20.59 
(5.23) 
20.38 
(5.17) 
SF36 – Mental Health Factor 3.64 
(1.03) 
3.11 
(1.08) 
2.53 
(1.02) 
2.93 
(1.16) 
3.03  
(1.1) 
3.22 
(1.15) 
2.71 
(1.01) 
SF36 – Physical Health Factor 13.79 
(4.49) 
13.45 
(3.72) 
13.2 
(4.05) 
12.61 
(4.69) 
13.8 
(3.59) 
13.76 
(3.83) 
13.01 
(4.16) 
DQ 7.58 
(3.24) 
9.44 
(3.26) 
12.77 
(2.75) 
11.72 
(4.48) 
9.7  
(3.11) 
9.55 
(3.16) 
11.34 
(4.09) 
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Table C.6 Descriptive statistics for PAMS-R scales according to sample, gender and cohort groups: 
M (SD) 
 Sample   Gender  Cohort  
PAMS-R Scale Clin. Comm. Student Male Female Old New 
Average Pain 12.27 
(6.05) 
10.11 
(4.99) 
6.79 (3.51) 8.8 (5.86) 9.52 (4.85) 9.89 (5.24) 8.52 (5.02) 
Minimum Pain 60.45 
(13.6) 
54.67 
(15.85) 
54.32 
(14.48) 
54.47 
(16.25) 
56.48 
(14.21) 
57.93 
(15.22) 
53.19 
(13.99) 
Maximum Pain 44.36 
(17.64) 
27.67 
(16.71) 
20 (24.41) 29.53 
(20.13) 
27.97 
(23.08) 
35.74 
(23.93) 
19.1 
(15.14) 
Distress 31.73 
(19.63) 
26.44 
(19.79) 
20.26 
(26.72) 
37.93 
(29.13) 
19.42 
(16.69) 
26.96 
(22.18) 
22.95 
(23.82) 
Self Efficacy 39.72 
(24.49) 
44.77 
(14.66) 
42.74 
(16.2) 
45.7 
(21.09) 
41.5 
(15.95) 
43.57 
(17.24) 
41.83 
(18.42) 
Perceived Interference 34.88 
(30.76) 
51.78 
(27.88) 
54.49 
(25.82) 
59.58 
(31.62) 
44.16 
(25.7) 
45.73 
(28.41) 
53.16 
(28.23) 
Catastrophising 61.82 
(25.61) 
59.13 
(23.06) 
56.04 
(26.81) 
54.96 
(29.89) 
60.14 
(22.35) 
63.64 
(22.08) 
51.94 
(26.91) 
Passive Coping 36.67 
(20.41) 
33.31 
(24.39) 
39.33 
(17.73) 
34.69 
(18.96) 
37.27 
(21.77) 
36.83 
(22.1) 
36 (19.44) 
Active Coping 1.94 (1.05) 2.22 (1.12) 2.35 (0.85) 1.89 (1) 2.35 (0.97) 2.15 (1.05) 2.27 (0.93) 
Function 3.6 (1.51) 3.19 (1.42) 2.85 (1.13) 3.11 (1.52) 3.18 (1.27) 3.39 (1.45) 2.84 (1.13) 
Average Activity 3.28 (1.18) 3.56 (1.48) 3.92 (1.12) 4.14 (1.32) 3.41 (1.21) 3.59 (1.26) 3.69 (1.33) 
Minimum Activity 44.82 
(15.99) 
46.78 
(16.39) 
50.26 
(12.93) 
49.47 
(16.32) 
46.91 
(14.33) 
46.67 
(15.43) 
49.05 
(14.33) 
Maximum Activity 28.36 
(18.54) 
17.28 
(14.34) 
10.42 
(9.23) 
13.53 
(11.45) 
18.73 
(16.39) 
19.74 
(16.1) 
13.71 
(13.31) 
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APPENDIX D 
Table D.1 Correlates of entry rates, and alarm response 
 Entries   Alarms Proportion of Alarms: 
 Days Number Per Day Days Opened  Dismiss Opened  Time-out 
Pain history 0.033 0.265 0.356* 0.056 0.274 -0.158 0.276 -0.201 
Pain always present -0.02 0.188 0.146 0.028 0.203 0.1 0.211 -0.316* 
Total Pain Sites -0.036 0.097 0.153 -0.096 0.098 -0.22 0.048 0.131 
Female -0.2 -0.002 -0.006 -0.18 -0.042 0.092 0.129 -0.204 
Age -0.404** -0.116 -0.064 -0.374** -0.126 0.16 0.018 -0.142 
Partner 0.107 0.128 0.118 0.026 0.117 -0.143 0.109 -0.027 
Senior HS or above 0.073 0.048 0.116 0.105 0.028 -0.071 -0.008 0.051 
Work (FT,PT, Casual, voluntary) 0.233 0.073 0.049 0.29* 0.013 0.136 -0.068 -0.023 
MPI - Pain Severity -0.203 -0.004 0.018 -0.274 0.013 -0.076 0.13 -0.094 
MPI - Affective Distress -0.025 -0.138 -0.166 0.024 -0.13 0.106 -0.115 0.042 
HADS - Anx -0.103 -0.032 0.007 -0.124 -0.056 0.003 0.024 -0.031 
HADS - Dep -0.151 0.073 0.072 -0.145 0.086 -0.04 0.198 -0.218 
SF36 - Bodily Pain 0.14 -0.12 -0.128 0.239 -0.075 0.037 -0.217 0.228 
DQ -0.178 0.022 0.004 -0.139 0.008 0.131 0.174 -0.318* 
PAMS Pain (average) -0.111 0.042 -0.031 -0.074 0.061 0.055 0.121 -0.182 
PAMS Distress (average) -0.047 -0.1 -0.123 -0.031 -0.088 0.057 -0.128 0.101 
PAMS Function (average) 0.18 -0.018 -0.152 0.083 -0.022 -0.093 -0.109 0.205 
PAMS Activity (average) -0.019 -0.074 -0.156 -0.049 0.003 0.164 0.033 -0.149 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 
 
Table D.2  Compliance-related correlates of attributions for dismissed entries 
 Endorsement  
Rate (%) 
Entries   Alarms  Proportion of Alarms: 
 Days Number Per Day Days Opened  Dismiss Opened  Time-out 
Location was not safe for the PDA 18 0.342* 0.224 0.112 0.309* 0.181 -0.047 0.004 0.017 
Physically impossible for at-least 
30mins  
10 0.091 0.212 0.157 0.061 0.134 0.026 0.042 -0.061 
Physically impossible at that time 18 -0.069 -0.151 -0.211 0.018 -0.221 0.278 -0.104 -0.097 
Inconvenient for at-least 30 mins 10 0.302* -0.043 -0.074 0.257 -0.02 0.029 -0.091 0.068 
Inconvenient at that time 18 0.041 -0.05 -0.068 0.037 -0.052 -0.03 -0.035 0.078 
Physically exhausted 10 -0.049 -0.088 -0.212 0.11 -0.161 0.395** -0.135 -0.148 
Psychologically distressed eg. 
tense, stressed, down 
6 -0.7*** -0.66*** -0.75*** -0.46** -0.64*** 0.81*** -0.55*** 0.019 
Pain was too bad  4 0.077 0.138 0.096 -0.041 0.045 0.014 0.184 -0.23 
Other  16 0.108 0.184 0.092 0.036 0.137 -0.164 0.165 -0.059 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 
No participants endorsed the item “I just couldn’t be bothered”. 
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Table D.3  Pain-related and psychological correlates of attributions for dismissed entires 
 
Pain 
History 
Total 
Pain Sites 
 MPI  HADS  SF36  PAMS   
 Age 
Pain 
Severity 
Affective 
Distress Anx Dep 
Bodily 
Pain DQ Pain Dist. Funct. Act. 
Location was not safe for 
the PDA 
-0.045 0.068 -0.19 0.08 0.104 0.17 -0.14 -0.178 -0.055 0.12 0.176 0.04 0.03 
Physically impossible for 
at-least 30mins  
0.079 0.005 0.049 0.104 0.017 0.028 -0.11 -0.2 0.087 0.1 0.024 0.124 0.051 
Physically impossible at 
that time 
-0.211 -0.049 -0.15 0.01 0.198 0.078 0.004 -0.151 -0.04 0.01 0.066 0.076 0.069 
Inconvenient for at-least 
30 mins 
-0.079 -0.144 -0.011 -0.25 0.034 -0.05 -0.07 0.251 -0.11 -0.19 0.03 0.151 -0.017 
Inconvenient at that time 0.036 -0.125 -0.09 -0.19 0.024 0.03 -0.14 0.238 -0.27 0.07 0.15 0.3* 0.29* 
Physically exhausted -0.158 -0.264 -0.19 -0.12 0.222 -0.02 -0.03 0.049 0.1 0.13 0.155 -0.103 -0.07 
Psychologically distressed 
eg. tense, stressed, down 
-0.201 -0.055 0.23 0.09 0.229 0.205 0.087 -0.06 0.13 0.03 0.176 -0.032 0.126 
Pain was too bad  -0.044 -0.132 -0.08 0.05 0.089 0.06 0.087 -0.317* 0.26 0.07 0.1 -0.176 -0.173 
Other  0.018 0.171 0.021 0.162 0.008 0.05 -0.048 -0.136 0.29* 0.18 -0.03 -0.179 -0.066 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 
 
Table D.4  Compliance-related correlates of attributions for missed entires 
 Endorsement  
Rate (%) 
Entries   Alarms  Proportion of Alarms: 
 Days Number Per Day Days Opened  Dismiss Opened  Time-out 
Location was not safe for the PDA 24 0.04 0.00 -0.06 0.21 0.02 0.2 -0.12 0.01 
Physically impossible at that time 10 0.02 -0.03 0.11 -0.04 -0.15 -0.09 -0.15 0.24 
Inconvenient at that time 20 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.15 -0.16 0.07 0.06 
Physically exhausted 8 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.04 -0.07 -0.11 -0.1 0.29 
Psychologically distressed eg. 
tense, stressed, down 
8 -0.39** -0.3* -0.32* -0.3* -0.42** 0.62*** -0.34* -0.08 
Pain was too bad 4 0.08 0.01 0.1 -0.04 -0.16 -0.06 -0.17 0.25 
PDA in the room & not loud 
enough 
36 -0.04 0.11 0.04 -0.11 0.16 -0.12 0.14 -0.05 
PDA not in the room & didn’t hear 
it 
42 -0.06 -0.15 -0.05 0.03 -0.15 0.06 -0.14 0.13 
Out & not carrying the PDA  40 0.03 -0.09 -0.01 0.01 -0.09 -0.03 -0.12 0.18 
Did not ring for long enough 16 0.11 0.01 -0.13 0.3* -0.03 0.27 -0.19 0.00 
Other 16 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.02 0.1 -0.18 0.11 0.02 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 
The items “I just couldn’t be bothered” and “It was too embarrassing to answer it, so I ignored it” were not endorsed 
Columns refer to the endorsement rate for the item, the number of days on which an entry was made, the total 
number of entries, the average number of entries per day, the total number of days on which an alarm was signalled, 
the number of alarms that were opened, and the proportion of alarms dismissed, opened and that timed-out. 
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Table D.5  Pain-related and psychological correlates of attributions for missed entires 
 
Pain 
History 
Total 
Pain Sites 
 MPI  HADS  SF36  PAMS    
 Age 
Pain 
Severity 
Affective 
Distress Anx Dep 
Bodily 
Pain DQ Pain Dist. Funct. Act. 
Location was not safe for the PDA -0.01 -0.01 -0.18 -0.19 0.09 0.02 -0.11 0.16 -0.08 0.03 0.07 0.05 -0.04 
Physically impossible at that time 0.17 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 0.239 0.14 0.09 -0.01 0.1 -0.09 0.17 -0.01 -0.32* 
Inconvenient at that time 0.25 -0.02 -0.1 -0.33* 0.013 0.01 -0.05 0.32* -0.23 -0.02 0.13 0.07 -0.19 
Physically exhausted -0.19 -0.03 -0.13 -0.22 0.166 0.09 -0.12 0.178 -0.04 -0.23 0.01 -0.01 -0.18 
Psychologically distressed eg. tense, 
stressed, down 
-0.20 0.05 0.15 0.17 0.28* 0.4** 0.18 -0.24 0.22 0.07 0.21 -0.07 -0.09 
Pain was too bad -0.15 -0.03 -0.16 -0.09 0.14 0.11 -0.01 -0.014 0.01 -0.24 0.08 0.06 -0.14 
PDA in the room & not loud enough -0.12 0.118 -0.17 -0.18 -0.17 -0.2 -0.04 0.141 -0.01 -0.13 -0.19 0.17 0.01 
PDA not in the room & didn’t hear it -0.09 -0.07 -0.2 -0.38** 0.1 0.03 -0.18 0.35* -0.13 -0.26 -0.1 0.13 0.05 
Out & not carrying the PDA  0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.18 0.2 0.105 0 -0.12 -0.14 0.12 0.02 -0.1 
Did not ring for long enough -0.15 0.03 -0.07 -0.31* -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 
Other -0.06 0.1 -0.16 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.14 0.17 0.11 -0.15 -0.16 -0.12 -0.21 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 
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Table D.6 Relationship between average PAMS scales and standard questionnaires 
Scale Pain Distress PSE. Catas. PI 
Passive 
Cope 
Active 
Cope Funct. Activity 
McGill Pain Rating Index 0.37** 0.29* -0.29* 0.33* 0.37** 0.37** 0.43** -0.09 0.04 
MPI Pain Severity 0.56*** 0.37** -0.29* 0.46** 0.59*** 0.26 0.42** -0.20 0.25 
SF36 Bodily Pain -0.58*** -0.34* 0.39** -0.47** -0.67*** -0.4** -0.43** 0.33* -0.07 
HADS Anxiety 0.29* 0.69*** -0.23 0.5*** 0.41** 0.29* 0.19 -0.21 0.19 
 Depression 0.39** 0.62*** -0.12 0.53*** 0.48** 0.4** 0.20 -0.46** 0.00 
MPI Affective Distress 0.26 0.85*** -0.11 0.49*** 0.4** 0.34* 0.08 -0.18 0.13 
SF-36 Mental Health -0.22 -0.7*** 0.05 -0.36* -0.26 -0.36* -0.04 0.20 0.04 
 Emotional Role Funct -0.31* -0.44** 0.28* -0.44** -0.42** -0.37** -0.3* 0.45** -0.07 
MPI Interference 0.36* 0.4** -0.17 0.39** 0.72*** 0.42** 0.28* -0.55*** -0.07 
 Life-Control -0.18 -0.49*** 0.22 -0.33* -0.18 -0.18 0.03 0.18 0.10 
PCS Rumination 0.17 0.62*** -0.16 0.51*** 0.27 0.18 0.05 -0.16 0.27 
 Magnification 0.18 0.51*** -0.15 0.58*** 0.27 0.22 0.14 -0.16 0.21 
 Helplessness 0.32* 0.75*** -0.17 0.61*** 0.31* 0.22 0.10 -0.18 0.25 
PSEQ  -0.33* -0.44** 0.34* -0.32* -0.43** -0.37** -0.14 0.48*** 0.08 
CSQ Catastrophising 0.21 0.54*** -0.24 0.56*** 0.28 0.26 0.15 -0.21 0.01 
 Control over Pain -0.08 -0.29* 0.13 -0.29* -0.13 -0.11 0.02 0.16 0.29* 
 Ability to Dec. Pain -0.21 0.02 0.23 -0.11 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.12 
CSQ Divert Attention 0.3* 0.04 -0.41** 0.14 0.24 0.3* 0.57*** -0.11 0.01 
 Rein. Pain Sens. -0.08 -0.35* -0.07 -0.25 -0.13 0.10 0.33* 0.04 -0.19 
 Ignoring Sensations 0.02 0.04 0.08 -0.11 -0.14 0.20 0.02 0.13 -0.09 
 Praying or Hoping 0.20 0.19 -0.24 0.36* 0.36* 0.29* 0.3* -0.38** -0.14 
 Coping Self Statements 0.01 -0.34* -0.01 -0.28 -0.12 -0.11 0.14 0.24 -0.06 
 Increased Beh. Act. 0.38** -0.08 -0.48*** 0.07 0.25 0.13 0.4** 0.01 0.08 
SF-36 Physical Funct -0.35* -0.19 0.36* -0.44** -0.54*** -0.11 -0.38** 0.46** -0.07 
 Physical Role Funct -0.3* -0.22 0.17 -0.39** -0.51*** -0.42** -0.53*** 0.28* -0.09 
 General Health -0.22 -0.39** 0.35* -0.48*** -0.38** -0.32* -0.38** 0.36* -0.06 
 Vitality -0.07 -0.46** 0.07 -0.18 -0.33* -0.27 -0.22 0.15 -0.02 
 Social Funct -0.45** -0.56*** 0.37** -0.45** -0.61*** -0.6*** -0.46** 0.46** -0.03 
 Health Transition 0.55*** 0.3* -0.31* 0.57*** 0.5*** 0.20 0.48*** -0.15 0.28* 
DQ  0.47** 0.24 -0.38** 0.51*** 0.63*** 0.31* 0.35* -0.69*** -0.04 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001 
Funct.= Functioning; PSE= Pain Self Efficacy; Catas.= Catastrophising; PE= Pain Expectancy; PI= Perceived Interference 
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Table D.7 Descriptive statistics for dataset of 3-hour adjacent entries 
 Min Max M SD Skew Std. Skew Kurtosis Std. Kurt 
Evening 0 1 0.30 0.46 0.87 13.23 -1.24 -9.39 
Work Hrs 0 1 0.62 0.48 -0.51 -7.74 -1.74 -13.20 
Pain 0 100 46.25 22.43 -0.24 -3.59 -0.50 -3.81 
Distress 0 100 37.18 20.32 0.12 1.74 -0.57 -4.34 
Self Efficacy 0 100 56.29 25.01 -0.14 -2.17 -0.43 -3.25 
Catastrophising 0 100 29.22 20.17 0.49 7.39 -0.53 -3.98 
Expectancy 0 100 45.03 19.51 -0.52 -7.86 -0.13 -0.98 
Perceived Interference 0 100 50.86 26.81 -0.35 -5.26 -0.58 -4.35 
Passive Coping 0 71.43 16.82 16.90 0.81 12.23 -0.11 -0.84 
Active Coping 0 100 26.55 25.02 0.77 11.68 -0.22 -1.66 
Function 0 100 60.58 21.51 -0.83 -12.61 0.62 4.63 
Function2 0 10000 4132 2312 0.21 3.17 -0.55 -4.10 
Activity-Level 0 100 35.45 22.06 0.19 2.94 -0.49 -3.68 
Lag2 Evening 0 1 0.42 0.49 0.34 5.08 -1.89 -14.32 
Lag2 Work Hrs. 0 1 0.55 0.50 -0.21 -3.15 -1.96 -14.85 
Lag2 Pain-Intensity 0 100 45.98 22.31 -0.23 -3.45 -0.50 -3.75 
Lag2 Distress 0 100 36.82 20.46 0.11 1.71 -0.63 -4.74 
Lag2 Self Efficacy 0 100 56.22 24.80 -0.11 -1.73 -0.46 -3.46 
Lag2 Catastrophising 0 100 29.08 20.15 0.46 6.89 -0.65 -4.92 
Lag2 Expectancy 0 100 44.59 19.87 -0.46 -6.98 -0.21 -1.55 
Lag2 Perc. Interference 0 100 50.88 26.90 -0.36 -5.48 -0.60 -4.54 
Lag2 Passive Coping 0 71.43 16.55 16.60 0.83 12.61 0.02 0.17 
Lag2 Active Coping 0 100 26.18 24.95 0.76 11.48 -0.30 -2.26 
Lag2 Function 0 100 60.32 21.22 -0.86 -13.03 0.73 5.47 
Lag2 Function2 0 10000 4088 2264 0.22 3.32 -0.44 -3.33 
Lag2 Activity-level 0 100 34.37 21.78 0.25 3.77 -0.45 -3.37 
∆ Self Efficacy -70 73 -0.08 16.07 0.10 1.44 2.41 18.08 
∆ Catastrophising -62.67 70 -0.13 14.01 -0.14 -2.11 3.56 26.74 
∆ Expectancy -78 80 -0.43 14.29 -0.08 -1.20 4.77 35.86 
∆ Perc. Interference -73 73 0.07 16.35 0.00 0.00 2.81 21.11 
∆ Passive Coping -71.43 57.14 -0.23 15.38 -0.10 -1.50 1.21 9.20 
∆ Active Coping -100 75 -0.42 18.14 -0.05 -0.73 1.78 13.35 
Alcohol 0 1 0.02 0.12 7.86 119.12 59.91 450.43 
Medication 0 1 0.12 0.32 2.40 36.30 3.75 28.16 
Sedative 0 1 0.01 0.12 8.07 122.21 63.15 474.83 
Lay/Rest 0 1 0.36 0.48 0.57 8.64 -1.68 -12.61 
Avoid Activity 0 1 0.22 0.41 1.39 21.05 -0.07 -0.53 
Hope/Pray 0 1 0.33 0.47 0.71 10.82 -1.49 -11.23 
Tell self it doesn't hurt 0 1 0.12 0.33 2.33 35.30 3.44 25.83 
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Table D.8 First-order relationships between key predictors and lag 2 outcomes: standardized 
coefficient (percentage within-person variance accounted for) 
 Outcome   
Fixed Effects Distress Function Activity-Level 
Lag 1 Predictors 
Pain 0.206 (4.65%)*** -0.057 (0.22%)* 0 (0%)ns 
Distress 0.42 (18.31%)*** -0.064 (0.28%)* 0.032 (0.07%)ns 
Function -0.041 (0.2%)ns 0.333 (10.82%)*** 0.123 (1.11%)*** 
Activity-Level 0.025 (0.1%)ns 0.144 (2.75%)*** 0.221 (4.9%)*** 
Pain Self Efficacy -0.238 (4.95%)*** 0.043 (0.06%)ns -0.057 (0.18%)ns 
Catastrophising 0.242 (5.93%)*** -0.099 (0.77%)** -0.002 (0%)ns 
Pain Expectancy 0.17 (3.13%)*** 0.021 (-0.04%)ns 0.092 (0.57%)** 
Perceived Interference 0.307 (8.35%)*** -0.105 (0.74%)** -0.052 (0.15%)ns 
Passive Cope 0.161 (3.62%)*** -0.153 (2.72%)*** -0.083 (0.6%)** 
Active Cope 0.012 (0.01%)ns -0.086 (0.58%)** -0.066 (0.28%)ns 
Lag 2 Predictors 
Pain 0.525 (30.01%)*** -0.028 (-0.01%)ns 0.197 (2.63%)*** 
Distress  -0.076 (0.42%)* 0.146 (1.33%)*** 
Function -0.065 (0.49%)*  0.276 (5.6%)*** 
Activity-Level 0.091 (1.33%)*** 0.203 (5.53%)***  
Pain Self Efficacy -0.484 (19.84%)*** 0.123 (1%)*** -0.024 (0.03%)ns 
Catastrophising 0.589 (32.93%)*** -0.151 (1.76%)*** 0.128 (0.97%)** 
Pain Expectancy 0.459 (22.58%)*** -0.061 (0.26%)* 0.221 (3.27%)*** 
Perceived Interference 0.576 (29.05%)*** -0.15 (1.6%)*** 0.075 (0.31%)* 
Passive Cope 0.209 (6.22%)*** -0.219 (5.74%)*** -0.077 (0.53%)** 
Active Cope 0.05 (0.24%)ns -0.068 (0.3%)* 0.084 (0.42%)* 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     *** p<.001  
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Table D.9 First-order relationships between key predictors at lag 1: standardized coefficient  
Lag-1 Outcome 
Fixed 
Effects Pain Distress Funct. 
Activity-
Level PSE Catas. PE PI 
Passive 
Cope 
Active 
Cope 
Entry-
number 
.039ns -.015ns .036ns .021ns -.064ns -.027ns .003ns .002ns -.002ns .001ns 
Pain  .496*** -.032ns .158** -.452*** .601*** .552*** .51*** .269*** .052* 
Distress .516***  -.124*** .098* -.409*** .558*** .45*** .515*** .291*** .045ns 
Function -.019ns -.11***  .32*** .095*** -.14*** -.036ns -.17*** -.263*** -.021ns 
Activity-
Level 
.104*** .064** .226***  -.016ns .036ns .121*** .004ns .05ns .047* 
PSE -.559*** -.49*** .124*** -.028ns  -.551*** -.436*** -.494*** -.308*** -.068* 
Catas. .646*** .567*** -.157*** .058ns -.473***  .576*** .583*** .327*** .06* 
PE .544*** .431*** -.038ns .18*** -.354*** .544***  .488*** .257*** .062* 
PI .622*** .607*** -.218*** .007ns -.489*** .67*** .595***  .408*** .1** 
Passive 
Cope 
.212*** .213*** -.214*** -.057ns -.192*** .236*** .197*** .257***  .206*** 
Active 
Cope 
.049ns .047ns -.024ns .073* -.057* .058*** .063* .084** .277***  
* p<.05     ** p<.01     ** p<.001  
Funct.= Functioning; PSE= Pain Self Efficacy; Catas.= Catastrophising; PE= Pain Expectancy; PI= Perceived 
Interference 
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Table D.10 First-order relationships of key predictors at both lags with lag 2 predictors: standardized 
coefficients 
Lag 2 Outcome 
Fixed Effects Pain PSE Catas. PE PI Passive Cope Active Cope 
Lag 1 Predictors 
Pain .46*** -.232*** .296*** .326*** .27*** .182*** .059** 
Distress .34*** -.193*** .308*** .258*** .321*** .187*** .074** 
Function -.017ns .069** -.073** -.017ns -.103*** -.143*** -.091** 
Activity-Level .073** -.003ns .035ns .067** -.014ns -.033ns .008ns 
Pain Self Efficacy -.328*** .414*** -.285*** -.272*** -.292*** -.262*** -.096** 
Catastrophising .391*** -.23*** .397*** .295*** .322*** .242*** .07** 
Pain Expectancy .37*** -.203*** .252*** .406*** .294*** .168*** .046ns 
PI .422*** -.269*** .341*** .335*** .495*** .32*** .057* 
Passive Cope .168*** -.158*** .179*** .142*** .195*** .29*** .106*** 
Active Cope .02ns -.067** .065* .039ns .075** .169*** .353*** 
Lag 2 Predictors 
Entry-number .023ns -.064ns -.02ns .017ns .014ns .018ns -.006ns 
Pain  -.452*** .581*** .586*** .495*** .317*** .05ns 
Pain Self Efficacy -.581***  -.538*** -.483*** -.531*** -.418*** -.071* 
Catastrophising .667*** -.479***  .627*** .592*** .361*** .056* 
Pain Expectancy .596*** -.381*** .555***  .502*** .293*** .058* 
PI .616*** -.512*** .643*** .615***  .452*** .086** 
Passive Cope .241*** -.247*** .24*** .22*** .276***  .189*** 
Active Cope .057ns -.062* .056* .065* .079** .284***  
Distress .571*** -.409*** .558*** .492*** .504*** .296*** .048ns 
Function -.032ns .1*** -.126*** -.066* -.114*** -.285*** -.06* 
Activity-Level .134*** -.013ns .076** .148*** .041* -.068** .05* 
* p<.05     ** p<.01     ** p<.001  
PSE= Pain Self Efficacy; Catas= Catastrophising; PE= Pain Expectancy; PI= Perceived Interference 
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APPENDIX E 
The Pain Ambulatory Monitoring Scale (PAMS) – Study 1 
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APPENDIX F 
Participant’s Information Sheet – Study 1 
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Participant’s Consent Form – Study 1 
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APPENDIX G 
Participant Feedback System – Study Two 
An automatic feedback form based on the participant’s own data was provided to all 
participants who provided 20 or more entries. Feedback was provided regarding all 
PAMS scales except activity-level. Feedback forms gave a descriptive report rather than 
a numerical report in order to maximize readability and comprehension. An outline of the 
feedback provided and the methods used to derive feedback is presented below. An 
example report is provided in the following pages.  
Feedback forms were generated by transferring the participant’s raw data, as a text file, 
into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet template. Formulas contained in adjoining sheets on 
the same template performed all necessary calculations and converted numerical data into 
verbal descriptors, as outlined below. 
Participant’s average, maximum and minimum pain intensity, distress, and function 
ratings were calculated. Their tendency towards each of the four appraisal factors (pain 
self-efficacy, catastrophising, pain expectancy, and perceived interference) and the two 
coping factors (passive and active) were also reported for average, maximum, and 
minimum ratings. Scores were categorised according to the following cut-offs:  
 
0 to 20 = “Minimal” 
20 to 39 = “Mild” 
40 to 59 = “Moderate” 
60 to 79 = “High” 
80 to 100 = “Severe” 
 
Average ratings were also expressed normatively relative to the mean and standard 
deviation of PAMS scores of 124 of the participants from Study One. Percentile ranks 
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were categorised according to the following cut-offs (corresponding to z-scores of -2, -1, 
0, 1, and 2 on the normal distribution): 
 
 below 2.28% = "significantly lower than the ratings of other participants”   
 to 15.87% = “somewhat lower than the ratings of other participants” 
 to 84.13% = “similar to the ratings of other participants” 
to 97.72% = “somewhat higher than the ratings of other participants” 
above 97.72% = “significantly higher than the ratings of other participants” 
 
For pain intensity, distress and function ratings, participants were given feedback 
regarding times of the day when their ratings were notable higher and lower than their 
mean ratings. Separate feedback was given for weekdays and weekends for each outcome 
variable. For the weekday profile, an average score was calculated from weekday entries 
for each of the eight daily time-slots during which alarms were scheduled. These 
averages were standardized like z-scores via comparison with the mean and standard 
deviation of the relevant outcome variable. A timeslot was considered to be below the 
mean on a certain outcome variable if the average score for that timeslot was equal to or 
more than one standard deviation below the grand mean for the outcome. A score equal 
to or greater than one standard deviation above the mean was considered above the mean 
on a certain outcome variable. A similar procedure was used to calculate daily profiles 
for weekend entries. 
Each of the three outcome variables, pain intensity, distress, and function, were correlated 
with a range of scales to provide the participant with an indication of the degree to which 
different aspects of their pain experience were related. Pain intensity was correlated with 
distress, function, previous-lag distress, previous-lag pain-intensity, the four appraisal 
factors, and the two coping factors. Distress was correlated with pain-intensity, previous-
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lag pain-intensity, function, previous-lag distress, the four appraisal variables, and the 
two coping factors. Function was correlated with previous-lag distress, previous-lag 
function, previous-lag pain intensity, and the appraisal and coping factors from the 
previous lag. In the feedback, correlations were expressed as a likelihood, with the 
interpretation differing depending upon the direction of the correlation. That is, 
relationships between factors were expressed as the likelihood that prior to or during 
periods of higher pain or distress or poorer function a certain thinking style was being 
engaged in, a certain coping strategy was being used, or that a state of high pain, high 
distress or poor function was being experienced. These likelihoods were expressed by 
categorising correlations according to the following cut-offs: 
 less than –0.75 or greater than 0.75 = “You were highly likely to….” 
 –0.5 to –0.75 or 0.5 to 0.75 = “You were moderately likely to…” 
–0.25 to –0.5 or 0.25 to 0.5 = “You were mildly likely to…” 
between –0.25 and 0.25 = “There appeared to be no relationship between…” 
 
The effect of individual coping and functional behaviours on each of the three outcome 
variables was also described. To do so, entries were identified during which the 
behaviour commenced during that entry (an “onset” entry). That is, an entry was 
identified as being an “onset” entry if the participant indicated that the behaviour was 
engaged in the period preceding that entry and that the behaviour was not engaged in in 
the period prior to the previous entry. Change in the outcome between the entries was 
calculated by subtracting the value of the outcome variable in the “onset” entry from the 
value in the previous entry. This difference was expressed as a proportion of the standard 
deviation of the outcome variable in question. The standardised change-values were 
averaged across each “onset” entry. Coping strategies or functional behaviours were 
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considered to have been influential if the onset of the behaviour was associated with an 
average change in the outcome variable equal to or greater than one standard deviation. 
Thus, a behaviour was considered beneficial if, on average, it was associated with at-least 
a one standard-deviation decrease in pain or distress or increase in function, and 
detrimental if it was associated with at-least a one standard-deviation increase in pain or 
distress or decrease in function. 
The frequency of coping strategy usage was also reported. The proportion of entries in 
which the strategy was reported as being engaged-in was calculated. Strategies that were 
not used were reported. The remainder of the strategies were rank ordered according to 
their frequency of use. The five most used strategies were reported, as were the five least 
used strategies.  
Participants were given an indication as to whether their most used strategies were in any 
way beneficial. That is, any of the five most frequently used coping strategies that were 
also associated with a significant beneficial change in pain, distress or function were 
listed. 
Participants were given an indication of the nature and accuracy of their pain 
expectancies relative to the pain-intensity rating in the next entry. For each entry, pain 
expectancies were subtracted from next-lag pain-intensity ratings. Participants were 
informed regarding the proportion of over-estimates (where the pain expectancy 
exceeded the subsequent pain intensity) and under-estimates (where the expectancy was 
less than the subsequent pain-intensity). A distinction was also made between mild and 
“significant” over- and under-estimates. An estimate was judged “significantly” 
inaccurate if the over- or under-estimate was equal to or greater than one standard 
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deviation in the pain-intensity ratings. Participants were informed of the proportion of 
their over-estimates that were “significant”, and likewise for under-estimates. Finally, the 
accuracy of their predictions was noted by reporting the average amount by which their 
over-predictions exceeded their subsequent pain intensity ratings and by which their 
under-predictions fell below their subsequent pain ratings. Inaccuracy was reported as a 
percentage of the 0-100 pain rating scale, for example “you tended to be out by 
approximately 15%”. 
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APPENDIX I 
Participant’s Information Sheet – Study Two 
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 Participant’s Consent Form – Study Two 
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APPENDIX J 
 
447 
APPENDIX K 
PAMS Monitoring Protocol 
The following pages display a flowchart composed of screen-shots from the PAMS 
electronic diary, illustrating the sequence of the PAMS protocol. Note that screen 32 was 
only displayed if the “Medication” item on screen 31 was checked. Otherwise, PAMS 
proceeded directly to screen 33. No other forms of “branching logic” were employed in 
the PAMS protocol. 
Responses on each GRS item were accompanied by verbal descriptors that were anchored 
at equal intervals to a range of values along the scale. These descriptors were displayed in 
the space below the sliding-scale, as illustrated in Figure K.1. 
 
 
Figure K.1 Example of PAMS GRS item 
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A list of the verbal descriptors used can be found in Table K.1. Items one and 17 on the 
following pages employed the descriptors in list A. Items 21 and 23 employed those in 
list E. Items three, five and seven used descriptors in list C. Only item 14 used list D. The 
remaining GRS scales employed list B. 
 
Table K.1 Descriptive anchors used in GRS sliding-scale items 
A B C D E 
NOT NOTICABLE 
JUST NOTICABLE 
VERY WEAK 
WEAK 
MILD 
MILD/MODERATE 
MODERATE 
CONSIDERABLE 
STRONG 
VERY STRONG 
INTENSE 
EXCRUCIATING 
AS BAD AS COULD 
BE IMAGINED 
 
TOTALLY 
DISAGREE 
STRONGLY 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
DISAGREE 
SLIGHTLY 
AGREE 
STRONGLY 
AGREE 
TOTALLY 
AGREE 
 
NOT AT ALL 
SOMEWHAT 
MODERATELY 
HIGHLY 
EXTREMELY 
FINE 
NOT THAT BAD 
BEARABLE 
UNPLEASANT 
UNCOMFORTABLE 
DISTRESSING 
MISERABLE 
AWFUL 
AGONISING 
INTOLERABLE 
UNBEARABLE 
NOT AT ALL 
ACTIVE 
SOMEWHAT 
ACTIVE 
MODERATELY 
ACTIVE 
HIGHLY 
ACTIVE 
EXTREMELY 
ACTIVE 
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APPENDIX L 
PAMS-R and Feedback Form 
 
455 
 
456 
 
457 
 
458 
 
459 
460 
 
 
461 
 
462 
 
463 
 
